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Revisiting Cuba’s First Republic
Steven Palmer, José Antonio Piqueras,  
and Amparo Sánchez Cobos
On May 20, 1902, the Republic of Cuba was proclaimed in an act 
transmitting sovereignty from the U.S. occupation authorities to the 
Cuban people’s elected representatives. A new state was born in the 
family of American nations. The republic came after three wars of 
independence in the space of thirty years that had served to express 
the Cuban will to self- government and erode Spanish colonial do-
minion, though they had not been sufficient to provide liberty to the 
island directly. The intervention of the United States in the conflict in 
1898 had precipitated the defeat of Spain and reserved for the United 
States a special role in determining the future of the “Pearl of the 
Antilles.” Despite the subordination to a new empire implicit in this 
relationship, the new state of Cuba enjoyed a democratic constitu-
tion that had been written by an elected constituent assembly a year 
earlier. It could build, moreover, on a series of measures adopted by 
the U.S. occupation government between 1899 and 1902 intended to 
address the main problems of reconstruction, even if these had also 
been designed to constrain and channel the country’s political ori-
entation. Cubans had been able to elect new municipal governments 
in June 1901, and they had gone to the polls on New Year’s Eve that 
same year to choose congressmen, governors, and provincial coun-
cilors as well as the electors who would vote for president, vice presi-
dent, and senators. On February 24, after the only other candidate for 
the country’s highest office withdrew from the race, Tomás Estrada 
Palma was acclaimed president of Cuba. The outcome was popular 
and legitimate: Estrada Palma had been president of the Republic in 
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Arms in 1876–77, and during the independence struggle of the late 1890s he 
had acted as José Martí’s delegate to the Partido Revolucionario Cubano.
That is to say, the Republic of Cuba was born democratic in 1902. It pos-
sessed a founding charter that organized political life and enshrined the 
rights of its citizens, among them freedom of assembly and association, free-
dom of speech and the press, the right to make petition, habeas corpus, the 
inviolability of correspondence and dwelling, and freedom of worship. Edu-
cation was declared obligatory, and while the state was unable to provide 
it, the burden would fall on the municipalities and the provinces. Political 
equality was guaranteed, as was universal suffrage for men over twenty- one 
years of age. Following the U.S. model, the constitution adopted a represen-
tative system that authorized wide powers to the presidency even as it pro-
moted administrative decentralization to the provinces, a compromise solu-
tion to avoid the frictions of federalism while giving continuity and honoring 
the federal spirit of the constitutional charters issued by independence forces 
in 1869 and 1895.1
At the moment it came into the world the Republic of Cuba enjoyed po-
litical and economic conditions much more favorable than those that the 
great majority of Latin American nations had worked through eighty or 
ninety years earlier at the beginning of their respective republican lives. It 
is true that the U.S. occupation apparatus and a Cuban creole elite that had 
devoted itself, between 1878 and 1895, to the cause of Autonomism rather 
than outright independence were both interested in a conservative regime 
that denied agency to popular forces.2 To that end they brokered a transi-
tional pact that pulled the rug out from under the more radical democratic 
impulses of the Cuban independence struggle. And it is true that the highest 
officers of the independence armies would opt to join in that pact to further 
their own material and political interests in the republic.3 Nevertheless, the 
country enjoyed a much more fortuitous and truly democratic basis for in-
dependent national politics than what had been achieved almost anywhere 
else in Latin America to that point. This was due to the later era in which 
Cuban independence was proclaimed, which occurred after the entrée of 
the masses into institutional politics. It was also, of course, due to the long 
struggle to achieve national liberation in which the protagonism of Cubans 
of African ancestry was widely acknowledged as key to the popular mobili-
zation that had taken place and during which the ideals of Martí had united 
the dispersed national forces.4 These formative experiences also proved an 
immovable impediment to Cuban and U.S. elite designs to engineer annexa-
tion of the island to the United States. Perhaps most important, they ensured 
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that the formal embrace of meaningful democratic politics would not be sac-
rificed to the doctrinaire and authoritarian liberal formulas that dominated 
the political panorama in the nineteenth century and that persisted in most 
countries in Latin America and Europe.
Yet neither democracy nor independence would flourish in the first 
Cuban republic. After a mere four years, amidst a crippling revolt of rival 
factions opposed to the (constitutionally quite permissible) reelection of Es-
trada Palma, the threatened president took the fateful step of requesting that 
the United States intervene to prevent civil war. Cuba would endure a second 
U.S. military occupation government from 1906 to 1909. Then, starting with 
the presidency of William H. Taft—ex- secretary of war and interim gover-
nor of Cuba in 1906—the United States would regularly practice “preventive 
intervention” in the island’s affairs. In 1912 the Independent Party of Color 
(piC) would revolt, claiming that Afro- Cubans, after playing a predominant 
role in the independence armies, had been thoroughly marginalized from 
the political process. Prickly diplomatic statements from the North raised 
the possibility that the unrest might provoke yet another U.S. intervention. 
The piC challenge was met by a savage racist backlash from the state and civil 
militias that left some gaping new wounds in the Cuban body politic, even as 
it reopened barely healed ones left by a slave society still very much part of 
living memory, emancipation having only finally become a reality in 1886.5 
Another liberal rebellion erupted in 1917 in the wake of electoral fraud perpe-
trated to keep the Conservative Mario García Menocal regime in power, and 
again the United States intervened to broker results favorable to “stability” 
(for U.S. investors in particular).
By 1920, despite rivers of gold flowing from Cuba’s sugar plantations 
thanks to unprecedented prices on the world market, a wide variety of voices 
began pronouncing Cuba’s republican experiment a failure.6 They decried 
a political culture rotten with clientelism and misappropriation of funds at 
every level and a sovereignty grossly mocked by the island nation’s acute eco-
nomic and foreign policy dependence on the United States. By that point the 
cancer of the Platt Amendment had been diagnosed. When the amendment 
was passed into U.S. law in 1901 under the direction of Senator Orville Platt, 
its acceptance by Cuba became the condition for ending the U.S. occupa-
tion. The Platt Amendment prevented Cuba from entering into many kinds 
of international agreements and gave the United States specific rights on the 
island. These included the right of intervention under certain circumstances 
and the right to establish a naval “coaling station” on the island (eventually 
built in Guantánamo Bay as something substantially more than a fuel depot).
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Much has been written about the folly and perfidy of the Platt Amend-
ment.7 Suffice it to say that, although in 1901 the constituent assembly had 
been offended by the heavy- handed substance and style of the legal impo-
sition, the eventual acquiescence to insertion of the clause in the Cuban 
constitution was not seen at the time as a fatal blow to the republic’s sov-
ereignty. It was the growing tendency of increasingly interventionist U.S. ad-
ministrations to adopt the most interventionist reading of the amendment 
that turned it into a symbol of neocolonial affront to sovereignty and inter-
national law in an emerging world system of nation- states. And it was the 
political elites of republican Cuba—important leaders of the independence 
movement among them—who first invoked the Platt Amendment in order 
to seek U.S. arbitration of conflicts over political succession. Once the door 
was opened by Estrada Palma in 1906, the United States began to get a feel 
for Platt leverage, and so did subsequent Cuban leaders: José Miguel Gómez 
would use the threat of further U.S. intervention to suppress the piC revolt 
in 1912, and Mario García Menocal would use it to keep his faction in power 
in 1917.
The commercial reciprocity agreement signed with the United States in 
1903 was embraced by the majority of Cuba’s principal economic actors and 
quickly proved a boon for the Cuban sugar industry. Sugar exports, almost 
all to the United States, grew 40 percent within five years, and Cuba quickly 
amassed a favorable balance of payments with the United States. Imports and 
investment from the United States also grew dramatically, with results that 
did not necessarily favor Cuban sovereignty. The emergence or resurgence of 
many local industries was curtailed by the presence of cheap manufactured 
goods from the United States. By 1927 the country was, after Mexico, the sec-
ond most important destination for U.S. investment in Latin America, and 
this rapid expansion of U.S. capital in the Cuban economy paved the way for 
the transfer of an unhealthy proportion of the island’s productive assets into 
the hands of U.S. financial concerns following the crash of 1920.8
As the sweet cycle went sour after that year, so went the republic. The 
total collapse of international sugar prices led to economic ruin for many 
Cuban companies and sugar concerns. U.S. banks were the main beneficia-
ries, rapidly achieving majority ownership over the island’s agricultural sec-
tor. During the shockingly corrupt presidency of Alfredo Zayas in the first 
half of the 1920s, Enoch H. Crowder, “special envoy” of the president of the 
United States, exercised unofficial rule over island politics and fiscal policy, 
first as a sinister proconsul who lived on a U.S. battleship in Havana harbor 
and later as ambassador.9 In the midst of widespread disenchantment, the 
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demand for the revitalization of Cuban republican democracy was taken 
up by a new generation. Intellectuals, professionals, workers, and university 
students confronted the persistent abuses of the political class and the presi-
dency of Gerardo Machado, whose co- optive populist regime slid inexo-
rably into a bloody dictatorship. If this cycle ended in 1933 with a cathartic 
nationalist revolution that rid the people of one dictator, it only proved that 
the republic could not shrug off the shackles it had been born into. Another 
U.S. ambassador was waiting in the wings to turn the screws; another strong-
man, Fulgencio Batista, was not long in showing himself capable of keeping 
the house of cards in order. The revolution of 1933 would soon become just 
another republican opportunity lost, ultimately going down in history as a 
prologue to the “real” revolution of 1959.10
It is easy to see why the Cuban republic has become “el tiempo omitido” 
(the “time that is left out”), as Marial Iglesias has put it. The fact that the cur-
rent Cuban state let the centenary of independence pass by without notice in 
2002—unprecedented in the history of modern statehood—reveals the de-
rision with which the first republic is dismissed in official Cuban historical 
culture. In this version, the U.S. intervention of 1898 and subsequent occu-
pation kidnapped Cuba’s history just as the insuperable contradictions of 
the late colonial period and the patriot blood spilled in the war of indepen-
dence had put the people on the brink of revolutionary sovereignty. The Platt 
Amendment is the smoking gun that proves the United States cheated Cuba 
of its true nation- statehood, replacing it with a “protectorate,” a “pseudo- 
republic,” or a “neo- colony” where U.S. power was mediated, in thinly dis-
guised fashion, by a former colonial ruling class turned into flunkies of U.S. 
financial and corporate power.11 Seen this way, the entire republican experi-
ence prior to 1959 is merely the antithesis of the Cuban revolution. It is a 
fifty- seven- year period of U.S. proxy rule studded with villains and martyrs 
and punctuated by political upheavals that prefigure the historical absolu-
tion of 1959. A main task for revolutionary scholarship has been to recuper-
ate the radical, popular, and epic nationalist character of the independence 
struggles in the face of the uncomfortable fact that a good proportion of its 
revolutionary leaders defected, during the occupation and the republic, to 
the service of a bourgeoisie dependent on U.S. capital.12
In U.S. historical culture the Spanish- American War and the occupation 
of Cuba pack a kind of “shock and awe” punch—1898—a watershed moment 
for a country en route to its place as preeminent world power. Whether ap-
proving or disapproving, a great deal of the historical work done within the 
U.S. fold picks up the story on the twentieth- century side of the great wall 
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of 1898. The year marks the beginnings of the country’s exercise of imperial 
power over foreign peoples, the unleashing of the foreign policy controversy 
leading to the Platt Amendment, the start of repeated U.S. military, diplo-
matic, and economic intervention in Cuban affairs, and of U.S. support for 
sun- drenched, mob- backed dictatorships that would come back to haunt 
them after 1959.13 A third strong historical culture—that of Spain—takes 
a proprietary interest in Cuba’s past as well and is also fixated on 1898. It 
is notable that studies of Cuba done in the Spanish scholarly context al-
most always end abruptly in 1898, mirroring the way that studies done in the 
United States so often begin there.14
There is no doubt that, as Louis A. Pérez puts it, 1898 “changed every-
thing”: the U.S. occupation and the early republic were times of dramatic 
interruptions, reorientations, truncations, and inertia. Wars are cataclysms, 
and wars that result in the death of 10 percent of the population, bring to an 
end four centuries of rule by the same colonial master, and usher in a fun-
damentally distinct (and in many ways even more potent) type of foreign 
oversight must be ruptures marking a “before” and an “after.” There are 
also a number of studies that range across the divide of 1898 and work to in-
corporate the republic into the logic of Cuban historical evolution. Princi-
pal among them are works by Pérez himself, beautifully crafted studies that 
stand out for their synthetic vision, ability to convey the perspectives of the 
United States, Spain, and Cuba in the momentous changes of the indepen-
dence era, and fresh and provocative location of social and political conti-
nuities.15 Notably, however, Pérez’s vision of Cuba is often framed in terms 
of an essential liminality. Cuba seems always in the process of becoming 
something through contradictions that negate that becoming—eternally 
“between” (reform and revolution, independence and colonialism, being 
American and being Cuban). The island is ceaselessly entering moments in 
which things will never be the same even as hopes will remain unrealized, its 
ruling class always already reduced to an empty shell. Even his boldly origi-
nal and erudite ventures into long- term patterns in Cuban climate and social 
behavior focus on the extreme, catastrophic, and self- negating—hurricanes 
and suicide.
These three nationally based historical views of Cuba show a strong ten-
dency to frame events in terms of what did not happen. Spain failed to find 
a reformist solution to the colonial question. The United States stopped 
Cuba from finding a route to national independence and social revolution. 
Cubans failed to attain clear independence or build a robust, sovereign, and 
democratic nation- state and national economy. Little wonder that repub-
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lican Cuba is predominantly portrayed as constrained and truncated and 
that we are frequently asked to understand this period principally in terms 
of failure, discontinuity, deformation, and illegitimacy. The main premise 
of this collection is that there is a need to revisit the Cuban republic on its 
own terms, in its own time, and with an eye to all segments of society, and 
to do so in a way that bridges the three historiographical solitudes discussed 
above. This is in no way to question the integrity or the value of the histori-
cal scholarship that has been done on the republic to date, much of which 
stands out as among the very finest work accomplished on the history of 
Latin America and on the history of Spanish and U.S. foreign policy and 
imperialism. Nevertheless, there is a certain narrowing of vision that comes 
from seeing periods of history as failures, or as adjuncts to grander histori-
cal processes whose subjects lie elsewhere, or in teleological terms as simply 
anticipations of other more authentic and significant periods.
The historical experiences of the republic were as real as any others, as au-
thentically Cuban as any others. Deserving of infamy as some of its signature 
episodes are, the republic was also made by a broad spectrum of Cubans who 
embraced a political and civic culture of national self- realization through 
citizenship, though they may have remained ambiguous about how precisely 
to achieve it. In revisiting republican Cuba, our collection shows how this 
period in Cuban history can be recast as one of deep continuity in processes 
of liberal state- and nation- building that were periodically upset—but also 
reinvigorated—by foreign intervention and profound uncertainty. Its con-
tributors explore how Cubans at all levels were urgently involved in the cre-
ation of liberal national political communities—imagined and real—and in 
defining the meaning and practice of a democratic modernity, though times 
and conditions did not remain long in their favor.
In this sense, we might see republican Cuba as a “tropical Weimar,” for 
it shared certain important traits with its later and more notorious German 
sibling. The Cuban republic, too, was born of (and in) military stalemate; 
it, too, saw the United States enter the fray at that point of stalemate and 
determine the outcome. In terms of net effect, the Platt Amendment and the 
Versailles Treaty were also surprisingly congruent. Imposed in the context 
of postwar occupation, each crippled sovereignty and inserted a wedge that 
ultimately prevented patriotic people from identifying their sense of national 
selfhood with the state. Both Weimar Germany and postcolonial Cuba con-
structed a republican politics in the shadow of foreign intervention legiti-
mized in treaties that were the price of assuming statehood, and both did 
so in a context of constant political instability that was in good measure a 
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product of that “legitimate” shadow. Each political experiment was pitched 
about by volatile economic extremes while vital sectors of national indus-
try suffered domination by foreign capital backed by military occupation 
or the threat thereof. All the while society was consumed by fits of violent 
racist paranoia carefully cultivated by political elites and in each case drifted 
toward political dysfunctionality, inflated nationalism, and dictatorship.
To adopt the perspective of a recent book on Weimar Germany, Cuba’s 
first republic still speaks to us as a “warning sign”—among other things 
of what havoc is wrought by opportunistic interventions and occupations 
that disguise imperial designs behind hollow commitments to democracy- 
building. Yet both Weimar and Cuban republican political cultures were also 
transformed by irrepressible boundary crossing, especially in urban spaces 
associated with cultural and intellectual flowering. And as with the case of 
Weimar Germany, republican Cuba’s serious political and cultural conflicts 
and disasters should not erase its significant political and cultural achieve-
ments. In Cuba, too, the “destruction of the old imperial order in war and 
revolution unleashed the political and social imagination.”16
A similar comparative point can be made without leaving the hemisphere. 
In essential ways, late colonial and early republican Cuba fit nicely into what 
Latin American scholars call the Liberal period, typically understood as run-
ning from roughly 1870 to 1930. Curiously, almost without exception, Cuban 
scholarship eschews this periodization.17 For many Latin American countries 
Liberal state- building was based on primary product exports benefiting an 
alliance of foreign capital and a local ruling class, and it was characterized 
by autocratic regimes capable of maintaining stability. Cuban historians have 
tended to avoid the “Liberal era” classification, concentrating on what they 
see as the uniqueness of the island’s brutal wars of independence and their 
aftermath, the U.S. intervention and occupation, the torturous experiment 
with democratic government that was crippled by corruption, patronage, 
electoral fraud, and gangsterism, and the precious sectors of the economy 
swallowed up by U.S.- based banks and super- corporations like United Fruit 
that created an acute agro- export dependency. Yet even a casual student 
of Latin American history will have noted how readily all these “uniquely 
Cuban” structuring experiences apply to Latin American states of the era, 
particularly to Mexico, Central America, and northern South America, all 
of which shared a geopolitical proximity to the new imperial United States. 
Cuba’s first war of independence is in many ways analogous to Central 
America’s struggles against William Walker in the 1850s, and Mexico’s against 
European reconquest in the 1860s. The strong regional inflection and social 
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yearnings of Cuba’s second war of independence and the interventionist ar-
bitration of the United States are comparable to the experience of revolu-
tionary Mexico, with its northern insurrectionism, its populist nationalism, 
and U.S. military intervention in Veracruz in an effort to broker a political 
outcome palatable to U.S. interests. There is also an enormous, and almost 
entirely unploughed, field of potential comparative study between this era in 
Cuban history and Brazil’s late emancipation of slaves (both coming only at 
the end of the 1880s) and tardy and curtailed republican experience (in the 
Brazilian case, the “old republic” of 1889–1930).
Historians of Latin America are acutely aware of the anti- democratic, eco-
nomically dependent, and militarist polities of the Liberal era. Yet they have 
not shied away from exploring them as authentic expressions of political cul-
tures and foundational processes of nation- building. Indeed, recent studies 
tend to take the political cultures of the Liberal period much more seriously 
and fully than in the past. They are treated with much greater nuance as im-
portant for the imagining of national political community, for the constitu-
tion of modes of gendered and racialized citizenship, for the launching of 
modern urban identities, and for the structuring of central- regional dynam-
ics in the modern state, to name just a few areas of current focus. There is no 
question that the Platt Amendment undermined aspects of state sovereignty 
and called into question Cuba’s degree of national independence in a pecu-
liarly explicit way. However, the main thing separating the Cuban plight from 
that of most Latin American countries who were also in the United States’ 
sphere of influence may have been its unique (and uniquely awkward) status 
in international law. The republic became neither a protectorate nor a colony 
in the formal sense, nor was it a colony of a new kind whose typology had 
yet to be defined. It is true that an external power limited in some ways the 
ability of the island’s representatives to make decisions about some issues. 
At the same time, this limitation did not erase the existence of a new juridi-
cal framework that provided a normal domestic government with complete 
powers of rule legitimated through participative mechanisms of citizenship.
Placing Cuba in the Latin American context is revealing and not simply 
because U.S. expansionism and its voracious Caribbean appetite were visible 
elsewhere. The Cuban republic had a rocky life, but if it was not the best of 
political regimes, for a long time it was far from the worst. The country freed 
itself from its former colonial master, and Cubans were able to provide them-
selves with their own institutions. The ideals of the revolutionary struggle 
were partially put into practice, if in some measure sacrificed in the inter-
ests of pluralism and the opposition of interests, and for the most part they 
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suffered a rapid decay. Cuban citizens were able to associate freely and elect 
their representatives, even if the processes for doing so showed marked de-
ficiencies. Over the first three decades of the twentieth century a very small 
minority of American nations enjoyed constitutional systems that were re-
spected and authorities who were subject to periodic electoral renewal, and 
even more rare were those that accepted universal male suffrage and a secret 
and direct vote. Cuba’s representative democracy quickly showed defects in 
its machinery. Different from virtually all its Latin American sister states, 
however, the Republic of Cuba was born democratic and endowed with rep-
resentative institutions that stood in marked opposition to the arbitrary au-
thoritarian rule and political exclusion that the people had been subjected to 
during the Spanish colonial era.
The Puerto Rican nationalist Pedro Albizu Campos contributed to pro-
moting the expression “república mediatizada” [mediated republic] by using 
it for the title of a pamphlet on the Cuban situation. The adjective mediated 
fits nicely with the “republic of generals and doctors” that provided the title 
to Carlos Loveira’s famous novel: a state that was nominally free but actually 
dependent, conditioned less by external dictate than by the threat of intru-
sion into national life and the imposition of a transitory administration that 
would reorient politics in a direction conducive to the occupier. The example 
of the U.S. occupation government of 1899–1902 was ever present. By not 
establishing with precision the unbreachable limits of Cuban sovereignty, a 
mirrored conditionality was created in the country’s domestic life. On the 
one hand, this imposed self- limitation and even surreptitious submission to 
signs and suggestions emanating from Washington and, on the other, it gave 
different factions the option of going to the American Protector (or threat-
ening to) to resolve internal disputes. This was a double perversion, based on 
the threat of invoking an international treaty.
Still, the task remains to define precisely the margins of action of Cuba’s 
republican government and the real degree of interference by U.S. diplo-
matic agents versus the threat of foreign intervention as a domestic political 
tool. Just as important would be to deepen our knowledge of the effective 
space of sovereignty that was developed during the republic, one that seems 
to have had a greater impact on the future of Cubans during the first three 
decades of the twentieth century than did those limits imposed from out-
side, no matter how important these latter were. Exploring the evolution of 
a republican society that it is impossible to reduce to the shrunken figure 
of dysfunctional politics is a task of considerable historical urgency that we 
turn to in the following pages. As editors we have chosen to characterize the 
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main patterns of republican civic life and public culture in terms of ambi-
guity rather than betrayal, failure, deformation, or liminality.18 By doing so 
we mean to acknowledge the hesitation, doubt, and uncertainty of different 
individual and collective Cuban actors as to the course republican political 
culture should take. We also acknowledge the dubious and sham qualities the 
republic all too often exhibited. At the same time, we wish to emphasize that 
this historical experience must be understood in multiple ways, in terms of 
many levels of significance, and as the result of choices made and not made 
by Cuban actors themselves.
The following pages present contemporary work by leading scholars of 
Cuban history from all three of the “national” historiographical networks 
mentioned above—the Spanish, the Cuban, and the North American. Many 
of the authors are based in Canada or Valencia, and the Cuban contribu-
tors are distinguished by their contemporary training in historical methods. 
The ensemble expresses new ways of thinking about the late colonial and 
early republican period, developed over the past decade or so in overlap-
ping networks that have come together, in varying combinations and with 
different objectives, in Havana, Trinidad, Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Cárdenas, 
Ann Arbor, Windsor, Montréal, Toronto, Castellón, Valencia, and Madrid. 
Whether presenting panels on specific themes, reading documents together 
in methodological workshops, or building bridges between different ten-
dencies in Cuban historiography at ecumenical seminars, the authors in this 
collection have coalesced on the basis of a shared historical sensibility and a 
sense of complementarity in their approach to the Cuban past.
Marial Iglesias begins the collection by exploding 1898. She takes us past 
the contentious domains of diplomatic, military, and economic history that 
have focused discussion of the United States’ most egregious acts of imperial 
excess (which are sovereign Cuba’s most painful episodes of violation).19 Igle-
sias instead explores the political and popular culture of the successive exhu-
mations of the “cadaver” of the USS Maine from its resting place in Havana 
harbor where, in 1898, it sank after a mysterious explosion—a blast that os-
tensibly triggered the U.S. intervention in the Cuban war of independence. 
Republican Cuba had a forensic obsession, one displayed early in the sub-
mission of the exhumed skeleton of Antonio Maceo for anthropometric ex-
amination in a racially anxious attempt to de- Africanize a hero of the new 
Cuba in the interests of creole hegemony.20 Iglesias draws our attention to 
this culture of unsettled republican remains: if the United States took pos-
session of certain sacred portions of Cuba’s sovereign history when it bro-
kered and restricted Cuban independence, Cuba also came to possess sacred 
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“American” relics. The monumentalization of the Maine’s remains would 
take a volatile course throughout the history of the republic. It showed itself 
capable of signifying a wide variety of public feelings about the fusion of U.S. 
and Cuban experience, from catharsis and love to hatred for the U.S.- backed 
dictatorial manipulation of public space. The rupture of relations between 
the two countries in 1961 at the beginning of the socialist revolution meant 
that the remains of the ship that stayed in Cuba would fall into oblivion in 
a corner of Havana’s Malecón, but not before being the object of a wave of 
anti- imperialist ire unleashed by the new regime. The United States did not 
simply impose itself on republican Cuba; its material presence circulated 
symbolically around the country, becoming part of Cuban popular culture 
in the process, vulnerable to expropriation, possession, and public and pri-
vate violence and rejection.
Iglesias’s magisterial redeployment of the Maine sets up four studies that 
explore important continuities connecting the late colonial period to the re-
publican era. In many respects, and in good measure because of the essential 
conservatism of the U.S. occupation government, the republic was more re-
formulation of an agenda sketched out under Spanish sway by Cuba’s creole 
elites than a radical break with the past. As the important liberal intellectual 
José Enrique Varona noted in 1915 (when he was vice president of the repub-
lic!), “republican Cuban looks like the sister of colonial Cuba.”21 Yet it was far 
from a twin, identical or fraternal. The radical break with the past dreamed of 
by many in the independence armies was frustrated by U.S. occupation and 
the room it gave the old creole elites to reestablish themselves in positions 
of strength in the new republic. At the same time, the reformulation of a late 
colonial agenda allowed for considerable maneuvering and the launching of 
novel programs and processes.
Deep continuities linking colonial to republican Cuba can be discerned 
in the domain of scientific research and debate. Steven Palmer explores the 
way that research in medicine, health, and the natural sciences were recon-
figured in the republic following a creole renaissance in the late colonial era 
focusing principally on laboratory medicine. The principal players in Cuban 
science remained practically the same between the 1870s and the 1920s. What 
changed was their position of power relative to one another and to the state. 
The U.S. occupation acted as a prism, refracting concentrated scientific ener-
gies into a more eclectic dispersal that tended to work within networks de-
fined by U.S. scientific and political needs. The search for scientific sover-
eignty that had characterized the program of the strongest actors in the late 
colonial research milieu gave way to scientific pursuits that could be of ser-
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vice to the attenuated sovereignty of the Cuban state and creole political 
society. In this context, laboratory- based medical research was supplanted 
as the mainstay of original Cuban science by eugenics and agronomy. At the 
same time, the role of foreign scientists, especially from the United States, 
increasingly influenced the national research agenda. This did not, however, 
make science in the republic “less Cuban” or less important in the making 
of a cosmopolitan and original intellectual culture. Nor did it exclude those 
who had been the powerbrokers of scientific research in the colonial era from 
staging a comeback in the republic by regaining control of a wider spectrum 
of scientific and professional associations.
Among recent historians of Cuba, those who have studied problems of 
gender and racial emancipation have been most likely to take republican 
political practices seriously and to explore them as nuanced and profoundly 
consequential. Lynn Stoner has drawn attention to the formation during the 
Cuban republic of one of Latin America’s most successful movements for 
women’s suffrage and legal reform.22 In a provocative reconsideration of race 
politics in the republic, Alejandro de la Fuente showed how the dominant 
political parties engaged Cubans of color as a significant electoral constitu-
ency. He revealed the dimensions of the material and political resources that 
were at stake in this dynamic, as well as the fact that, during periods when 
democratic politics were severely eroded in the republic, as under Menocal 
especially, Afro- Cubans had less access to employment, political representa-
tion, and other rewards.23 The nature and meaning of those spaces of free-
dom for those who fought to open them—the “degrees of freedom” available 
to people of color in late colonial and republican Cuba for pressing claims on 
citizenship, stature, and property—are the subject of groundbreaking work 
by scholars led by Rebecca Scott.24 Scott’s contribution to this collection is a 
classic consideration of these “dynamics of the search for political voice”—
the emancipatory possibilities that the wars of independence opened up for 
former slaves and their children in republican Cuba.
Scott, too, locates deep continuities in struggles for political voice among 
former slaves that date from the era of emancipation itself, through the 
claims made by societies of colored people for desegregation and for elec-
toral rights during the periods of Spanish flirtation with political opening. 
Full citizenship, meanwhile, was put squarely on the agenda of the indepen-
dence armies. The U.S. military occupiers were imbued with the experience 
of reconstruction after the U.S. Civil War, accepting of segregation and the 
mechanisms developed to deny the franchise to African Americans. Flying 
in the face of this, the “tenacity of the claims advanced by ordinary Cubans,” 
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Scott writes, was such that the battle for full franchise rights for Afro- Cuban 
males was won. Such claims- making dovetailed with labor activism in 
Cienfuegos during the U.S. occupation and later in solidarity with striking 
Havana workers in the early days of the republic in 1902, while former slaves 
and their descendants emerged as combative and dissenting figures during 
the second U.S. occupation of 1906–9. The electoral system fell short of true 
democracy in many ways. Nevertheless, constructed within a framework of 
Cuban caudillismo, it still had to acknowledge many midlevel black and mu-
latto leaders—a pattern also visible at the level of municipal politics, trade 
unionism, and police forces. Among its many foibles, the republic also had 
spaces of vigorous struggles for “expanded citizenship.”
Reinaldo Funes offers an environmentally considered take on new health 
and production technologies that transformed Cuban life in the latter years 
of the colony and first three decades of the republic. His study delves into 
the applied scientific guts of milk and meat processing, inspection, and dis-
tribution. Funes focuses on a forgotten but key social group in the changing 
relationship with animals and animal products that defines modern urban 
civilization—veterinarians and their politically and economically sensitive 
tours of the slaughterhouses, stables, and milk factories of the capital city. 
The implementation of these processing and distribution systems made pos-
sible dramatic gains in life expectancy and decreased infant mortality in the 
first two decades after independence, but by the late 1910s these systems were 
degenerating alongside the political culture of the republic.
As José Antonio Piqueras argues in his meditation on the urban ma-
terial and symbolic culture of late colonial and republican Havana, there 
was more continuity than rupture in the periodic reinvention of the capi-
tal. If the “Americanization” of Havana’s architecture and spatial layout 
after 1900 is often pointed to as evidence of the U.S. “takeover” of Cuba, 
Piqueras shows that similar processes were visible as early as the 1850s. 
Colonial Havana was readily becoming “American” even as it tasted its first 
moments of sugar splendor, while republican Havana readily reembraced 
Spanish colonial styles—whether real, imagined, or newly popular in the 
United States (for example, the missionary style that rapidly took over in 
early twentieth- century California and Florida). Piqueras paints a transitory, 
ephemeral capital city for an “austere republic.” Havana was always under-
going demolition and reconstruction, ceaselessly reproducing an emergent 
modernity in a second city arising beside the old “colonial” one and against 
a “vast third city that was neither modern nor traditional, but simply de-
prived.” Neither the colonial nor the republican incarnation of Havana had 
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much time for public planning or grand edifications of statehood. The social 
contours and architectural expressions of urban development were for the 
most part left for the market to determine—even if these sometimes needed 
a helpful nudge from the forces of order to empty out sectors of the city tar-
geted for building. What type of city did the capital of a new republic require? 
And what type of city was it possible to make or construct in accordance with 
the state of public funds, the island’s political status, and the idiosyncrasies 
of the ruling class?
There are a number of excellent studies of radical worker organizations 
in Cuba, most of them concerning the 1920s and 1930s when working- class 
organizations were led by the Cuban Communist Party (organized in 1925 
and a member of the Third International). In these studies, the culmination 
of working radicalism and combativeness is the revolution of 1933, the maxi-
mum expression of class and national ideals that led all workers to struggle 
together independently of nationality or skin color and under communist 
leadership.25 Amparo Sánchez Cobos shifts attention to an earlier phase of 
working- class struggle during which anarchist currents were among the most 
dynamic. The anarchist newspaper ¡Tierra! was a staple of the radical press 
during the first two decades of republican life, spreading news and inter-
pretation different from the “bourgeois press” and serving as a network in 
its own right bringing together contributors, editors, and readers. Sánchez 
Cobos looks at the newspaper as a nexus of anarchist discourse that linked 
reader- workers throughout Cuba with an Atlantic community of anarchist 
thought, news, subscription, and solidarity. This community was concen-
trated in certain parts of the United States and Spain, but understood as a 
transnational network free of divisions based on nationality, skin color, and 
other markers. Such an analysis views the reorganization of workers after 
independence in terms of a different internationalist and ideological tradi-
tion from that of the later communist stage. Ironically, the new blood of the 
new republic was drawn in large measure from massive immigration from 
Spain, an immigration wave promoted by a creole elite eager to dilute the 
Afro- descended makeup of the population. This massive influx of almost a 
million Spaniards between 1900 and 1930 also reestablished and developed 
“old” Atlantic networks of popular solidarity. It was a process in which mi-
grant worker intellectuals, many of them from Spain, played a significant 
role, and the meshing of Cuban and Spanish anarchist energies in the pro-
duction of ¡Tierra! serves as an example of the originality and cosmopolitan 
horizons of working- class culture in the early republic.
Imilcy Balboa takes us into the island’s agrarian history and to the heart 
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of one of the great debates over the fate of Cuban republicanism—namely, 
whether or not the absence of a rural middle class doomed republican 
democracy. She explores the finer points of the restructuring of the sugar 
industry that began with the creation of the great centrales (large- scale pro-
cessing factories) at the end of the nineteenth century. In part driven by 
the arrival of more intense capital investment from the United States, the 
phenomenon would have profound social consequences after independence. 
The idea that the expansion of this latifundium system choked off the pos-
sibility of the birth of a rural middle class in Cuba that could have been the 
principal social base for the republic has given rise to a historical explana-
tion of the “failure” of the new political system of the independent coun-
try. Without a middle class to support it, politics became a parasitic busi-
ness for a Cuban elite dispossessed of the economic production that was 
now in the hands of foreigners.26 Against such presumptions, Balboa’s study 
focuses on demonstrating the existence of a middling agrarian bourgeoisie 
during the first decades of the republic, one that allied itself with the upper 
classes and assumed political offices that, in spite of the apparent contradic-
tion this involved, shared interests and needs with the large centrales and 
sugar companies and benefited from the policies imposed by their repre-
sentatives.27 In the context of the crisis of the 1920s, some notable figures of 
this agrarian petit bourgeoisie—among them the intellectual and politician 
Ramiro  Guerra—invented the figure of the Cuban colono destroyed by the 
evils of the latifundio that should have provided the bases of the new nation 
and republican system.28 But according to Balboa, the image of the colono 
created by Guerra and the other ideologues of the nation is an image of a 
colono who is white and—dressed in guayabera, mounted on his steed, a 
regular at the cockfights, and touring about on Sundays—symbolically one 
with the old colonial hacendado, reflecting a colonial past that resists disap-
pearing with the economic crisis.
Maikel Fariñas looks at forms of sociability related to the early arrival of 
the Rotary club in “District 25” (Cuba). This is a pioneering study that looks 
at social clubs outside of the capital and during the republican era. Fariñas 
proposes that the Rotary clubs acted as authentic centers of power and as 
pressure groups. Though their membership was principally among the white 
middle classes, it permeated the middle and upper strata of Cuban society.29 
The Rotary club networks in Cuba extended to all the productive lines of the 
island, and their technical superiority was based on the support given by the 
national and international networks of the club and also by the important 
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links that they maintained with the press, providing them with the attendant 
possibility of mobilizing public opinion. This turned them quickly into pres-
sure groups with the capacity to intervene in local, regional, and national 
issues and even, as Fariñas shows, to exercise influence outside the borders 
of Cuba in matters under negotiation with the United States.
Alejandra Bronfman tunes our attention to the Cuban ether, asking how a 
public for broadcasting emerged in the republic and under what conditions. 
In seeking to identify the first audiences for this novel medium of the pub-
lic sphere, Bronfman understands the public and the machinery of radio as 
“artifacts of mutual intervention,” in a constitutive moment of great contin-
gency, unevenness, and incompleteness when the seamless selling of hygiene 
products and romantic radio novelettes was still part of an unimaginable 
future. The radio had yet to be wrestled into its serviceable shape by those 
who would make it accessible and profitable, and in its beginning it threw up 
unruly practices of listening in the street and other public places. Amateur 
operators constructed equipment and searched for “an esoteric variety of 
emanations from multiple locations”—among them the 9 p.m. cannon shot 
over Havana harbor that began the two- hour pwx broadcast each Wednes-
day and Saturday, followed by a weather forecast. Immediately political—
the first official broadcast was an awkward presidential address by Alfredo 
Zayas—the intromission of foreign signals in Caribbean skies echoed the 
fragility of Cuba’s sovereignty. Inexorably, the audience that came into being 
was constituted by private capital exhorting listeners to listen from private, 
domestic, moneyed spaces, but the process, insists Bronfman, was incom-
plete and left alternative publics in its wake.
One such alternative public was the Cuban Folklore Society, one of many 
new intellectual coteries and associations that fleetingly flowered in the 
década crítica of the 1920s. Ricardo Quiza explores the society as an articu-
lation of a dynamic civil society and vehicle for the emergence of new social 
actors. Although propelled by luminaries—in particular Fernando Ortíz—
Quiza shows that the society made possible the creation and circulation of 
novel symbolic goods that expressed the complex racial and gender reformu-
lations of the public sphere. The membership of the society and authorship 
in its journal included a notable participation by women, while it brought 
together an eclectic group of mature cultural figures with a star- studded cast 
from the first generation of intellectuals who grew up entirely in the context 
of the republic, oriented by a new populist nationalism and, frequently, an 
embrace of leftist ideologies. From 1923 to its demise in 1927, the Folklore 
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Society expressed the dialectic between tradition, change, nationalism, and 
social science that burned brightly during the 1920s in a Cuba in search of 
national reconstruction. It also explored the margins of tolerance and dis-
sidence within a civil society brushing up against increasing authoritarian 
moments.
The volume closes with Robert Whitney’s work on the way Afro- Antillean 
migrants were kept from the enjoyment of labor and political rights during 
the Batista- dominated regimes of the 1930s. It is a fitting end to our consider-
ation of Cuba’s ambiguous republican state. Whitney documents an explicit 
effort by a more sophisticated, if considerably less democratic, Cuban state 
to bring certainty to bear on the island’s population: in a tight labor market, 
hiring preference had to be given to “Cubans.” But shearing Cuban nation-
ality of its many ambiguities—over half the 4 million inhabitants were mi-
grants who had arrived since independence (mostly from Spain, Haiti, and 
the British Caribbean)—and establishing with certainty who was a worthy 
Cuban was a process fraught with discrimination. Between 1936 and 1940 
Batista oversaw the successful implementation of the nationalization of labor 
laws passed by the revolutionary government of 1933. Perhaps the most dra-
matic episode in this process was the mass expulsion of thousands of Haitian 
and West Indian workers.30 As Whitney shows, making the labor laws real 
also involved a deep institutional transformation: establishing civil regis-
tries and labor exchanges throughout the country, especially in eastern Cuba 
where state power had remained weak during the buildup of the enclave 
economies of the vast sugar estates owned primarily by U.S. corporations. 
The late republican state was able to “nationalize” a working class that had, 
until then, retained an eclectic and frequently extra- Cuban repertoire of cul-
tural characteristics, tendencies, and ties.
These eleven chapters propose new approaches to the study of the history 
of the early twentieth- century Cuban republic. They tackle issues such as the 
circulation of urban material and symbolic culture in new civic institutions 
and public practices; modes of sociability and self- representation among an 
emerging middle class; changes in scientific and technological practices to 
regulate humans and animals; and the repercussions of slave emancipation, 
agrarian reform, and labor organizing on struggles over citizenship and the 
making of social identities. No collection of this nature can be comprehen-
sive. Many crucial themes and episodes certainly remain for future explo-
ration, but there is no doubt that such exploration is overdue. In introducing 
or reintroducing readers to the political culture broadly conceived of the first 
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Cuban republic, State of Ambiguity reframes central concerns of civic and 
cultural life and rehangs them in the gallery of history so that the period can 
be considered on its own terms.
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CHAPTER 1

A Sunken Ship, a Bronze Eagle,  
and the Politics of Memory
The “Social Life” of the USS Maine in Cuba (1898–1961)
Marial Iglesias Utset
In June 1961, at the age of 106, María de la Cruz acquired sudden 
notoriety. Learning to read and write at such an advanced age, as part 
of a major literacy campaign, turned this elderly woman into a public 
celebrity.1 Born as a slave on a Havana sugar plantation in 1855, María 
de la Cruz Senmanat witnessed the wars of independence, the eman-
cipation of slaves, and, in 1898, the U.S. intervention that helped put 
an end to four hundred years of Spanish domination in Cuba. Like so 
many thousands of other residents of Havana, she probably saw the 
U.S. flag raised in the Explanada del Morro, only to see it, with ex-
ultation, lowered and replaced with the Cuban national flag in 1902. 
The Cuban Republic, formally inaugurated as an independent state, 
was nonetheless tied by “bonds of singular intimacy”—seemingly 
unbreakable—to the new imperial power in the region: the United 
States of America.2
Nearly six decades later, María de la Cruz would witness another 
exceptional event: the symbolic rupture of those bonds. In January 
1961, Cuba and the United States severed diplomatic relations. Three 
months later, in the early hours of May 1, in accordance with the dec-
laration of the socialist character of the Cuban Revolution, a large 
crane from the Ministry of Public Works knocked down from its ped-
estal the bronze eagle that had adorned the monument dedicated to 
the victims of the explosion of the battleship Maine. Soon after, the 
former slave famed for the extraordinary longevity of her life recalled 
the event commemorated by the monument. On the night of Febru-
ary 15, 1898, while working as a servant in the house of her former 
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masters—where, like many other ex- slaves in urban areas, she had continued 
to reside many years after her emancipation—she heard the explosion that 
sank the ship reverberating from the Bay of Havana. According to her testi-
mony, she knew immediately that “the culprits of the explosion had not been 
the Spanish but the Yankees themselves.”3 María de la Cruz likely adapted 
her account of the Maine explosion, which had occurred sixty- three years 
earlier, to accord with the nationalist and anti- imperialist reinterpretations 
of this event in the context of the Cuban Revolution. The interview took 
place in April 1961, when ardently anti-U.S. rhetoric permeated all media 
and public opinion, only days after the unsuccessful invasion of Cia- backed 
Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs.
The story I wish to narrate here takes place precisely at a time that is either 
omitted or demonized in the version of national history that begins to im-
pose itself at the same moment in which María de la Cruz is called upon to 
recount episodes from her long life. Somewhere between the two most sym-
bolic caesuras in Cuba’s contemporary history—1898: the end of the “time 
of Spain,” and 1959: the “time of revolution”—a republic emerges, flourishes, 
and perishes, marked from its birth by traces of its ambiguous conception. 
It was at once the legitimate child of the Wars of Independence and the bas-
tard of U.S. intervention.
The sudden explosion and sinking of the battleship USS Maine in the 
Bay of Havana on February 15, 1898, was the singular event that gave rise 
to the first of these caesuras. The catastrophe provoked an impassioned re-
action against Spain within U.S. public opinion that acted as a catalyst for 
the intervention of the United States in the war between Cuba and Spain. A 
few months later, Spain laid down its arms before the overwhelming military 
superiority of the United States, and the remainder of its once great colonial 
empire—Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines—was handed over to form 
part of the territories then under U.S. control. The U.S. Congress, nonethe-
less, approved a historic agreement known as the Joint Resolution due to 
strong sympathies and a sense of solidarity toward Cuba among the public, 
pressure from anti- imperialist circles, and the influence of Cuban émigré 
lobbyists. This resolution ultimately obliged the United States to concede to 
Cuba its much sought after independence in 1902, though it would be an in-
dependence circumscribed by the Platt Amendment.
The sinking of the Maine, the intervention of the United States in the war, 
and the birth of the republic have been subject to contradictory political in-
terpretations in the Cuban historical memory. According to one interpreta-
tion, a young nation is constituted as a sovereign state by the noble gesture 
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of a powerful state that, by intervening in the war against the old Metropole, 
lends a helping hand in eliminating the colonial yoke. In another version of 
these events, the U.S. intervention is condemned: the republic—an aspira-
tion that had motivated more than thirty years of fighting over the course of 
two independence wars—was born deformed, bound as it was to the United 
States by neocolonial political ties that de facto prevented the exercise of full 
sovereignty. In other words, accounts of the factors behind the explosion of 
the battleship Maine are embedded in one or another political hermeneu-
tic—either that of a rhetoric of gratitude for Uncle Sam’s generosity or a 
rhetoric of nationalism denouncing imperialist intervention.4
My text, however, is certainly not a historical investigation of the “real” 
causes of the explosion and sinking of the battleship, an issue that is in dis-
pute even today, despite the sheer quantity of research and superabundance 
of literature on the catastrophe amassed over the course of a century. Rather 
than try to establish a history of “what really occurred” with the Maine, I am 
interested in exploring the politics of memory around this event, the ways in 
which it was remembered, reconstituted, and forgotten in different political 
contexts. Accordingly, this is a history of a lieu de mémoire, to use loosely the 
expression coined by Pierre Nora, where “place” is not exclusively a physical 
site, a material enclave, but a space of representation around an artifact (the 
contorted remains of a ship), the object of powerful remembrance on both 
sides of the Florida Strait.5
The issue I am tackling here is not just a conventional history of a specific 
site of commemoration: the monument to the victims of the battleship Maine 
inaugurated at the beginning of 1925. What follows is a history of the “social 
life” of the Maine’s remains: the cycles of “death” and “resurrection” of its 
memory, cycles spanning several decades, and the dynamics of its sanctifica-
tion as a relic of patriotism or, conversely, of its mutation into a banal object, 
rendered as merchandise or souvenir. Finally, I tell the story of its integration 
into the urban landscape—at first half submerged in Havana’s bay and later 
incorporated into a collection of monuments at the city’s seafront.
At the same time, as became evident after the mutilation of the monu-
ment at the beginning of the Cuban Revolution, the history of the vicissi-
tudes of the sunken battleship and its wreckage is metonymically and inex-
tricably related to the “bonds of singular intimacy” between Cuba and the 
United States. That is, studying the saga of the multiple political lives of the 
Maine’s “corpse” between 1898 and 1961 is also indirectly a way of contribut-
ing to an understanding of the tense, yet fascinating, history of the political 
and cultural relations between these nations.
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“Remember the Maine”
It is quite possible that there is no other event over the long course of Cuban 
history that so immediately became “immortalized” in countless illustra-
tions, photographs, films, and resurrections by way of a series of invocations 
and commemorations. Sent to the Cuban coast to protect “American life 
and property,” the USS Maine, according to Fitzhugh Lee, the U.S. consul, 
entered Havana “gliding smoothly” into port on a peaceful winter morning 
on January 25, 1898. “It was a beautiful sight and one long to be remem-
bered,” Lee wrote in a letter to William R. Day, the U.S. assistant secretary of 
state.6 The consul was quite satisfied: since his appointment in 1896, he had 
pressed his superiors on the issue of taking part in the conflict between Cuba 
and Spain. His contentment, however, was not long lasting. Within a few 
weeks, the arrival of the Maine in Havana became, as Lee had predicted, an 
object of powerful remembrance. Nevertheless, the Maine was less remem-
bered for the spectacle of its graceful entrance into the bay of Havana than 
for the terrible explosion that sank it and killed 266 members of its crew.
The day after the explosion, although news of the tragedy had only barely 
reached its destinations by telegraph, myriad accusations were published. 
The coverage of the Maine incident is a paradigmatic example of the kind of 
sensationalist and aggressive journalism that proliferated in the United States 
Figure 1.1 Destruction of the U.S. battleship Maine in Havana Harbor, February 15, 1898. 
Source: Library of Congress. Prints and Photographs Division.
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in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The industry fiercely competed 
for the attention of millions of readers that constituted the new urban public. 
People who had only recently gained access to the printed word augmented, 
without precedent, literacy rates: recent immigrants, women, migrants from 
the countryside, and descendants of slaves newly resident in large cities be-
cause of the start of the Great Migration. They seemed to enjoy sensational 
headlines, simple and emotive language, abundant illustrations, the comics, 
and numerous commercial advertisements. This new style of journalism 
also required bold journalists who could immediately mobilize to the site 
of action and telegraph dramatic accounts that, at times, although plagued 
by exaggeration or conveniently “fabricated,” were nonetheless convincing 
and compelling. The coverage of the war in Cuba—especially the explosion 
of the Maine and the reactions to it—cannot be understood apart from this 
era of sensationalist journalism, boosted by the fierce war that sustained the 
New York press barons, Joseph Pulitzer of The World and William Randolph 
Hearst of the New York Journal.7
As for the Maine, the magnitude of the disaster and the substantial loss of 
life, in addition to the mystery surrounding the explosion, turned this event 
into a news story of the first order.8 The sinking of the battleship raised the 
print run of newspapers to record numbers. The World, which sent divers to 
Havana to “cover the story” in situ, and the Journal, which first coined the 
slogan “Remember the Maine, to hell with Spain,” and offered $50,000 to 
those who found the “perpetrators of this outrage,” managed to sell 1.5 mil-
lion copies in a single day. In turn, the coverage of the catastrophe provided 
a unique occasion to mobilize public opinion in favor of U.S. intervention. 
Despite a lack of evidence, most articles accused Spain of being responsible 
for the explosion. Within days, the headline “Remember the Maine!” put the 
entire country on the warpath. The promptness and enormity of this mobi-
lization of popular opinion in favor of war with Spain, which ultimately de-
veloped into a national cause, was most certainly an expression of solidarity 
with the cause of a small populace confronted with a tenacious colonial 
power refusing to grant independence. Nevertheless, it revealed the strength 
of latent expansionist longings of a nascent U.S. imperialism that, with the 
closing of the western frontier, searched for new horizons to conquer abroad.
The image of the battleship was transformed into a powerful icon, whether 
accompanied by narratives of solidarity that emphasized Uncle Sam’s re-
sponsibility to a nation struggling to free itself from the yoke of Spanish 
imperialism, or employed as an instrument of jingoist propaganda. It was 
reproduced, until thoroughly exhausted, in drawings, engravings, photo-
A Sunken Ship, a Bronze Eagle, and the Politics of Memory | 27
graphs, and stereoscopic pictures. The scenes of the Maine’s catastrophe 
were represented in theatrical reenactments as well as in the short current-
event documentaries with which the film industry made its debut.9 The sil-
houette of the USS Maine became a kind of trademark of the year 1898, per-
manently marking the memories of those old enough to remember it, both 
in the United States and, of course, in Cuba.
Perhaps surprisingly to us today, because of its popularity and resonance, 
the saying “Remember the Maine” was almost immediately turned into a 
slogan used to attract the attention of consumers. Employed so widely in 
solemn editorials, fiery news reports, and countless patriotic songs, poems, 
and hymns, it also appeared in enticing advertisements for merchandise as 
diverse as books, furniture, clothing, jewelry, dishes, and even pianos.10 The 
tension between the “sacred” and the “profane” manifested itself in a fasci-
nating conjunction between the sacrificial rhetoric of editorials on the catas-
trophe, appearing in the first few pages of newspapers, and the references 
to it featured in the papers’ advertisement sections at the back, is a vivid 
testimony to the complex ways in which nationalism was converted into a 
mass phenomenon and “consumed.” By the end of the nineteenth century 
the rapid development of industrialization had lowered the prices of manu-
Figure 1.2 Wm. H. West’s Big Minstrel Jubilee (formerly of Primrose & West).  
Source: Library of Congress. Prints and Photographs Division.
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factured goods and hence broadened the consumer public; new practices 
of retailing, of advertising, and of extending credit all transformed the con-
sumer landscape. If saving, abstinence, and frugality (associated with puritan 
creeds) still represented the ideal values of the Victorian generation, at the 
gates of the twentieth century, advertisement and the growth of a “shopping 
culture” were turning the increasing capacity to consume into one of the 
foremost indicators of success within the American Dream.
A profusion of merchandise—including spoons, dishes, buttons, clasps, 
brooches, ashtrays, paperweights, matchboxes, cards, and children’s toys—
began to appear stamped with the image of the battleship. Even biscuits were 
imprinted with the words “Remember the Maine.” This abundance of rep-
resentation certainly serves as a testimony to the popularization of a culture 
of nationalism, one that not only invaded public spaces but also penetrated 
the interstices of the domestic sphere as well, embodied as it was in the lure 
to purchase countless objects for daily use.11
A Monument to the Memory of the Maine: The First Proposals
In contrast to the U.S. public, whose accounts of the sinking of the ship were 
received entirely through media, residents of Havana had been firsthand wit-
nesses. Within barely half an hour of the explosion, even as desperate rescue 
measures were in place, the police battled with hundreds of onlookers. At-
tracted by the roar of the detonation that shattered the windows of neighbor-
ing buildings and rumors of the event that quickly traveled across the city, 
residents of Havana congregated near the bay, conjecturing over the causes 
of the explosion. When the sun rose, the sheer magnitude of the catastrophe, 
in all its dimensions, could finally be observed: that which hours before had 
been an impressive military gunboat was now reduced to a heap of twisted, 
blackened iron, half- submerged at one side of the city’s bay.
Two days later, more than 50,000 residents of Havana, hundreds of re-
concentrados among them, congregated in the streets to see the funeral pro-
cession on its way to the Cementerio de Colón. There the corpses of the 
first nineteen marines recovered from the bay received provisional buri-
als. Among those present at the ceremony were the Spanish military and 
civil authorities, the captain of the Maine, Charles D. Sigsbee, his chaplain, 
Father John Chidwick, the surviving sailors, Clara Barton, founder of the 
American Red Cross, and Fitzhugh Lee, the American consul in Havana.12 
The funeral on February 17 was only the first of a series of interments and 
disinterments that—accompanied by public ceremonies that were at times 
modest and at other times spectacular, carried out in various locations in-
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cluding Havana, Key West, and Washington—kept the memory alive for 
more than a decade.
The remains of the victims were buried in a plot in the Cementerio de 
Colón, donated and designated for this purpose by the Roman Catholic 
bishop of Havana, and the idea of building a monument dedicated to the 
memory of the destruction of the battleship was born, literally, on the tombs 
of these victims. On March 4, 1898, on the occasion of another interment of 
sailors belatedly recovered from the bay, one attendee mentioned the idea of 
inaugurating a monument: “flowers were the only tribute possible at present 
to the poor fellows who died in the line of duty, but [it is hoped] that some-
day a shrine would rise there, to which Americans visiting Cuba would come 
to pay honor to the dead.”13 Nevertheless, for the moment, in the absence of 
a definitive monument, the modest wooden crosses in the Havana cemetery 
would stand in place of a tribute.
In the United States, the mobilization to raise funds for a commemora-
tive monument had begun within a day of the sinking. On February 19, one 
of Hearst’s newspapers, the Journal, published a call to the generosity of all 
social classes to support the campaign for the construction of a monument to 
the Maine. “Send a dime, a dollar, a hundred or a thousand or five thousand 
dollars. Send your tribute, no matter how small, to the memory of the 250 
Figure 1.3 Destruction of the USS Maine, Havana Harbor, Cuba, Spanish-American War, 
1898. Source: Library of Congress. Prints and Photographs Division.
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men who typified all that is most admirable in American manhood.” The ap-
peal was warmly received and, by June, the “Maine Memorial Fund” headed 
by Hearst had raised over $100,000.14
Nevertheless, not all “popular voices” in the United States joined in this 
patriotic chorus. A meeting of the Central Labor Union, an organization that 
consolidated labor unions in New York, Brooklyn, and New Jersey, was the 
scene of a debate. Many delegates from unions with anarchist and socialist 
leanings voiced their objections to the memorial project. One worker, repre-
senting the Cornice and Skylight Makers Union, stressed, “I do not believe 
in this talk about pride of country and patriotism. The soldiers and marines 
are not our friends. They are hirelings of monopolies and corporations. I do 
not believe in a monument to the lost sailors and marines, for they are not 
producers.” His delivery was met with a mixture of applause from among the 
ranks of anarchist delegates and cries of disapproval from a large majority 
of those present in the meeting. In the end, nationalist workers won, and a 
resolution was approved to support the collection of funds for the future 
construction of a monument to honor the victims of the explosion.15
In the meantime, hundreds of residents in Havana, both the curious and 
the dismayed, watched, over several days, the work of U.S. Navy divers, 
submerged in the dirty waters of the bay in attempts to recover the bodies 
trapped in the ship’s hull. The work was compelling. The divers, wearing 
two-hundred-pound suits, dove for hours into the dark waters of the muddy 
Havana harbor. Charles Morgan, an official of the USS New York and also a 
trained diver, left a stunning account of the experience:
It was horrible! . . . As I descended into the death- ship the dead rose up 
to meet me. They floated toward me with outstretched arms, as if to wel-
come their shipmate. Their faces for the most part were bloated with de-
cay or burned beyond recognition, but here and there the light of my 
lamp flashed upon a stony face I knew, which when I last saw it had smiled 
a merry greeting, but now returned my gaze with staring eyes and fallen 
jaw. The dead choked the hatchways and blocked my passage from state-
room to cabin. I had to elbow my way through them, as you do in a 
crowd. While I examined twisted iron and broken timbers they brushed 
against my helmet and touched my shoulders with rigid hands, as if they 
sought to tell me the tale of the disaster. . . . From every part of the ship 
came sighs and groans. I knew it was the gurgling of the water through the 
shattered beams and battered sides of the vessel, but it made me shudder; 
it sounded so much like echoes of that awful February night of death.16
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While the remains of the sailors were recovered and buried, arms and other 
personal belongings of the crew, remnants of furnishings and dishes, and 
fragments of the ship’s hull were carefully packed and sent to the United 
States to begin a new life as “relics” displayed in public exhibitions or 
hoarded in private collections.
However, in April recovery efforts suddenly ceased. The U.S. flag that had 
been lowered at half- mast by the captain the day following the explosion 
was taken away. The rescue fleet of tugboats and barges headed back in the 
direction of Key West. The official explanation was that, after many days of 
hard work, there remained nothing left to do, faced with the impossibility of 
recovering the remains of crew members whose bodies were likely already 
completely decomposed or were trapped in the sunken hull of the ship out 
of reach of the rescue boats.17
Days before, on March 25, the results from the U.S. investigative com-
mission had been released, concluding that the explosion that destroyed the 
battleship was provoked by external causes, presumably an explosive mine. 
This statement confirmed the culpability of the Spanish, an assumption that 
had already been declared by the press.18 In consequence, the suspension 
of the recovery mission and the subsequent retreat of the U.S. consul from 
Havana was a clear sign to Havana residents of the imminent outbreak of 
hostilities. They were not mistaken: on April 14, Henry Cabot Lodge, advo-
cating for the declaration of war in the Senate, temporarily closed the debate 
on the memorial to the victims of the Maine. “There is only one monument 
to raise over that grave, and that is free Cuba and peace in that island. That 
Figure 1.4 Stereoscopic photo of American divers at work, exploring the Maine wreck, 
Havana Harbor. Source: Library of Congress. Prints and Photographs Division.
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is a worthy monument, worthy of men who died under the flag they loved, 
died in the cold language of the law, in the line of duty.”19
Forgetting the Maine
In the end, as a result of the war’s outcome, the withdrawal of Spanish troops 
from Havana, thereafter in the hands of U.S. military authorities, provided 
the first opportunity to pay homage to the victims of the Maine at the origi-
nal site of the explosion. With the military occupation barely under way, a 
group of women—wives of American officials based in the city—initiated 
the first celebration of “Maine day” in Havana. Thus in February 1899 the 
appropriation of $10,000 for the construction of a granite monument in the 
Cementerio de Colón was debated and eventually approved.20 On February 
15, the first anniversary, the ship’s wreckage was adorned with flowers, a U.S. 
flag was raised on its mast, and U.S. troops congregated in the cemetery to 
pay their respects.
Nevertheless, at the request of the victims’ families, it was later decided 
to exhume the bodies of the sailors in order to bury them in the National 
Cemetery at Arlington, Virginia. The project for a Havana monument was 
promptly abandoned. After the bodies were transferred to Washington at 
the end of 1899, all that remained to recall what had happened were the bare 
remnants of a blackened ship, half sunken in the middle of the city’s port. 
Over time, the “corpse” of the ship integrated into the familiar landscape of 
the bay and was eventually transformed, as all quotidian things are, into an 
almost invisible presence for those who lived in Havana. Only flocks of trav-
elers from the United States convened at the site. Colorful postcards, mostly 
printed for tourists, and stereographs (an early form of three- dimensional 
photographs) perpetuated the image of the Maine in the waters of the bay as 
one of the first stereotypical images of the city created for the tourist mar-
ket, a market that began to develop as an industry in the United States. In 
those years, the emphasis upon the project of memorializing the war of 1898 
was moved to Santiago in eastern Cuba. This was the site of the “splendid 
little war” to which, in 1901, the military occupation government inaugu-
rated a monument on San Juan Hill. Three years later, the “First Landing 
Monument” was erected in Daiquirí to mark the site in which marines dis-
embarked in July 1898. In 1908, a bronze plaque was mounted in Siboney to 
commemorate the ten- year anniversary of the taking of Santiago. The space 
around the enormous tree where the armistice with the Spanish was signed 
was converted into a public park. At the foot of the tree, in a bronze book, 
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were the names of the U.S. soldiers and sailors who had fallen in battle dur-
ing the capture of the city.
Thus, in 1906, the eighth anniversary of the sinking of the battleship was 
not celebrated in Havana but in Santiago with the inauguration of a memo-
rial in El Caney. Speeches exalted the bravery of the U.S. soldiers who seized 
the city and emphasized the protective role of the “great nation to the north” 
for a young Cuban republic. According to General Samuel B. M. Young, who 
traveled to Cuba expressly for this occasion, the United States intervened in 
1898 to guarantee Cubans “a fair, square deal and a chance to play their own 
hand at the game of self- government.” “You, my Cuban friends,” asserted 
Young in a paternalistic tone, “have shuffled and dealt the cards and you are 
happily playing the game well for beginners.”21
However, the “beginners” soon failed to meet their mentors’ expecta-
tions in the game of self- government. Riots provoked by a dispute between 
the liberals and conservatives over fraudulent presidential elections marked 
by caudillismo set the stage for a new military occupation. The failure of 
the first attempt to stabilize a Cuban republic made it immediately evident 
that “the bonds of singular intimacy and force” that united Cuba and the 
United States, far from a metaphorical expression, held real consequences, 
certainly with respect to force. It also demonstrated that the controversial 
Platt Amendment was no dead letter. If there remained any doubt about this, 
the 5,600 U.S. soldiers that invaded Cuba in order to “pacify” the country in 
1906 were proof enough.
“Remember the Maine II”: The Remake
Charles Magoon, a lawyer from Minnesota, was an official of the Bureau 
of Insular Affairs in the U.S. Department of War; as the ex- governor of the 
Panama Canal Zone and an expert in the legal management of “territories 
under occupation,” Magoon was appointed military governor of the island 
in September 1906.22 When the second U.S. occupation came to an end and 
self- government returned to Cuba in 1909, Magoon’s activities while mili-
tary governor became a topic of controversy. Although congratulated by his 
government for the success of an extensive public works program, as well as 
the sanitization of Havana and other regions, he was nonetheless unfavor-
ably remembered in Cuba. Magoon was accused of squandering the island’s 
treasury and opening the door to U.S. investors with contracts and unscru-
pulous tenders that only served to aggravate the dependency of the Cuban 
economy on U.S. capital.
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One of the governor’s proposals, included in the 1908 annual report, 
reopened the polemic surrounding the now “slumbering” memory of the 
Maine. According to the testimony of a U.S. official, a decade after the sink-
ing of the vessel, a sandbank had formed around the ship that was presenting 
a significant obstacle to the navigation in the bay; the problem was exasper-
ated by an increase in commercial traffic within the harbor. What was worse, 
affirmed Magoon, was that the public as much as the government had for-
gotten about the wreckage, despite the fact that it still harbored the bodies of 
more than sixty sailors. Magoon’s report, which recommended proceeding 
without delay to remove the Maine’s frame from the bay and put an end to 
the “deplorable spectacle” of its abandonment, received ample publicity in 
the United States. His report was followed by an extensive debate over the 
fate of the remains of the ship.23
As could be expected, the suggestion to flood the vessel so that it might 
finally meet its definitive end in the coastal waters of Cuba was met by oppo-
sition that considered this inappropriate and almost “sacrilege.” An engi-
neer from New York proposed building a monument in its place: an artificial 
island in the bay of Havana, “properly decorated with roses and palm trees, 
could be arranged so that people could promenade there and rest on settees 
while they meditated over the fact of the gallant sailors entombed below.”24 
Others proposed raising the ship to recover the bodies and inspect the re-
mains one last time. This was nothing new: in 1900, Beach & Co. in Washing-
ton had tried to obtain authorization from the navy to undertake a project to 
extract, reconstruct, and sail the boat from one port to another throughout 
the United States—a kind of patriotic “pilgrimage” that would keep the (itin-
erant) memory of the victims alive.25
A decade later, some still attempted to take advantage of the wreckage. 
Engineer John O’Rourke offered his services in retrieving the remains. After 
a detailed explanation of the technical procedures necessary to accomplish 
the task, O’Rourke demanded a high price—affirming, however, that no 
amount of money would be sufficient for the task of retrieving not simply a 
ship but the very “historical truth” whose secret is guarded by its remains. He 
added that one could only imagine the patriotic rapture that the very sight 
of this mythical craft, entering New York harbor, would arouse: “That day of 
patriotic hysteria will do us a tremendous lot of good.”26
In Congress, the topic was the subject of lively deliberations. William Sul-
zer, U.S. representative from New York, advocated the approval of the sum of 
money necessary to retrieve the ship. “It was a national disgrace to allow the 
wreck to remain and not take out the 63 bodies still in the hulk,” declared the 
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congressman. On the other hand, Albert Douglas, U.S. representative from 
Ohio, made a call for laying the memory of the Maine to rest. “We would 
better quit remembering the Maine,” he announced. In the end, he felt, the 
corpses that could not be recovered in 1898 were no longer bodies but food 
for fish, so that bringing home the hideous remains would serve only to re-
open old wounds.27 Finally, in early May 1909, both the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate approved the allocation of funds necessary to retrieve 
the ship, recover the remaining bodies, and give them an honorable burial 
in Arlington. The principal mast of the ship would be preserved and added 
to the pantheon of the Maine located in the Arlington National Cemetery. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, not a private institution, took charge of 
retrieving the ship while the federal government covered the costs of this 
complicated task.28
The Cuban government immediately stepped forward to collaborate. In a 
letter to President Taft, José Miguel Gómez conveyed the desire to conserve 
a part of the ship’s wreckage in Cuba in order to preserve its memory. “On 
the eve of the raising of the remains of the Maine whose sad fate is so closely 
connected with the history of the independence of Cuba, I desire, voicing the 
general sentiment of the Cuban people, to ask the American people to let us 
have one part of the ship with which to erect a plain and shining monument 
that will forever recall the union of love between the great Republic of the 
United States and the Republic of Cuba.”29 In the meantime, a permanent 
guard stationed by the authorities of the port of Havana would avoid the 
potential of “depredations” from souvenir and relic hunters.30
The Cadaver of the Maine: Exhumation, Autopsy,  
and Burial in the Waters of the Gulf
Thus in February 1911, on the thirteenth anniversary of the sinking of the 
battleship, a celebration was organized with a ceremony in the bay, where 
memorial services were carried out near the remains of the ship. A corps of 
Spanish- American War veterans and the Havana chapter of the Daughters 
of the American Revolution organized the event. Cubans were included in 
the official delegation for the first time. Among those present were Alfredo 
Zayas, the vice president of the republic, as well as veterans of the Liberating 
Army and representatives of different associations and political parties.31 As 
a result of a year of strenuous work and the construction of an enormous cof-
ferdam around the wreckage, which was itself an extraordinary work of engi-
neering, the hulk of the battleship partially resurfaced. Between November 
and December 1911, a new investigative commission inspected the remains 
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that were now exposed to the light of day, only to concur with the expert con-
clusion of 1898, which had determined that an external cause (such as a mine 
or torpedo) had destroyed the navy ship.32
The recovery project in Havana more than ten years later, and the results 
of the new investigation, revived the memory of the event, provoking as a 
result a “remake” of the 1898 “Remember the Maine.” The discovery of the 
victims’ remains and some of their personal belongings, as well as a number 
of objects in the hull that had formed part of the ship’s equipment, aroused 
once again an emotional reaction that harkened back to the impact of the 
first news in February 1898. Scores of articles reclaimed the pages of U.S. 
newspapers with the stories of survivors and nostalgic accounts of the event. 
The idea of building a commemorative monument resurfaced to enthusias-
tic support and, in a matter of months, the Maine Memorial Committee had 
collected over $100,000 to construct a monument in New York City’s Cen-
tral Park.33
However, just as in 1898, the explosion of nationalist fervor quickly drew 
commercial interest that manifested itself in a veritable avalanche of “patri-
otic” merchandise and advertisements, which profited from the kind of pub-
lic interest the shipwreck aroused. A decade later, the deliberation in Con-
gress over the fate of the Maine’s remains would once again provide evidence 
Figure 1.5 Maine in cofferdam, Havana. Source: Library of Congress.  
Prints and Photographs Division.
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of the tension between, on the one hand, the impulse toward a “sacred” cult 
of heroes and nationalist symbols of a “civil religion” and, on the other, the 
incorporation of this memory and nationalist symbolism into the everyday 
circuits of mercantile traffic and the entertainment industry.
In December 1911—when the House of Representatives was debating the 
question of the funds necessary to complete the task of recovering the ship—
a sum that in the end reached $900,000—a group of representatives cate-
gorically opposed the idea of making an investment of such magnitude in a 
process that would end “unproductively” by sinking the remains of a ship 
that had been so costly to recover in the first place. Robert B. Macon, repre-
sentative from Arkansas, proposed opening up the sale of the Maine’s wreck-
age to auction. “I believe it would be better for the people to get what we 
can for the ship,” he declared before the House. “There are plenty of novelty 
seekers and Coney Islandites who would gladly take the old carcass where it 
is and pay a good price for it in order to get it over here and charge so much 
per look at it, or sell pieces of it to curio hunters at so much per curio.”34 
Thomas Sisson, representative from Mississippi, also spoke for a group of 
investors “who desire to exhibit it at various ports of the United States and 
charge an admission fee to visitors,” and was therefore offering $1 million 
for the ship’s remains.35 Both proposals provoked indignant reactions from 
those who believed that the remains of the ship, especially as it embodied a 
tragic national memory, deserved to be treated with respect and considered 
venerable relics rather than merchandise or novelties. “I am surprised that 
this gentleman has not included in his proposition the selling of the bones 
of the seamen who died in the Maine,” articulated James R. Mann, one of the 
leaders of the Republican Party.
In the end, taking a clear stand against the commercialization of the 
wreckage, John J. Fitzgerald, chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Appropriations, promptly put an end to the debate. “In my 
opinion, the American people would not tolerate making a public show of 
that old vessel. There are some things that are sacred to the people, and 
among them are the remains of men or vessels lost in defense of the Nation. 
I would deplore the American Government attempting to make profit out 
of this ship, merely to gratify the idle curiosity of any people of the United 
States.”36 The law authorizing the remaining funds required to recover the 
ship was approved by a majority vote and commercial offers from business-
man looking to profit from the memory of the Maine were rejected; these 
offers were considered “unpatriotic” and any attempt to commercialize the 
ship’s remains was prohibited. As such, this mass of twisted iron attained 
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the status of “patriotic relic,” sharing a destiny homologous with the bodies 
of the crew that had remained trapped in its hull. The crew would later be 
buried with military honors in Arlington, and it was decided that the carcass 
of the ship would similarly be given an “appropriate grave,” submerged at 
the bottom of the sea.37
On the island, Havana residents had followed the yearlong developments 
in the construction of the cofferdam with immense curiosity.38 The “exhu-
mation” of the Maine’s “cadaver” together with the publication of the results 
of the new investigation into the causes of the explosion—a new “autopsy” 
if you will—succeeded in reopening the public debate over the implications 
of the U.S. intervention in the conflict between Cuba and Spain, as well as 
the nature of the relationship of “tutelage” exerted by their northern neigh-
bor. Nevertheless, both the moving tone of the coverage of the “exhumation” 
of the Maine in Cuban newspapers and the emotional reaction of Havana 
residents—a populace that gathered en masse on the pier and in adjacent 
streets on the day of the Maine’s “funeral” to witness the “farewell” spec-
tacle—speaks to the presence of conflicting feelings with respect to the mem-
ory of the Maine, experienced as part of a local and rather intimate memory 
of the city.
It is very likely that, among the thousands of Havana residents who par-
ticipated in the symbolic funeral of 1912 were many firsthand witnesses to the 
enormous explosion in the port, such as María de la Cruz Senmanat. Many 
had also been present at the burial of the first victims in the Cementerio de 
Colón or seen the impressive spectacle of rescue efforts that, for several days, 
attempted to recover the corpses of U.S. Marines from the waters of the bay. 
In contrast to later generations for whom the Maine was merely a monument 
made of marble and bronze in the district of Vedado or a stereotypical nar-
rative in the pages of a textbook, for those who had witnessed the episode it 
was a highly complicated experience. The sinking of the ship was no doubt 
associated with memories of the U.S. military intervention and the image of 
the ominous U.S. flag flying over the fortress of del Morro. But it also un-
doubtedly evoked a sense of enormous relief provoked by the end of the war 
and the reconcentración. The event was also connected with the moderniza-
tion of the city on the North American model that started during the U.S. 
occupation: the expansion of paved streets, electric lighting, and a telephone 
network, as well as a modern sewage layout and the creation of new public 
spaces like the Malecón (the seawall along the outer bay), left an indelible 
physical mark on the landscape of the urban capital.
“The Maine, protruding out in the middle of the bay, its mast faded in 
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color, its corroding bow; this mass of blackened ruins has been a permanent 
detail in our landscape, it has been truly ours for the last 14 years. There is a 
sincere melancholy in seeing it disappear forever from these greenish waters 
and blazing skies,” noted a journalist in the pages of the newspaper La Dis-
cusión. This was published on February 15, 1912, on the occasion of the last 
commemorative ceremony, which took place in the port of Havana, on the 
anniversary of the explosion. “This is to be the last February sun [the vessel] 
will experience, since, in short, it is to take its final resting place at the bottom 
of the sea, indeed a suitable grave for the greatness of such a powerful ship.”
A sector of the public refused to part with the “cadaver” of a ship that was 
perceived to be theirs, particularly since it had been so closely tied to the re-
cent history of the republic as well as the memory of the city. “That reddish 
light of the battleship as it blew into pieces was the resplendency of the dawn 
of our republic,” an editorial poetically proclaimed in La Discusión. “The 
memory of the disaster must not die alongside the generation of Cubans 
who were alive during this terrible episode.” For this reason, suggested the 
author, in place of sinking the ship, “it would be far more agreeable to patri-
otic Cubans if the cadaver of the ship that with its death gave the republic 
life were held by a dense layer of our land and sleeping below a monument 
erected for our republic.” To conclude, the author wrote, “if the miserable 
remains have for so many years been immovable in the mud of our bay, why 
not entrust it once again to the genuine earth of this island of tears in whose 
process of development it has been silently present as a faithful friend?”39 
Beyond its political implications, then, the remains of the ship, with its aura 
of mystery and tragedy, had for Havana residents become an intimate part 
of the city’s landscape. Indeed, in the days following the final sinking of the 
Maine, a rumor traveled throughout the city: for inexplicable reasons the 
ship had resurfaced anew, and several people claimed to have seen it floating 
adrift like a ghostly presence refusing to make its final departure.40
A similar reaction occurred in the United States. Patriotic organizations, a 
handful of senators, and officials from the U.S. Navy made it known that they 
opposed the decision to sink the ship. Since the government had invested 
such a considerable sum of money to recover the boat, it seemed almost sac-
rilege to return it to the sea. Furthermore, it would have looked particularly 
irreverent if there existed the slightest possibility of returning it to the United 
States where so many would look on with satisfaction at its conversion into a 
monument that preserved the memory not only of the victims of the Maine 
but also of all Spanish- American War veterans.41 Nevertheless, the decision 
taken by the government and the secretary of the navy was irrevocable, and 
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on March 15, 1912, the official burial of the USS Maine’s “cadaver” took place 
in Havana.
The final “farewell” to its remains was a theatrical spectacle of grand pro-
portions, carefully conceived down to the minutest detail. Although orga-
nized in Washington, Cuban authorities had an important role in the script. 
The New York Times described the ceremony as “the most stately naval 
funeral in the history of the world.” According to the Cuban press, the cere-
mony witnessed the largest public demonstration in the city since May 20, 
1902—the day of the republic’s inauguration. It was a great mise-en-scène of 
the “fraternal friendship” of the two nations. The act included the presence of 
General William Herbert Bixby, chief of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
and the president of Cuba himself, José Miguel Gómez, who took part in 
the ceremony from a Cuban naval ship. Furthermore, diplomatic represen-
tatives in the city, members of various associations, U.S. veterans of the war 
of 1898, and veterans of the Cuban independence army were present. The 
USS North Carolina and the USS Birmingham arrived in the port of Havana 
for two purposes: to accompany the remains of the Maine’s “cadaver” to the 
waters of the Gulf, where it would be sunk, and to later escort the bodies of 
U.S. sailors to the United States, where they would be buried in Arlington 
National Cemetery.42
Nearly 100,000 people congregated on the seafront to see the departure of 
the mythical ship, tugged out from the port where it would be sunk at three 
nautical miles from the coast. According to the New York Tribune, around 
2 p.m., with her deck “covered deep with flowers and a great American ensign 
floating from the jurymast, where the main mast formerly stood,” the Maine 
put to sea on her last voyage. As the wreck passed the American squad-
rons, “the Marines presented arms and the scarlet coated bandsmen on the 
quarterdeck played the national anthem, while minute guns boomed a re-
quiem.” A large procession of Cuban and American ships followed the vessel 
until the three- mile limit was trespassed. At 5 p.m., the valves in the carcass 
were opened and the wreck started to sink. A few minutes later “there was a 
Figure 1.6 The USS Maine going to her final resting place. Source: Library of Congress. 
Prints and Photographs Division.
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flash of blue and white, as the great ensign floating from the mast struck the 
waves and disappeared. Simultaneously, the decks were blown up by the air 
pressure, and with incredible velocity the Maine plunged down, leaving no 
trace save flowers tossing on the surface of the sea.”43 But a series of photo-
graphs that immortalized her “final moments” were at first abundantly pub-
lished in the newspapers and then reproduced in postcards, giving a graphic 
testimony to the burial of the wreckage in the sea. In Havana, a film about the 
“burial” was created by Enrique Díaz, a pioneer of Cuban cinematography, 
and premiered to the great excitement of the public in the Payret cinema on 
March 19, 1912.44
Four days later, the last of the sailors’ bodies were buried. President Taft, 
accompanied by Charles D. Sigsbee and Reverend John P. Chidwick, the cap-
tain and chaplain of the Maine, were in attendance. The ceremony brought 
to a conclusion a series of memorial services that had begun in Havana four-
teen years earlier when, on February 17, 1898, the first victims were buried in 
the Cementerio de Colón.45
The “Life after Death” of the Maine:  
The Resurrection as Monumentalization
But the “social life” of the Maine did not end the final sinking of its “corpse” 
in the sea, with the “honors of a soldier who died in combat.” On the con-
trary. As Katherine Verdery has argued in her book, The Political Lives of 
Dead Bodies, often it is just in the moment of “death” that the more signifi-
cant symbolic life actually begins. Despite an agreement that was passed 
by Congress in 1911, explicitly preventing the “dismemberment” of the ship 
for commercial purposes, all that could be detached from the frame was 
nonetheless taken away: what Havana residents saw submerged in the sea 
was only the hull of the battleship. Fragments—veritable “relics”—were dis-
persed and became part of memorials and monuments that preserved the 
memory of the sunken ship in stone and bronze.46
As we have already seen, the “revival” of the memory of the Maine—a 
consequence of a series of campaigns for its “resurrection” from the Havana 
bay and its subsequent burial—reinvigorated the activities of the Maine 
Memorial Committee. Though the committee was nominally presided over 
by James Grant Wilson, it was driven and sponsored by William Randolph 
Hearst from its inception in 1898. On May 30, 1913, a monument to the 
Maine, sponsored by the committee, was inaugurated in Columbus Circle 
next to Central Park in New York City. The principal sculpture, created by 
architect Harold Van Buren Magonigle and sculptor Attilio Piccirilli, was 
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Columbia Triumphant. According to what is said in the description of the 
project, it was crafted out of bronze cannons taken from the Maine itself. 
A second allegorical sculpture group, named The Antebellum State of Mind, 
featured a female figure representing peace, accompanied by other figures 
representing courage and fortitude. This sculptural group also included the 
representation of a young boy who expectantly advances toward the bow of 
the boat; according to the creators of the memorial, he represented the “new 
era inaugurated in Cuba through the Spanish War.”47
The inauguration of the monument was preceded by a large commemora-
tive Memorial Day parade, which, according to the New York Times, was one 
of the major celebrations in the city. The cost of the monument, $170,000, 
was defrayed by contributions from “among the poor and plain people of 
almost every State of the Union,” which amounted to more than a million 
donations. Former President Taft was the keynote speaker at the ceremony 
and succinctly summarized the significance of the memorial: “The monu-
ment we dedicate today is an enduring witness of three facts. The first is the 
gratitude that our country feels towards the men who went down on the 
Maine, in that they gave up their lives in her service. The second is the birth 
of new people and the founding of a new nation through our disinterested 
aid and sacrifice. The third is the expansion of this nation into a wider sphere 
of world usefulness and greater responsibility among the nations than ever 
before in its history.”48 The association that Taft made in his address—the 
connection between the sinking of the ship and the birth of the Cuban Re-
public, and the relationship of both to the beginning of an era of imperial 
expansion by the United States—would eventually be the subject of ardent 
debate and reinterpretation in Cuba in the years to follow, in a time when 
anti- imperialist discourse carried increasingly more force.
Two days after the “burial” of the Maine, the Cuban press circulated the 
news of the government’s decision to preserve the memory of the ship with a 
monument in Havana. The Republic of Cuba obtained its share of the “relics” 
that were packed and sent to the United States.49 It was thus that a second-
ary mast, some chains, and two of the ship’s cannons remained on the island 
with the intention of being incorporated into a monument that would be 
constructed to fill the memorial void left in the city by the absence of the 
ship’s proper “body.”
In fact, receiving notice that the hull was to be submerged at sea, the 
council of the Asociación de Veteranos de la Independencia de Cuba [Asso-
ciation of Veterans of the Cuban Independence War] agreed to compose a 
letter to President Taft, requesting that the cofferdam, built to extract the 
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hull of the ship, be preserved once the ship’s remains were removed. The in-
tention was to refill the cofferdam so that a monument could be built on it 
to perpetuate the memory of the ship in the very location of the bay where it 
had lain for so many years.50 Days later, in the Cuban House of Representa-
tives, a similar proposal was forwarded. The senator for the province of Ori-
ente, Erasmos Regueiferos, proposed a bill that would supply funds for the 
erection of a monument on the cofferdam. Its surface would be filled in with 
earth, creating a small artificial island upon which the monument would be 
constructed just as the senator in question had imagined it: a lighthouse with 
a Statue of Liberty carrying a torch and accompanied by two effigies, one of 
José Martí and the other of George Washington.51
Nevertheless, despite the initial enthusiasm of the newspapers and a 
presidential order signed on December 6, 1913 by Mario García Menocal, 
which created a committee to design the monument and allocated the initial 
funds for its construction, the project eventually fell into oblivion. In Sep-
tember 1915, nearly two years later, the newspaper La Noche reported that the 
cannons and the mast of the Maine, which had been donated by the United 
States to be used in a memorial, remained abandoned in the same warehouse 
on the harbor where they had been left the day the ship was sunk in 1912. This 
report had repercussions in the U.S. press, and many papers demanded the 
return of “relics” that were so underappreciated by the Cuban government.52
Under the pressure of public opinion, the committee in charge of the cre-
ation of the monument decided to hold an international competition for the 
design of the future memorial to the Maine. Engineer and architect Félix Ca-
barrocas won the contest with a plan in a neoclassical style that combined 
both the cannons and chains from the ship. However, it was not until 1918 
that the Secretaría de Obras Públicas decided to begin construction on the 
monument in the designated site: the Avenida “Antonio Maceo.” The avenue, 
known as “el Malecón,” is located near the headland where the Santa Clara 
battery was situated, at the gates of Vedado. Despite good intentions, the 
commencement of construction was once again delayed by problems with 
the budget and a conflict between Cabarrocas, the designer of the monu-
ment, the organizing committee, and the Ministerio de Obras Públicas. In 
1924, the government of Alfredo Zayas resolved to execute the project anew 
and allocated a budget of 116,000 pesos for that purpose.53
Finally, on February 15, 1924, on the twenty- sixth anniversary of the 
catastrophe, the first stone was laid.54 This monument to the victims of the 
Maine—the work of sculptor Moisés de la Huerta and Cabarrocas—was in-
augurated by Zayas a year later on March 8, 1925, when he was nearly at the 
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point of handing over power to the succeeding president, Gerardo Machado. 
Nevertheless, just as his presidential authority had been consistently put into 
question by the presence of Enoch Crowder, the U.S. proconsul in Havana, 
the speaker at the ceremony was not the Cuban president but U.S. Gen-
eral John J. Pershing, who had come explicitly from the United States for 
the commemoration. More than a quarter century after the catastrophe—a 
catastrophe that with the intervention of the United States in the war be-
tween Cuba and Spain inaugurated the imperialistic expansion of the United 
States within the Americas—the tone of U.S. discourse had changed slightly. 
If, with the first commemorations of the Maine, the role of tutelage was re-
peatedly claimed by the United States in relation to the small and emerging 
Cuban Republic, this time, at the height of pan- Americanism, the “moral 
obligation” of the United States to watch over the development of democ-
racy went far beyond Cuba and extended to all its “little sisters” in Latin 
America.55 An interesting detail about the commemorative inauguration of 
1925 was the participation of the Spanish ambassador to Cuba, who rendered 
homage to the victims, leaving an offering of flowers.56
The monument’s base, built of granite, was adorned with the cannons 
and chains procured from the remains of the ship; two twin marble columns 
emerged from the base to support a bronze eagle with extended wings, an 
image whose imperial symbolism was poorly received by Cubans from its in-
ception. It seemed born for a tragic fate. Indeed, within a year of its inaugu-
ration, a fierce hurricane hit Havana, leaving more than $1 million worth of 
damage, destroying the columns, and shattering the eagle.
Nevertheless, the memorial was restored. The marble columns were re-
placed, and the original eagle was substituted for another with a slender and 
more aerodynamic body in order to better resist the battering of the winds.57 
In 1928, the area was significantly beautified with the building of the Plaza 
del Maine around the monument. A series of esplanades and gardens added 
not only equilibrium and beauty but also symbolic connotations to the site: 
the plaza was complemented by the busts of former U.S. presidents William 
McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, as well as that of Leonard Wood, who 
had been the U.S. military governor in Cuba during the first intervention. 
These busts were the creations of U.S. sculptor Gutzom Borglum.58 The de-
sign of the plaza and the gardens bordering it were the work of the presti-
gious French architect and landscapist Jean Claude Nicolas Forestier. For-
estier had been expressly invited to Cuba to act as a consultant on an urban 
renewal project for Havana, launched by President Gerardo Machado and 
his minister of public works, Carlos Miguel de Céspedes.
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Forestier designed the plaza as a gateway that connected the old part of 
the city, across from the Malecón, with Vedado. As previously mentioned, 
both the Malecón—an avenue built during the first U.S. intervention that, 
with each new government, stretched out further west along the coastline—
along with Vedado—a neighborhood made up of straight tree- lined streets, 
main avenues, parterres, and public parks, as well as chalets and cottages 
built in the style of U.S. suburbs—were paradigmatic models of the spatial 
transformation of the city on a U.S. model.59 Early in 1928, motivated by both 
the celebration of the sixth international Conference of American States in 
Havana and a visit from the president of the United States, Calvin Coolidge, 
Gerardo Machado ostentatiously inaugurated the plaza.60 In what largely re-
sulted in an insult to the memory of nationalist patriots, the commemorative 
ceremony, which took place on October 10, the anniversary of the declara-
tion of the war of independence against Spain, was celebrated in the Plaza 
del Maine with an impressive military parade.
In later years the monument would be strongly associated not only with 
U.S. presence in Cuba but also with the unfavorably remembered Machado 
Figure 1.7  
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dictatorship. In 1930, with the construction of the deluxe Hotel Nacional next 
door to it, the monument became a site of obligatory pilgrimage for the hun-
dreds of U.S. tourists who came to Cuba each winter. In 1953, the inaugura-
tion of a new building for the nearby U.S. embassy, a seven- story modernist 
building designed by Leland W. King, completed the definitive “American-
ization” of the area.61
At the same time, police and military parades, organized for the anni-
versary of the Maine in the esplanade facing the plaza during the 1940s 
and 1950s—particularly during the years of tyranny under President Ful-
gencio Batista—contributed to endowing the site with repressive and pro- 
government affiliations. As a result, this site frequently became the scene of 
nationalist and anti- government protests. In March 1949, the monument to 
the victims of the Maine was vandalized in reprisal for the desecration of the 
José Martí monument in Parque Central by a group of drunken U.S. Marines 
who urinated on the statue.62 Carlos Franqui, a veteran of the revolutionary 
underground in Havana, relates in his memoirs how July 26 Movement at-
Figure 1.8 Monument to 
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A Sunken Ship, a Bronze Eagle, and the Politics of Memory | 47
tempted in vain to explode the monument. The structure was so solid that 
the endeavor was impossible: “more dynamite was needed to knock it down 
than [to depose] the Batista regime itself.”63
The Fall of the “Eagle of Imperialism”
It is not surprising that with the triumph of the revolution in 1959, the monu-
ment, with its imperialist symbolism and unfavorable memories that asso-
ciated it with both the Machado and Batista dictatorships, was bound to 
disappear. As if that were not enough, in March 1960, La Coubre, a Belgian 
commercial freight ship transporting arms, exploded in Havana Harbor, kill-
ing more than seventy- five people. The revolutionaries immediately claimed 
the blast was an act of terrorism, and Fidel Castro blamed the United States 
and compared the incident to the sinking of the Maine, though acknowledg-
ing that there was no material evidence for this accusation. So this unfor-
tunate event conjured up the ghost of the Maine, which resurrected again 
to become a symbolic trope in the aggressive anti-U.S. rhetoric of the early 
1960s.64 It was in Castro’s speech at the funeral of the victims of the explosion 
of La Coubre where the slogan of the July 26 Movement, “Patria y Libertad,” 
was replaced by “Patria o Muerte,” a pivotal point in the process of radical-
ization of the revolution.
A few months later, in August 1960, the nationalization of U.S. property 
in Cuba provoked an enormous demonstration by Havana residents in the 
city streets heading toward the Malecón. They intended to “bury,” by throw-
ing into the sea, coffins made of cardboard that symbolically represented the 
“corpses” of U.S. corporate monopolies. Henceforth, tensions escalated and 
relations deteriorated between the United States and Cuba until the com-
plete rupture in diplomatic relations in January 1961.
And so, immediately after the defeat of a U.S.- backed invasion of Cuba at 
the Bay of Pigs, and in the early morning of May 1, 1961, the eagle that topped 
the monument was pulled down by a Cuban government crane—made to 
fall once again, only this time by force of the overwhelming gale of the revo-
lution.65 The initial suggestion to substitute it with a cubist sculpture, a peace 
dove designed by Picasso (“a picassian symbol of liberty atop the decapitated 
columns of the old Maine,” according to Carlos Franqui, the mastermind of 
the proposal) was never realized.66 Half a century after the mutilation of the 
monument, its pinnacle still remains vacant. The marble and bronze struc-
ture stands as silent witness to the profound political disagreements between 
the nations.67
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This very same marble surface of the monument is today a kind of palimp-
sest, bearing visible traces of the rewriting of the meaning of the event that 
the monument commemorates. The simple inscription, “To the victims of 
the Maine. The people of Cuba,” that originally appeared on the front of the 
monument was, in 1961, traded in for an accusatory, “To the victims of the 
Maine who were sacrificed to a voracious imperialism in its eagerness to seize 
the island of Cuba.” The text of the resolution approved by the U.S. Con-
gress in 1898 that affirmed that Cuba is and, by right, ought to be free and 
independent was preserved on the other side; nevertheless, as a nationalist 
gesture, the cast text that was originally in English was replaced by a Span-
ish translation.
The singular destiny of the three- ton imperial eagle that was “overthrown” 
in 1961 can also be read as a metaphorical rupture of the “bonds of singular 
intimacy” between both nations. The body and wings of the eagle were ex-
hibited for many years in the Museo de la Ciudad (Museum of the City of 
Havana) as trophies won in the “defeat of imperialism.” Meanwhile, the head 
of the bird was stolen in 1961 by an anti- Castro group from a warehouse of 
the Ministry of Public Works where it was stored and later returned to U.S. 
diplomats as a symbolic gesture of making amends. It now hangs on the wall 
in a conference room in the United States Interests Section in Havana.68
“I have been the faithful custodian of the body,” the director of the mu-
seum and Havana’s city historian, Eusebio Leal, recently told Peter Orsi, the 
Associated Press correspondent in Cuba. After half a century of abandon-
ment and dilapidation, the monument is now being restored, due to the ini-
tiative of Leal, who is also president of the National Commission of Monu-
ments. “Gone are the rusty stains beneath the two 10- inch guns that were 
salvaged from the Maine. The statues are a lustrous bronze again after cor-
rosive salt air turned them bright green,” wrote Orsi in a piece published on 
the occasion of the 115th anniversary of the sinking of the Maine. But there 
seems to be little hope that the body and the head of the bronze eagle will be 
reunited soon, since the normalization of relations between the two coun-
tries is unlikely in the near term.69
However, in spite of the fifty years that have transpired since the mutila-
tion of the monument, the “social life” of the remains of the battleship Maine 
is not over. Silent witnesses of the encounters, conflicts, and misunderstand-
ings that have marked the tense relationship between Cuba and the United 
States, from its granite and marble niche on the Havana’s Malecón, the can-
nons and chains of the warship have resisted the battering and corrosion 
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of the sea and the passage of time, awaiting the next stage of the intimately 
fraught kinship between the two nations.
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CHAPTER 2

Shifting Sands of Cuban Science, 1875–1933
Steven Palmer
The principal cast in the production and politics of mainstream 
Cuban science did not change much between 1875, when a dynamic 
group of young creoles began transforming research practice in 
Havana in the waning years of the first war of independence, and the 
1920s, when their last representatives passed away.1 The U.S. occupa-
tion and the birth of the republic allowed many scientists to return 
home from exile, but most had only been gone for a year or two to 
avoid the war or to establish a role for themselves in the indepen-
dence movement. The new republic harbored few new scientists of 
note. Of the one hundred Cuban scientists featured in a recent bio-
graphical dictionary, only nine began their research careers between 
1895 and 1920 (and five of these in the social sciences). Twenty- five of 
the previous generation—those whose research had begun between 
1870 and 1890—made the cut (seventeen of them were in medicine or 
related fields, and most of the rest in the natural or pure sciences).2 
What the occupation and the republic did transform was the political 
arrangement of scientific institutions, agendas, and practices: their 
position of power relative to one another, their relationship to the 
state, and their significance within creole political culture.
The U.S. occupation acted as a prism. It diffracted Cuban scien-
tific energies that had been relatively concentrated in laboratory- 
based medical research prior to the outbreak of the war of indepen-
dence in 1895, generating a spectrum of new projects in the republic 
that, if at certain points vibrant, was dispersed.3 Moreover, if in the 
late colonial period many Cuban scientists enjoyed great proximity 
to the defining research and debates in their field, the science done 
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in the republic was more parochial. There were a number of reasons for this 
shift. Before the war of independence and U.S. occupation, Cuban science 
was structured by a creole anti- colonialism in which cultivating a sovereign 
research capacity was felt to be key. After 1902, with the Platt Amendment 
giving the United States the right to intervene in the event that Cubans did 
not effectively manage epidemic diseases that might threaten the United 
States, scientists and experimental institutions were enlisted to shore up 
Cuban political sovereignty in a way that valued the reproduction of exist-
ing testing and administrative techniques over research autonomy and 
innovation. In this context scientific service could bring significant politi-
cal rewards, including appointment to senior state offices. At the same time, 
especially among physicians, local commercial opportunities during the first 
two booming decades distracted energies that might otherwise have gone to 
research. Over the same period, as the resources required for experimental 
ventures increased with the complexity of much research, it became harder 
for individual or institutional Cuban actors to compete with, or to collabo-
rate on even terms with, or to get noticed by U.S.- and European- based sci-
entific initiatives. The two areas of greatest innovation in Cuba’s republican 
science were eugenics and agronomy, both domains of inquiry that promised 
to provide elements for a new creole hegemony.
Of course, these are only the most visible trends in a changing scientific 
ecosystem that was extremely rich and variegated both before and after in-
dependence. I will try to illustrate them by looking primarily at the shifts in 
the power, agenda, and institutional involvement of two main actors, both 
creole men from the world of medicine, running through the late colonial 
era, the U.S. occupation, and the first two decades of the republic: the oph-
thalmologist Juan Santos Fernández y Hernández (1847–1922), who was at 
the epicenter of Cuban scientific life during the late colonial era, and the 
physician, medical bacteriologist, and tuberculosis expert Diego Tamayo y 
Figueredo (1852–1926), who played a pivotal role in reconfiguring scientific 
power during the U.S. occupation and early republic. I will follow this with a 
look at examples of innovative experimental practice that dotted the intellec-
tual landscape of the republic, in particular that of the primate collector and 
breeder Rosalía Abreu. Their stories show that science and scientists were at 
the heart of creole politics, both before and after independence. They also 
demonstrate the strong continuity in scientific leadership that, incredibly, 
lasted almost half a century and even continued to condition scientific prac-
tice and politics through the Machadato.
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Searching for Scientific Sovereignty
From 1875 to 1898, Cuban science was not just clustered in the domain of 
medicine; it was increasingly concentrated in a vanguard group of creole 
physicians led by Juan Santos Fernández.4 Born in 1847 on the Atrevido sugar 
mill in Bolondrón, Matanzas, Santos Fernández was one of a number of ex-
traordinary scientists spread around the Atlantic world in the second half 
of the nineteenth century who were children of Matanzas or Cuatro Villas 
sugar plantation owners. They were at once hugely privileged beneficiaries 
of the colonial slave- based sugar economy and inherently dissident vehicles 
of creole desire for political autonomy and nationhood. Indeed, Santos Fer-
nández was not so different in profile from the eight first- year University of 
Havana medical students sent to the wall for a student prank in November 
1871 during the first war of independence. Their mock execution was a sym-
bolic acknowledgment by colonial Spanish society that creole doctors were 
the emerging leaders of the imagined political community of independent 
Cuba.5 Fearing some such trouble, in 1870 Santos Fernández’s parents had 
taken their two boys out of medical studies at the University of Havana after 
their first year and sent them to Spain.
At Madrid’s San Carlos school of surgery, alongside many liberal- thinking 
medical students from South America, Santos Fernández gravitated toward 
a famous professor of anatomy, Pedro Velasco, and was later captivated by 
the surgical acumen of Spain’s leading ophthalmologist, Francisco Delgado 
Jugo, originally from Venezuela. Both maestros were part of the Liberal camp 
in the turbulent Spanish politics of the 1860s and 1870s, as well as directors 
of the Spanish Anthropological Society, founded in 1869 in Velasco’s home 
(which doubled as his private museum of anthropology). Santos Fernández 
became an enthusiastic member. After a period of study in Delgado Jugo’s 
Madrid Ophthalmic Institute, he specialized in Paris under the meteoric 
Xavier Galezowski before completing his doctorate in medicine at the Uni-
versity of Barcelona.6 Returning to Cuba in 1875, Santos Fernández set him-
self up at Prado 3, in the heart of the capital’s fashionable new district, and 
within two years was a leader of the creole intellectual avant- garde.
Within months of his return he founded a medical newspaper, the Crónica 
Médico- Quirúrgica de la Habana, and assembled a de facto medical society 
of some renown to act as its contributing staff. One of those on the mast-
head was Luis Montané, who had also just returned from Paris after making 
a name for himself as a brilliant disciple of the medical anthropologist Pierre 
Broca. Santos Fernández avoided seeking a place in the university faculty, 
with its scholastic politics and traditional horizons of teaching, but he did 
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immediately bid on a seat in Havana’s Royal Academy of Sciences and was 
admitted in 1875 on the basis of his doctoral thesis on diseases of the eye (the 
similarly precocious Montané was admitted the same year). In 1877, with 
wartime restrictions on creole assembly still in effect, he surprised many by 
receiving permission from the colonial authorities to establish the Cuban 
Anthropological Society, whose inaugural session was held in his apartments 
on the Prado. The society is usually recalled as the creature of Montané, but 
Santos Fernández was just as significant an agent in its founding: aside from 
the fact that he had formed a special relationship with Joaquín Jovellar, the 
captain general of Cuba, after operating successfully on his daughter’s eyes, 
he apparently had accepted a mission from his Madrid mentors to found a 
Cuban chapter of the Spanish Anthropological Society.7
The Crónica Médico- Quirúrgica and the coterie of physicians behind the 
Anthropological Society are two clear expressions of the dynamic medical 
universe that took shape in Havana in the aftermath of the Ten Years’ War. 
The number of licensed doctors practicing in nineteenth- century Cuba was 
always large by Latin American standards. Cuba had hosted many skilled 
medical practitioners since the early nineteenth century, an anomaly pro-
duced by the expanding demand for medical and hospital services on ships, 
in garrisons, and on slave plantations.8 In 1887 almost one thousand physi-
cians and surgeons practiced in the island, and by 1899 there were five hun-
dred medical doctors in the city of Havana—at one licensed practitioner 
for every five hundred inhabitants, one of the highest ratios of physicians 
per capita in the world.9 Over 80 percent of them were Cuban- born, in 
many cases homegrown products of the university medical school.10 Funes 
has noted the crossing of a threshold of organizational necessity during the 
1880s and 1890s, with new associations and organized initiatives springing 
up with great regularity and variety, though again with leadership clearly ex-
ercised by medical doctors.11 According to Pedro Pruna’s history of the Royal 
Academy of Sciences (1861–98), all but two of the nineteen figures he identi-
fies as the academy’s “guiding group” (based on a point- scale evaluation of 
administrative and academic contributions) were doctors of medicine.12 The 
most active in this group over the entire period, in his calculation, was Juan 
Santos Fernández.
Perhaps because most analysts of the creole intellectual culture and na-
tionalism have literary studies and political history orientations, medical 
doctors and other scientists have been left out of portraits that emphasize the 
artistic, social essayistic, and lawyerly constitutional elements that underlay 
the Autonomist cause. The role of the Revista de Cuba, founded in 1877 by 
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the lawyer and leader of the Autonomous Liberal Party, José Antonio Cor-
tina, is often seen as the exemplary expression of this new creole liberalism.13 
Santos Fernández’s Crónica Médico- Quirúrgica (founded two years earlier) 
should be read as its pure and applied scientific counterpart. It served an 
ebullient potential readership that, especially once one considers the rapid 
expansion in the practice of pharmacy at the time, counted in the thousands. 
The ambitions of his medico- political project grew apace, especially after 
1881 when he married Teresa González de Aguilar, the daughter of the Count-
ess of San Ignacio and heir to the Toca fortune. Now involved in managing 
sugar capital on both sides of the family, Santos Fernández faced the planter 
class’s conundrum of the 1880s—“threatened with extinction,” in the words 
of Pérez, with the end of slavery in sight, sugar prices low, and the island in 
the throes of depression. How to reinvent a creole ruling class in a rapidly 
changing, increasingly capital- intensive and corporate political economy 
and how to do so in a way that enhanced claims for Cuban autonomy within 
the Spanish colonial system?14 His answer was novel and audacious: with 
echoes of the early nineteenth- century creole reformer Arango y Parreño as 
described by Moreno Fraginals, Santos Fernández undertook or sponsored a 
series of voyages to identify new technology and incorporate it into his medi-
cal enterprise.15 He sought a transmutation of the sugar mill into the research 
laboratory, using sugar capital to build a bacteriology and vaccine research 
institute according to the model and methods of the Pasteur labs.
Science historian José López Sánchez identifies 1885 as an “eclosion,” or 
coming of age year for Cuban science. Five new scientific periodicals (for the 
most part medical in nature) saw the light of day, joining the Crónica Médico- 
Quirúrgica, the Anales of the academy, and the periodical of the Society for 
Clinical Studies (founded in 1881).16 The Instituto Histo- bacteriológico y de 
vacunación antirrábica de la Crónica Médico- Quirúrgica de la Habana also 
had its origins in 1885. Bacteriology and the hunt for vaccines were the “big 
things” of the 1880s, promising substantial prestige and power in national 
as well as scientific politics. The Instituto’s first administrator, Eduardo Plá, 
later recalled that in October 1885 the editorial board and contributors of the 
Crónica Médico- Quirúrgica were sitting around the newspaper office discuss-
ing the significance of the recent cable announcing Pasteur’s breakthrough 
in producing an effective rabies vaccine for humans. They began to imag-
ine a radical possibility: “to import the benefits of the Pasteurian method to 
our patria, at the same time bringing it the Glory of being the first country 
in America to put it into practice.” Santos Fernández decided to seize the 
moment and finance the creation in Havana of a complex medical research 
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facility where “professors and students could familiarize themselves with the 
discoveries of the modern science of bacteriology, which promises to shed 
light on many points in the still dim field of intertropical pathology.”17
The Cubans were instantly on top of the momentous announcements 
coming from Paris by virtue of the telegraph, but they also had special con-
nections to the inner world of Pasteur’s experimental methods. Pasteur’s 
main physician ally in the rabies experiments, Joseph Grancher, was mar-
ried to the immensely wealthy Cuban sugar heiress Rosa Abreu, and his chief 
clinician, the eminent Paris urologist Joaquín Albarrán, was also the Cuban- 
born son of a sugar planter. In 1885 both were corresponding members of 
the editorial board of the Crónica Médico- Quirúrgica.18 In April 1886, San-
tos Fernández went to New York to purchase equipment. Again according 
to Plá, once the installation of the lab had begun, “it became apparent that 
we needed to send one of the pioneering group to Paris to study the method 
in its tiniest details at the side of the illustrious maestro.”19 The following 
month, Santos Fernández sponsored a journey to Paris by two young mem-
bers of the Crónica circle, Diego Tamayo and Francisco Vildósola, to train at 
Pasteur’s laboratories. In August, Albarrán presented the two to Pasteur in 
his provisional facilities on the rue Vauquelin. After a three- month program 
of intense study, they returned to Cuba, reproducing strains of rabies vac-
cines from Pasteur’s labs as they traveled.20
For the Cubans, Paris was a very practical matter of networks outside of 
Spanish colonial ones that allowed them direct access to resources: allies, 
training missions, methods, and living laboratory organisms that could be 
carried to Cuba and inoculated, magically animating their bacteriologi-
cal technology with Pasteurian power. Creoles now had quasi- therapeutic 
powers to prevent a specific and feared disease in stricken Cubans that the 
Spanish colonizers did not possess; they had scalar powers to see and record 
and analyze and identify potential pathogens in a vast domain of Cuban 
microbiological matter that the Spanish colonial regime had no access to; 
and they had established a technology and a network for publication and 
dissemination of their new products, to be circulated, evaluated, and re-
ciprocated in a new international network of science in which Spain was far 
from a dominant player. In May 1887, over three hundred eminent creoles 
crowded by invitation into the Quinta de Toca, the fabulous mansion on 
Reina that Santos Fernández had acquired through marriage, to see a mod-
ern medical laboratory unveiled and observe the production and inoculation 
of Pasteur’s marvelous new vaccine for rabies. Among the expectant guests 
were representatives of every instance of Cuban creole cultural power: the 
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Royal Academy of Sciences, the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, 
the university, the literary and scientific societies of the capital, the Military 
Sanitary Corps, the militia, the medical- pharmaceutical corps of Havana and 
Matanzas, and ten newspapers. At the end of Santos Fernández’s welcoming 
address, the luminaries solemnly signed an acta de constancia, constituting 
themselves in an “extraordinary Junta,” a declaration of creole scientific sov-
ereignty.21
The Santos Fernández group now made its final ascent on the summit of 
scientific power and authority in the island. Instituto scientists (a dozen or 
more of the most accomplished researchers in Cuba could be found at its 
benches at any given time) took the lead in commissions and expeditions 
to discover the source of livestock and crop diseases. They also formed the 
core of the commission appointed by the Spanish governor in 1889 to study 
what they declared to be an epidemic of glanders (an equine disease trans-
missible to humans, especially in dense urban concentrations of people and 
horse- drawn coaches and carts). The Instituto labs were used by both local 
and foreign luminaries to settle an important international debate over the 
germ of yellow fever. Diego Tamayo, the Instituto’s star bacteriologist who 
had been on the original training mission to Pasteur’s labs, made an inter-
national reputation for himself with his cautious lab work and collaboration 
with high- profile researchers like George Sternberg, a leader in U.S. bacteri-
ology who would become surgeon general of the U.S. Army in 1893.22
The First Medical Congress of the Island of 1890 (a “national” medical 
congress in all but name) was a remarkable expression of the ascendance 
of the Instituto, with its research associates not only among the principal 
organizers but also accounting for a plurality of the eighty- seven papers 
presented.23 The Crónica Médico- Quirúrgica had doubled its production 
schedule from monthly to biweekly to account for the volume of research 
being written up for publication under its prestigious brand. The Instituto 
was awarded the public contract to attend to bromatological and forensic 
analysis, and by 1893 the Santos Fernández faction had gained control of 
the Academy of Sciences. Its fortunes tied to the hopes of the Autonomist 
program, this enterprise was positioned to assume the hoped- for mantle of 
“national” medical research center and semiautonomous public health advi-
sory unit, a private initiative with an organic connection to a public academic 
body (the Academy of Sciences).24 By this time the Santos Fernández group 
had lost Tamayo, who resigned in anger in early 1891 claiming that the origi-
nal spirit and group impetus of the Instituto project had been lost.25 Never-
theless, the lab enjoyed commercial success with its services and biologics, 
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and in February 1895 its researchers triumphantly announced that they had 
developed an effective diphtheria antitoxin. These triumphs were eclipsed by 
the outbreak of the 1895 war of independence. Neither the Instituto’s science 
nor its political influence prospered in a context of polarized and populist 
belligerence, and the lab would find itself sidelined in the reconstruction of 
Cuban scientific life under the U.S. occupation.
The Return of Diego Tamayo
After the stabilization phase under General John R. Brooke came to an end 
and General Leonard Wood took over the government in December 1899, 
the U.S. occupation became peculiarly medical in nature. Wood himself was 
a physician, and his tenure in Havana began with an extraordinary effort to 
sanitize the city by dousing its streets and diluting its fetid port waters with 
oceans of disinfectant.26 Among the principal targets of this epic sanitizing 
program was yellow fever, whose source remained a mystery, though it was 
still strongly believed to be bacterial and likely, then, to be endemic in the 
putrid organic morass of the capital. The failure of this emblematic effort to 
reduce the incidence of yellow fever was followed by the splash of a dramatic 
and entirely novel medical research project in which Cuba’s colonial sci-
ence played a leading role. Through a complex transaction whose dynamics 
remain the subject of considerable and heated debate among historians of 
medicine, two of the most important research clusters in the history of tropi-
cal medicine—a Cuban one led by Carlos Finlay and a U.S. military one led 
by Walter Reed—combined their knowledge of mosquitoes and yellow fever 
epidemiology. The Reed team was able to carry out an elaborate series of ex-
periments at a U.S. military encampment outside Havana to test the propo-
sition, first proposed by Finlay as early as 1881, that yellow fever was trans-
mitted by the Culex mosquito.27
The famous results showed definitively that the mosquito was the main 
issue in yellow fever prevention, and this led to a sanitary engineering pro-
gram in Havana that eradicated yellow fever from the city in the space of one 
year. Because of the international profile of these experimental findings and 
their enormous political implications for development in the tropics (dem-
onstrated in short order in the isthmus of Panama), the episode quickly be-
came the basis for a struggle on the part of virtually every influential physi-
cian in Cuba, including former rivals of Finlay like Santos Fernández, to 
ensure that Carlos Finlay was recognized as the key scientist in the unravel-
ing of this research puzzle. The sense that Finlay’s role was given short shrift 
by Reed and in international medical reportage of the scientific triumph be-
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came, overnight, the central symbol of Cuban medical nationalism, and it 
remains so to this day.
The politics and symbolism of the glamorous Finlay- Reed affair were cru-
cial to the shifts in Cuban science during the second half of the U.S. oc-
cupation, but a second drama pitting Diego Tamayo against Juan Santos 
Fernández, one that has gone essentially unnoticed in Cuban history, was 
just as fundamental in redrawing the landscape. On taking charge in 1899, 
Wood established a “creole cabinet” to broker the reconstruction of Cuba, 
and he appointed Santos Fernández’s estranged protégé, Diego Tamayo, to 
the crucial position of Cuban minister of the interior. This was a portfolio 
that charged him with overseeing the civilian side of health and sanitary mat-
ters.28 Tamayo, originally from an important family from eastern Cuba, had 
strong connections with creole elites in the capital. He was an internation-
ally respected scientist who had shared laboratory benches with members of 
Pasteur’s famous research team as well as with Sternberg. Tamayo was, more-
over, a former Autonomist who had abjured at the proper time, gone into 
exile, and joined the Revolutionary Junta as soon as war broke out in 1895. 
Wood encouraged and enabled Tamayo’s election to the Constituent Assem-
bly in 1900, where he would play a key role in helping convince the assembly 
to acquiesce to the Platt Amendment. Wood also appointed Tamayo to the 
presidency of the Cuban Academy of Sciences when it was refloated in 1900 
as a republican institution- in- waiting. Given the history between Tamayo 
and Santos Fernández, this was a serious affront to the power and honor of 
the latter who had been president of the academy when it lowered the Span-
ish flag and relinquished its royal status in 1898.
The response of the Santos Fernández group came during the Third Pan- 
American Medical Conference, held in Havana in late 1900 and early 1901 
with delegates from throughout the Americas in attendance. The announce-
ment that the mystery of yellow fever transmission had been solved caused 
a sensation, and the Santos Fernández group seized the opportunity to con-
duct a public relations campaign in a journal of popular hygiene published 
by one of its researchers. The cover of the January 1901 issue of La Higiene 
sported the caricature of a triumphal Carlos Finlay flying astride a giant mos-
quito, with an admiring chorus of smaller Culex winging along beside (see 
figure 2.1). Its pages contained a profile of Cuba’s premier scientific facility, 
Santos Fernández’s Instituto, a research laboratory still waiting for a sign 
from the new authorities on its future role. A month later the cover of La 
Higiene featured the Instituto’s leading researcher, Juan Dávalos, reveren-
tially and pointedly caricatured as Quijote on a glanders- ridden Rocinante: 
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here was the heroic figure of the “Cuban bacteriologist” who had been the 
first person to identify the glanders germ in Cuba and had battled against 
the disease during the Spanish empire along with others of the Instituto 
(see figure 2.2). Although the U.S. authorities had introduced regulations 
to eliminate diseased horses from the capital as early as May 1900, both ani-
mal and human glanders were still endemic in the city. The accompanying 
article, “Glanders and the Intervention” was extremely critical of the U.S. 
occupation authorities. “The Intervention Government has taken control of 
city sanitation,” and though they found hideous abuses by the owners of 
stables and horse- drawn transportation concerns, the “Chief of interven-
tionist Sanitation” had not acted. “Glanders continues to take its course, the 
same with the Americans as with the Spaniards [in the late 1880s]. The truth 
is that the Intervention Government only cares about yellow fever, as though 
Cuba must be forever the exclusive patrimony of those foreigners who have 
no acquired immunity. Neither the tb hitting our children nor the glanders 
that shames us in the eyes of civilized peoples enter into the calculations of 
our non- Cuban governors.”29
The challenge was pointed, but so was Wood’s response: Tamayo was 
named to head a Special Commission for the Extinction of Glanders and 
Figure 2.1 Cuban 
physicians extol Finlay,  
La Higiene, 1901. Courtesy 
of the Rare Books Library, 
University of Havana.
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Animal Tuberculosis. While Gorgas has gone down in history for oversee-
ing the elimination of yellow fever from Havana during 1901, Tamayo’s suc-
cess in eliminating glanders during the same period of time was, for the 
Cuban audience of professionals, probably more decisive in consolidating 
the scientific and public health legitimacy of the occupation authorities and 
their Cuban interlocutors. The creole medical profession had seen the San-
tos Fernández group make the fight against glanders, during the late 1880s 
and 1890s, the defining struggle against the irrationality of Spanish colonial 
control. Tamayo’s success, using the tools placed at his disposal by the occu-
pation authorities, showed that the new regime was more than capable of 
responding to the shortcomings of Spanish colonial public health. Tamayo’s 
strict enforcement of regulations concerning the keeping, reporting, and 
quarantining of sick animals, complemented with an offer of compensation 
for each suspicious animal culled, seems to have made the difference in the 
eradication of glanders from Havana by the end of 1902.30 This was a signifi-
Figure 2.2 A quixotic 
Juan Dávalos celebrated 
for his work on glanders, 
La Higiene, 1901. Courtesy 
of the Rare Books Library, 
University of Havana.
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cant victory for the U.S. occupation government and for those Cubans in the 
sanitary world who backed it.
Cuba’s best physicians clamored to get on board and participate in the 
U.S. hygienic mission, seeing it as the practical materialization of the anti-
colonial scientific agenda.31 But they soon saw that they were collaborating 
in something quite distinct. Whereas, under the anticolonial banner of the 
Santos Fernández group, hygienism had been part of a rationalist discourse 
that also envisioned a sovereign Cuban scientific capacity for research and 
innovation, under the banner of the United States and in the context of the 
republic, it was the organizing principle of a discourse of sanitary adminis-
tration using established techniques that was explicitly decoupled from any 
notion that the island would have state- backed centers of original medi-
cal research. Indeed, Santos Fernández’s power base, the Instituto, was seri-
ously weakened by the occupation regime when, in 1901, Tamayo and Wood 
promoted the creation of a new official state laboratory, the Laboratory of 
the Island of Cuba. Renamed the National Laboratory in 1902, it displaced 
much of the public function and all of the public authority that the Insti-
tuto together with the academy had fulfilled in the 1890s. Wood and Tamayo 
added insult to injury by hiring away Dávalos, the Instituto’s senior micro-
biologist. The very figure the Instituto group had trumpeted on the cover 
of Higiene as a Cuban scientific hero working in their employ now became 
director of bacteriology at the National Laboratory and brought with him a 
number of the other specialists who had staffed the Instituto.32 There is no 
clear date marking the demise of the Instituto Histo- bacteriológico. It was 
still the principal private producer of vaccines and sera in the republic in 
1915, and it continued to function as a private laboratory, but it never recap-
tured its centrality to scientific research in the republic.33 Santos Fernández 
and his project lost out in the politics of the U.S. intervention, relegated to 
the margins in the reconstruction of medical and scientific power under the 
occupation and early republic, stripped of power and personnel, drained of 
recognition and momentum in each domain of action.
Cuba and the New Tropical Medicine
The Cuban medical community rebounded quickly after 1898: by the census 
of 1907 there were 1,240 physicians practicing in Cuba (almost equaling the 
number of lawyers), over 1,000 of them creoles. The national average of one 
schooled and titled medical doctor for every 1,600 people—quite high in 
Western terms—was matched by a dense urban concentration in Havana: 511 
doctors attended 300,000 residents of the capital (1:600).34 By 1919 the num-
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ber of practicing physicians and surgeons in the capital had risen by a third 
to 684, just ahead of the pace of growth in the city’s population, and another 
300 were established just outside the city in Havana province.35 The Uni-
versity of Havana’s medical faculty was relaunched in conjunction with the 
U.S. model of the teaching hospital, and Cuban medicine was soon among 
the leaders in Latin America in medical specialization, something reflected 
in the growing numbers of professional associations and journals in spe-
cialized fields. The center of Cuban medicine, Havana, experienced a prolif-
eration of medical research actors and spaces, but their focus became much 
more politico- administrative and commercial, much more oriented toward 
the application of basic sanitary science and clinical and hospital care, with 
few “pure” research clusters.
Finlayism had instantly become a symbol of the integrity and promise 
of Cuban medical science, but the sudden power won by U.S. sanitary dis-
course and tropical medicine—in good measure due to the yellow fever 
breakthrough in Cuba—was such that it subsumed the program of medical 
research in Cuba during the first two decades of the republic. Cuba’s most 
important established medical scientists were motivated to throw themselves 
into the task of organizing and carrying out basic public health measures, be-
ginning with the enlistment in 1900 of more than a hundred eminent Havana 
doctors to map and sanitize the streets and slums of the capital. They con-
tinued to work on basic sanitary management during the cleansing of the 
city of mosquito breeding grounds, and then carried on staffing the new 
apparatuses of sanitary administration in the early republican governments. 
Symptomatic of this shift from innovative research to basic application was 
the appointment of Finlay as director of sanitation in 1907, a tradition of ap-
pointing the most brilliant of Cuban medical researchers to senior politico- 
administrative public health posts that carried on through the 1920s. To some 
degree, this was a factor of age and the logical tendency for mature scientists 
to move into managerial posts and seek public roles. More than this, how-
ever, it came of raising Cuban public health to a vital matter of state sover-
eignty by virtue of Article 5 of the Platt Amendment. Cuba concentrated its 
most competent scientific minds—especially those recognized as such in the 
United States—in keeping the island free of diseases the United States con-
sidered matters of its own national security. Ironically, in this sense, main-
taining political sovereignty through applied science came at the expense of 
building up a sovereign science.
By the same token, it became clear to established and emerging Cuban 
medical researchers that resources and recognition would come most readily 
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in the area of tropical medicine. Between 1898 and 1902 medical research on 
diseases or conditions in countries located in the tropics radically reconfig-
ured the discourse of tropical medicine. On the British side, the key mani-
festations of this shift included the creation of a Colonial Medical Service by 
the British Colonial Office (1898); the publication of the “bible” of tropical 
medicine, Patrick Manson’s Tropical Diseases: A Manual of the Diseases of 
Warm Climates (1898); the announcement of the work of Ronald Ross on the 
role of mosquitoes in the transmission of malaria (1898); and the creation 
of the London and the Liverpool Schools of Tropical Medicine (1899). On 
the United States’ side were the medical and health apparatuses established 
in the country’s newly acquired tropical colonies—Puerto Rico, the Canal 
Zone, the Philippines, and of course occupied Havana.36
Within a very short period of time, then, two great empires—one in mid-
life, the other declaring itself dramatically for the first time—created insti-
tutional circuitries of medicine and sanitation for their imperial spheres of 
influence and electrified them with a scientific discourse coterminous with 
imperial dominion. Obviously, the moment did not emerge from nothing. 
Medical researchers whom we might see as engaged in “tropical medicine” 
had been active throughout Britain’s colonies since the seventeenth cen-
tury, and if the United States was a new player in this game, French, Ger-
man, and Spanish scientists had been at it for a very long time. But some-
thing fundamental had changed. What had been a multi- polar endeavor, 
with heterogeneous and individual actors, shifted very suddenly toward 
an Anglo- American apparatus of network- based and institutionalized re-
search, codification, classification, agenda setting, and application. The work 
of the Reed Commission and Gorgas’s sanitary regime in Havana would be a 
spectacular confirmation of this shift, and the U.S. ability to tackle success-
fully the disease obstacles of the Panamanian isthmus through sanitary engi-
neering a spectacular demonstration of the practical power of Anglo- Saxon 
tropical medicine.
This was the vehicle for two powerful dual- national figures, John/Juan 
Guiteras and Aristides Agramonte, to reintroduce themselves into Cuba after 
long absences where they created new nodes of medical research. Of course, 
neither was a stranger to Cuban scientific life. Originally from Matanzas, 
while pursuing opportunities in Philadelphia where he had studied medi-
cine, Guiteras had been appointed by the United States as a member of the 
1879 joint Spanish-U.S. Yellow Fever Commission, and his connections with 
Cuban science and society had remained strong; Agramonte was in a sense 
a younger version of Guiteras, a protégé of U.S. Surgeon General Sternberg 
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who had been sent to Cuba on a special yellow fever research assignment 
that complemented the work of the Reed team. University reforms enacted 
by the occupation government led to the creation of a chair in Intertropical 
Pathology at the University of Havana in 1899, and the position was promptly 
awarded to Guiteras. Agramonte, a member of the Reed team, also created 
a power base for himself with a university chair in Bacteriology and Experi-
mental Pathology, and following the spectacular outcome of the yellow fever 
experiments, he assumed a leading role in the island’s scientific life. Both 
Guiteras and Agramonte would later serve as ministers of public health.
But they did not carry on the previous discourse of Cuban tropical medi-
cine. The shift can be illustrated by looking at Guiteras’s Revista de Medicina 
Tropical, which he began publishing in 1900 under a new banner of tropi-
cal medicine defined in the metropolises of the Atlantic empire, particularly 
London and Washington. The network described on the masthead of the 
first issue is another good expression of the shift in scientific networks in 
Cuban medicine following 1898. His collaborator in the journal was Emilio 
Martínez, director of the Clinical Laboratory, a rival to Santos Fernández’s 
Instituto. Carlos Finlay figured as a writer, while the list of collaborators in-
cluded three men who had been central to the scientific project of the Insti-
tuto but who were on their way to new appointments under the occupation 
government: Juan Dávalos, Eduardo Lainé, and Tomás Coronado.37 Also fig-
uring in the group were Agramonte as well as Enrique López, Santos Fer-
nández’s principal commercial- professional rival as a cutting- edge ophthal-
mologist in Havana.
In his presentation of the first issue, Guiteras proposed that with the 
growth of subdivisions in medical science, tropical medicine should become 
the specialty of “our country, due to its climate, its topographical and ethnic 
conditions.”38 He specifically inserted this project (emerging “in the last five 
years”) into the Anglo- American ascendancy over a French- based anatomo- 
clinical and bacteriological tradition that had grounded Cuban medical re-
search in the late nineteenth century and linked the project to the emer-
gence of parasitology as a discipline. Guiteras endorsed the reaping of Cuba’s 
comparative advantage in terms of the interest of the new colonial powers 
in solving problems relating to the colonization of the tropics. He proposed 
a move to parasitology over bacteriology because it is more applied, and 
inserted his tropical medical program into the contemporary race science 
by suggesting that Cuban researchers pursue the lessons of the most recent 
Liverpool trips to Africa and the work of Koch showing that the population 
of “Negros” were actually carriers of malaria.39
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It is notable that Santos Fernández had already moved away from this es-
sentialist mode of racism characteristic of the new current of tropical medi-
cine. Over his first two and a half decades of practice, Santos Fernández had 
accumulated clinical data on some 5,531 subjects deemed to be of African de-
scent (3,003 “Negros” and 2,528 “mulattos”). In his summary analysis of the 
data, Enfermedades de los Ojos en los Negros y Mulatos (Diseases of the eye in 
Negros and mulattos) presented to the 1900 International Medical Congress 
in Paris, he argued that there were no new or special diseases in determinate 
races; indeed, his immense database demonstrated the opposite: everyone 
suffered the same diseases of the eye regardless of race.40 This Paris paper 
was an early announcement of the kind of reformulation of categories that 
would characterize postcolonial Cuban racism—a shift that has been part of 
a major recent historiographical discussion.41 Virtually all the works on this 
subject emphasize the way that Cubans of African ancestry were denied citi-
zenship and scripted into a U.S. and Western European–influenced eugenic 
narrative that focused on atavism. Yet Santos Fernández was precisely mov-
ing away from a notion of pathologies native to different races. Instead, his 
racial vision of the “vision of race” was more in keeping with the dominant 
Lamarckian eugenic currents in Latin America—that is, the conjuring of a 
cubanidad that would come from the gradual absorption of those of African 
ancestry into the general population pool.
His racialized medical research project reminds us that the intellectual 
process of this reformulation predated independence and was the product 
of the internal development of Cuban science (including its anthropological 
vector) using Cuban data.42 Santos Fernández certainly remained a leading 
creole voice in favor of immigration from Spain, and he was part of an im-
portant faction in Cuban eugenics.43 His predilection, however, was based 
more on the logic of a “whitening” mestizaje (race mixture) and a belief 
that Spaniards were more suited to improving Cuba, having acquired greater 
“civilization.” This was a very different current of racism than the more ge-
netically and tropical medicine–based racist essentialism expressed at this 
time by Cuban intellectuals such as Fernando Ortíz and Guiteras. As Alejan-
dro de la Fuente has shown, by the second decade of the republic both these 
latter two would also move away from their early essentialism, in the case 
of Guiteras to a position almost identical to that of Santos Fernández, and 
in the case of Ortíz to an ever deeper engagement with Afro- Cuban cultural 
forms and an embrace of “Afro- cubanidad.”44
In the two decades following 1898, a handful of private laboratories de-
voted to clinical diagnostics were created, and five state labs began to operate, 
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all under the wings of different ministries, in particular the two main ones 
devoting their services to the Department (after 1909, Ministry) of Health. 
The public labs were overtaxed and burdened with analyzing specimens of 
direct consequence to public administration to the point that they could not 
even keep up with routine work.45 This was a constant complaint of Cuba’s 
leading scientific actors in the early republic. When Agramonte and Guiteras 
were asked to provide bacteriological confirmation of the existence of plague 
in 1912, for example, they could not complete their analysis of specimens col-
lected from a cadaver because the official laboratories had had their funds 
“distracted” and so did not have the proper equipment for the job, “and we 
were forced to omit this very important detail from our investigation.”46 In-
deed, one might say the same thing for the energies of all the titans of Cuban 
medical research after 1898: their science was “distracted” into government 
sanitary administration work and into service defined by the agenda of U.S. 
tropical medicine. Even Guiteras and Agramonte, who cultivated successful 
international scientific reputations through the 1920s, carried out their most 
significant work as consultants in yellow fever for the Rockefeller Founda-
tion in other countries. (Ironically, Cuba no longer had any clinical research 
advantage in yellow fever, having eradicated the disease.)
The shortcomings were not lost on the country’s medical elites for long. 
In 1917, the Academy of Sciences paid homage to Juan Santos Fernández, 
its long- serving president, on his seventieth birthday. The heart of the affair 
were speeches by former collaborators at the Instituto Histo- bacteriológico. 
The master of ceremonies, Jorge Le Roy y Cassá, one of the most important 
social and political intellectuals in the early republican community of Cuban 
medical doctors, observed that events had vindicated the medical research 
model that Santos Fernández had built in the late colonial era and then seen 
displaced by the war of independence and a republican birth under U.S. tute-
lage. Le Roy y Cassá noted that whenever the Cuban Department of Health 
required specialized research on particular problems, its facilities were so 
overburdened with the mundane matters of sanitary and legal laboratory 
analysis that they had no capacity to carry out the work, and neither did the 
new labs at the university. He concluded, “Given the character and tendency 
of science, today more than thirty years ago it is useful and necessary to have 
a research center that is free, without the obligations of teaching institutions 
and official centers, where old and young, maestros and disciples, might find 
the manner to perfect their knowledge and devote themselves to the good of 
the nation and of humanity.”47
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New Wine in Old Bottles
Funes has called the first two decades of republican Cuban science a time 
of “expansion and continuity” of processes begun in the late colonial era, 
though broadening in scope into new disciplines and specializations. While 
scientific research had hardly been monochromatic in the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century, central issues in medicine were at the core of scien-
tific debate: from clinical practice and specialization, to epidemiology, bac-
teriology, vaccines, and serology. This changed during the U.S. occupation. 
Cuban scientific research—still overwhelmingly dominated by creole men—
became an eclectic affair that generated a number of novel projects, espe-
cially in the areas of agronomy, botany, and zoology, with medical research 
more or less confined to a thoroughly reframed field of tropical medicine.48 
Each of the nine scientists listed in García’s biographical dictionary who 
began their careers after the late 1890s worked in a separate field, and seven 
of them worked outside the field of medicine. Although the Academy of 
Sciences was reconstituted in the republic, and medicine retained its domi-
nant role in membership and debates, the institution was neither reinvested 
with the responsibilities of an official or consultative body for the state, nor 
given any authority to make scientific policy decisions. These powers were 
dispersed into different state bodies, many of which developed their own 
limited research capacity. This dispersal also had an expression in the ap-
pearance of new specialized societies and journals, especially in the area of 
medicine that appeared in the fifteen years after independence.49
One of the most significant institutions of republican science was the 
Estación Experimental Agronómica de Santiago de las Vegas, founded in 
1904 to pursue research on Cuban crops in the context of a need to rebuild 
the Cuban sugar industry following the devastation of the independence 
wars.50 It was built through close consultation with the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture on the model of U.S. agricultural research stations, and its first 
two directors were from the United States. This did not prevent the station 
from becoming a crucial node in a growing Cuban network of agronomists 
and botanists, and staff appointments soon “Cubanized” the station. The 
highly politicized nature of these appointments disrupted research conti-
nuity over the first fifteen years of operation. In the 1920s, however, after the 
1917 appointment as director of Mario Calvino (the father of novelist Italo 
Calvino, who was born on the station), there was both a scientific revival and 
a program of practical popular outreach to Cuban farmers.51 The autodidact 
botanist Juan Tomás Roig y Mesa had a long, if fitful, career at the station, 
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and in 1928 he published under its auspices one of Cuba’s classic tomes of 
popular science, the Diccionario botánico de nombres vulgares cubanos.52 The 
station also developed links with the Atkins Garden for research on tropical 
botany and agriculture, established on the Soledad estate outside Cienfuegos 
as a joint venture between the philanthropic planter and Bostonian Edwin 
Atkins and Harvard University—another venture that transmuted the sugar 
plantation into a research station.53 The Atkins Garden flourished in the late 
1910s and 1920s and became accessible in a variety of ways to Cuban re-
searchers, but it was also an expression of how the new scientific institutions 
of the republic could be dependent on U.S. research institutions and models 
and even formally subordinate to a U.S. agenda.54
Of course, not all new science fit this mold. The scientific universalism to 
which the academy had always aspired, as Rolando García Blanco has noted, 
“began to be taken on by the University” according to the new model un-
veiled by the military government in June 1900.55 For someone like Santos 
Fernández, who had always staked out his territory outside—and against—
the scientific jurisdiction of the university as a moribund, scholastic space, 
this cut further into his influence, and he could only stand on the outside 
looking in as the university was recharged with modernist vigor. But not all 
of his generation or inclination faced the same fate. His old collaborator in 
the founding of Cuban anthropology, Luis Montané, was invited inside the 
university structure. Montané’s career path recapitulated an important shift 
in the nature and purpose of creole scientific practice from the late years of 
Spanish colonial rule to the second decade of rocky republican politics. Ale-
jandra Bronfman has explored this rebirth of Cuban anthropology in 1900, 
given impetus by the occupation authorities who created a Department of 
Anthropology and Anthropometric Exercises as part of their university re-
form project.56 Montané devoted himself increasingly to anthropological, 
botanical, and zoological research in a broadly conceived and vaguely de-
fined “political laboratory.” Bronfman looks at Montané’s role in the com-
bined process of pathologizing and criminalizing Afro- Cuban physiologies 
and cultural forms. He played no small role in constituting a scientific dis-
course that served as a reference point and sounding board for the series 
of disturbing, racist moral panics in early republican Cuba over the alleged 
kidnapping and murder of “white” children by practitioners of Afro- Cuban 
religious ceremonies.
Montané also played a role in a world- historical moment in Cuban zool-
ogy during the first republic, one stemming from the eccentric genius, inter-
national contacts, and great wealth of Rosalía Abreu. Abreu revived and re-
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configured late colonial medical research energies in an entirely novel space 
of republican science: the Quinta Palatino, an estate housing primates that 
she built on the outskirts of Havana where she became the first person in the 
world to breed chimpanzees successfully in captivity. In 1915 Montané was 
called to Abreu’s “finca de los monos” (monkey farm) to witness the birth of 
Anumá, el “chimpance criollo” (the creole chimpanzee) and the first chimp 
in the world to be bred and born out of the wild.57 The paper he presented 
on the subject to the Cuban Society of Natural History “Felipe Poey” (a new 
republican space of science founded in 1913) attracted the attention of lead-
ing U.S. eugenicist and psychologist Robert Yerkes, who had it translated 
into English and published in the Journal of Animal Behavior.58 Hoping to 
establish a primate research facility of his own, Yerkes was acutely interested 
in Abreu’s methods. Notably, Abreu initially made contact with Yerkes, who 
was at that time a Harvard- based researcher, through Harvard botanists who 
were in Cuba developing the Atkin Gardens.
Abreu was in many ways an extraordinary figure, not least because she 
was a rare Cuban woman who was able to carve a niche for herself in national 
or international science, even if that niche was inevitably cast in terms of the 
“eccentric amateur.”59 The early republican era was arguably more closed 
than the late colonial era to women in science. This is evident in the trajec-
tory of Laura Martínez de Carvajal, the first woman to graduate from the 
University of Havana medical school (1888), who became the scientific col-
laborator of her husband, the ophthalmologist Enrique López, on the bril-
liant three- volume Oftalmológica Clínica. Yet, following López’s 1901 death 
from tuberculosis, Martínez de Carvajal withdrew completely from medical 
practice and research, secluding herself on an estate outside Havana where 
she directed a school for disadvantaged girls.60 Abreu likewise set up her 
estate on the outskirts of Havana (and, notably, also ran there a trade school 
for poor girls), but she was hardly a recluse. Instead she hosted one of the 
country’s most important salons, a coterie aligned with leading factions of 
Liberalism (Luis Estevez, the first vice president of Cuba was her brother- 
in- law, and Alfredo Zayas lived for a time at the Quinta Palatino during the 
Menocal regime). Abreu’s interests in animal collecting and the creation of 
a menagerie during the first few years of the republic transformed gradually 
into a more systematic focus on collecting and then, quite extraordinarily, 
breeding primates. While universally recognized for her pioneering feat (one 
she repeated on many occasions before anyone else had deciphered primate 
breeding needs), Abreu’s status in the history of primatology is problematic 
due to her reluctance to document her ideas or techniques or publish them 
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in scientific fora. Even so, her work has recently been the subject of close 
attention by zoologist Clive Wynne, who calls her “the founder of the study 
of captive apes.”61
Although she sketched out a highly original agenda on the outskirts of re-
publican science, Abreu was herself typical in having been part of the inner 
circle of the Atlantic medical research world of late colonial Cuban science. 
She was the sister- in- law of Grancher and had lived in the Paris house of 
Grancher and her sister, Rosa. In 1885 she married Domingo Sánchez Toledo, 
a Cuban expatriate who was a leading Paris physician and close confidant 
of Grancher.62 She had been, then, a member of the close- knit Pasteurian 
family during the heyday of its international medical triumph. While it re-
mains unclear how Rosalía Abreu came to study primates, her ideas about 
breeding and observing animals in captivity were almost certainly formed, 
at least in part, by her experience of experimental animals kept at the Pasteur 
Institute.63 In this sense, her more formal entrée into the scientific world as 
wealthy and innovative primate breeder in early republican Cuba was simply 
another instance of the shift of a creole medical research establishment with 
sugar riches and strong French networks into a new mode and guise. Like 
Santos Fernández, she created an urban estate that transmuted sugar wealth 
into a research station whose concerns overlapped with emerging areas of 
biosciences, though given the republican context she cultivated contacts 
with scientific networks in the United States.
More work on Abreu is needed to discover what relationship her program 
had to Cuban political and intellectual life, although there are evidently a 
number of possible connections between her project to breed, study, and de-
velop techniques for stable social hierarchies using captive African primates 
and the creole concern to find a way to contain politically an Afro- Cuban 
citizenry perceived to be dangerous, volatile, primitive, and not yet fully so-
cialized. Certainly Yerkes’s interest in developing a primate research facility 
as the basis for the new discipline of psychobiology has been read by Donna 
Haraway as an “intersecting construction of nonhuman primates as pets, 
surrogate children, endangered species, research animals, colonial subjects, 
and wild animals.”64 Haraway cites Yerkes’s book as a particular expression 
of this. Almost Human documents Yerkes’s two- month visit in 1924 to study 
Abreu’s estate and her primate management and breeding practices. After a 
long exchange of correspondence and visits with Abreu, during which they 
explored the possibilities of establishing his own primate laboratories as an 
extension of Abreu’s estate, Yerkes finally received a large grant from the 
Rockefeller Foundation to create the Yale University Laboratories of Primate 
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Biology and the Anthropoid Breeding and Experiment Station in Florida, 
though he was fortunate to get the core of Abreu’s collection as a donation 
to the Yale facility following her death in 1929. Thus Abreu’s Quinta Palatino 
combined a multitude of strands in late colonial medical, anthropological, 
and natural history research, from both sides of the Atlantic, to establish an 
unlikely satellite of psychobiological modernism in republican Havana.
The Fernández Group (Slight Return)
New patterns of Cuban science took shape in the republic. No longer would 
medical research rule the roost; no longer would creole enterprise and sci-
entific eminence provide a simultaneously official and unfettered state and 
sovereign scientific agenda to public power. And no longer would the axes 
of this scientific network run through Paris, Madrid, and Barcelona. Instead, 
the more common pattern would see actors institutionally entrenched in the 
university (and other centers of learning) working with private research ini-
tiatives that were linked to U.S. scientific networks. Diego Tamayo’s career 
followed a typical path for the new scientific leadership. His cabinet role 
came to an end in 1905, but his political aspirations continued, and he was 
elected to the Senate in 1908, the same year that he launched his journal of 
national hygiene, Vida Nueva—at once a vehicle for disseminating a dis-
course on the intrinsic connection between fomenting hygiene and main-
taining sovereignty, and a means for advertising the Tamayo Clinic and its 
medical product line. He became Cuba’s foremost expert on tuberculosis, 
and in 1919 he was appointed rector of the University of Havana, receiving 
his own homage from the Academy of Sciences in 1922. He hastened to send 
a copy of the brochure made for the occasion to his old friend and colleague 
Leonard Wood, then occupying the governor’s chair in Manila’s Malacañan 
Palace. Wood wrote a warm note of congratulations and thanks in return, 
saying that it brought back “many pleasant recollections of old days in Cuba 
and your efficient and loyal service in the great work we did there.”65
Of course, these were tendencies rather than sudden and total shifts—
Luis Montané retired to Paris in the early 1920s to live the final chapter of his 
life as president of the French Society for Anthropology. Indeed there was a 
strong residual pull toward France and Spain in these years, itself reflective 
of the eclecticism of the era. And it was in the context of this eclecticism that 
the Santos Fernández project reformulated itself, in part by disaggregating 
and redeploying its energies in a way that mirrored and anticipated the dif-
fracted field of Cuban science in the republic. First, at the dawn of the repub-
lic, Santos Fernández reclaimed the presidency of the Academy of Sciences. 
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Tamayo had likely ceded the space willingly once the retooling process of the 
occupation had come to an end and with it the need to dominate spaces of 
scientific leadership—even retrograde ones like the academy—for defensive 
reasons if nothing else. While the Academy had lost its élan and was even 
the butt of ridicule among a younger generation of physicians, Santos Fer-
nández retook the position as part of a strategy to embrace associationism 
for its own sake. During the early republic the medical patriarch became a 
kind of one- man civil society, organizing national and international confer-
ences in medicine, public health, and medical journalism. He also founded 
medical associations, including the Colegio de Médicos Cubanos, the first 
attempt at an island- wide professional association, and other groups like the 
Cuban Society for the Protection of Animals. He began self- consciously to 
knit a hispanoamerican network with a society and a periodical focused on 
hispanoamerican ophthalmology that linked practitioners in Spain, Cuba, 
Mexico, and Argentina. The same kind of “retreat to specialty” character-
ized his Cuban professional project, as he transformed the Crónica Médico- 
Quirúrgica into a medical periodical focusing on ophthalmology and ex-
panded his practice by taking on his nephew, Francisco María Fernández, 
who had completed an ophthalmology specialization in the United States.66
While Santos Fernández enjoyed some final years of acclaim and homage, 
it was his nephew who was able to combine these ingredients to attain politi-
cal power. Francisco María shared the established practice with his uncle, 
co- edited the Crónica, became an important organizer of medical confer-
ences, was elected to the Academy of Sciences in 1921 while his uncle was 
in his very last year in the president’s chair, and soon became a member of 
the executive himself—treasurer from 1923 to 1926, vice president from 1926 
to 1929, and president from 1929 to 1933. His father had risen to be chief of 
the Liberal Party in Matanzas, and Francisco María used this regional power 
base to get himself elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1925 as a represen-
tative for Matanzas.67 He acquired an international profile as one of Cuba’s 
most outspoken eugenicists, culminating in his role as founder of the Cuban 
League of Mental Hygiene and principal organizer of the First Pan- American 
Conference on Eugenics and Homiculture in 1927. By the time he welcomed 
delegates to Havana, he was Machado’s minister of health, which did not stop 
him from subsequently complementing his ministerial power with a Pan- 
American diplomatic post stemming from the 1927 congress: he served as 
president of the Pan- American Office of Eugenics and Homiculture from 1927 
until 1933, and housed the agency’s office in Havana’s Ministry of Health.68
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Thus it would be a mistake to see the residual institutions and activities 
pursued by Juan Santos Fernández as insignificant to the constitution of sci-
entific or political power in the republic. Not for nothing was his nephew 
simultaneously an elite practitioner of ophthalmology, editor of a medical 
periodical, president of the Academy of Sciences, minister of health, conve-
nor of a Pan- American congress, and president of a Pan- American bureau 
with considerable international cachet. Nevertheless, with Francisco María 
Hernández’s 1933 flight into Miami exile upon the fall of Machado, we might 
consider that a long period of creole scientific life, first articulated in the 
1870s by a coterie of ambitious young researchers led by his uncle, had finally 
come to an end. To avoid seeing this legacy of Santos Fernández as purely 
reactionary, however, it is worth pointing out that the Colegio de Médicos, 
which he cofounded in 1910–11 as part of his ceaseless associationist im-
pulse, metamorphosed in 1925 into the Cuban Medical Federation (fmC), 
an association that would become a critical forum of Cuban civil society 
during the Machado period. Not coincidentally, Francisco María Fernán-
dez, who was also president of the fmC in 1929, had to face the challenge of 
a radical faction, Renovación, formed as a result of the physicians’ strikes of 
1927–28. Medical students and physicians emerged as one of the most tren-
chant opposition groups to Machado—what Ross Danielson has called a 
“medical insurgency”—and their role in the dictator’s overthrow culminated 
in 1933–34 with the tantalizing rise to power of the physician, professor of 
medicine at the university, and member of the Academy of Sciences, Ramón 
Grau San Martín.69
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CHAPTER 3

Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Cuba
A View from the Sugar District of Cienfuegos, 1886–1909
Rebecca J. Scott
Writing in 1902, Victor Clark, who had traveled to Cuba to report on 
labor conditions for the United States Department of Labor, made 
the following startling observation: “Cuba is one of the most demo-
cratic countries in the world. Nowhere else does the least- considered 
member of a community aspire with more serene confidence to social 
equality with its most exalted personage.”1 Clark’s sweeping state-
ments about national character, with their faintly mocking tone, can 
hardly be considered definitive evidence. But his remarks do suggest 
that four centuries of colonial domination and hierarchical authority 
in Cuba had not left precisely the visible legacy that one might ex-
pect. This raises the question: can one in fact document a widespread 
presumption to social equality and with it, perhaps, some of the prac-
tices that might be encompassed in the term citizenship?2
Scholars of Latin America have long noted the marked absence of 
full rights of citizenship for rural workers, including former slaves.3 
Stanley Stein, for example, took up this question in a pathbreaking 
1957 study, Vassouras: A Brazilian Coffee County, 1850–1900. In his 
introduction to the 1985 reedition, Stein clarified the challenge he had 
intentionally posed to the arguments of Frank Tannenbaum’s influ-
ential Slave and Citizen. Tannenbaum had argued optimistically that 
in Catholic Latin America the “moral status of the freed man” was 
higher than in Protestant North America, thus facilitating a relatively 
smooth transition from slave to citizen. Stein convincingly demon-
strated that whatever the notional Catholic recognition of the moral 
equality of the slave, the coffee planters of Vassouras emphatically 
did not wish to see their slaves transformed into citizens.4 Subse-
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quent scholarship has emphasized continuities of impoverishment, patri-
archal control, and patron- client relations in rural Brazil, particularly in the 
sugar regions of the northeast.5 Brazilian historians, including João Reis and 
Hebe Mattos de Castro, have retrieved some evidence of claims to citizenship 
on the part of slaves and former slaves in Bahia and in rural Rio de Janeiro.6 
But such claims generally met with resolute opposition. The trend toward 
formal disfranchisement and informal subordination of rural workers was 
very strong in the late Brazilian empire and the early republic.7
It may therefore be particularly interesting to ask where, among Latin 
American slave plantation societies, there might be some exceptions to this 
powerful pattern. If in most instances economic transformations—including 
the shift from slavery to free labor—were accompanied by disfranchisement 
in the political sphere, perhaps in a few instances they were not. The pur-
pose of such a search for alternatives is not to argue that deeply embedded 
structures failed to limit social transformations. Rather, it is to ask just what 
it took to break these patterns. Under what circumstances did some forms 
of political voice construed in terms of citizenship become a reality for those 
who had occupied the lowest rungs of plantation society? One can then pro-
ceed to ask how deeply embedded structures—or shallow contingent ones, 
for that matter—operated to shape the space and extent of that citizenship.8
On the island of Cuba the tumult of the wars of independence, which ac-
companied the process of slave emancipation, opened up possibilities that 
not even the prompt United States military occupation could close down. 
Moreover, these two phenomena—anticolonial war and foreign military 
occupation—each generated extensive documentary evidence, providing 
an unusual richness of detail for the study of a postemancipation society 
in Latin America. The dynamics of the search for political voice by former 
slaves and other rural workers can thus be examined on the ground, not only 
in particular regions, but even in neighborhoods.
From Slavery to Free Labor in Cienfuegos
The district of Cienfuegos on the southern coast of the province of Santa 
Clara, encompassing both the prosperous port city from which it took its 
name and an enormously rich hinterland, offers the possibility of a reveal-
ing case study.9 In the 1870s the rapidly developing hinterland of Cienfuegos 
comprised the partidos of Camarones, Cartagena, Cumanayagua, Las Casas, 
Yaguaramas, and Santa Isabel de las Lajas, which together contained some 
seventy- seven sugar estates (ingenios), most linked by water or rail to the 
port itself.10 The incomplete agricultural census of 1877 enumerated 5,396 
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slave workers on these estates, and the ingenios of Cienfuegos also relied on 
a smaller number of free wage laborers and Chinese indentured workers.11 
The river valleys of Cienfuegos thus encompassed a large, relatively recently 
arrived multiracial workforce in sugar, most of whose members were bound 
by slavery or indenture. At the same time, the hills rising to the east toward 
the Trinidad Mountains and the interstitial small farms in the valleys con-
tinued to be worked by long- free descendants of earlier settlers as well as by 
former slaves who had recently obtained their freedom.
The planters of Cienfuegos managed to sustain a substantial slave labor 
force despite the passage of the Moret Law of 1870, which freed children and 
the elderly, and even through much of the Ten Years’ War (1868–78), which 
raged to the east and undermined the social relations of slavery in those re-
gions that it touched. But Cienfuegos could not hold out indefinitely against 
the forces undoing slavery in Cuba. The late 1870s brought turmoil as indi-
vidual slaves traded with, and in some cases joined, the anticolonial insur-
gents in the hills.12
Map 3.1 The jurisdiction of Cienfuegos, with its principal sugar plantations in 1878. 
Courtesy of Irá Millán.
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Within the insurgent ranks, a conventional form of address was ciuda-
dano (citizen), sometimes abbreviated in rebel records as c.c., for ciudadano 
cubano, and sometimes modified by de color. The perceived need to specify 
that a given citizen was an individual de color hinted at the distinctions that 
still pervaded the thinking of white rebel officers, and some were reluctant 
to describe former slaves as ciudadanos at all. But the introduction of citi-
zen as a term of description did not go unnoticed by those accustomed to 
racialized and derogatory forms of address from their social superiors. Rebel 
nationalists were explicitly proffering the notion of citizenship in an imag-
ined free Cuba, even if some among them subsequently and selectively with-
held equal rights from former slaves and other Afro- Cubans in the course of 
the struggle. As Ada Ferrer argues, the evidence suggests that “free persons 
of color demonstrated their awareness of the new rebel discourse of freedom 
and equality and their willingness to make demands on the basis of that dis-
course.”13
Challenges within and outside estates multiplied, and rumors of new alli-
ances between slaves and their free neighbors plagued slave owners around 
Cienfuegos. An informant from the town of San Antón wrote confidentially 
to the administrator of the Santa Rosalía estate to warn of trouble in July 
1879, just before the outbreak in Oriente of the Guerra Chiquita. He reported 
that word was spreading that “tonight or tomorrow the residents of this dis-
trict are going to rise up along with the slaves of the plantation.”14
By 1880 the immediate political threat posed by the Ten Years’ War and the 
Guerra Chiquita had been suppressed militarily, but the breakdown of the 
social relations that underlay slavery was already well advanced. Moreover, 
Cuba was now one of only two societies in the hemisphere whose agrarian 
elite was still attempting to sustain chattel slavery. It had become increas-
ingly evident to the Spanish parliament that to prevent anticolonial rebel-
lion from being nourished by antislavery convictions and slave resistance, 
the term slavery had to be eliminated. Cuban slaveholders, unsurprisingly, 
hoped that much of its substance could nonetheless be retained. The colonial 
authorities tried to accommodate the needs of planters by designing a grad-
ual abolition, which provided for an intermediate period of “apprenticeship” 
during which former slaves were to work for their former masters for token 
wages. Freedom was scheduled to come in small doses and, finally, by lottery 
between 1885 and 1888.
After twelve years of war and innumerable challenges from slaves, how-
ever, the power relations of a smoothly functioning slave society had be-
come a thing of the past. Apprentices, denominated patrocinados, pushed 
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at the limits of their masters’ control. Many succeeded in exiting slavery 
altogether through self- purchase, legal challenge, flight, or negotiation. In 
the face of an accelerating breakdown, abolition was completed two years 
early. In the province of Santa Clara, of which Cienfuegos was an important 
part, the number of patrocinados had fallen from 23,260 in 1883 to 5,648 in 
1886, whereupon all were freed by a Spanish decree that ended the patronato 
on the island.15
Though they had fought abolition for decades, large- scale planters in 
Cienfuegos hardly missed a beat, shifting quickly to new structures and new 
sources of labor. They adopted a three- part strategy, encompassing wage 
labor, tenantry, and contract farming. Plantations hired Spanish, Cuban, and 
Chinese workers directly or through labor contractors, they leased out land 
for the growing of cane, and they purchased cut cane from nearby suppliers. 
The Spanish government contributed to these strategies, introducing new 
subsidies for workers and their families who chose to immigrate to Cuba. 
Innovative planters with capital thus rapidly expanded their operations; 
others fell behind, and some were simply bought out by their neighbors.16
Successful landowners and merchants moved quickly toward moderniza-
tion of the local infrastructure to facilitate commercialization of the region’s 
Figure 3.1 A view across cane fields of Limones, a colonia of Soledad (now Pepito Tey), 
toward Cumanayagua and the Trinidad (now Escombray) mountains. Photograph by 
Rebecca Scott.
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expanding production. The most prosperous planters transformed their es-
tates into central sugar mills (centrales), grinding cane from multiple sup-
pliers. The most impressive of these was Constancia, owned by the Marqués 
de Apezteguía, which produced sugar worth a staggering 1 million pesos. By 
1890 Constancia’s output was larger than that of any other single mill in the 
world.17 In an appeal for permission to build new rail lines for private use, 
Fermín de Solá wrote exuberantly that Cienfuegos was providing a brilliant 
example of work and of “faith in the future.”18
A buoyant North American market for sugar, combined with new capi-
tal from the United States and from local merchants, made it possible for 
the most aggressive Cienfuegos planters to expand the scope of their opera-
tions and offer wages to old and new workers alike. The sugar plantations of 
central Cuba had largely escaped the kind of turmoil and open contest over 
access to resources that marked the occupied areas of the U.S. South dur-
ing the process of emancipation, where war and Union presence inadver-
tently opened up the possibilities for cooperative agriculture and hastened 
the emergence of grassroots “labor companies” and Union Leagues.19 None-
theless, labor mobility, the arrival of immigrants, and the continued threat 
of anticolonial insurgency on the island made an entirely smooth continuity 
of authority highly unlikely.
The Santa Rosalía estate, tucked in between the Arimao and the Caunao 
Rivers to the east of the bay of Cienfuegos, provides an example of the pattern 
of evolution of moderate- sized estates. In 1877 Santa Rosalía held 150 slaves 
and produced some 32,000 pesos worth of sugar. It had been developed by 
José Quesada and was later taken over by Manuel Blanco, a politically intran-
sigent Spanish merchant.20 In 1880 its dotación of slaves consisted of eighty-
one men, forty-nine women, and sixty-one nominally free children. In 1887, 
immediately after slave emancipation, its payroll included many of the same 
names (though surnames now accompanied Christian names), and com-
prised seventy-four men, thirty-three women, and twenty-four children.21
By the early 1890s, the workforce had become significantly more complex. 
Many of the black laborers bore the surname Quesada, which publicly iden-
tified them as former slaves of the estate. Others carried the names of the re-
gion’s prominent slaveholding families, including Iznaga, Zulueta, Argudín, 
and Goytisolo. But the estate also listed a series of laborers who had come 
from Spain and before whose name the honorific don was carefully placed. 
Don Bernardo Villar’s pay, for example, was issued in a “letra y giro sobre 
España,” and don Vicente Villar worked nearly every day for fifteen months 
before leaving the estate “para marchar a la Peninsula.” Little racial differ-
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entiation in wages was evident: like the former slaves, the Spanish workers 
earned about seventeen pesos a month.22
Adjacent to Santa Rosalía stood the expanding Soledad central, owned 
by the energetic Edwin Atkins of Massachusetts. Atkins had acquired the 
estate from the Sarría family through foreclosure in the mid- 1880s, assuming 
rights over more than a hundred former slaves, now denominated patrocina-
dos.23 Benefiting from large- scale investments in equipment and a voracious 
policy of land acquisition, Soledad expanded its production and drew in 
large numbers of immigrants and other wage workers. Atkins saw the years 
from 1886 to 1894 as good ones and spoke with some pride of the hundreds 
of workers who came to labor on his estate. Though it was still overshadowed 
by giant estates like Constancia and Caracas, Soledad seems to have devel-
oped a reputation as something of a model plantation.24
The plantation workforce that evolved in Cienfuegos was neither that of 
an all- male proletariat nor that of a family- based sharecropping system. The 
names of children and of women loomed less and less large on the planta-
tion payrolls, as women turned to household labor, market gardening, and 
laundering, but they were not absent. The resident population of Santa Ro-
salía, for example, still included women. Some planters, however, refused 
to allow certain former slaves to remain on the estate if their services were 
no longer needed or if they showed too much independence. Tomás Pérez y 
Figure 3.2 The livestock- raising settlement of Gavilán, eventually acquired by Soledad. 
Photograph courtesy of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Atkins Family Papers.
Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Cuba | 89
Pérez, born in 1902, remembers that his mother, Bárbara Pérez, a domestic 
slave who had learned to read from her young mistress, was forced off the 
Pérez Galdós plantation after emancipation, and she moved to the town of 
Arimao to work as a laundress. Toward the end of the 1886 grinding season, 
the administrator at Soledad took pains to expel “a great many negroes who 
have horses,” presumably in an effort to reduce their mobility and their con-
sumption of estate resources.25
Managers could not always afford to be quite so particular about the be-
havior of former slaves. The general expansion of production on the larger 
estates in Cienfuegos created a strong seasonal demand for fieldworkers and 
a challenge for employers. In March 1886 the manager of Soledad wrote that 
all the estates in the district were “short of hands and some have had to stop 
grinding for a few days.” The possible consequences were clear: “I fear if 
hands continue to be scarce we will have to increase wages and so bring men 
from other districts.”26 The relatively high wages at harvest time drew not 
only men but also some women of color, who returned to the cane fields as 
short- term laborers.27 There was thus continual mobility of male and female 
Figure 3.3 Cutting cane on 
Soledad, early twentieth century. 
Photograph courtesy of the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, 
Atkins Family Papers.
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workers, ensuring that workers in the cane would not be isolated from de-
velopments in town.
The growth of centrales, which drew in cane from multiple suppliers, 
brought new opportunities for small renters and landowners. After signing 
a contract with a nearby central, they could plant their land in cane and 
reliably plan for the mill to grind it. Smallholders thus gained a foothold 
in an industry that had previously been largely restricted to those prosper-
ous enough to fund their own milling. These contracts, however, were often 
draconian. If a colono under contract to the Hormiguero estate in the 1890s 
failed to comply with the terms of the contract, he had just two months to 
sell out to someone more satisfactory to the estate.28
Some colonos tried to resist the terms laid down by the estates, and their 
obstreperousness placed certain limits on the expansion of large planta-
tions.29 In 1884 the manager of Soledad wrote with impatience that “the colo-
nos are giving us much more trouble than we anticipated; San Pelayo, Roque, 
and Cantignon all refuse to sign new contracts unless we make them larger 
advances, for more than their property is worth.”30 In 1891 colonos in the 
province of Santa Clara organized an attempt to raise the level of compen-
sation beyond the standard rate and seem to have met with some success.31
Though sugarcane covered vast swaths of land, it was not the only crop 
cultivated, nor did large estates monopolize the territory. Frutos menores, in-
cluding sweet potatoes, bananas, and yucca as well as maize, were grown on 
hundreds of small farms, both for subsistence and for sale. In the property 
lists of Santa Isabel de las Lajas, in the northern part of Cienfuegos, most of 
the smallholders seem to have been individuals who could claim the honor-
ific don and were probably categorized socially as white. But one can follow 
through the 1880s a slowly growing group of smallholders listed as moreno 
(black). The morena Mercedes Alonso, for example, occupied a sitio (small 
farm) called La Palmita and was taxed about two pesos a year. Her neighbor, 
the moreno Tomás Mora, occupied the even poorer sitio named Santo Tomás 
and paid just seventy centavos per year in taxes.32 From the point of view of 
former slaves and other rural workers, the hills and unoccupied land on the 
periphery of sugar estates could provide a kind of refuge. From the point of 
view of planters, the monte yielded wood and a trade in foodstuffs, but it was 
also suspected of harboring cattle thieves, bandits, and small communities 
that had escaped the direct supervision of local authorities.
This was not, then, a region of strict monoculture and dichotomous so-
cial divisions. At the extremes, of course, class coincided with the prevailing 
notions of race, and lines were sharply drawn. There was a cosmopolitan and 
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exclusive elite defined as white, some of whom participated in the concerts, 
“opera, garden parties, sailing parties, or excursions to some country estates” 
that Edwin Atkins had enjoyed as a youth. And there were former slaves in 
the barracón (barracks) at the Soledad plantation who, according to Atkins’s 
account, “being mostly imported Africans, came from many tribes and kept 
up their tribal customs for years after slavery was abolished.”33 But both of 
these groups existed alongside, and of necessity interacted with, administra-
tors, machinists, artisans, and overseers, in the midst of a vast population of 
Cubans from all racial groups and Spaniards who worked as day laborers, 
cane farmers, and small- scale cultivators. Moreover, town and country were 
intimately linked by the vaporcitos (little steam- powered boats) and lanchas 
that traveled the river between Soledad and Santa Rosalía and the bay, by the 
stevedores who loaded and unloaded the sugar, by families who moved back 
and forth in search of work, and by members of the elite who alternated life 
in the city of Cienfuegos with residence on their rural estates.
This world was porous and multiracial, but even at its base it revealed 
some lines of national and racial distinctions. When asked about the pri-
vate guards on his estate, for example, Edwin Atkins replied that “they were 
mostly composed of men recruited from Spanish laborers who had nearly 
all of them served their time in the Spanish army.”34 Though their ostensible 
purpose was to protect the estate from external threats, it is not difficult to 
see in them certain echoes of the white militia of the Southern United States. 
As Spaniards on the lookout for Cuban bandits, or as white men on horse-
back on the lookout for potential trouble from fieldworkers, they would at 
times have stood out as distinct from the men and women around them.
Even more starkly, the management of the Soledad estate seems to have 
moved toward denying employment in the mill to former slaves and their de-
scendants, relegating them to fieldwork. The surname Sarría, taken by many 
former slaves on Soledad, is rare in the pay lists for mill labor in the 1890s, 
appearing frequently instead in the agricultural section. Tomás Pérez y Pérez, 
who worked for most of his life on Soledad, recalls the color consciousness 
of the administrators of Soledad. Pérez, whose mother, Bárbara Pérez, was 
a former slave and whose father, Manuel Lago, was a Spanish carpenter, ob-
tained special dispensation in the early years of the twentieth century to 
work at the mill, from which the administration apparently otherwise ex-
cluded workmen of color.35
These forms of exclusion coexisted with many forms of cross- racial inter-
action. On estates and on cane farms, people of all socioracial groups came 
and went, bought and sold, talked and drank coffee, collected wages and 
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argued about the price of cane. At Soledad, the squalid barracks built during 
slavery remained, with the same atrocious consequences for public health 
and personal comfort. But the prison- like control to which their inhabitants 
had been subjected was now largely gone, though it occasionally reappeared 
in moments of attack from smallpox or bandits. Partial residential segrega-
tion continued alongside growing spaces of integration. For example, the 
Spanish owner of a tienda and a parcel of land near the Caunao River, located 
behind the Soledad mill, apparently had no objection if families from Santa 
Rosalía settled there. There soon emerged the small multiracial community 
of El Palmar, composed of former slaves, some with the surname Quesada, 
as well as Spanish workers and Cubans of various groups.36
The Search for Political Voice
The heterogeneous and mobile working population of rural Cienfuegos did 
not, by and large, have access to the vote in the early 1890s. The electoral 
law in force limited suffrage to those paying five pesos annually in taxes—a 
threshold that easily excluded smallholders like the moreno Tomás Mora.37 
His slightly more prosperous neighbor, Mercedes Alonso, was of course ex-
cluded both by her poverty and by her sex. But there were signs that some 
former slaves and other people of color were pressing for greater participa-
tion in the public sphere. The city of Cienfuegos had created a school for chil-
dren of color, and in several of the district’s towns, mutual- aid organizations 
had been constituted by members of the clase de color. As political conflict in-
creased, new voices were raised in public debate, particularly in the towns.38
The conservative pro- Spanish and integralist Constitutional Union Party 
had little electoral use for assertive nonelite Cubans, and few would have 
been drawn to its intransigent stance in any event. It was primarily the more 
oppositional Liberal Autonomists, supporters of electoral reform and lim-
ited self- government, who potentially stood to gain from wider mobilization. 
Their task, however, was a difficult one. They had come to an abolitionist 
position relatively late in the day, and their leaders at the national level were 
socially very distant from the agriculturalists and urban workers who consti-
tuted the majority of the population. Locally, they did develop their own net-
works of clientage and support, but they were increasingly reviled by Cuban 
separatists, who supported independence for the island and saw reforms as 
delusions for the gullible.39
All of the Autonomists’ difficulties came together in an ill- fated meeting 
in Cienfuegos in October 1886. Autonomist deputy J. Fernández de Castro 
was scheduled to speak in the Teatro Zorilla, the only meeting place his party 
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had been able to secure, located in a section of town largely populated by 
people of color. As the speakers made their way to the theater, several people 
of color accompanying them hurled corn kernels at the houses of suspected 
Constitutional Unionists. The theater was packed, with many of those in at-
tendance described by the authorities as “people of little education, people of 
color in the majority.” When Fernández de Castro first criticized the Spanish 
government, the audience divided into those who applauded and those who 
hissed. When he claimed that the Autonomists could take credit for the abo-
lition of the patronato and thus the definitive end of slavery, he was met with 
shouts of “¡mentira!” (a lie!). The hall broke out in disorder as some cheered 
for Spain and others for autonomy, while chairs began to crash.40
The events in the Teatro Zorilla are not easy to interpret. Some of the 
“people of little education” present seem to have come in support of the Au-
tonomists; others may have been recruited by pro- Spanish forces for the 
purposes of intimidation. Indignation at the Autonomists’ attempt to take 
credit for abolition could originate from several quarters: from supporters 
of the Spanish government who wished credit for the belated emancipation 
to go to the metropolitan lawmakers who formally promulgated the law, or 
from others who considered that popular pressure by slaves and rebels, not 
legislative steps in Spain, had accelerated the end of slavery. Whatever the 
precise mix of prior allegiances in the crowd, the meeting seems to have re-
flected the eruption into the field of public debate of a large number of people 
who did not have access to the vote but did claim the right to political voice.41
From the point of view of the forces of order, such mobilization was by its 
nature problematic. The police chief noted that Fernández de Castro could 
have avoided these troubles if he had taken into account “la clase de público 
a quien se dirigía” (the kind of public whom he was addressing).42 But it was 
not possible for politicians to entirely overlook the potential of such groups. 
The Autonomists were fighting a genteel but uphill battle, and they tried the 
weapons of debate, parliamentary boycott, and, in extremis, popular mobi-
lization.43
Despite the generally reactionary tone of much elite life in Cienfuegos, 
urban activists of color undertook various efforts to achieve racial integra-
tion, negotiating with Spanish authorities while consulting with the future 
independentista Juan Gualberto Gómez. Among these Cienfuegos organiz-
ers was Gabriel Quesada, a noted baseball player and later cofounder of the 
Sociedad Minerva, a mutual- aid and educational society for people of color.44 
The colonial government had formally ruled in favor of equality of access to 
public places, and on January 4, 1894, a group of men of color attempted to 
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integrate the elegant Teatro Terry by attending a performance of Los Hugo-
notes. The ensuing fracas precipitated ferocious debate in the press, denun-
ciation of the activists from various quarters, and criticism of the colonial 
authorities for having failed to respect the opposition of the white majority 
to the idea of “decreeing social equality.”45
As the Autonomists dithered on the question of race and failed miserably 
to achieve electoral reform from Spain, initiative was already shifting to the 
separatists in exile, who had long advocated full independence from Spain. 
At the same time, the financial panic of 1893 was followed by the expiration 
of the Foster- Cánovas agreement and a disastrous reconfiguration of trade 
relations between Spain and the United States. The 1891 commercial treaty 
between these two countries had facilitated the export of Cuban sugars to the 
U.S. market, but the Wilson Tariff of 1894 took raw sugar off the “free list” 
and undermined the entire structure of Cuban trade with the United States. 
In the vivid phrase of Louis A. Pérez Jr., “An impenetrable protectionist wall 
reappeared around the island in mid- 1894, reviving memories of the worst 
features of Spanish exclusivism.”46
From Edwin Atkins’s vantage point at Soledad, the effects were swift 
and deadly: As “the cost of living in Cuba advanced and the price of sugar 
dropped, credit became impaired.” By January 1895, wages and cane prices 
had fallen, and Atkins reported that he had to contend not only with rains 
and “customs house complications” but also with “strikes owing to low 
wages.” At Soledad the “poor laborers with their thin clothes were suffering 
from cold and an epidemic very like intestinal influenza.”47
To many on the island, Spain increasingly looked to be not only an au-
thoritarian colonial power but an incompetent one as well.48 Cuban planters 
railed loudly and indignantly at the commercial crisis that threatened to en-
gulf them.49 For the nationalist movement in exile, the moment was fast ap-
proaching to unleash what they anticipated would be a brief but necessary 
war of liberation from Spain. In the Cienfuegos region, workers discharged 
at the end of the 1894–95 crop season faced a very uncertain future and 
might be expected to be receptive to such a call.
The story of the beginning of the final war of independence has been 
told so many times that it has taken on the character of an epic, marked by 
drama and a certain sense of inevitability. On February 24, 1895, in the east-
ern part of the island, insurrection against Spanish rule was proclaimed in 
the “grito de Baire,” and a short- lived “grito de Ibarra” in Matanzas echoed 
the call. Long- standing separatists in the east left the cities for the country-
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side when word of the revolt reached them. Lino Sánchez y Murillo, for ex-
ample, a young white man from a family of conspirators in Santiago de Cuba, 
reported somewhat boastfully that “since I had use of reason I used to talk 
about the war of ’68 and how the war had been lost by the pact made by Zan-
jón.” On February 23, 1895, the day before the formal uprising began, he took 
to the woods near a sugar estate in the eastern province, having been alerted 
by Cuban telegraph operators on the railway line that the police were plan-
ning to arrest him.50
In April, Antonio Maceo landed near Baracoa, on the north coast of San-
tiago de Cuba province. One coffee planter later testified: “As he was the soul 
of the revolution, as soon as we heard that he was there, all of us that had 15 
or 10 or 20 men went to join him.”51 Even elderly veterans of the Ten Years’ 
War joined the fight. Gaspar Caballero, an African- born fieldworker from 
San Luís, in the east, had fought in both previous rebellions. He enlisted with 
the rebels as a soldier in the first days of the 1895 war and was later trans-
ferred to the task of growing crops to provision the troops.52 Within a month 
after arriving on the island, Antonio Maceo wrote to his wife that he had six 
thousand men under his command and much territory under his control. He 
added an exultant postscript: “No day goes by without people coming to join 
me, all the youth of Santiago de Cuba have gone to the countryside; we have 
doctors and lawyers with us.”53
In Santa Clara and in its core region of Cienfuegos, however, rebellion 
seemed less epic and certainly less inevitable. The nationalist movement, 
initially operating from exile, was calling on Cubans to take enormous risks 
in pursuit of a great gamble: a gamble that Cubans could win against Spain 
and that winning would make a real difference to the lives of those who suf-
fered from unemployment, humiliation, or impoverishment. Some people 
from the central region took to the hills; others waited and watched. Already 
in mid- February, a group of insurgents was reported to be meeting at Los 
Guaos, near Soledad, and telephone lines were cut. But the anticipated local 
uprising did not follow.54
On the surface, the Cienfuegos district remained relatively quiet through 
the spring of 1895. The landing of a rebel expedition on the coast of Santa 
Clara in late spring, however, provided a new impetus to revolt.55 Troubles 
began by late June near the city of Santa Clara, and Edwin Atkins received re-
ports that a party of a dozen or so rebels was being pursued in the area of Cu-
manayagua, close to Santa Rosalía and Soledad. By summer there was little 
work to be had in the area, and in Atkins’s view, “many, particularly negroes, 
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joined the insurgents or took to the woods to live by pillage.” Companies of 
pro- government voluntarios, meanwhile, were formed from among elements 
of the Spanish population.56
Around Soledad and Santa Rosalía, black and mulatto men, some with 
the surnames Quesada or Sarría, began to head to the monte to join forces 
with others, forming the nucleus of what would later become companies of 
the rebel Ejército Libertador. Claudio Sarría, born a slave on Soledad, quickly 
emerged as a leader. Two neighbors from Santa Rosalía, Ciriaco and Caye-
tano Quesada, joined up as well. News was clearly spreading fast.57
In the late summer, rebels from Oriente undertook the initiative that 
seemed essential to victory: they mounted an invasion westward, aimed at 
projecting their power out of their region of origin and placing the Spanish 
on the defensive. After gathering their forces, rebel generals Antonio Maceo 
and Máximo Gómez made their way across the central province of Cama-
güey (formerly Puerto Príncipe) and reached the economic heartland of the 
island. When the insurgent army from the east arrived at the edge of the rich, 
open central sugar zone, Antonio Maceo is said to have looked out over the 
land and observed, “Our ship has reached the high seas.”58
The Spanish captain general, Arsenio Martínez Campos, responded by 
deploying thousands of new Spanish troops to the central sugar regions and 
transferring his headquarters to the city of Santa Clara. But the insurgent ad-
vance was relentless, and the breakout of the eastern rebel forces provided an 
additional stimulus for local insurgents to take initiatives of their own. In the 
town of Las Moscas, in the hills across the Arimao River to the east of Cien-
fuegos, the black rebel veteran and shopkeeper Benigno Najarro had linked 
up both with Alfredo Rego, a white conspirator from the city of Cienfue-
gos, and with Juan Ramírez Olivera, known as el mejicano, to form a cadre 
of leaders for the rebellion. It was less than a day’s ride from Las Moscas to 
Soledad and Santa Rosalía, and by August and September rebels in that area 
were said to be operating “under a chief named Rego.”59
By November, Martínez Campos had relocated to Cienfuegos and was 
fortifying the immediate region. The insurgent forces under Maceo and 
Gómez confronted the Spanish in the dramatic battle of Mal Tiempo, near 
the town of Cruces. The rebel victory provided an impressive demonstra-
tion of the capacity of the insurgent armies from eastern Cuba, in conjunc-
tion with local forces, to defeat the Spanish troops.60 The question was now 
starkly posed to the residents of the central sugar zones: Would the descen-
dants of slaves and the descendants of slaveholders, as well as those who had 
been free rural dwellers on the margins of the slave system, perceive them-
Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Cuba | 97
selves to have a shared interest in this revolt? And if so, would they and could 
they mobilize together?
The Dynamics of Recruitment and Warfare
The rank and file of the forces from Oriente were composed in the majority of 
men defined as black or mulatto, strongly identified in popular perceptions 
with the dynamic figure of Maceo, son of a family of free people of color. 
Alongside them fought many Cubans who counted themselves as white and 
even a few renegade Spaniards. Rebel units from the central province of 
Santa Clara, also heterogeneous, had joined up as well. The official ideology 
of the rebels portrayed racism as a legacy of slavery and colonialism, des-
tined to be eliminated in a democratic Cuban republic. Divisions and am-
bivalence on questions of race were for the moment muted, as a multiracial 
rebel army under multiracial leadership swept westward.61
This, then, was the force that was visibly overpowering the Spanish in the 
countryside and seeking new allies to assist in the task. Recruitment in Cien-
fuegos was becoming a personal, face- to- face affair, as friends and neighbors 
who had joined the insurgent army confronted those who had not. On the 
Hormiguero plantation, for example, workers watched as virtually the entire 
invading force rode or tramped across estate lands in their march to the west. 
Even those who resisted appeals to enlist found it hard to refuse requests for 
information.62
The moment of recruitment itself could be ephemeral. Rural workers 
were, after all, committed to their homes and to their families and might 
have second thoughts about abandoning them, particularly if this meant 
marching out of their home district. One laborer from Cienfuegos, Miguel 
Angel Abad, had a small farm of his own but also worked on a colonia sup-
plying the Hormiguero mill. He described the passage of Gómez and Maceo 
through the estate as they torched the cane before moving westward. Local 
insurgents came out of the woods to join them, though most of the workers 
on the estate did not. Abad had joined the insurgents after a friend in the in-
vading force had urged him to go with them. But after a few hours, Abad later 
recounted, “I slowly fell to the rear, and as soon as I found I could separate 
myself, I started running for my house.”63
As the main invasion force passed to the north, local insurgents in the 
partido of Cumanayagua consolidated their forces, and in early January 1896 
the administrator at Soledad reported a “uniting of [the] small parties into 
one large party of rebels. Claudio Sarría, Rafael Monte, Torres, and Najarro 
have united their forces with el mejicano for their own safety.” The admin-
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istrators of Soledad had no clear idea of how many of their workers sympa-
thized with the rebellion, and they could not stop rebels from entering the 
estate to collect supplies.64
In mid- January 1896, the rebel troops of Quintín Bandera paid a visit to 
Soledad. The administrator, P. M. Beal, was impressed by Bandera’s forces 
from the east. “They were here under trying circumstance, hungry, bare-
footed and half naked, yet not one of them appropriated the smallest thing 
without permission.” He added that “with exception of the officers, they were 
all colored.” So, too, was Quintín Bandera, whom the rebel high command 
had ordered to remain behind to guard their flank and consolidate their 
gains as they continued toward the west.65
In the core sugar areas around the bay of Cienfuegos, the Spanish has-
tened to construct a garrisoned zona fortificada, blocking the penetration 
of insurgents and inhibiting recruitment. Confrontations continued on the 
margins and around estates like Santa Rosalía in Cumanayagua, but during 
1896 and 1897 many of the major Cienfuegos estates were secured against in-
surgent attack. Soledad moved into a liminal state, guarded and fortified to 
permit grinding, but always vulnerable at its edges.66
Despite Spanish efforts to inhibit recruitment, the multiracial world of 
sugar plantations and of the small farming sector had given rise to multi-
Figure 3.4 Officers of the rebel Cienfuegos Brigade, including E. Collado Curbelo. 
Photograph courtesy of the Archivo Nacional de Cuba, Fototeca (anc, Caja m- 11,  
sobre 101, reg. 105).
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racial insurgent forces, and the experiences of cross- racial collaboration in 
the insurgency had changed the character of social relations in the country-
side. To say this is not to claim that lines were so fluid that racial identities 
were insignificant. But shared grievances against the authoritarian Spanish 
state and its local manifestations, combined with popular imaginings of a 
“free Cuba,” provided points of convergence among what may in fact have 
been quite different visions of a postwar future.67
In the central province of Santa Clara (Las Villas), most members of the 
rebel high command were individuals who were identified as white. For 
example, General José de Jesús Monteagudo, surrounded by white creole 
officers, appears to have presented himself as a member of the white creole 
classes.68 General Higinio Esquerra, who commanded the Cienfuegos Bri-
gade, was described as a white farmer, though his brigade itself was thor-
oughly multiracial, with significant numbers of black and mulatto officers. 
There were, however, notable Afro- Cuban members of the high command: 
Brigadier José González Planas exercised authority over white subordinate 
officers (including, early in the war, Esquerra himself ) and commanded a 
large number of white, black, and mulatto troops.69 Throughout the war, 
smaller bands under local leadership, often black or mulatto, controlled 
Figure 3.5 Officers of the Cienfuegos Brigade of the Ejército Libertador, including  
General Higinio Esquerra. Photograph courtesy of the Archivo Nacional de Cuba,  
Fototeca (anc, Caja m- 11, sobre 100, reg. 104).
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large sections of the countryside. Claudio Sarría, for example, had joined 
the rebellion in August 1895 and by November 1896 was captain of Com-
pany 3 of the First Battalion of the Infantry Regiment of the Cienfuegos Bri-
gade. His neighbor José Sarría was a sergeant, and Ciriaco Quesada, a former 
slave from Santa Rosalía, served as one of the soldiers under his command.70
As the recent works of Ada Ferrer and of Aline Helg have demonstrated, 
this multiracial alliance was riven through with tensions and conflicts. These 
included resentment at the frequent relegation of African- born recruits to 
menial positions and competition for resources between units under the 
leadership of white officers and those under the leadership of black and mu-
latto officers.71 But despite these conflicts, the insurgency itself represented a 
massive effort at cross- racial mobilization under the formal aegis of equality 
and antiracism. It could thus serve as a seedbed for strong claims of citizen-
ship, even when in practice many of its leaders fell far short of observing its 
egalitarian principles. It also led to the emergence and reinforcement of ex-
tensive cross- racial clienteles developed by white officers and to the consoli-
dation of leadership by black and mulatto soldiers at various levels.
With increasing urgency and desperation, the metropolitan government, 
while denying the very idea of Cuban citizenship, had sought throughout the 
1890s to persuade residents of Cuba that they had wide access to a qualified 
citizenship as Spanish subjects. In response to pressure from an urban- based 
movement for equal rights for Cubans of color, the Spanish government had 
conceded, at least in theory, that the honorific title of don could be claimed 
by all men, regardless of color. Cubans of African descent had also been for-
mally accorded equal rights to education and to public accommodation.72
In 1897, in the midst of war, the colonial government belatedly con-
ceded the basic demands of the political reformists and, under the tutelage 
of Spain, constituted a new autonomist government for Cuba. In theory, a 
broader suffrage and a more expansive politics would now be possible. Sur-
viving electoral lists from Santa Clara province in early 1898 highlight both 
the presence of Cubans of color among those recognized as electors and the 
persistence of distinctions of status in the lists themselves. The ayuntamiento 
of Sagua la Grande, for example, listed hundreds of electors in each district 
of the municipality, but accorded the title don to some and omitted it from 
others, generally following the names of the latter with the color terms pardo 
or moreno. The printed lists from Cienfuegos were more discreet, eschewing 
these distinctions. Those of the town of San Fernando included hundreds of 
fieldworkers, half a dozen of them with the surname Sarría, and were equally 
silent on color. Actual practice at election time, of course, cannot be inferred 
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from such sources.73 But though the disruptions of war rendered these late 
electoral rights largely moot, the establishment of integrated electoral lists 
in itself established precedents for the postwar period. Both sides, in effect, 
were proffering citizenship without distinctions of color.
Autonomy under Spanish auspices had come much too late. The armed 
Cuban separatists had by now fought and harassed the Spanish forces to 
a standstill, though they could not yet expel them. Losses were mounting 
and raw recruits from Spain were expected to manage the rigors of irregular 
warfare in the tropics. Spanish forces could not move safely in most of the 
countryside; they were largely reduced to garrisoning the towns and trying 
to protect selected fortified rural zones.
By 1898 the effects of destruction were visible throughout the island. For 
rural Cubans, physical insecurity and widespread devastation were a harsh 
reality. Many sugar mills had been destroyed, and many others were unable 
to grind. José Martí had been quite wrong in imagining that the necessary 
war would be brief. Nonetheless, it seemed plausible to expect that the rebels’ 
summer campaign of 1898 might extend their control from the countryside 
into the cities and finally win the war.74
If the outbreak of the war is often portrayed as epic, its conclusion might 
best be depicted as tragic. The standoff between Cuban rebels and Spanish 
Figure 3.6 Officers of the Cienfuegos Brigade of the Ejército Libertador. Photograph 
courtesy of the Archivo Nacional de Cuba, Fototeca (anc, Caja m- 11, sobre 101, reg. 105).
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forces was broken by the intervention of the U.S. military, allied with the 
most conservative wing of the Cuban separatist coalition. The Cubans who 
had fought the war for three years were quickly constructed as the insuffi-
ciently grateful beneficiaries of American generosity and sacrifice. They were 
said to be, in the unforgettable words of General William R. Shafter, “no 
more fit for self- government than gunpowder is for hell.”75 Instead of Cuba 
Libre, the island would become occupied Cuba, and a U.S. military govern-
ment would take over the sovereignty relinquished by Spain.
Cienfuegos under U.S. Occupation
The leaders of the U.S. military government had little or no sympathy for the 
wartime vision of Cuban citizenship in which nationality transcended color 
and in which service in the Ejército Libertador entitled one to political voice 
and access to resources. The occupation forces represented a federal gov-
ernment that had itself debated the meanings of free labor and citizenship 
during its own civil war and afterward. After a period of experimentation, 
the notion of a right of access by former slaves to productive resources (par-
ticularly land) had been put aside, and free labor was defined more simply 
as the right to sell one’s own labor. Moreover, the federal government had all 
Figure 3.7 Brigadier José González Planas (labeled #1) and members of the Remedios 
Brigade of the Ejército Libertador. Photograph courtesy of the Archivo Nacional de Cuba, 
Fototeca (anc, Caja m- 10, sobre 97, reg. 101).
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but settled on its own territory the question of race and citizenship: although 
the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited restrictions on voting rights based on 
color, no significant effort would be made to halt local attempts at system-
atic disenfranchisement.76
The officers of the U.S. occupation government were strongly disinclined 
to recommence an experiment in interracial democracy on an island they 
viewed as temperamentally and constitutionally unsuited for self- rule in the 
first place. Order was far more important than inclusiveness, and mecha-
nisms for providing order were designed to reinforce the supremacy of the 
right sort of people. A rural guard, for example, if properly constituted, 
could help to curb disorder and importunate claims of representation. But 
the rural guard likely to emerge from the demobilized Ejército Libertador 
would be altogether too heterogeneous.77
There was, however, a notable disjuncture between the larger structures 
of sovereignty asserted by the United States and the local patterns of power 
on the ground. In several areas of Cienfuegos, for example, Edwin Atkins 
reported that insurgents “under negro officers” were still effectively in con-
trol, keeping the peace and levying small taxes to support their men. When 
Máximo Gómez made a visit to Cienfuegos in February 1899, the insurgent 
force of the region, people of color in the great majority, assembled to greet 
him, demonstrating their continued capacity to mobilize.78
The U.S. presence provided a substantive and symbolic counterweight 
to earlier visions of Cuba Libre. But this presence could not effectively pre-
vent challenges, small and large, from emerging in the cities and country-
side. Military pacification was one thing; social peace was quite another. One 
incident on the Santa Rosalía estate illuminates the tenacity of the claims 
advanced by ordinary Cubans, especially former slaves who had fought in 
the rebellion.
Santa Rosalía had been radically depopulated during the war. Some of its 
residents had joined the rebellion, others were consigned to the reconcentra-
ción villages set up by the Spanish general Weyler, and a few remained on the 
estate to guard the cattle and the property. Descendants of former slave resi-
dents recall that when the war was over, the reconcentrados returned to Santa 
Rosalía, only to find that Manuel Blanco would not let them resettle; the land 
was to be occupied by others. Women in particular seem to have been unwel-
come, but arguments between the administrator and male workers, followed 
by expulsions, were also common.79
The administrator of Santa Rosalía, Constantino Pérez, was accustomed 
to writing nearly every day to Manuel García Blanco, the agent of the owner, 
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Manuel Blanco. The administrator had many tales of woe, centering on the 
lack of willing workers and the insolence of those he found. On August 17, 
1899, Pérez reported that “un tal Ciriaco y Paulino Quesada,” former slaves 
on Santa Rosalía and sons of “la vieja Francisca,” had come to see him about 
retrieving “la mula . . . de Gregoria.” Ciriaco Quesada had obtained his legal 
freedom in January 1886, and he and his brother Paulino had worked season-
ally on the estate in the late 1880s and early 1890s. Ciriaco Quesada had en-
listed in the rebel Ejército Libertador in August 1895. Now the war was over 
and he was back. The administrator stood on ceremony: he would not give 
up the mule without a written order from the owner or his agent. Indeed, 
Pérez seemed rather pleased with himself for turning away this request from 
Ciriaco and Paulino Quesada. (He said nothing about Gregoria herself, but 
other evidence suggests that she had moved to the city of Cienfuegos dur-
ing the war.)80
At seven o’clock the next morning, however, the chief of the Rural Guard 
appeared on the estate and called for Pérez, presenting him with an order 
from the mayor of Arimao to turn over the mule to Ciriaco Quesada. Pérez 
Map 3.2 The various 
properties constituting 
Soledad. The Santa 
Rosalía plantation is its 
southern neighbor. San 
Antón, where Ciriaco and 
Cayetano Quesada settled, 
is in the southeast corner. 
Photograph courtesy of 
the Archivo Principal de 
Cienfuegos. Photograph  
by Jack Kenny.
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initially refused, but the guardsman threatened to go after the mule himself. 
Pérez seems to have become a bit flustered. He relinquished the mule, but 
only in exchange for a receipt, in case Manuel Blanco wanted to collect for 
the grass the mule had eaten in the meantime. In his next letter, Pérez fumed 
that any day now Antonico (presumably another former slave) would turn 
up to look for his two mules, since he had come around earlier to get them. 
Pérez advised Blanco’s agent to try to collect from Ciriaco Quesada for the 
three years the mule had been grazing on estate property, if only to make the 
point that Ciriaco should not have gone to the mayor.
What is most striking is the speed with which Ciriaco Quesada enlisted 
the assistance of the alcalde of Arimao and of the Rural Guard. He must have 
had a horse to reach Arimao so quickly, and he must have been received 
promptly by the mayor. Were these two officials perhaps fellow insurgent 
veterans, willing to take up the case against the estate’s administrator out of 
friendship with Ciriaco? (Ciriaco Quesada had joined the Ejército Libertador 
well before the invading rebel army from the east swept through the country-
side north of Soledad and Santa Rosalía, and he had served with a local rebel 
force under Claudio Sarría during 1896.) Was the mayor also moved in part 
by resentment against Manuel Blanco, an unreconstructed Spanish conser-
vative? The existence of hostility against Blanco is confirmed by Constan-
tino Pérez’s later report that an employee on the estate had been mocked at 
the country store by “un ciudadano de esos Bandidos,” who told him that 
he was “un sinvergüenza” (a person without shame) for guarding the cattle 
of Manuel Blanco. During these same months, Constantino Pérez feared a 
strike by Cuban workers. He later concluded that the workers would wait 
until the terms of peace—and perhaps the fate of Spanish property owners 
like Manuel Blanco—were settled.81
Ciriaco Quesada’s decision to take his claim straight to the town of Ari-
mao was an astute one. Arimao, whose population was composed of black, 
white, Chinese, and mulatto campesinos, was a likely spot in which to nour-
ish and reinforce a claim of rights. Home to sugar workers from Soledad 
and from the Pérez Galdós estates, as well as to many small- scale farmers 
and tobacco workers, it had a long history of separatist activism. Some of 
the first rumors of war heard on Soledad had come from “over by Arimao.” 
The 1898 electoral lists of the Arimao district, encompassing the surrounding 
countryside, accorded everyone the honorific title of don and included Fran-
cisco Achón, probably a Chinese worker from Soledad; Manuel Lago Tacón, 
the master carpenter from Vigo, Galicia, who was the father of Tomás Pérez 
y Pérez; and eight men with the surname Quesada, very likely former slaves 
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from Santa Rosalía. Twenty- three of the registered voters in Arimao carried 
the surname Sarría, and many of them were almost certainly former slaves 
and their descendants from Soledad.82
The electoral lists, of course, include only men. But from the memoirs of 
Tomás Pérez y Pérez we can identify another resident not on the lists and 
catch a glimpse of the public sphere in this dusty riverfront town. Tomás 
Pérez’s mother, Bárbara Pérez, was born a slave on the Pérez Galdós plan-
tation, where she later attended the owner’s young niece as a personal ser-
vant. Among her tasks as a slave was to collect the mail when it arrived at the 
house. One day when she brought the mail back to the main room there was 
no one around, so she took the liberty of opening up a newspaper to see what 
she could make of it. Moments later the niece walked in, and Bárbara quickly 
folded up the paper and lowered her head, expecting punishment. Instead 
the niece said, “Don’t tell anyone I saw you, and I’ll teach you to read.” Bár-
bara Pérez seems to have been a ready student, and by the time emancipation 
came, she could read and write.
Figure 3.8 Tomás Pérez y Pérez, born 1902 in El Palmar, interviewed in 1998.  
Photograph by Paul Eiss.
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In the late 1880s, Bárbara Pérez took her skills with her when she moved 
to Arimao, after being expelled from the Pérez Galdós estate. Whenever a 
newspaper arrived in town, her neighbors would each bring a chair from 
their living rooms out to the sidewalk, and she would read the news aloud to 
the pueblo of Arimao.83 Bárbara Pérez and her neighbors had, in effect, re-
invented that classic symbol of working- class Cuban political consciousness, 
the lector (reader). But instead of a male tobacco worker paid to read to his 
companions while they worked, this was a lectora, a laundress whose direct 
access to the news made her the central figure in a set of everyday inter-
actions among her neighbors.84
In the city of Cienfuegos, this was also a time of formal revindications 
and collective action. Port workers went on strike in 1899 and obtained a 
fifty-cent wage increase. On February 19, 1900, the lightermen struck again 
and were joined by a “sympathetic strike of stevedores, wharfmen, freight 
handlers on the railroad, cartmen, and etc.,” paralyzing business. The union 
membership and leadership included many workers categorized as black and 
mulatto.85 The U.S. occupation forces attempted to set limits to this kind of 
action. In this instance, the mayor and the leader of the union were promptly 
“bounced” out of office by General Leonard Wood.86 But this barely slowed 
the process of mobilization.
On the larger question of suffrage, the occupation government found itself 
obliged to back down. Hoping to place power in the hands of the better sort 
of people, the military government initially imposed property and literacy 
restrictions that might minimize the voting strength of lower- class Cubans, 
particularly people of color. Such restrictions, however, flew squarely in the 
face of the patriotic vision of the liberation army as the force that had won 
Cuba’s freedom from Spain and thus a right to political voice. The occupa-
tion government next incorporated a “soldier clause,” permitting those who 
had served in the army to vote. In 1902, when the United States relinquished 
power and conceded formal sovereignty to the government of Tomás Estrada 
Palma, the new Cuban constitution went the rest of the way and provided for 
universal manhood suffrage.87
Rural residents of Cienfuegos continued to organize, both in politi-
cal parties and in unions. In November 1902, “commissions” of workers 
marched from the town of Cruces to nearby sugar estates to try to obtain 
the suspension of work in solidarity with strikers in Havana. The U.S. consul 
at Cienfuegos reported that work had stopped in the municipalities of Lajas 
and Cruces, including the plantations of Caracas, San Agustín, San Fran-
cisco, Andreita, Dos Hermanas, and others. The men in charge of Hormi-
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guero claimed that they “have been threatened by colored men to stop work 
and laborers have quit work through fear.”88 Anarchists as well as veterans 
of the Ejército Libertador, including the mulatto officer Evaristo Landa, were 
conspicuous in these organizing efforts, which encompassed workers from 
multiple national and racial groups.89
The extended suffrage of the early Republic nourished a vigorous local 
politics, albeit one marked by the proliferation of patron- client relations 
and corruption. The charismatic Liberal Party leader José Miguel Gómez 
adroitly sustained linkages of loyalty with former officers and enlisted men 
from his region. When, in 1906, the Estrada Palma government discredited 
itself through corrupt manipulation of the electoral law, the Liberal Party 
rebelled, mounting a military challenge to Estrada Palma’s effort to ensure 
reelection. Loyalties forged during 1895–98 were invoked, and many black 
and mulatto Cubans became both soldiers and officers in the rebellious Lib-
eral army.90
The manifest incapacity of the Estrada Palma government to contain the 
rebellion brought a reluctant United States back into Cuba in 1906, deter-
mined once again to try to create structures of continuity and authority that 
would protect its interests. A provisional government was set up, and Cien-
fuegos once again found itself occupied by the U.S. military. Bárbara Pérez, 
who had done laundry for the Spanish forces in Arimao, would now wash 
uniforms for the Americans at Soledad.91
The occupation forces seemed ill at ease this time. In 1907 the military in-
formation officer responsible for Cruces reported that the people of Cruces 
were “unfriendly toward the Americans.” Although some members of the 
elite welcomed the occupiers, the Military Intelligence Division of the Army 
of Cuban Pacification could not fail to note that they were surrounded by 
veterans of the independence struggle, the 1902 strikes, and the 1906 revolu-
tion.92 Even apparently reliable workmen and labor contractors might turn 
out to have alarming antecedentes. One local leader on the Constancia estate 
was described as follows: “Nicolás Fernández. Black or dark mulatto. Aged 
about 35. Speaks only Spanish. Soldier in War of 1895–98. Joined insurrec-
tion of 1906 as Captain and had company of about 80 blacks, all mounted 
and said to have been well drilled and under good discipline. Appears to be 
a strong character. Employed as overseer at Horquita because he has great 
influence over the negroes and has brought them there to cut cane.”93
Here, then, was a man with authority over an impressive body of “negroes 
who have horses,” to use the phrase of the Soledad administrator who twenty 
years earlier had tried to rid his estate of such mobile and assertive workmen. 
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Automatic deference, one assumes, was not to be expected from Nicolás Fer-
nández.
Some veterans of the 1906 Liberal uprising remained in the hills after 
formal pacification and the arrival of the U.S. military. One official of the oc-
cupation forces reported that “when we first located in Santa Clara in Octo-
ber last, members of detachments of these negroes of the mountain came to 
camp, some of them remaining all day, in uniform, watching the movements 
of camp.”94 Each group may have been assessing, uneasily, the strength of 
the other and wondering how long they would stay.
In Arimao, former slaves from Santa Rosalía and their descendants again 
emerged as combative figures. Fermín Quesada had appeared on the estate’s 
slave list of 1880 as a seven- year- old. By 1907 he was described by a hostile 
intelligence officer of the Fifteenth U.S. Cavalry in the following terms: “Que-
sada, Fermín. Negro. Liberal. Age: About 35 years. A farmer by occupation. 
Lives near Arimao, Cienfuegos district. Served in the Cuban Army during 
the 95–98 war reaching the grade of sergeant. Was a soldier in the insurgent 
ranks during the recent disturbance. Has a very bad reputation. Is said to be 
a cattle thief operating in the vicinity of Arimao and La Sierra. Is controlled 
by General Esquerra. Has but little influence, and that among the negro 
farmers in the country. Is considered a dangerous man in case of trouble.”95
In addition to enumerating the “dangerous men” in their neighborhood, 
intelligence officers also filed alarmed reports of contentious gatherings of 
various kinds. Some of these gatherings reflected party rivalries between 
Liberals and Conservatives, but others were provoked by conflict over such 
issues as the presence of U.S. troops or the legality of cockfighting. Observers 
often noted that the gatherings included blacks, whites, and mulattos.96
The Politics of Leadership and Voice
Cuban politics, like Brazilian politics in a comparable period, can accurately 
be characterized as clientelistic. Its patterns of patronage bear considerable 
resemblance to familiar forms of Latin American caciquismo. But there is 
a distinctive feature: beginning in 1902 Cuba’s electoral system functioned 
with universal male suffrage in the midst of a politicized population, many 
of whose poorest members had recently participated in an armed struggle. 
This was an electoral system in which the construction of alliances involved 
acknowledging numerous midlevel leaders drawn from among black and 
mulatto veterans. In the small towns of central Cuba there were mulatto 
mayors as well as mulatto and black police chiefs and policemen. Overall, 
men of color made up more than 20 percent of the soldiers and policemen in 
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the province of Santa Clara—not a proportional representation, but a visible 
armed presence as part of civil authority in the countryside.97
Black and mulatto leadership was exercised in the countryside in commu-
nities identified as predominantly black, such as Congojas and Parque Alto. 
It emerged in the cane fields and on the docks as part of the working- class 
movement. It was demonstrated in the towns at the intermediate levels of the 
system of clientelism. Some of these leaders suspected, on good grounds, that 
the most powerful members of the existing parties would not permit them 
to rise beyond a certain point, and a few undertook to organize an “agrupa-
ción de color” that could defend their interests.98 Over the next few years, 
the national counterpart of this “agrupación” would give rise to the Partido 
Independiente de Color, which met with fierce repression.99 The emergence 
of an “independent party of color,” however, was but one of several forms of 
assertion and organization at the local as well as the national level.100
Certain features of turn- of- the- century Cienfuegos seem to have con-
verged to make possible such vigorous contests over voice and space, along 
with associated claims to various kinds of rights. First, an expanding and 
multiracial rural workforce, marked by mobility and a certain fluidity of 
roles, underlay the multiracial organizing that occurred in the war of 1895–
98, in the strikes of 1899–1902, and in the intermittent protest of 1906–9. Sec-
ond, a recent and powerful experience of armed conflict, in which black and 
mulatto officers often assumed command over troops from all socioracial 
groups, provided experienced leaders and multiple patterns of leadership. 
Third, the wartime ideal of transracial national identity and citizenship, how-
ever often violated in practice, constituted a powerful ideological framework 
within which to claim rights to political voice and representation.101
These circumstances permitted a struggle for expanded citizenship to 
emerge; they by no means guaranteed that it would be successful. Recogniz-
ing the dimensions of that struggle, however, may help us to situate Cuba’s 
history among other postemancipation experiences. In this light, the multi-
racial organizing that characterized the Cuban war of 1895–98 may usefully 
be compared to the parallel experiment in interracial democracy carried out 
during Reconstruction in the United States and to the mobilizations in the 
cane fields of Louisiana that outlived Reconstruction itself. The fracturing of 
lines of authority on Cuban sugar plantations may also be contrasted to the 
relative continuity of authority on sugar plantations in the Brazilian north-
east, although the settlement of families with the surnames Quesada, Pérez, 
and Sarría behind the Soledad mill, in the community of El Palmar, echoes 
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the fragile but decisive access of some former slaves in the Brazilian north-
east to a roça (plot of land) inside or outside the sugar plantation.102
Victor Clark’s impressions of democracy and social equality in Cuba, with 
which we began, may by now make a certain amount of sense. Ciriaco Que-
sada’s demand that Manuel Blanco, a wealthy merchant and former presi-
dent of the Casino Español de Cienfuegos, defer to him in the matter of a 
mule was issued forcefully and with immediate and successful recourse to the 
civil authorities. This was precisely the sort of act that might cause a North 
American to marvel that “nowhere else does the least- considered member 
of a community aspire with more serene confidence to social equality with 
its most exalted personage.” Though their assertions could not suffice to 
make Cuba a fully democratic polity, rural former slaves like Ciriaco Que-
sada and his neighbor Bárbara Pérez exercised rights of public voice in a con-
text in which the concept of citizenship was widely available and vigorously 
debated. We need not assume that when Cubans chose to address or refer 
to each other as ciudadanos they used this term with precisely the presump-
tions attached to it by those who spoke it at other times or in other languages. 
Citizenship, like freedom itself, could be built up from the ground, even as 
occupiers and legislators debated its meanings from above.
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CHAPTER 4

Slaughterhouses and Milk Consumption  
in the “Sick Republic”
Socio- Environmental Change and Sanitary  
Technology in Havana, 1890–1925
Reinaldo Funes Monzote
“I think of our republic as a sick patient who has to be led by the hand along 
an endless path overlooking an abyss into which we might fall at the slight-
est inattention.”
—MIGUEL DEL CARRIÓN, 1921
In August 1924, in its “Palpitations of National Life” section, the maga-
zine Cuba Contemporánea dedicated one of its entries to the appear-
ance of a serious epidemic of typhoid fever in Havana.1 The head-
ing, “The Sick Republic,” was also the title of one of the permanent 
sections of the Havana medical journal Vida Nueva (New Life). The 
diagnosis in this particular case was that the Republic of Cuba, “mis-
treated by the ineptitude and avarice of its governors,” displaying the 
general breakdown of its vital organs, had been seized by certain ill-
nesses “whose destructive power was growing within the exhausted 
organs.” Among the conjunctural causes cited were the economic 
crisis and a deficient official protection of sanitation. The latter was 
particularly evident in the contamination and insufficiency of drink-
ing water in the capital that came from an aqueduct built originally 
for a population of 150,000 to 200,000 inhabitants that had now 
topped 400,000.2
While the allegory of the polity as sick organism was common 
in the Latin American social essay and novel of the era, its appear-
ance in Cuba was surprising, contrasting as it did with two decades 
of positive evaluations of the island’s progress in hygiene and pub-
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lic health starting with the first U.S. occupation.3 Even during the national 
crisis years at the beginning of the 1920s there was no lack of voices extolling 
those advances in hygiene and health and noting how they differed from the 
state of things in other administrative domains. In 1923, discussing indicators 
of Cuba’s regression since 1906, bibliographer and historian Carlos Trelles 
noted that there was “little to criticize” about the Department of Sanitation.4 
Whether to certify the decadence of the republic inaugurated in 1902 or to 
show one successful side of it, medico- sanitary activity and science in general 
became protagonists of the first order in narratives of the country’s social 
transformation.
The birth of industrial society came with growing urbanization, which in 
turn demanded a search for solutions to serious sanitary problems that large 
cities created. Yet there are few works on the Cuban capital that emphasize 
the role of science and technology on the changes that took place between 
the last years of Spanish rule and the first decades of the republic.5 Most of 
those that touch on the question focus on urban expansion, architecture, 
political conflict, and the lifestyles of distinct social sectors.6 To use a current 
metaphor, we know more about the “software” than about the “hardware” of 
the transformations during this period, though of course any such separa-
tion is arbitrary, since both dimensions are reciprocally determining.7
Science and technology were vital in modifying living conditions in 
Havana in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We start by 
making reference to the general question of sanitation and public hygiene 
according to evaluations made by leading scientific actors of the day. Initially 
they emphasized the positive changes that were reflected in statistics on, for 
example, the reduction in mortality and the standard of living of the poor-
est social sectors. Nevertheless, in the 1920s new criticism emerged among 
scientists concerning the state of health and hygiene, and it became an im-
portant part of the enumeration of symptoms of republican decadence. The 
valuations using medical symptomatology to demonstrate the sickness of the 
republican organism centered principally on Havana, its sanitary regression 
seen as the most obvious symbol of a capital city that had been unable to 
maintain the “civilizing” impulse after the island acquired sovereignty. From 
this perspective, the degeneration was a consequence as much of biological 
and social heritage or the influence of climate as it was of political corrup-
tion, bad public administration, and control over national resources by for-
eign interests. It was frequently asserted that the colony remained alive in the 
republic—an analogy that was congruent with the evolutionary and social 
Darwinist conceptions of many scientists and other intellectuals.
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Regardless of how the urban transformation of Havana was read at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the replacement of animals by automo-
tive vehicles and the simultaneous mechanization and industrialization of 
products of animal origin destined for public consumption played central 
roles. Science and technology were determinant in promoting and implant-
ing practices and habits that came to symbolize the life of modern cities, 
marked by new urbanistic conceptions, the advance of electrification, im-
provements in the supply of water, and new means of transport and com-
munication. What happened with slaughterhouses and milk consumption 
are excellent examples of socio- environmental change in modern societies.8 
The need to feed growing urban populations not connected to the direct pro-
duction of food arose alongside greater productivity facilitated by mechani-
zation as well as the greater need and ability to extend and perfect sanitary 
vigilance over growing consumption.
In this context, public administrators, physicians, and veterinarians pon-
dered the public health and hygiene implications of slaughterhouses and 
dairies. Veterinarians in particular were members of a profession that began 
to have greater presence in Cuba starting with the founding in 1907 of the 
Free Veterinary School, which shortly afterward became part of the Univer-
sity of Havana.9 As Stefania Gallini shows for the case of Colombia, the study 
of veterinarians proves to be fundamental to writing a cultural and envi-
ronmental history of the production and consumption of meat—a criterion 
that could be equally well applied to diverse aspects related to milk.10 Both 
issues are addressed in the following analysis of public debates on Cuban 
decadence and are shown to be indicators of the complexity of a society in 
motion and influenced by rapid transformations made possible by the ap-
plication of techno- scientific innovations. While the discussion of meat and 
milk production coincided in some ways with the politicized narrative of 
the sick- to- healthy- to- sick republic, the chapter proposes that these were 
more concrete issues within the overall problematic of hygiene and health, 
in which objective transformations and their limits can be observed beside 
great discourses about the advancement and regress of the republic or con-
junctural statistics. As one of the symbols of the lack of hygiene during the 
colonial period, slaughterhouse reform and the increase in consumption of 
sanitary milk became without a doubt emblems of a new era.
Hygienic Modern Capital
In the late nineteenth century, physicians and scientists exercised greater 
protagonism in their areas of expertise, in the capital as well as in other cities. 
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The Royal Academy of Medical, Physical, and Natural Sciences of Havana, 
founded in 1861, and other scientific societies created after 1879, took on the 
principal problems of health and hygiene that affected colonial society.11 The 
most alarming issue was yellow fever. In 1893 the physician Diego Tamayo 
estimated that yellow fever had killed more than forty thousand in Havana 
over the previous thirty years, not to mention the great mortality from other 
diseases like tuberculosis, typhoid fever, diphtheria, enteritis, and tetanus. 
He also concluded that 60 percent of these deaths could have been prevented 
had it not been for a lack of urban planning, deficient drainage, the accumu-
lation of waste, and the adulteration of food. Above all, though, was the lack 
of initiative to achieve change and the absence of “a general plan of sanitary 
reform that would tend to guarantee the health of the land in which we live.”12
Tamayo was joined by others such as the engineer Herminio Leyva, who 
blamed the poor initiative and scarce resources of Havana’s city authorities 
for problems like the presence of stables in populated areas, the state of the 
plazas near markets and slaughterhouses, the contamination of the harbor 
(a major cause of disease in the opinion of many sanitary experts of the day), 
and the “reckless, near criminal, lack of concern” about quarantine.13 Spanish 
military doctors added their voice to the clamor over the capital’s hygiene, 
including Cesáreo Fernández, who addressed the Royal Academy of Sciences 
in 1896 on the subject.14 The growing number of medico- scientific journals 
became platforms for specialized debate, including La Higiene, the flag-
ship journal of Havana’s Society of Hygiene between 1891 and 1895.15 These 
efforts, of course, have to be understood against the backdrop of the great 
advances in hygiene, medicine, science, and technology that characterized 
the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe and the United States. 
This was a context that promoted, for example, the creation in 1887 of the 
Histobacteriological and Anti- rabies Vaccine Institute of the Crónica Médico- 
Quirúrgica de la Habana at approximately the same time that the Pasteur 
Institute was established in Paris. The institute became a local reference point 
for complaints over sanitary deficiencies. In the opinion of creole higienistas, 
desires to reproduce such sanitary progress were blocked by the interfer-
ence of the colonial authorities, adverse socioeconomic conditions, a lack of 
backing by wealthy creoles, and scarce general concern about hygiene. The 
outbreak of the 1895 war of independence and, after 1896, Spanish General 
Valeriano Weyler’s military strategy of Reconcentración (forced removal of 
the rural population to urban concentration camps) caused mortality rates in 
Havana to soar from 32.4 per 1,000 in 1895 to 89.2 per 1,000 in 1898.16
U.S. military intervention came in the midst of this crisis. The hygiene 
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and sanitary improvement work during the four years the island was occu-
pied are considered one of the most successful facets of the intervention. 
Ever since the participation of a U.S. delegation in an 1879 study of Havana’s 
yellow fever problem, U.S. sanitary experts had been convinced that the in-
salubrious nature of the port city was a major local and international public 
health concern. They outlined a number of necessary reforms, among them 
provision of safe drinking water to all social sectors, elimination of swamps, 
the replacement of existing sewerage with modern systems, widening and 
maintaining the cleanliness of streets, covering toilets, removing stables 
from the urban areas, cleaning up the harbor shore, and modifying the cus-
toms of the “lower orders.” Many local sanitarians agreed, although some 
like Herminio Leyva were critical of proposals to tear down the majority of 
houses or widen the streets.17
True to form, one of the first measures of the U.S. military occupation 
government was to form a corps of medical inspectors, as well as clean streets 
and public places. Regulations were promulgated on quarantine, obligatory 
vaccination, immigration, prostitution, glanders, infectious diseases, slaugh-
terhouses, markets, veterinary measures, pavement of the streets, construc-
tion of a seawall (the famous malecón), and provision of water. The assistance 
of the local medical community was key in making these initiatives work, 
and many of their representatives occupied high public posts. The most sig-
nificant of these was Tamayo, who became minister of the interior.
The most notable breakthrough, of course, was the eradication of yellow 
fever, which the United States was able to achieve, after a number of fruitless 
initial attempts concentrating on disinfecting streets and water supplies, by 
applying the theory and method that the Cuban physician Carlos Finlay had 
been working with since 1881. Proof that a biological vector, the mosquito, 
was responsible for transmitting the disease meant that effective prophylac-
tic measures could be carried out. General Leonard Wood, the U.S. military 
governor and a physician by training, maintained that “the confirmation of 
Finlay’s doctrines is the greatest step taken in medical science since the dis-
covery of the smallpox vaccine by Jenner and by itself makes the war with 
Spain worth it.”18 It has been proposed that the struggle against yellow fever 
in Havana gave birth to a colonial U.S. public health apparatus oriented to 
safeguarding its commercial interests, protecting its troops and labor force, 
and justifying domination.19
Sanitation became a kind of guarantee of the island’s ability to acquire 
independent statehood. In fact, among the restrictions on national sover-
eignty codified in the Platt Amendment, appended to the Cuban constitu-
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tion by fiat of the U.S. occupying power, was Article 5: “The government of 
Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised 
or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of 
the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases 
may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce 
of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the southern ports of the United States 
and the people residing therein.” Failure to do so would be legal justification 
for further intervention by the United States, something that Cuban sanitary 
leaders were immediately attuned to. Juan Santos Fernández, in his capacity 
as president of the Academy of Sciences of Havana, referred to the obligation 
in the first session of the body that followed Cuban independence in May 
1902, with Wood and the president- elect of Cuba, Tomás Estrada Palma, in 
the audience. “The exigencies of sanitation in the Island of Cuba are an issue 
of international interest and have to be placed above all political questions 
. . . because one would have to be blind not to comprehend that we will not 
have a patria if we do not maintain public health at the level established by 
the United States government during its military occupation, to the aston-
ishment of locals and foreigners.”20
The warning did not go unheard, if one is to judge by the progress in the 
area of public health over the following years. Of particular note were the 
sanitary ordinances; the improvement of the quarantine service; health in-
spection in the area of immigration; the building of leper asylums, sanitari-
ums, and hospitals; and the laying of modern sewerage and paving of roads 
in Havana and other cities.21 One striking event was the creation in 1909 
of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the first of its kind in the world.22 
The physician and public hygiene specialist Enrique Barnet reiterated be-
fore the academy in 1913 the favorable image of Cuba’s sanitary state. In his 
judgment, as a small people spinning “like a satellite in the orbit of a star of 
the first magnitude,” the republic could not tolerate “quarantinable diseases” 
that would compromise health in other territories. Fortunately, however, the 
situation in the island was so satisfactory that its mortality index placed it 
“beside the most privileged nations.” In 1912 the country had 12.89 deaths 
per 1,000 inhabitants, and Havana 16.97, while in Washington the figure was 
17.4 per 1,000. There was still work to be done on a number of fronts: along-
side the usual suspects was a need to build sanitary housing for the lower 
classes as well as public bathing and washing facilities. Public parks were 
needed to serve as the city’s “lungs.” Once in place, according to Barnet, 
Havana would stand alongside the world’s healthiest cities, “and its astonish-
ing and rapid growth and spread, far from being a motive of sanitary alarm, 
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will be more like those of a healthy and vigorous organism that is developing 
without setback or stumble.” The same advances were being made in other 
areas of the island, thanks to the “centralization and nationalization of sani-
tary services.”23
The Sick Republic
In the 1920s, in contrast to these optimistic appreciations and in keeping 
with a growing unease about “Cuban decadence,” the republic’s sanitary 
state also became the object of criticism.24 The principal points of reference 
were increases in the general mortality rate and in the incidence of diseases 
that had seemed under control. In the case of Havana, the theme of the har-
bor came up again, with Antonio González Curquejo characterizing it in 
1921 as “a petrie dish of pathological microbes, and because of its stink a true 
pigsty.”25 After praising the gains made during the U.S. intervention and the 
work of the Ministry of Health, he argued that since 1916 the country had 
“moved backward in hygiene.” Part of the explanation he attributed to immi-
gration from the Antilles, seen negatively by many scientists who argued that 
it introduced diseases that had been eliminated from Cuba, like smallpox 
and malaria.26 Among the internal causes, González Curquejo underlined 
scarce and contaminated drinking water as well as deficient street cleaning, 
rat infestations, and potholes and breaks in streets, especially those in the 
outlying barrios, that were sites of infection. Troubling was the fact that pub-
lic health had regressed most rapidly at the very time during the First World 
War when the national treasury was in good shape and individual salaries 
were high. The decadence, in other words, was occurring despite the Minis-
try of Health’s efforts, which were colliding with the established system and 
the administrative mechanisms in place.
More exhaustive was a 1925 study read at the University of Havana by Juan 
Antonio Cosculluela, a professor of hydraulics in the School of Engineer-
ing.27 It was predicated on the idea that the modern city was distinct from 
the old city because it was “a product of steam and electricity.” Its growth had 
been contributed to, moreover, by the great discoveries of biology, which 
along with progress in science and technical knowledge had allowed for im-
provement in urban health. The fundamental characteristic of the modern 
city was its “continuous, incessant, violent growth” and the intense influx 
from rural areas, which created the grave problem of depopulation in the 
countryside.28
Cosculluela underlined that civilization came with an irremediable con-
sequence: the complete contamination of the environment, such that even 
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the most modern and progressive cities claimed more victims than would be 
found on a battlefield. He gave the example of New York where, despite the 
efficiency of the public services, one in every seven inhabitants suffered from 
tuberculosis and 25 percent of infants died before the age of five. In the case 
of Havana, statistics showed an alarming increase in mortality from infec-
tious disease, to the point that it was on the road to becoming one of the least 
healthy cities in the Americas. Its mortality index was 20 per 1,000, while 
Montevideo’s stood at 12 per 1,000, Buenos Aires at 16 per 1,000, and Rio de 
Janeiro at 19 per 1,000. Havana’s sanitary decadence was manifest in a natu-
ral population growth that was essentially zero, with natality dropping from 
4.16 between 1905 and 1910 to only 1.13 between 1920 and 1924. The growth of 
almost 45 percent in population in the previous twenty- four years was due to 
immigration from rural areas and foreign countries. In the first instance, the 
influx from the interior to the capital meant that the Cuban peasant could no 
longer be found in the fields but rather in the populated centers, especially 
Havana, “where he is found working as a peon for a bricklayer or in mod-
est clerical posts.” On top of this was the allowing of Antillean immigration, 
which he qualified as undesirable and dangerous due to the reintroduction 
of diseases that had been extirpated from Cuba.
According to Cosculluela, the contagious diseases that best demon-
strated this decadent sanitary state were tuberculosis, malaria, and typhoid 
fever. The first was linked to street cleaning, the accumulation of waste, and 
empty lots that had been converted into dumps. Malaria, in frank resur-
gence, had to do with the lack of “petrolization” of stagnant waters and the 
abandonment of the war on the mosquito. But it was typhoid fever that rep-
resented the greatest evidence of the sanitary crisis, since mortality from this 
cause had a determinant role on health indicators for the city. The statistics 
for Havana showed that mortality had dropped dramatically from 1900 to 
1910, from 30.6 to 20.3 per 100,000, before beginning to rise alarmingly and 
steadily, reaching 51.92 per 100,000 in 1924. This last constituted without 
doubt an epidemic of hydrological origin, “provoked by the contamination 
of the public water supply, by its direct mixing with the untreated water of 
the Rio Almendares.” This, in turn, was due to the state of abandonment of 
the aqueduct, “a fecund fount of fraud and irregularity.” So, among modern 
capitals, Havana occupied an inferior position “due to the complete relax-
ation of hygiene and sanitary practices in necessary public services.” One 
of the most alarming indicators of this was infant mortality, which had sur-
passed 15,000 age 0 to 1 between 1919 and 1923.
Cosculluela saw two phases in the urban health indicators of Havana, 
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one of improvement between 1900 and 1915 and one of decline from that 
point onward. Modern life was not possible without efficient public services 
like potable water and proper sewerage, “services that must be controlled by 
competent hygiene and sanitary engineers.” Nevertheless, Havana was sub-
ject to a degree of fraud and corruption “more intense than any country has 
ever suffered.” This decadence in urban salubriousness was part of a context 
of “general regress suffered by the country in every area of life, since every-
thing is contaminated, everything is infected, to the point that the purest and 
most honest souls are sick with it.” Meanwhile, the sanitary bureaucrats tried 
to demonstrate, as a consolation, the efficiency of public hygiene by compar-
ing the mortality statistics of Havana with statistics from the colonial period. 
For Cosculluela this meant that “if the indices of health measure the degree 
of progress and civilization in the cities, the fact that Havana’s are so poor 
. . . is related very closely with the certain and demonstrated cultural regres-
sion that all of Cuban society is suffering at present, in each and every one 
of its cultural manifestations.”29 In this pessimistic evaluation, Cubans had 
always remained behind civilized peoples until external factors allowed them 
to overcome inertia. He cited the taking of Havana by the English in 1762 and 
the French immigration to the island following the revolution in Haiti as ex-
amples, and ended with the U.S. intervention that “provided the greatest 
and most efficient civilizing impulse.” But within ten or twelve years of that 
impulse, given over once again to its own forces, “the decadence in all our 
institutions” commenced anew. Not coincidentally Cosculluela invoked the 
specter of the Platt Amendment, by showing his hopes in new changes: “The 
geographic fatality of Cuba’s proximity to the United States means that we 
must take care of urban health if we want to maintain our mistreated sover-
eignty and leave behind these embarrassing periods of pillage and corruption 
in hopes of better times. . . . That will have to come quickly.”
This summation of Havana’s state of health was part of a broad national 
debate that took shape as the republic neared its first quarter century of exis-
tence. The most radical analyses pointed to the interference of U.S. imperial-
ism and its growing control of economic and political interests to explain the 
country’s ills. But other visions concentrated more on determining symp-
toms than deep causes. In the latter cases, biological, climatic, and medical 
metaphors were commonly used. One example of such a reading was that of 
the physician and writer Miguel del Carrión, whose analysis broached issues 
like the lack of “ethnic unity” and the absence of a spirit of association (orga-
nizations of civil society), of discipline, and of hierarchical order. He was 
particularly concerned with the poverty experienced by Cubans in their own 
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land, in contrast to the opulent living of foreigners, leaving nationals only 
the option of cultivating a political career to garner resources and influence. 
He blamed the forming of the people’s character “in the narrow confines of 
a colonial regime; lulled into the inactive sleep of an easy life in an enervat-
ing climate.”30
In spite of this, for Carrión the republican slate was not all negative. De-
spite its deficiencies, Cuban society had progressed in part thanks to the 
effect of sanitary policies. “Our compatriots have learned to live better, more 
hygienically, with an order of comfort in their houses and their towns.” There 
were isolated areas and even important towns where the peasantry remained 
on the margins of “the new cultural currents introduced into the country,” 
but from every town there radiated “beneficent waves” that would permit a 
metamorphosis. There remained great challenges, like that of “fabricating” 
citizens in order to change an evolutionary trajectory “strictly controlled by 
the laws of biology” and to awaken public interest. The Cuban state, in his es-
timation, was an essentially hypothetical entity, since Cuban society itself did 
not exist per se. The “de facto” governments of the republic, therefore, had 
exercised over the country “a doctor’s oversight at the bedside of patients 
attacked by a long illness.” This was not something that could be achieved 
in a single generation. It was only possible through the reconquest of eco-
nomic wealth. Carrión warned that those in government could not afford to 
lose sight of the fact that “peoples who do not control the sources of wealth 
in their own land sooner or later must become slaves.” A simple program of 
government was required to guarantee public hygiene, easy communication, 
access to schools for all, and a treasury without deficit.
Using terminology familiar to all his colleagues, habituated to the lan-
guage of science and technology, the writer spoke of the need to establish 
solid supports for the dangerous bridge connecting this era with the future. 
Cuba was a republic in its infancy, and it could not be corrected only with 
laws, since these did not serve “as orthopedic apparatuses on the malformed 
limbs of the collective body.” This was the personified nation as unsteady 
and immature convalescent that Carrión saw himself leading along the edge 
of an abyss. “Let us pray to the god of children, and of countries that are be-
ginning to venture their first steps on the slippery slope of Liberty, to pre-
serve us from an untimely fall.”31
Slaughterhouses of Havana
The great narrative of sanitation, health, and hygiene in the young nation 
was conjured metaphorically to imagine the state of political independence, 
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institutional integrity, biological destiny, and cultural potency. To what de-
gree was it echoed by evaluations of the state of health and hygiene in every-
day life, especially in mundane areas like meat and milk production that 
were beneath the limelight of epidemics and gross statistics at the heart of 
debates over the island’s health? The two levels did coincide, as for example 
in Barnet’s 1913 address to the academy, where he insisted that, along with 
a litany of other sanitary measures, the island’s well- being required guaran-
teeing the purity of milk and impeding the adulteration of its food supply. 
And yet, if we look more closely at the concrete attempts to guarantee that 
purity and impede that adulteration, we will find a different set of actors and 
narratives with distinct arcs.
Havana’s scientific community had long been concerned with the condi-
tion of the capital city’s slaughterhouses, and it was a common topic in the 
discourses and practices related to the modernization of urban life in the 
process of industrialization.32 Without going back too far, we might start 
with physician Ambrosio González del Valle’s 1870 demand that they be 
transferred to the edges of the Rio Almendares. In his judgment this was 
the most appropriate place because of its topography and the abundance of 
water for eliminating waste, which could also be used to produce fertilizer 
if the proper precautions were taken.33 Ten years later, another physician, 
Eduardo Plá, reiterated the need to move slaughterhouses, which he saw as 
true foci of physical and moral infection, to the city’s outskirts.34 Among a 
number of problems, he mentioned their location in more populous and im-
poverished barrios to the south, which meant that the bad odors covered the 
city when the wind blew in a certain direction, as well as the absence of water 
to carry off the detritus and the contamination of the harbor. The buildings 
were of primitive construction, without the space they needed and in a state 
of ruin, with scenes like the washing of intestines in the principal entryway 
being common. Other criticisms were directed to the lack of a veterinarian to 
inspect the cattle before their slaughter and the barbarous manner in which 
the killing was carried out.35
In 1889 the Spanish governor, Manuel Salamanca, tried to promote a 
packet of sanitary measures. The Crónica Médico-Quirúrgica de La Habana 
identified the most important one as the project to build a new slaughter-
house, given that the existing ones were permanent concentrations of infec-
tion so bad they kept the necessary influx of immigrants from the island. 
The banks of the Almendares were considered more appropriate because the 
river course would permit the cleaning of the enclosure and the washing out 
to sea of all matter that could not be used for fertilizer and other industrial 
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ends.36 It was noted that such establishments had attained a maximum state 
of perfection in more advanced nations, and the Havana municipal govern-
ment asked the Academy of Sciences to evaluate the project. In 1894 the new 
municipal slaughterhouse was finally inaugurated, with the financial backing 
of thirty meat wholesalers.
The slaughterhouse question was one of the first to be addressed as part 
of the sanitary measures for the city undertaken during the U.S. interven-
tion. On July 24, 1899, the municipal government passed the Regulation of 
Slaughterhouses, followed later on August 31 by rules governing markets and 
another on October 10 regarding stables.37 At the end of the same year Tomás 
Mederos wrote a report on his efforts for the year while filling the office of 
slaughterhouse deputy. In his opinion, these were establishments that gave 
the city “a great deal of unwanted notoriety and its most repulsive aspect” 
because they stood out for their absence of hygiene and morality. In the one 
dedicated to larger livestock (cows, horses, and mules), the refuse could be 
seen strewn about in every direction and the heaps of manure and other re-
sidual products were an affront to the environment. Many sorts of waste were 
tossed into the river, which was covered with organic matter as it flowed into 
the harbor. The picture was even worse in the abattoir for lesser livestock 
(pigs, sheep, and goats)—an old and broken- down building, “a true pigsty” 
where meat was mixed ceaselessly with the garbage covering the ground. In 
each place, the slaughtermen, “drunk with such disorder,” were prone to for-
get all social consideration and humanitarianism and show themselves “cruel 
to the animals and shameless with one another.”
Mederos claimed that from the first he understood that the situation re-
quired enormous remedial transformation that “could not be the work of a 
single day or a single man.” For this reason he required the assistance of two 
physicians on a commission charged with evaluating the slaughterhouses 
and their implications for health, hygiene, morality, and popular consump-
tion. They had been able to show the poor state of the buildings in some cases 
and in others the way in which the waste clogged up a pipe from which water 
was taken to clean hooves and intestines. The adjacent river was grotesque 
and nauseating, with “heaping amounts of intestinal bits” and the water 
colored greenish black from putrefaction and thick layers of flies. Inspection 
of the cattle was deplorable, with the veterinarian responsible barred from 
doing his job scientifically, “to the point of being forced to declare healthy 
and fat the majority of those cows who were banged up, skinny, and sick.”
The work undertaken according to the recommendations of the com-
mission quickly transformed this panorama. In the site for larger livestock 
Slaughterhouses and Milk Consumption in the “Sick Republic” | 133
the central pavilion was covered with planks and flumes, and basins were 
installed to manage the water. Solid waste and excrement were deposited in 
iron tanks and taken to a disposal site in metal vehicles, part of a business 
run by two men from the United States. According to Mederos, the site soon 
became the best-run establishment of those under municipal administra-
tion. “The pestilent and repulsive buildings, the mountains of garbage, the 
sludge, the small trench filled with the area’s drainage—all have disappeared 
and the site has been converted into clean and manageable terrain ready for 
setting up gardens that will provide a certain poesy to a place that used to 
be famously sinister.” Moreover, the river was dredged and its banks disin-
fected, to the great benefit of those who lived on its course.38
Despite these improvements, much was still required to leave the large 
cattle abattoir in perfect condition. In order to achieve that, the privileges in-
herited from the colonial era would have to disappear, and for the same to be 
achieved for the abattoir for pigs, sheep, and goats, which was an affront to 
“all sense of hygiene and progress,” the solution was its complete demolition 
and combination with the slaughterhouse for larger cattle where a crematory 
oven needed to be installed to process the waste. Some of the city govern-
ment’s dispositions allowed a glimpse of new horizons, like the suppression 
of some of the rights and privileges to slaughter animals unimpeded that 
were enjoyed by the heirs of a Havana aristocrat, Count O’Reilly, or those ac-
quired by the wholesalers who had founded the abattoir for large livestock. 
Mederos concluded that all such prerogatives should be eliminated, “con-
verting those establishments into property of the municipality which would 
put them at the disposition of the public,” showing neither the favoritism nor 
the arbitrariness that undermines public order and raises the price of meat. 
He also requested limits on the activities of the numerous intermediaries in 
the meat business.
Another of the changes had to do with the reform of the slaughtermen 
themselves who, once “stripped of vices and bad customs,” would carry out 
their work with good order and economy. The new administrator of abat-
toirs, Miguel Zaldivar, promised to dedicate himself to this and other im-
provements. In the meantime, the veterinarians Valdivielso and Etchetgoyen 
deserved the credit for the fact that meat was clean and nutritious. Their 
work demonstrated that the fall in the city’s mortality rate was due in great 
part to the rigorous and scientific inspection of slaughterhouse meat. Me-
deros’s report ended with a reference to three deaths from anthrax in the 
corrals of the slaughterhouse for large livestock. The blood of the cows was 
sent to the Histobacteriological Laboratory, where the experienced micro-
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biologists and physicians Juan Dávalos and Enrique Acosta confirmed the 
diagnosis. In response, the municipality decided immediately to establish 
a laboratory in the abattoir to assess the cattle and to purchase a “splendid 
microscope.” Among other measures, it was determined to take the tem-
perature and blood samples of suspect beasts, as well as from 10 percent of 
the healthy ones.
In 1909 one of the expert professionals who worked in Havana’s munici-
pal slaughterhouse, the physician Manuel Ruiz Casabó, presented a study 
to the Academy of Sciences.39 Aside from assessing the facility in which he 
had worked for ten years, the study also looked at the other two facilities in 
the city, the Luyanó Slaughterhouse and the Industrial Abattoir. In regard 
to the Luyanó Slaughterhouse, Ruiz Casabó mentioned that due to com-
plaints from the Cuban Humanitarian Society, two holding apparatuses to 
avoid mistreatment of the cattle prior to slaughter were built for the corral, 
and the method of killing was modified. Basically operations relied on the 
strength of five hundred workers, though the end result was an improvement 
on the former situation, which had been the subject of “mockery and ridicule 
around Havana at the time.” The facility at Luyanó, founded in 1907, had 
an electric motor and steam machinery to move the equipment for hanging 
the beef and weighing or transporting the meat. Electricity allowed the com-
plete service to operate with only twenty- four workers. On the other hand, 
its corrals left much to be desired. A purpose- built pipe eliminated water 
after traveling a great distance to the inlet at Guanabacoa, while the waste 
products were used by industrial entrepreneurs who maintained crematoria 
nearby to transform them into fertilizer.
The industrial abattoir was the most recent and important for its mag-
nificence, extension, machinery, processes, elegance, and investment. It was 
the property of a private company, located at the back of the harbor on the 
edge of the Atarés inlet. Ruiz Casabó regretted the choice of the site, since 
he felt it was likely the place where Havana’s notoriously fetid bay showed 
the greatest concentration of “microbial fermentations.” The plant possessed 
an enormous refrigerated room and floors for different derivatives of the 
slaughter, areas for worker hygiene including showers and toilets, as well as 
metal and wood shops. Huge Westinghouse dynamos generated power for 
the machines in each department. In sum, everything there was “grand and 
magnificent.” The killing methods were very advanced, especially those for 
pigs, done by an “original and ingenious machine.” All derivatives were used 
at this slaughterhouse, yet it still had difficulties due to the lack of sufficient 
water for its operations.
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An article published in the magazine El Fígaro, also in 1909, stressed that 
the industrial abattoir satisfied a need in the city deeply felt for over half a 
century, since meat processing had been quite deficient in comparison with 
progressive capital cities. In terms of sanitation and hygiene, the new instal-
lation—a veritable “industrial palace”—was in keeping with the new stan-
dards being realized in the country. Moreover, they noted the potential it 
had to make Havana the meat supplier for the entire republic, the way Chi-
cago was in the United States, and even allow exports to the United States at 
certain times of the year. The abattoir was, in sum, one of the activities that 
could consolidate Cuban nationality and a symbol of work, strength, and 
civilization.40
Despite these advances, Ruíz Casadó denounced the fact that the three 
slaughterhouses were poor in terms of the sanitary inspection of cattle des-
tined for public consumption. In the municipal facility, there were daily pro-
tests from merchants who felt disadvantaged by the sanitary regulations. Of 
the 150 cows that died in its corrals during the ten years he worked there, 115 
had had anthrax, and many other cases might have been detected had their 
slaughter been delayed slightly. The situation was worsened by the naming 
of unqualified personnel to the inspector positions—for example, a medical 
doctor who had no knowledge of bacteriological work with a microscope. 
The author likewise decried the fact that the machinery in the municipal 
Figure 4.1 Industrial abbatoir, area for slaughtering pigs. El Fígaro, no. 39  
(September 26, 1909): 491.
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abattoir for transforming organic residuals did not do their job and that 
much waste was thrown into the harbor or mixed into the earth of a neigh-
boring piece of land. In its favor, the facility had one professional inspector 
for large livestock and another for small, whereas in the rest a single veteri-
narian was in change of inspecting live animals, meat, and viscera. Never-
theless, no facility really guaranteed the quality of meat consumed in the city.
A critical perspective on the inspection of slaughterhouses was reiterated 
in 1925 by a veterinarian, Ricardo Gómez Murillo, in his inaugural discourse 
as a member of the Academy of Sciences. In his opinion, the peculiar orga-
nization of these facilities and of the markets was a serious danger for those 
charged with inspecting the animals and the meats at the moment they tried 
to gain compliance based on the inspection outcome. One veterinarian, Lut-
gardo de la Torre, was assassinated upon leaving the industrial abattoir after 
such an incident. Gómez Murillo denounced the fact that “it seems that sci-
ence in the markets and slaughterhouses of Havana has turned back the 
clock fifty years and today, as then, all that is needed to guarantee the clean-
liness of food of animal origin is a quick and summary examination with the 
naked eye.”41 He attributed this “inexplicable” backwardness in food inspec-
tion, in part, to the fact that it was a municipal jurisdiction, and he advo-
cated nationalizing the service and transferring it to the Ministry of Health.
Milk Production and Consumption
The gradual expansion and perfecting of the dairy industry is another of the 
great symbols of urbanized industrial society, thanks to the advances in bac-
teriology, refrigeration, and transport. In this context, milk began to assume 
the category of the most perfect of foods, as Melanie Dupuis has nicely illus-
trated in her study of the U.S. experience with this product.42 Toward the 
end of the nineteenth century, the distribution and consumption of milk 
in Havana occurred on a reduced scale and in rudimentary conditions. At 
Figure 4.2 Drawing of the Industrial Abbatoir, Havana. Source: Carlos de la Torre y 
Alfredo Aguayo, Geografía de Cuba (Havana: Cultural S.A., 1928).
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the time, the Spanish military physician Fernández Losada noted the high 
indexes of infant deaths in Havana from the consumption of contaminated 
milk, given the lack of real organization of a municipal hygiene laboratory 
to perform services like the analysis of adulterated foods.43
At the outset of the twentieth century, the consumption of milk in Havana 
was constantly climbing. A coachman of the era, Luis Adrián Betancourt, 
relates how many stables were dedicated to cows, and the city filled up with 
dairies. Between 4 and 5 a.m., people would head to the milking sites with 
jars in search of fresh milk, or the milk was sold from horses carrying con-
tainers. According to the coachman, around 1910 the health authorities made 
war on the milk producers on the grounds that the presence of cows in the 
city caused diseases and huge quantities of flies. Because of this they ordered 
the creation of carts made of galvanized zinc and painted yellow, a color that 
identified the milk vendors, and they began to inspect milking sites and bot-
tling the milk with seals from the Ministry of Health to avoid the watering 
down or adulteration of the product.44
The growing importance of milk as a foodstuff was related to progress in 
bacteriology and its effect on the improvement of public health, as well as 
with the appearance of new techniques for dairy production, processing, and 
distribution. More than thirty- five articles in the Sanitary Ordinances of 1906 
were dedicated to different aspects linked to the consumption of milk, and in 
1913 new norms were added following proposals by a commission made up of 
Figure 4.3 System for milk delivery in Cuba, beginning of the twentieth century.  
Cuba Review & Bulletin, April 1906.
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academicians Alonso Cuadrado, Barnet, and Coronado. Among their stipu-
lations was that to be distributed milk had to be duly bottled, covered, and 
sealed; that its sale from stables was prohibited; that licenses for dairies had 
to be renewed annually or be rescinded indefinitely for those in contraven-
tion; that certificates of health had to be secured every six months; and that 
the milkers had to have well- washed hands. They also recommended fixing 
the proportions of sugar in condensed milk and that the tins come with dates 
of manufacture and expiration.45
The milk question was relevant not only in terms of food but also in terms 
of its close connection to distinct diseases. A 1923 article in the Bulletin of 
the Panamerican Union made reference to both dimensions.46 The departure 
point was that it was one of the cheapest foods in proportion to the energy 
supplied in its production and one of the most desirable for rich and poor 
alike. But despite these qualities it was also a dangerous foodstuff because 
each year thousands of children died from diseases transmitted in impure 
milk like typhoid, Malta fever, scarlet fever, tuberculosis, diarrhea and en-
teritis, diphtheria, and diseases of the throat.
To prevent such disease, the entry of harmful bacteria into the milk had 
to be avoided by ensuring cleanliness, healthy animals, careful milkers, spe-
cial covered vessels, sterilized receptacles, and refrigeration. One advantage 
was that modern vehicles were faster, but the product containers had to be 
well covered and not left in the sun. To be sold, milk had to be bottled, as 
was demanded in “progressive” cities. In a number of such cities a dairy 
inspection service had been created under the departments of health that 
covered the entire process from the farms to the consumer. The article par-
ticularly exhorted pasteurizing the milk, a procedure that was most extensive 
in the United States and through which a healthier and sanitized product was 
secured, though it did not discount other measures such as boiling the milk, 
a method more widely used in Europe and Latin America.
Cuban physicians and sanitary authorities were aware of these calls to 
increase milk consumption without converting it into a route for disease 
transmission. In 1914 the eminent medical scientist Arístides Agramonte pre-
sented a study to the Academy of Sciences in which he recounted his visits to 
pasteurization plants in Europe and the United States. His departure point 
was that milk was the basis for the artificial feeding of infants, so its pro-
duction and distribution required the oversight of sanitary institutions in 
civilized countries. One way to achieve this objective was pasteurized milk, 
which was the kind most consumed in populous cities of the United States 
and Germany (Berlin, for example). Years earlier Agramonte had been able 
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to visit Berlin’s Bolle dairy and facilities in New York. In the latter city, two 
large companies dominated the market and “in heated and tireless but peace-
ful competition” extended and improved their installations to the benefit of 
the public and their shareholders. The Sheffield Farms–Slawson Decker Co. 
plant in Manhattan could produce sixty thousand liters in four hours thanks 
to its semiautomatic bottling machinery. The employees, dressed in steril-
ized, white work clothes, had only to supervise operations to remove cracked 
bottles while others were taken out for random bacteriological analysis. In 
sum, with a workforce of only fifty- eight, one thousand liters per worker 
could be pasteurized. In accord with this experience he recommended that 
Cuba “get our health authorities to set up something of this nature, since it is 
still impossible to hope for anything from private initiative.” If milk treated 
in this way could be sold at a normal price, “and given out free to the poor, 
setting up for this purpose many depots in such neighborhoods throughout 
the city,” Agramonte was “sure that the results would not be long in showing 
themselves, and we would feel immediate benefits in lower infant morbidity, 
which more than mortality is what should be concerning us.”47
Agramonte’s comments encouraged another academician, Leonel Plasen-
cia, to present a more extensive study to show that Havana’s milk was of good 
quality but was bacteriologically unclean due to deficient handling.48 In his 
estimation, the idea that the milk from Cuban cows was poor had its origins 
in national pessimism, the tendency “to consider that everything we have is 
bad and that we are less capable than any other inhabitants of the globe.” The 
problem was in the milking and in the washing of vessels in rural dairies and 
urban stables where little attention was given to dairy cattle and neither the 
udders nor the hands of the milkers (who in many cases were children) were 
washed. Likewise transport was beset by delays and other obstacles. Urban 
stables were relatively cleaner due to the direct oversight of the health au-
thorities, but they still had sources of infection like “the crowding around the 
milking by those who want to drink pure milk straight from the cow, who go 
even in the clothes they’ve been using to take care of sick people.” They also 
got a lot of germs from the streets, and it was only due to the immunity ac-
quired when the cows “ate papers” (“pastaban papeles”) in the streets or the 
safeguarding habit of many families of boiling the milk that more damage 
was not done. Another grave danger was the watering down of milk without 
taking care that the diluting water was sterilized.49
The veterinarian José Simpson took up the topic of milk in the academy 
in 1922.50 He claimed that it was the food of greatest importance to humanity 
and of greatest rank from the point of view of physiology, as well as a product 
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that constituted the principal wealth of a number of countries that had dedi-
cated their industrial and agricultural energy and initiative to its production. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that Cuba had propitious climate and soil con-
ditions to become one of the most important producer countries, its dairy 
industry did not have adequate hygienic or industrial methods. In tours of 
the rural areas of the province of Havana, as chief of the Dairy Supply In-
spection Service, he had observed that a primitive system was still in effect. 
Milking was done beneath a leafy tree, on filthy and foul- smelling soil, by a 
Cuban guajiro who rarely felt the “refreshing splash” of clear, clean water on 
his hands, making it impossible to apply the milk regulations in the ranches 
of the interior.
Simpson himself and Domingo Ramos, a university professor, shared the 
work of channeling the supply of milk to Havana and proposed setting up 
a school on the El Dique farm, which was the property of the state, to show 
ranchhands how to milk properly (the farm in question was in an area that 
could be called “dairy alley,” on the road to Güines). Moreover, agronomy ex-
perts should visit the dairy farms or groups of dairy workers in their places of 
work, programs that should not wait for the initiative of foreigners. Just as in 
England, Holland, and the United States, schools should be set up for adult 
and child dairy workers. One example invoked was the school in Guelph, 
Canada, whose fame was such that thousands of interested people with inter-
ests in the industry visited annually.
Simpson estimated that Havana needed some 200,000 liters of milk per 
day, a figure distant from what was then being produced. England’s inhabi-
tants had access to 650 cc each per day, Switzerland’s 700, those in Brussels 
800, in Paris 460, in Canada 450, and in Munich 600 cc. By contrast, those 
in the Cuban capital barely had access to 150 cc per day, despite the fact that 
its inhabitants not only ate dairy with breakfast, but also had milk products 
in their afternoon snacks and meals. Having mentioned statistics on con-
sumption in cities like New York, Paris, and Berlin and the number of cows 
that produced it, the author intoned: “The rivers of milk produced in these 
countries that stand at the head of civilization still are not enough, however, 
to satisfy the feeding of the poor in the great cities, where the weak children 
of the proletariat cannot get enough to eat proper portions. What can we say 
about the poor of Havana, whose milk sells at the fantastic price of a luxury 
good?”51 The Ministry of Agriculture should devote preferential attention to 
the dairy industry. Along with special schools and conferences in dairy re-
gions, fairs and competitions could be promoted. The guajiros would have to 
be taught how to make silos for dried products, how to select cows to create 
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new creole breeds, how to establish a good feeding system based on pastur-
age and other feed supplements, and how to prepare stables with abundant 
water for proper milking. Cows as well as milkers had to be clean, the former 
with tests for tuberculosis and the latter with white clothing and caps, disin-
fected hands, and training in using the milking machines.
Like other authors, Simpson underlined the importance of pasteurization 
and refrigeration. Fortunately, the regulations on dairy supply in Havana 
had produced results in terms of the adulteration of products. Based on his 
experience he affirmed that the ranchers of Havana did not add substances 
like flakes of yucca or yam, which he considered a popular myth. But they 
did become “unconscious criminals by producing an impure food of poor 
nutritional value,” and he criticized their poor techniques—for example, the 
custom of choosing the best cow in the stable for constant milking. Simp-
son proposed collaboration with the university, the faculties of medicine and 
pharmacy, and its professors of medical chemistry and special analysis in an 
effort to intensify studies on the chemistry of milk. He also proposed that 
every pharmacy should be ready to provide the public with milk for formula 
as well as for medicinal purposes, meaning that they would be “equipped to 
satisfy the need and facilitate the scientific artificial feeding of babies, which 
is not widespread in our country.”52
In spite of the limitations outlined in these studies, the nascent dairy in-
dustry showed progress over the first decades of the republic. The pages of 
The Book of Cuba (El Libro de Cuba), published in 1925, feature four busi-
nesses devoted to dairy commerce.53 The largest of these was the Havana 
Dairy Supply Company (Compañía abastecedora de la leche de La Habana), 
founded in 1908. Among the novelties it introduced was the substitution 
of animal hauling from the countryside with specialized trucks, which al-
lowed for better hygiene and more regular distribution. The system of direct 
boiling with wood fires was replaced by an expensive steam machine which, 
along with refrigeration and machines for the rinsing and sterilization of re-
ceptacles (the only one in the city), put this factory “at the level of the most 
perfect in Europe and the United States.” The company had acquired prop-
erties with large dairy ranches and purchased an ice factory with a capacity 
of forty tons per day that was later expanded to a hundred tons, a fundamen-
tal element for conserving milk over long distances and distributing it via a 
deluxe truck service.
These improvements raised sales from 5,000 to 30,000 liters a day, along-
side the raising of an ice cream factory with the most modern machinery. 
Sanitary regulations were scrupulously followed during the entire process, 
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with constant inspections by the Department of Health and without use of 
artificial coloring, which produced milk “of an admirable purity and hygienic 
character,” preferred in the majority of cafés, both private and state- run. 
By 1925 the company had become a commercial and industrial force of the 
first order, with thirty- five dairy outlets around the city. It was followed in 
importance by the Palacio de la Leche (Milk Palace), founded in 1900, and 
by 1925 with an electrified refrigeration plant with the capacity to preserve 
twenty thousand liters of milk per day and ice cream. Milk was received by 
rail and transported in eight large trucks for distribution in the city, with four 
more for ice cream. The company had twenty- four outlets, and its daily sales 
reached fourteen thousand liters.54 Two other dairy merchants were Modesto 
Suárez y Hno (Modesto Suarez & Bro.) and Sixto Abreu. The first was estab-
lished in 1907 as a business specializing in milk transport, receiving it from 
the train and transporting it in ten- ton trucks. Its fleet of large and small 
trucks distributed six thousand liters per day of a milk described as pure and 
supremely hygienic. By 1925 the company had inaugurated a building that 
conformed to the most modern methods of hygiene. Abreu’s business, for 
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its part, was a stable in Vedado for the distribution of milk “according to the 
strictest sanitary observance.”55
The sales of all four businesses put together did not surpass fifty thousand 
liters per day. Though an indeterminate quantity from other smaller estab-
lishments could be added to the total, they did not come close to supplying 
half the potential demand of the city. Together with the criticism on the defi-
ciencies that persisted in the production, distribution, and inspection of milk, 
this shows that the system was far from meeting the degree of development 
aspired to by physicians and veterinarians. The wide margin that existed 
for criticism allowed for calls to solve the problems of hygiene and public 
health in an era in which techno- industrial advances in relation to food and 
successes in the control of diseases accompanied the quick rise of big cities.
Years later, in 1938, the veterinarian Idelfonso Pérez Vigueras regretted 
that the services his profession could add to the dairy sector had been dis-
pensed with. The only assistance vets supplied the industry had to do with 
the deficient inspection of ranches. He noted that there remained diverse 
problems that required veterinary science. Pasteurization was insufficient, 
since there was a large underground sale of untreated milk, and the tech-
nique did not apply to milk that went to the smaller towns. There was also a 
large consumption of fresh cheese made with raw milk and therefore prone 
to contamination. Even with pasteurized milk there remained the problem of 
whether or not it came from healthy cows, which could only be determined 
Figure 4.5 Milk delivery vans of the firm Modesto Suárez y Hno. Libro de Cuba, 1925.
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by competent veterinarians. Moreover, the large companies that did pasteur-
ize their milk were able to impose a very low purchasing price on producers 
and resell the milk at prices prohibitive to the poor.56
Meat, Milk, and the Sick Republic
In Cuba’s transition from colony to republic, the theme of hygiene and pub-
lic health occupied a place of great relevance. Various factors made this the 
case, from the prior tradition of a solid medical community that had been 
capable of producing notable science—the supreme example being Finlay’s 
work on the existence of a biological vector of yellow fever transmission—
to the interest of the U.S. military occupation government in showing rapid 
results in this domain that would cement its economic and political influ-
ence as well as its superiority over the old Spanish colonial regime. It is not 
an accident that the defense of sanitary policies became essential to the dis-
course on the viability of the republic and the independence of Cuba.
As seen at the outset of this chapter, there was initially strong agreement 
on the positive march of the country in the area of sanitation, but this image 
was quickly turned upside down when the signs of “Cuban decadence” began 
to appear in other domains of national life. In that context, scientists, physi-
cians, and other intellectuals used their arsenal of scientific terms to describe 
the pathologies of the republic in the political, economic, and social arenas, 
as though it were a sick patient that required urgent treatment, which itself 
depended to a great extent on the intervention of technocrats and scientific 
experts. This rise and fall narrative was not reproduced in the area of dis-
courses on meat and dairy production. Instead, scientific assessments of each 
industry remained relatively optimistic, centered on the need for improve-
ment (and especially the incorporation of more competent experts) while 
insisting that core sanitary objectives had been reached or were within reach.
Nevertheless, it would be inexact to attribute the relative success in each 
endeavor to a change in sovereign status or political system. Although these 
were not without effect, in reality such changes corresponded to wider trans-
formations like the rise of bacteriology at the end of the nineteenth century 
and its practical application to areas like the quality of food, the beginnings 
of automotive transportation, the improvements in industrial technique and 
assembly line production, the development of veterinary science, and incipi-
ent types of mass consumption as the great urban centers expanded. In all 
these areas the role of science and technology would be ever more influential.
In closing we might make reference to the meaning that Fernando Ortiz 
gave to the consumption of milk in modern society in the middle of the twen-
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tieth century, in a 1947 essay on the Good Neighbor Policy, U.S. imperialism, 
and pan-Americanism. In his opinion, in the realm of the possible created 
by science there had appeared the metaphorical ideal of Henry A. Wallace, 
“to distribute each morning a ration of sterilized and nutritious milk to each 
inhabitant of the globe.” In advocating the need for an Inter- American New 
Deal—a “Renew Deal”—that would bring to all peoples of the Americas a 
plethora of food, mines, machinery, laboratories, schools, universities, and 
civic and cultural institutions, he could think of no better allegory than the 
following: “Ah! And jugs of good milk at the dawn of each day.”57
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In the new city growing next to the old city of Havana, the traces of 
Spanish civilization were slowly and relentlessly disappearing. Ac-
cording to notes made by a foreign traveler, they were being replaced 
by “modern American civilization, which callously invades every-
thing.” The narrow streets with elevated sidewalks and large, old 
houses “built in the pure Spanish style” were things of the past in the 
urban area that was expanding to the west of the city. Of course, the 
past had not disappeared, and numerous observers declared that it 
was still alive, displaying the idiosyncrasies to which Havana owed 
its fame as a major Atlantic metropolis of Caribbean vocation. The 
city was a large street theater with a multicolored cast of hawkers 
and shopkeepers, artisans and wholesalers, public functionaries and 
animals pulling carts laden with goods from the docks. Atop filthy 
cobblestones, breathing a thousand city smells, they were all mixed 
together in a city radiating out from the large inner bay that, in the 
classic conception of the artists and historians fascinated by the great 
urban markets of the nineteenth century, was both “the belly and 
the lungs” of a commercial metropolis. Havana, however, was chang-
ing. Modernity was rising alongside it, in a second city that the trav-
eler went on to describe as having “beautiful” roads—wide, spacious, 
straight, and well designed—with “buildings constructed in the style 
of the United States” on tree- lined avenues with parks nearby, mark-
edly different from the older buildings. The new city housed modern 
cafés, theaters, the railway station, industrial establishments, and the 
“most reputable” schools. Travelers, then, were presented with two 
opposing cities: one modern, one traditional. The modern city dis-
played the clear influence of the Anglo- American North. The old city, 
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apparently unmistakably “Hispanic,” was in fact a mixture of Spanish and 
creole—indeed, almost entirely creole, with little real originality beyond its 
syncretism, its humbler homes built in interstitial spaces and in outlying 
neighborhoods next to the docks and warehouses. This old city inherited the 
legacy of large public buildings, fortresses and palaces, convents, churches, 
and large stone houses.
The image we have just evoked could apply to the dawn of the twenti-
eth century, to the first years of the republic when a paradigm of American 
modernity began to take shape that contrasted itself with a supposedly tra-
ditional Spanish colonial order. The birth of a national state provided the 
perfect opportunity to open the city to other influences—especially given 
the decisive defeat of an enemy, Spain, that surrendered once on the battle-
field and again in the Treaty of Paris—and to introduce the latest advances 
from one of the most economically advanced nations of the age, the United 
States. The United States was the country closest to the New Cuba in practical 
and functional terms because of the tight commercial links that had already 
been established, because it was the main destination for Cuban political and 
industrial emigration, and because it was where the majority of the heirs of 
Havana’s elite received their higher education. Marial Iglesias has elegantly 
explored discourses and symbols that reveal a desire for change and an iden-
tification with a certain imaginary of modernity among ordinary people dur-
ing the limbo years of the U.S. occupation when the past was dead, the future 
still to be constructed.1 The most advanced sectors of society had idealized 
images and models of this future that they hoped to introduce, as if it were 
possible to disregard the reality of the existing society and ignore its natural 
impulses and inertias.
But let us return to our traveler and his tale of a city being ruthlessly in-
vaded by “modern American civilization,” an urban image characterized by 
its duality. The account actually refers to a visit made in 1853 by the Colom-
bian Nicolás Tanco. The author, who shortly afterward began to import in-
dentured Asian workers for work on the main sugar plantations (a new mo-
dality in an ancient form of exploitation), contrasted traditional Havana with 
the new Havana growing outside the city, on the other side of the Paseo del 
Prado and the Paseo Isabel ii, together constituting the main thoroughfare 
beginning at Castillo de la Punto and ending at the Campo de Marte (see 
map 5.1). Two different styles of life were gradually taking shape, even in 
terms of the physical appearance of a city which was, in the words of Tanco, 
suffering from the ambiguous nature of two civilizations (Spanish and North 
American) competing with each other.2
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Yet these changes were themselves prefigured by the urban expansion 
plan of 1819 and the reforms promoted by General Tacón (the most impor-
tant of the reforms carried out during the colony), though they still con-
formed to the “European style.” The sewer system was developed, the main 
arterial roads were created, and the construction of new emblematic build-
ings in the area outside the city walls was promoted. This could be seen in 
the construction of the Teatro Pancho Marty (later the Teatro Tacón), built 
in the style of the Teatros Principales found in Spanish cities, and in the way 
avenues were designed and decorated in the European style. The Palacio Al-
dama was the first major building constructed outside the city walls. It was 
a splendid residence in the style of the neoclassical aristocratic palaces of 
the early nineteenth century and before (that is, “in the old style”). It was an 
accurate reflection of the pathos of an old Spanish American slave trader, the 
Basque Domingo Aldama, who found inspiration in the homes of the aristo-
cracia hatera (livestock owning aristocracy) and the sacarocracia criolla (cre-
ole sugar barons) of the previous century.3 The finishing touches were ba-
roque features that forged a link with the more refined mansions of the day.
In contrast to the above, the creole middle classes, who were not involved 
in the sugar industry, had specific channels of prosperity. These channels 
Map 5.1 Havana, 1853. Courtesy of the Archivo Nacional de Cuba, Mapoteca.
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were by no means exclusive to creoles, given that the mixing of Spaniards 
and creoles was a permanent affair that Cubanized the second generation 
of immigrants from mainland Spain and the Canary Islands. With military 
careers relegated to a secondary position and high- level administration ruled 
out, the cultivation of a professional culture became one of the safest means 
of achieving social mobility. In Cuba, there was a certain model of special-
ization that provided income and status through higher education and en-
abled professions to be practiced in several very specific areas: medicine, 
agriculture, and the law. Some technical professions such as land surveying 
and construction were also acceptable, with engineering restricted to a large 
extent to the colonial military corps. Yet in no way did these classes cease to 
have a hand in commerce and particularly in property speculation.
The conflict between a new city that looked to the north and an archaic 
city trapped by its physical walls (which began to be demolished in 1863) and 
by the social and cultural barriers that shackled it to the past and to the colo-
nial administration, as Tanco highlighted in 1853, was more a metaphor than 
a reality at the time he wrote. From about 1900 on, things would be different, 
but let us note that it was a question of degree more than one of tendency 
or essence. What type of city did the capital of a new republic require and 
what type of city was it possible to make or construct in accordance with the 
status, the state of public funds, and the idiosyncrasies of the ruling class? 
There was more continuity than there were ruptures in the periodic reinven-
tion of Havana. Indeed, the only real exceptions to this were the Master Plan 
commissioned from Jean- Claude Forestier in 1925 (although never fully im-
plemented, it included landscaping the city, creating scenic views, and de-
signing the Capitólio in the image of the Capitol building in Washington) 
and the proyecto batistiano (Batista’s urban reform project).4 In spite of the 
overwhelming consensus against such a claim, there is evidence to support it.
The Second Hispanicization of Havana’s Urban Landscape
Havana emerged from the war of independence in 1898 as the city that best 
symbolized Cuba’s colonial era. The premises of political moderation, social 
control, and adapting the conditions of the country to democracy faced an 
acid test in a capital that was almost ten times bigger than the country’s next 
largest city. In 1899, the census registered 235,981 inhabitants, almost one in 
five of the island’s residents. By 1907, the figure had risen to 300,000. The 
following decade witnessed a more modest increase, with 363,000 inhabi-
tants in 1919, one out of every six residents of Cuba, while from that date on 
the city population grew considerably until reaching 520,504 inhabitants in 
152 | José Antonio Piqueras
1931. Home to the new institutions and to cultural life, as it had been during 
the colony, during the first decades of the republic Havana had to create and 
accommodate various cities: the political, intellectual, financial, working- 
class, marginal, and speculative cities, but above all the city which housed the 
middle classes who demanded progress and moderation. The physical cre-
ation of the “new Havana” was an accurate reflection of this trend, in which 
residential neighborhoods stood out more than the emblematic buildings 
characteristic of a big city, whose construction had to wait until the 1920s. 
Starting with the U.S. occupation, an image of immediate modernity spread, 
but took a long time to become a reality and often did not coincide with the 
political times. Modernity was closely related, on the one hand, to a feeling 
of fervent hope, and on the other hand to a mirage, an image that never be-
came a tangible reality.
When beginning to organize the Constituent Assembly, General Wood 
had attempted to lay the foundations for a “stable, well- organized, free gov-
ernment.” Stable and well organized, not subject to another foreign sover-
eignty but instead under the tutelage of the United States—this was a situa-
tion that obviously challenged full sovereignty. Stable and well organized, 
following the natural chaos of the war, with the active participation of social 
and ethnic actors who had to be included in the new democracy since, even 
though it was the subject of debate, the republic could not adopt a system 
that restricted people’s rights and freedoms.5 It was at this point that the 
middle and upper classes looked forward not to a modernist North Ameri-
can style but rather to the tastes of the past in order to establish once again 
visual differences marking the social hierarchy, in opposition to the inevi-
table democratization, to the theoretical dominance of the masses—the 
people—most of whom were from rural communities, small villages, and 
the tenement buildings of the Havana slums.
Let us take a look at some examples. Construction work on the Palacio 
de la Asociación de Dependientes began in 1903. It was a four- story building 
with a concrete structure, but the style chosen for the building was Vene-
tian Renaissance.6 Such historicism was all the rage, and the style, inspired 
in Old Europe, soon became a permanent feature of the cityscape. Whatever 
was not built in an eclectic style could be classed as Italianized academicism. 
Large mansions and corporate buildings went even further or looked even 
further back and drew upon neo- Spanish styles: neo- Mudéjar, so- called 
Andalusian architecture and decoration, Herrerian Renaissance, and plater-
esque neobaroque.7 The stylistic influence after 1900 was of Spanish origin 
and even more so during the 1910s and 1920s when the same international 
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fashion spread to California, Florida, and the Hispanic South of the United 
States. The influence was therefore twofold. It came directly from Spain, and 
it was also reinterpreted in the so- called Spanish style, which the illustrated 
magazines and the cinema made popular; the style was shown on the screen 
and also used in the villas owned by the stars.
The adoption of these styles in Cuba began almost as soon as the Span-
ish flag had been lowered over the metropolis. It was first seen in the Cuban 
pavilions at the World’s Fairs in Paris and Buffalo in 1900 and 1901, respec-
tively. And it was used in two of the major constructions of the first republi-
can period: the train station and the port customs office in 1912. Residen-
tial houses were built with porticos and plateresque façades. The national 
style looked for inspiration in the colony and in the eighteenth century, 
with additional features taken from popular culture. From 1917 onward, the 
neo- Hispanic, Californian- style bungalow became popular, with the sloping 
roofs and angled towers found in Vedado (and Nuevo Vedado) and on the 
sea front in Miramar.
According to Roberto Segre, one of the best contemporary experts on 
Latin American architectural history, the architecture of the first decades of 
republican life missed the opportunity to build a creative interpretation of 
cultural roots and instead became an artificial façade, a decor that replaced 
the search for a national style.8 It could be said that the early “Americaniza-
tion” of Havana’s urban design under Spanish colonial rule was followed by 
a late “Hispanicization” during the first two decades of the Republic.9 To 
a large extent these took place simultaneously and, as we shall see below, 
Americanization returned as a paradigm after 1920 with the avalanche of 
capital from the United States. This met opposition (just as it had met oppo-
sition from Rodó in Uruguay) from a type of Hispanicity that acted as a line 
of defense while Cubanizing culture.
Did Hispanic elements mix with modern elements? It is important not to 
confuse techniques, comfort, and architectural style. With regard to build-
ings, and insofar as decoration was concerned, Hispanic elements became 
a synonym for modernity during the republic. Scholars of architecture in 
Cuba and in other countries classed the group of styles mentioned above 
as neocolonial, without according them any political connotations because 
they extended over such varied geographies, from Porfirian Mexico to San 
Francisco and Los Angeles. The question is why the style was used in Havana. 
Neocolonial and neo- Hispanic styles became popular in Cuba just when po-
litical links with Spain had disappeared and North American influences pre-
vailed over almost everything else, not least the “mediation” of politics. It was 
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not a passing phase: one section of the intellectual movement that opposed 
the republic promoted or was associated with the flamboyant Institute for 
Hispano- Cuban Culture.10
The first large building constructed in the new era was the Lonja de Ví-
veres or Lonja del Comercio. It was built between 1907 and 1909 in the Plaza 
de San Francisco and was based on a design by the Spanish architect Tomás 
Mur. The work was carried out by the Cuban architect José Toraya, who had 
been educated in the United States, and few changes were made. It was the 
most grandiose building of the time, five stories high and constructed in a 
neoclassical style. Toraya soon became the most sought- after architect. He 
renovated the old building of the Marine Headquarters and converted it into 
the first building to house the Chamber of Representatives, in Calle Oficios, 
next to the Convent of San Francisco. He was later involved in the construc-
tion of the Banco Nacional de Cuba, in Calle Obispo (1907), and the Hotel 
Sevilla Biltmore (1908), built in a neo- Moorish style. After leaving the presi-
dency, in 1915 José Miguel Gómez commissioned Toraya to build his home 
on the Paseo del Prado. Inspired by classical styles, Toraya rejected the ba-
roque style yet still maintained the historicism.
The U.S. construction company Purdy & Henderson was responsible for 
most of the buildings mentioned and for many others. Modern building tech-
niques were used but, paradoxically, at that time modern styles came under 
Spanish artistic influence. Again it is worth dispensing with any prejudices 
that associate U.S. styles with “the modern” and Spanish styles with “the tra-
ditional.” Around 1900, one of the most innovative and decorative building 
techniques was the bricked vault, a structure allowing the construction of 
large arches which represented a modernist retake on classicism. The tech-
nique (which was not used in Cuba until the 1960s) appeared prominently in 
the United States, used in the Boston Library, in Pittsburgh’s Union Station, 
and in New York’s Grand Central Station, all works carried out by the Span-
ish architect and builder Rafael Guastavino, who settled in the United States 
in the 1880s and patented the system.11
Historicism was also a feature of Havana’s large public and corporate 
buildings. The Belgian architect Paul Belau designed the new Centro Gallego 
in a Hispanic baroque style, and this was annexed to the Teatro Nacional, 
formerly the Teatro Tacón. It was also symbolic that an immigrant from the 
old colonial metropolis was responsible for constructing the first national 
coliseum, the most famous monument in the country (larger and more 
solemn than the official headquarters of the republican state). As a result of 
its success, in line with the tastes of the period, the same architect was com-
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missioned to build the Palace of Provincial Government in cooperation with 
the Cuban architect Rodolfo Maruri. After reappraisal, the project went on 
to become the Palacio Presidencial, built in a truly varied style, since it in-
cluded elements of Spanish renaissance and Prussian baroque. The Presiden-
tial Palace is possibly, along with the Capitólio, the least Spanish of the offi-
cial republican buildings. The Centro Asturiano added the finishing touches 
to the series when it was completed in 1927. It was inspired in the Herrerian 
renaissance style and had a stone façade with the Spanish coat of arms.
As part of a project to promote tourism, in 1929 Gerardo Machado’s 
government began the restoration of the most emblematic buildings of the 
colonial period. These included El Templete and the Palacio de Gobierno 
(Governor’s Palace), former seat of the Senate, which had just moved to the 
Capitólio, thus removing the last symbol of political power from the Plaza 
de Armas. Restoration work was also carried out on the Plaza de la Catedral. 
The world of colonial traditionalism was re- created. The work undertaken 
on the Palacio de los Capitanes Generales was a perfect illustration of the 
concept of the historic city which the Machado regime was attempting to 
present: it had everything that a visitor—a modern tourist—could imagine 
a stately, fortressed city should have, with its defenses and noble buildings. 
For Segre this was “the beginning of a process to invent a colonial ambience 
to restore a non- existent classical ‘dignity’ or a hypothetical environmental 
coherence” adapted to the image a foreigner required. The first step con-
sisted of removing the buildings’ colored plaster (the layer of plaster and lime 
wash that was considered too ordinary) to reveal the gray stone underneath. 
This is the appearance we have come to know and which both travelers and 
residents now believe to be original and characteristic.12 Shortly afterward, 
in 1936, Emilio Roig’s Las calles de La Habana (The streets of Havana) paid 
homage to the colonial city, and in 1938 Roig persuaded the city council to 
restore the old colonial names of hundreds of streets in the historic center.
Obviously the “Hispanicizing” style found widespread support among 
the Spanish immigrant colony and its descendants. The Centro Gallego and 
Centro Asturiano were the best examples of this, yet the style also caused a 
sensation among the creole upper middle classes and in official government 
spheres. These higher social groups and political authorities became “trend 
setters” whose prestige and privileged position meant that they were soon 
copied. In addition, they made the “Hispanicizing” tastes of those originally 
from the old metropolis, Spain, seem more acceptable instead of appearing 
to be the continuation of a defeated cause. There were undoubtedly excep-
tions which favored eclectic academicism, such as the residence which the 
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Pérez de la Riva family built opposite the entrance to the port, now the Pala-
cio de la Música (Palace of Music), but the style was similar to that used in 
Spanish cities of the period, to which it bore more of a resemblance than to 
buildings from any other place.
Modernities and Their Expiration Date
Let us agree that urban modernity is but an instant. In 1975, before an audi-
ence gathered at the Central University of Venezuela, Alejo Carpentier intro-
duced himself as a member of a peculiar generation. The acclaimed writer, 
who was born in 1904 and arrived in Havana in 1915, declared that
Latin Americans of my generation experienced an unusual fate which 
on its own was enough to distinguish them from European men: they 
were born, they grew up, and they matured in relation to reinforced con-
crete. . . . the city I grew up in was still similar to Humboldt’s Havana. . . . 
And suddenly, our sleepy capitals become real cities (anarchic in their 
sudden growth, anarchic in their design, excessive, disrespectful in their 
urge to demolish in order to replace) and our men, inseparable from the 
metropolis, become city- men, twentieth- century- city- men, that is to say 
History- of- the- twentieth- century- men.
Such was the view of this former student of architecture, author of La ciu-
dad de las columnas (The City of Columns), a declaration of identity within a 
framework of time standing still.13
The notion that people were aware of change and that they were both 
“bewildered onlookers and the main actors” was repeated once again. When 
writing about the São Paulo he knew in 1935, Lévi- Strauss maintained that 
in America, cities “go directly from luxuriance to decrepitude, but they are 
never ancient,” and that part of their essence was that they lacked relics. 
These words could not be applied to Havana, meaning that its moderniza-
tion did not conform to the model of the new large American metropolis, so 
taken with the notion of an essentially vertical avant- garde—or at least that 
such a modernization was delayed until much later on in the 1950s.
In the New World, continued Lévi- Strauss, cities “are in need of restora-
tion as quickly as they are built, or rather badly built.” The anthropologist 
aimed to highlight the existence of very short evolutionary urban cycles, 
in comparison with those of the Old World. This “thirst for restoration” of 
which he spoke was closely related to the cycles of the export economies, in 
which members of the generation leading the cycle aspired to shape the city 
and leave their mark on houses, which demonstrated their personal opu-
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lence, in other words social capital in architecture.14 On occasion they were 
also closely related to political cycles, which despite claiming to be reformist, 
often corresponded to authoritarian formulas, in Havana’s case under the 
aegis of Tacón, Machado, and Batista. David Harvey has provided some 
valuable reflections on the conflict that underlies the relationship between 
the imaginative spatial play characteristic of regenerative policies and au-
thoritarianism, and on the nostalgic strain with which the “authenticity” of 
cities is often established, a combination sought by conservative inertia rep-
resented above all by institutional buildings and which is more likely to pre-
vail under authoritarian governments.15
Latin American cities periodically reinvented themselves, driven by the 
price of export commodities and by trade agreements. They presented hints 
of modernity followed by periods during which they faded away due to cycles 
of reduced commercial activity—as Lévi- Strauss noted, a permanent “fleet-
ing youth.” They were cities that experienced a considerable amount of im-
migration, attracted by the sparkle of success, and were subjected to the ex-
treme conditions of the tropics, including annual storms and hurricanes. As 
a result of all these factors, reports by locals and visitors (often the reflections 
of scholars) continuously bore witness to urban signs of innovation in which 
modernity was repeated, only to fade away and then reappear once again.
Segre has made Havana the subject of incisive reflections on urbanism, 
architecture, social hegemony, and political power. He does not hesitate to 
highlight the modern city’s rapid transformation after 1899. This modern 
transformation involved both speculative fervor and the substitution of the 
symbolic system of the peninsular government—although, as we will see, 
the same process of speculation could be observed from the 1870s onward 
in the area of Las Murallas, and the symbolic substitution, which involved 
moving government buildings to that very area, was a continuation of the 
same development initiative. It also involved a marked social division, which 
was perhaps the most unmistakable phenomenon. The bourgeois city (El Ve-
dado, Miramar) was situated in the west, the south was home to the petite 
bourgeoisie (Santos Suárez, Luyanó, La Vívora), and the poor area of the city 
was located in the center, in the adjacent suburbs (Jesús María), and in the 
surrounding areas (Cayo Hueso and the lower part of the bay).16 However, 
Segre admits that the division was more a trend than a reality, just as the cited 
occupation of land and the assigning of symbolic functions were trends, as 
was the “airborne” republic itself (as Bolívar would have said—without roots 
or with hidden roots), since the bourgeois and working- class areas were still 
adjacent to each other. Again, the trend can be detected before 1899.
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In 1886, three decades after Tanco’s comments and after the city walls had 
been demolished, another traveler (Peris Mencheta, a well- known Spanish 
journalist) commented on the city’s growth since 1878. Of the twenty thou-
sand buildings registered in the census, he said, over three thousand were 
newly constructed buildings and over two- thirds of the new constructions 
were for wealthy families. The El Cerro neighborhood, built as a summer re-
sort at the end of the eighteenth century to the southwest of the bay, toward 
Vueltabajo, had become a residential area with villas and country houses 
which to the visitor looked similar to those found in the recent extension of 
the Paseo de la Castellana in Madrid, although in Havana most were one- story 
houses. The Paseo de la Reina and Paseo de Carlos iii, built by the great urban 
reformer of the nineteenth century, General Tacón (who was so reactionary in 
politics), gave way to villas set among tree- covered gardens. The place where 
these came to an end marked the beginning of the new botanical gardens, 
after the old ones located next to the Teatro Tacón had been demolished and 
used as the site for the first railway station, the Estación Villanueva (map 5.2).
The city’s two modern markets were located outside the city walls (one 
Map 5.2 View of Cerro and Jesús del Monte, 1875. Courtesy of the  
Archivo Nacional de Cuba, Mapoteca.
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was the Mercado de Tacón in the Plaza del Vapor and the other was the 
Mercado de Colón), and these were reconstructed in 1876 and 1884, around 
the time of Peris Mencheta’s visit, using metallic structures imported from 
Belgium. The new barracks had been built in the area, which also housed 
the Teatro Tacón, Teatro Albisu, and Teatro Irijoa, among others, together 
with the modern Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes Hospital (the first of 
three planned hospitals), finished in 1882, which had beds for two hundred 
patients. Although the reporter did not mention them, the area also played 
host to the Teatro Payret (a modern building from 1877 with an iron roof ), 
the Teatro Alhambra, and the Circo- Teatro Jané, which was opened in 1881 
and had a roof with an avant- garde cast- iron framework. The Teatro Irijoa, 
on Calle Dragones and Central (later Calle Zulueta), was opened in 1884. It 
was renovated in 1897, and in 1900, after being renamed the Teatro Martí, it 
was used as the venue for the Constitutional Convention.
The casas de salud, private clinics providing health care and hospital ac-
commodation through subscription, were located outside the city walls in 
extensive, tree- covered grounds. The model of mutuas, originating in the 
colonial era, was fully developed by the time of the first republican period, 
almost always promoted by workers’ associations and Spanish regional asso-
ciations from colonial times. In 1885, the Sociedad Gallega contracted the 
Quinta del Rey clinic to provide a hospital and sanatorium for its members. 
In 1894, it bought the grounds on which La Benéfica sanatorium was built, 
which when finished was able to accommodate five hundred patients in vari-
ous wards. The Asociación de Dependientes del Comercio (Shop Assistants 
Association), which was founded in 1880 and consisted mainly of Spaniards, 
commissioned the Quinta de Salud medical center. In 1912, the association’s 
membership had reached the considerable figure of 27,600 and their health 
care facilities included sixteen wards able to accommodate 680 patients.17 
Around 1925, they had some eighty thousand members, that is to say, one in 
six inhabitants of Havana.18
Mencheta, who was a keen observer of social and material realities, did 
not fail to notice the existence of a vast third city that was neither mod-
ern nor traditional, but simply deprived. It was made up of tenement build-
ings (the solar habanero) and accounted for approximately one in four 
homes in which, he said, “Chinese, blacks, and dirty whites (mulattos) all 
lived crowded together.”19 The modernity of the cities, when visible, was a 
tiny fragment surrounded by a much wider reality of little interest to occa-
sional visitors, left out of tourist guides and ignored by photographers and 
the tinted postcards that became fashionable during the third decade of 
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the twentieth century. The history of poor housing, generally occupied by 
workers, is the history of how the communities living in the areas outside 
the city walls designated for “modernization,” “reform,” and “the new” were 
gradually displaced through the use of brutal methods (as brutal as those 
used by Haussmann in Paris), and their former residents were subsequently 
confined in unsanitary ghettos within the old city.
The history of the Jesús María neighborhood provides a telling summary. 
In 1802, the humble dwellings of 11,370 people (1,332 houses and 1,265 out-
buildings and back rooms) were burned down. Rebuilding was prohibited. 
The residents evicted as a result of the fire were black creoles and “mangrove 
workers.” The fire had broken out simultaneously at various points, an un-
mistakable sign of arson. In 1828 a second fire destroyed what was left of the 
neighborhood, which at that time was home to only 3,126 people, two- thirds 
of them white. The blacks had fled to Horcón and to other outlying neighbor-
hoods. The influx of people into Havana, particularly during the two major 
anticolonial wars (1868–78 and 1895–98) and as a result of General Weyler’s 
Reconcentration Policy (1896–98), and the fact that a large proportion of 
that population settled in the city, resulted in overcrowding in the most di-
lapidated neighborhoods (which the wealthy people gradually abandoned) 
and the division of houses. Condominiums and apartments were parti-
tioned off, a trend which continued during the hazardous twentieth century 
in Havana. In 1919, over fifteen hundred casas de vecindad (tenement build-
ings) or solares, as they were generally called, were registered in the census. 
One type had a dozen rooms to rent (the casa de vecindad proper), another 
from 20 to 30 rooms (the solar), and a third up to 100 rooms (the ciudadela). 
Juan Manuel Chailloux estimated that there was an average of twenty-eight 
rooms per solar in 1945 and that their inhabitants represented a third of the 
population of Havana, which was undoubtedly an increase with regard to 
the figures for 1886, when the number of poor houses was estimated to be 
around five thousand.20
In 1899, the census indicated that 43 percent of houses in the capital had 
a cesspit and no drains. It can easily be deduced where those houses were 
located. In 1904, there were 2,839 solares housing 86,000 inhabitants, in 
the region of 30 per house.21 In other words, one in every three inhabitants 
lived in this kind of “infra- Havana.” In 1945, Chailloux explained that sev-
eral families lived crowded together in old colonial mansions, “divided and 
subdivided” until they held over 100 people in rooms partitioned off with 
cardboard and curtains to make poky little rooms reminiscent, in the words 
of the sociologist, “of the holds of slave ships.” In 1910, the first workers’ 
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housing estate, named el Redención (or Pogolotti), was distributed and con-
sisted of 950 houses; in 1945, it had as many as fourteen thousand residents, 
almost fifteen people per house.22 That meant that overcrowding and insalu-
brity increased in Havana during the republic, at least for an ever greater 
proportion of citizens (at least 33 percent and perhaps as much as 40 percent 
of the populace were generally left out of the general view of urban mod-
ernization). The proletarian city and the city in which ordinary people lived 
were located in the old urban center and overflowed into the suburbs.
At the same time, the centers of production took on a palatial appearance, 
as could already be seen in the factories of the late nineteenth century—La 
Meridiana (1880), Gener (1882), Bances y López (1886)—and in factories that 
other tobacco dealers constructed in “the ring” (the space made available for 
urban construction by the demolition of the city’s walls and moat), quite a 
long time before the construction of the American Tobacco Co. building in 
1902 or the provocative Fábrica Partagás in 1929, right behind the Capitólio.23 
There were previous cases of architecture being used to ennoble manufac-
turing centers. The Palacio Aldama, having served to augment the grace and 
style of the family that constructed it and after its use as the seat of the High 
Court following its confiscation in 1869, was eventually given over to the 
noble industry of tobacco production (“the only remaining virtue of tobacco 
is that of the people who work with it,” as Martí wrote). It housed the La 
Corona factory and, from 1898 to 1932, the Havana Cigar and Tobacco Fac-
tories, Limited. This was a clear sign that the productive world was devour-
ing the symbols of social prestige, while changing the Spanish trade names 
for other foreign names. It was certainly true that urban design and social 
formation bore very little relation to colonial or republican political status.
Commercial life after 1898 was located in the old center and in the cen-
ter outside the city walls, where buildings were renovated on spaces incor-
porated more than half a century earlier. The symbolic replacement of the 
buildings of power, which Segre refers to as a physical reality marking the 
rhythm of change from a colonial to a republican regime, had to wait quite a 
long time. The substitution took place during two periods. The first, during 
the second half of the 1910s, was interrupted by the economic crisis of 1920 
and was resumed at the end of that decade and in the early 1930s. The sec-
ond took place considerably later, in the 1950s, when alongside the establish-
ment of the violent Batista dictatorship, the city underwent its greatest urban 
renovation. Havana was endowed with public buildings that finally freed 
themselves from academicism and classicism and experimented with cre-
ole functionalism (the Palacio de Justicia and the Palacio de Bellas Artes, the 
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Biblioteca Nacional and the buildings in Marianao).24 Meanwhile, planning 
for the city was based on its new role as the capital of tourism and leisure 
on a large scale. It was carried out in collusion with inadvisable partners in 
a similar style to that used in Ciudad Trujillo, in the Dominican Republic, 
except that more resources were available in Havana and there was a more 
developed environment that was culturally closer to U.S. customers.25
Urban Renovation in the Late Colony
In 1853, Nicolás Tanco could not find a good hotel in Havana. A decade 
earlier, Salas y Quiroga complained about the city’s poor restaurants, while 
noting that a recently established U.S.-style restaurant offered the highest 
levels of comfort, elegance, and service aimed at travelers from the United 
States who had gone to spend the winter there for health reasons.26 In 1875, 
in the middle of the Ten Years’ War, the Hotel Inglaterra opened next to the 
Louvre and took its name from one of the most modern and renowned cafés 
of the city. This period witnessed the beginning of the development of the 
wide strip of land, referred to as “the ring,” created by the demolition of the 
city walls (decreed in 1863) and the filling in of their wide external moat. It 
was the most sought after area for construction as it served as a link between 
the old and the new cities and was close to the axis that had been used dur-
ing the previous fifty years as a promenade, a leisure area, and a place for the 
upper classes to show off their wealth. Here the new leisure establishments 
were situated.27
The land became known as the Reparto Las Murallas and was the object of 
speculative fervor for fifty years, the period between the first transfers made 
to Julián Zulueta (1870) and the construction of the Palacio Presidencial, the 
Centro Asturiano, and the Bacardí corporation’s building (1930). From 1880 
onward, the construction of many of these buildings in the ring made use 
of the reinforced concrete that Carpentier referred to, mistakenly confusing 
them with the functional buildings built after 1950 because they left the ma-
terial exposed. The difference, according to Segre, was that the academicism 
of the period between 1880 and 1920, spanning the end of the colony and the 
beginning of the republic, concealed the technical innovations that lay be-
neath it.28 In short, technical modernity came before aesthetics and began 
during the old colonial regime.
Zulueta, the “prince of slave traders,” realized the potential of the real 
estate business and commissioned the Spanish architect Pedro Tomé (who 
created the Palacio Balboa) to construct a large block of commercial prem-
ises. Tomé had arrived in Cuba in the mid- 1860s to take up the post of mu-
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nicipal architect. The building, which from 1894 onward was known as La 
Manzana de Gómez in reference to its new owner, the sugar tycoon Gómez- 
Mena, was a one- story building with an inner glazed gallery running diago-
nally through the building in line with Parisian trends. Between 1916 and 
1918, four more stories were constructed for apartment accommodation, 
giving the building the appearance it still has today.
During the last two decades of colonial rule, advertisements for spacious 
shops selling foreign articles of the type found in the North were often placed 
in newspapers. It is worth remembering, however, that most shops were of 
a distinctly popular nature, with the exception of (most of ) the most luxu-
rious outlets in Calle Obispo, O’Reilly, San Rafael, and Galiano. They were 
not like the shops of the Parisian- style boulevards and plazas of the Second 
Empire, but were instead closer to the model of the bazaar, with large signs 
traditionally used to capture the attention of pedestrians and large awnings 
overhanging the sidewalks. This continued at least during the first decade of 
the republic, as can be seen in the photos taken of the Parque Central at that 
time, which illustrate a kind of primitivism that was highly idealized by nu-
merous subsequent reports and analyses.
At the same time, the fin de siècle era following the Treaty of Zanjón 
saw the construction of residential villas to the west, next to the coast, in 
a new upper- middle- class suburb between El Carmelo and El Vedado. It 
was completed after 1899 and also given the name El Vedado.29 The birth of 
the Vedado residential neighborhood has mistakenly been associated with 
the republic. This idea was proposed by the geographer and historian Leví 
Marrero, and he was joined by numerous authors who confused the creation 
of the neighborhood with its extension toward Marianao and the south (what 
is known as Nuevo Vedado) into a vast, crowded modern nucleus.30 The con-
fusion was convenient when all eyes were focused on a foundational, innova-
tive republic that denied or disputed the spontaneity with which civil society, 
in particular the upper and upper middle classes, designed their own habitat 
during the colony.
The introduction of an electric tramway improved transport links in the 
growing city. Distances were measured in traveling time, and the “center” 
lost its centrality as a result of public transport. However, the greatest im-
petus to the move toward peripheral areas was when the middle classes re-
nounced the historic city (the old and the new) and turned to the garden- city 
concept in search of a reflection of harmony, ethnic uniformity, and separa-
tion from the lower classes. This was the perfect world to which they aspired; 
the model inspired the English country cottage, which was transferred to 
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New England and then suburbanized. Shortly afterward, El Vedado stood 
out as being the most aristocratic area, with small gardens and unmistakable 
porticos with Ionic columns a sign of status, a mock classical touch used by 
the nouveaux rich to pass themselves off as old families while constructing 
with stucco and limestone.31 The trend of constructing on a grand scale had 
been started by Aldama a century earlier when he built his mansion next to 
the Campo de Marte, then on the outskirts of town.
The early introduction of the automobile to Havana provided freedom 
of movement to those who could afford it. The phenomenon has been high-
lighted with regard to other American metropolises, and the experience 
spread when Fordization allowed the price of cars to drop and made them 
available to professionals, qualified employees, and traders, but not, for 
the time being, to those who manufactured them.32 The city expanded and 
widened its urban boundaries. The physiognomy of the new outskirts and 
their exclusivity gave them a select, suburban status that contrasted with 
the poor, working- class suburban neighborhoods. Transport, both private 
and public, played a different role for each social group. The introduction of 
trams in the old city caused countless problems and made traveling difficult 
for individuals and private vehicles, causing inconvenience and increasing 
the risk of accidents. In 1945, Chailloux explained that the lack of fuel and 
spare parts due to the Second World War disconnected the suburbs from 
the city, leading people to take refuge in urban areas. At the same time, the 
usual immigration from rural areas continued, giving rise to overcrowding 
and terribly unhealthy conditions (the same thing occurred half a century 
later, during the “special period”).33 With regard to the city acting as a mag-
net and a shelter, the problem was less circumstantial than Chailloux postu-
lated, since the rate of immigration was constant prior to the crisis caused by 
international shortages: a lot less was built than was needed, which was the 
fate of the big metropolises and a permanent stigma of Havana.
The traditional interpretation has it that the expansion of Vedado dur-
ing the first years of the republic was based on the introduction of the elec-
tric tramway. In 1929 Martínez Ortiz proposed that “entire neighborhoods, 
such as El Vedado, grew as if by magic; . . . the value of property rose in-
credibly quickly and large fortunes were made overnight with the urbani-
zation of agricultural farms and even land which was previously used as a 
quarry.”34 The explanation has since been repeated again and again. How-
ever, the creation of this neighborhood and the tendency of a particular sec-
tor of the population (the middle and upper middle classes) to converge went 
back further. The census of 1899 situated El Vedado as practically the sec-
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ond neighborhood of Havana in terms of population with almost ten thou-
sand inhabitants, after San Lázaro (twenty thousand) and on a par with El 
Cerro, Jesús del Monte, and Punta.35 The difference was that its horizontal, 
landscaped design meant that it occupied a much larger surface area, with a 
layout which when finished occupied approximately half the area of the old 
walled city (map 3).
During the early twentieth century, the Hotel Plaza was constructed in the 
ring (by redesigning the building previously used as the newspaper offices 
of Diario de la Marina), as was the Hotel Sevilla- Biltmore. On the other side 
of the Parque Central, the Hotel Telégrafo was built, which was later fre-
quently used as the venue for politicians’ celebrations. But before then, in 
1876, the Hotel Pasaje was opened next to the Teatro Payret, with its iron 
and glass- covered gallery, which represented a true innovation. In 1881, the 
Hotel America was opened, which was later renamed Hotel Roma. In 1908, 
the Hotel Saratoga was opened behind Teatro Irijoa, opposite the railway 
station, but the building was actually an apartment block built in 1880, and 
though remodeled inside, was still modern enough in terms of construction 
techniques, spatial design, and external decoration to look “modern” three 
decades later. Trends in fittings, the adoption of new building techniques, 
Map 5.3 Havana, 1900. Courtesy of the Archivo Nacional de Cuba, Mapoteca.
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and the introduction of aesthetic forms generally associated with the initial 
decades of the republic actually began around 1875–80.
The surge in construction, the introduction of new techniques, and aes-
thetic renovation within eclectic academicism (like the era and the social 
class that were undergoing changes and adapting) coincided with the period 
of the highest sugar prices on the international market, between 1869 and 
1883, and with record levels of exports from 1868 onward, which offset the 
loss of capital that sought security away from the island starting in 1868 with 
the first war of independence.36 Carlos Venegas has highlighted how it fell 
to the oligarchy of Havana, who had made their fortune from sugar and 
tobacco, to give social meaning to the Reparto de Las Murallas given that 
the state was incapable of planning how to use this space for civil purposes, 
as had initially been intended. Without considering the uncertainty that the 
war could generate and fully confident in the triumph of the Spanish army, 
Zulueta, the Marquis of Balboa, Gener, González del Valle, the Marchioness 
of Villalba, Jané, and others bought land and built luxurious buildings from 
1871 onward. They increased their efforts after 1875, when land could be paid 
for with treasury bonds, whose value was otherwise not liquid.37 In 1895, a 
park and a monument in honor of Francisco Albear were opened in the area 
where the Puerta de Monserrate stood, a remembrance of the military engi-
neer who had built the city’s water supply system (the Acueducto de Vento, 
1855–93). Albear was a Cuban creole in the Spanish army who had reached 
the rank of brigadier and who remained loyal to Spain until his death in 1887.
It is important to remember that through these buildings the represen-
tatives of the Spanish elite in Cuba “monumentalized” the architecture of 
Havana referred to by Venegas. To a large extent the following facts pro-
vide the key to what happened. There was a state at war which was unable 
to invest in civil works and a city council which had sought- after land but 
which was in need of resources, municipal taxes having been committed to 
the war effort. There were affluent “patriots” who were able to do business 
having previously purchased bonds that increased their political influence. 
They were presented with the opportunity of projecting the image of their 
opulence in what went on to become the center of the city due to the urban 
redesign process. Against the backdrop of the abolition of slavery, the start of 
massive peninsular immigration, the final years of high sugar prices, and the 
feeling of optimism which, in general, took hold of urban social life, the Ten 
Years’ War and the first decade of the postwar period helped to dissolve the 
old colony and to increase the prospect of material, intellectual, and politi-
cal improvement.
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The building activity that took place between 1875 and 1915 along the axis 
formed by Fortaleza de la Punta and the Parque de Colón transformed the 
sleepy city of previous decades. However, the fact that modernity was identi-
fied with North American civilization related to an imaginary that had been 
slowly constructed during the colonial period by one sector of the island’s 
elites. It found inspiration in the progress of the United States, from the edu-
cation system aimed at the most privileged groups (which attracted their 
attention from the 1830s onward) to the urban design of the mid- nineteenth 
century and the extraordinary levels of material growth following the Civil 
War and Reconstruction, just when commercial links strengthened between 
Cuba and its natural market. From the last few years of the eighteenth cen-
tury onward, close economic relations with the most powerful cities of the 
United States (those situated on the East Coast and in the Northern states, 
in other words, the most developed cities) had a major influence on the cus-
toms, tastes, and pastimes of the most dynamic sectors of Havana’s popula-
tion, a very wealthy, trend- setting minority. This invisible link was strength-
ened during the second half of the nineteenth century. The greater the 
prosperity of the United States, to which trade was linked, the greater the 
desire to emulate that country. Trade is never a simple exchange of goods: it 
involves a wide variety of influences and a spread of habits that also guar-
antees a demand for articles. However, the notion of reciprocity cannot be 
reduced to balancing the value of trade. The export of raw sugar, honey, 
tobacco, wood, and fruits did not have the same significance in the target 
market as the importation of machinery, construction materials, books, 
clothes, and domestic and work equipment. These were accompanied by 
new sales techniques: a notion of perfectly divided urban space with large, 
bright shops that invited passersby to enter, thus requiring wide sidewalks, 
cafés, and leisure establishments next to the stores whose latest goods had 
been advertised in the press.
From the late nineteenth century onward, graphic publications became 
more popular and lithography was introduced in the advertising sections of 
daily newspapers and weekly periodicals. The era of “new journalism” began 
around 1870, a revolution in social communication during which the news-
paper became the intermediary between individuals and the outside world, 
in which political news and issues of human interest were mixed with adver-
tising promotions and the glorification of modern progress. Printed photo-
graphs transformed and renovated the presentation of periodicals and had 
a major effect on the transmission of images. Then came the invention and 
expansion of the photogravure process.38 Seen from the viewpoint of the 
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highly visual culture of the twentieth century, it is difficult to understand the 
changes that immediate and massive increases in the number of images had 
on the construction of social imaginaries.
Such imaginaries were brought abruptly up to date in 1899 at the begin-
ning of the occupation government. The United States, that idealized agent 
of progress, was the leading authority and was in charge of overseeing the 
birth of the republic. The main measures adopted then were related to health 
and urban hygiene. Hygiene was associated with the civilization of the Pro-
tector State, while squalor and filth were linked to the obscurantism of Span-
ish domination, as Iglesias reminds us. “American- style” modernization had 
begun.39 Or rather, it had begun again, according to Louis Pérez’s study, Ser 
cubano: Identidad, nacionalidad y cultura, which details North American in-
fluence on Cuba throughout the nineteenth century. However, the elements 
which in Pérez’s opinion contributed to forming the Cuban personality in 
the image of a modern United States would appear to be exaggerated, regard-
less of how attractive the model was to a minority of sectors.40
“American- style” modernity could already be seen in the urban expan-
sion outside the city walls during the 1830s and 1840s and in Vedado at the 
end of the century, still during colonial rule. It could also be seen in cer-
tain customs. Even so, it did not have a major influence on society. Around 
1870, American- style social and sports clubs did exist, but during the 1880s, 
young wealthy men who had studied in the United States and returned with 
new pastimes were presented as strange, ironic figures in literature aimed at 
popular audiences. In Raimundo Cabrera’s 1885 comedy for the stage, Viaje 
a la luna (Trip to the moon), the author describes the modern dandy as fol-
lows: “He is a young man / educated in Pennsylvania. / He can skate very 
well / he steals the show when he plays baseball; / he’s a master at Noké, / 
but he hardly speaks English.” Three years later, in the sequel, ¡Vapor correo! 
(Mail boat!), one of the characters says that baseball is the most fashionable 
pastime. Still, even if certain pastimes were beginning to move out of the 
circles of those who had been educated abroad, they could still be subject 
to mockery insofar as they had not managed to win over the general public.
Exchanges between the United States and Cuba had been a common oc-
currence for a long time. They included commercial transactions, financial 
links, and the heirs of the sugar aristocracy undertaking periods of study in 
colleges and work experience placements in companies.41 The best known 
case was that of Cristóbal Madan in the 1820s, yet it was by no means an ex-
ception. Between 1860 and 1895, exchanges also included migrant workers 
and exiled people, together with people returning to their own country. Emu-
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lation became more widespread among the cultured classes after 1878, par-
ticularly among pro- independence supporters, the country’s self- proclaimed 
regenerators who were the only ones capable of promoting potentially suc-
cessful change that would advance society without dragging the country 
toward another destructive war. These regenerators-cum-reformers chose a 
model of Autonomism: modernization controlled from above which at the 
same time curbed the signs of social breakup attributed to the prolonged 
slavery of blacks and the Spanish colonial government’s lack of foresight 
in light of the new reality of a multiethnic society, which they believed suf-
fered from a major gap between civilization and barbarism. Indeed, ¡Vapor 
correo! was dedicated to the Autonomist leader Rafael Montoro. Raimundo 
Cabrera, the era’s most successful writer of light- hearted plays, while de-
scribing the chaos and abuses of the colonial administration and criticizing 
Spanish Americans, reminded audiences how in Havana it was often possible 
to come across thieves and witness fights among ñáñigos—members of the 
Afro- Cuban men’s fraternity, Abakua—which he identified as a “clandestine 
institution of savages.” Such prejudices were also evident in Fernando Ortiz’s 
first major work, El negro esclavo, written in 1916, in which he revealed that 
for a certain cultured section of society, the enemy of civilization (the Afro- 
Cuban criminal underworld) coexisted in the city and, as a result, occupied 
certain areas and shared other spaces with exemplary citizens.
The Republican City
If improving hygiene was the most visible measure undertaken by the U.S. 
occupation government, it was also an efficient propaganda instrument. The 
census taken in 1899 paid particular attention to this issue—and with good 
reason, given the conditions found in the city and its renown for insalu-
brity.42 Moreover, in addition to the usual unhealthy conditions, ever since 
the years of the war (1868–78) the public roads had not been cleaned, no 
investment had been made in sanitation, and there was insufficient urban 
policing. The situation got worse from 1895 onward with the addition of refu-
gees and the reconcentrados (people forced to emigrate to the capital from 
rural areas). Conditions of hygiene were definitely much worse in 1899 than 
they had been five years earlier, and in relative terms conditions in 1895 were 
worse than in 1868. By contrast, in terms of its urban design and buildings, 
in 1895 the city had a level of modernity which, despite continuing to develop 
after the end of the war, was not surpassed for a long time. A walk down the 
Paseo del Prado to Reina and then to the bay along Calle Zulueta is enough 
to confirm this, since the vast majority of the noncorporate buildings belong 
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to the end of the colonial era and those were the buildings that gave the city 
its character in 1900.
General Leonard Wood’s government was characterized by its ability to 
draw up balanced budgets during its two years in power (1900–1902). During 
that time, spending on health represented 20 percent of the budget; spending 
on hospitals and nursing homes 5.5 percent; primary education 16 percent; 
higher education 4 percent; and public works 7.8 percent, most of which 
was assigned to the docks. Health, assistance to the poor, and education 
accounted for 45.5 percent of spending.43 Nonepidemic mortality rates in 
Havana fell from an average of 36 per 1,000 between 1870 and 1899 to 22 per 
1,000 during the first decade of the republic, which represents a dramatic de-
crease.44 However, in order to obtain the average figure, the census took into 
account the decades of the wars (when conditions were different for obvious 
reasons) and periods of peace, without considering how this would distort 
the figures. For example, the figures ranged from 29 per 1,000 in 1889 to 89.19 
per 1,000 in 1898.45 If yellow fever and smallpox deaths are removed from the 
equation, in the 1880s the mortality rate in Havana was 28 per 1,000, which 
is not so different from the figure for 1908.
There is no doubt that the sanitation works undertaken after 1899 were 
substantial and essential. But in addition to providing an account of the 
progress made, statistics became a political instrument aimed at partially 
concealing reality and presenting the best possible image of the protection 
provided by the United States. The census ordered by Governor Charles E. 
Magoon in 1906, at the beginning of the second intervention, bore witness 
to this.
The first investment made in hospitals after 1898 involved renovating 
buildings and providing them with equipment and medical instruments. Ac-
cording to Martínez Ortiz, the “unsanitary and gloomy hospitals of the old 
regime became pleasant, hygienic places,” and the new wards were equipped 
with “all the latest advances.”46 The most important building work involved 
conditioning the Hospital de las Mercedes, which in 1886 (four years after it 
was opened) was classed as modern and became the clinical hospital of the 
university, which was built nearby. The biggest building project, the Hospital 
Calixto García, was carried out between 1914 and 1917 under Menocal’s gov-
ernment, which expanded the scope of the project and also built the main 
buildings of the university. The new 625- bed hospital incorporated the latest 
technological advances, but it was built on land made available after the 
demolition of the Alfonso xiii Spanish military hospital (which had only 
been built in the 1890s during the war) and continued a project which had 
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begun in the early 1860s to build a hospital complex with nine hundred beds. 
At the end of the period of Spanish rule, the only part of the complex to have 
been built was the Hospital de las Mercedes. The joint capacity of these two 
hospitals corresponded approximately to the forecast made half a century 
earlier, but there was now a much larger urban population to cater for.
Let us concur that modernity was selective and provisional. After some 
repair work, the Hospital Alfonso xiii was used as a military hospital for 
North American troops during the intervention, and in mid- 1900 it was 
opened to the public as Hospital No. 1. In 1906, the Cuban Congress autho-
rized the president to spend 650,000 pesos over four years to build the Hos-
pital Nacional on that land.47 On numerous occasions when referring to hos-
pitals for infectious diseases, hospitals for women, charitable hospitals, and 
so on (either new or built during the colonial period), the medical historian 
of the early republic, Jorge Le Roy, repeatedly states that they were “equipped 
with the most modern facilities.”
The occupation government took responsibility for the health service, for 
education, and for sanitizing Havana, in addition to attending to the hos-
pitals and looking after the maintenance of the city’s streets, all areas for 
which the city council was normally responsible. Under its authority, in 1900 
work began on the Malecón (the city’s oceanfront esplanade), the Academia 
de Ciencias (Science Academy), and the Escuela de Artes y Oficios (School 
of Arts and Crafts). In the meantime, the city council was responsible for 
policing the city and resorted to expeditious methods that sent offenders to 
correctional institutions. The deterioration affected not only buildings and 
roads but also customs as a result of the habits and the extremely rural nature 
of the inhabitants. This was also a sign of people’s voluntary or forced immi-
gration from rural areas. Drastic measures were then taken to “reeducate”—
that is, they were forced to urbanize their way of life.
The first governor of the U.S. occupation administration, John R. Brooke 
(1899), suspended the city council’s contract with the Banco Español, freeing 
it from the debts that the municipal corporation had been burdened with, 
which were the original reason basic services were no longer provided. Wood 
began construction of the sewer system and paved the main streets, continu-
ing the projects of his predecessor. It was during this period that the “mod-
ern sanitation system transformed the concept of cleaning services through 
the construction of drainage and sewer systems, regular rubbish collections, 
and hosing down the streets.” Up to 1.5 million pesos per year were spent 
on such measures.48 Chroniclers generally pointed out that the city coun-
cil limited itself to increasing employees’ wages without undertaking any 
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major works. No monumental buildings were constructed, nothing that, in 
the words of Martínez Ortiz, “demonstrates the sublimity of design, high 
spirit, broad- mindedness, and breadth of aspirations.”49
Of course, the person who wrote this also dedicated his book to Presi-
dent Machado (1925–33), the promoter of the Carretera Central (the Cen-
tral Highway, which had been the object of various projects since the mid- 
nineteenth century, one of them the work of the military engineer Francisco 
Albear) and the Capitólio Nacional, among other monumental buildings. 
According to Martínez Ortiz’s compelling analysis, this increased Machado’s 
political stature in contrast with the modest beginnings of the republican 
regime, though he fails to mention the fact that Machado and his minister 
of public works, Carlos Miguel de Céspedes, were shareholders in Warren 
Brothers, the company contracted to build the Carretera Central. Neither 
was there any mention of the loans taken out with the House of Morgan, 
which were used to fund some essential infrastructure and other structures 
that were purely symbolic, in conditions that very soon made it difficult to 
pay off the debt.
In a letter in 1901 describing the philosophy with which he aspired to pre-
side over the new state, Tomás Estrada Palma wrote the following: “when set-
ting up the republic, so to speak . . . it is necessary to bear in mind . . . that 
we are a new nation with moderate resources; that it will be more dignified 
to remain within the limits of prudence, as modestly as possible . . . and we 
must therefore carefully combine the organization of public services and 




















Figure 5.1 Balance in Cuba’s favor. Source: Author collation of data.
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In 1904, when conservative political elements regrouped and attracted the 
president to their ranks to back his reelection, they took the name of the 
Partido Moderado, a name which reflected the obsessive concerns of José 
Martí’s former collaborator: moderate resources, prudent and modest limits, 
services in moderation.
In synch with the profits of the sugar industry and the waves of material 
accumulation, investments were made in order to make a new city and to 
construct new and generally privately owned buildings. However, public 
spending was moderate, in line with the spirit of the presidency (and more 
importantly the fiscal policy), in particular with regard to public works. A 
state that collected little revenue could spend little on infrastructure and 
services. And the republic, because of its opposition to the tax system of the 
colony and its predisposition to facilitate private investment and the repro-
duction of capital, adopted a “prudent” (in other words weak) fiscal policy. It 
was fundamentally based on raising funds through customs duties, thus ex-
tending the abusive taxation policies of the colony. Customs duties provided 
over 50 percent of the money collected, and during the early years these were 
affected by the drop in trade and by reductions in exportation rights due to 
the temporary drop in the price of sugar.
The 1907 census acknowledged that prior to 1906, budgetary spending 
on repairing and extending state buildings was “very small.” Between July 
1906 and September 1907, a period that included the first twelve months of 



















Figure 5.2 Trade balance. Source: Author collation of data.
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double the amount was spent on such things than during the period be-
tween 1902 and 1906.51 In 1913, after calculating the balance of what today 
would be referred to as capital endowment and calculating the balance by 
sectors, the head of information of the Department of Agriculture, Trade, 
and Labour stated that in fifteen years, between 1898 and 1913, 61.5 million 
pesos had been invested in new buildings, residences, and premises. Gov-
ernment investment in public works had been 57 million pesos. Whereas the 
second figure could be confirmed in the state budgets, the first was only a 
low estimate. “In fifteen short years, the island of Cuba has risen like a phoe-
nix from a vast wasteland of ashes and ruins to high levels of prosperity and 
financial prestige,” he concluded, after adding that the value of landowner-
ship in Havana had increased by 144 million pesos and that foreign capital 
invested in Cuba during that time amounted to 112 million, half of which 
corresponded to British companies.52
Analysis of the activities of the legislature reveals that in July 1903 a small 
loan for the construction of a building for the House of Representatives was 
approved and then the executive branch was granted authority to use a plot 
of land belonging to the state for that purpose. No further progress was made 
in this respect. The legal authorization for the presidency of the republic to 
acquire the Teatro Nacional in 1905 was put on hold by Estrada Palma.53 The 
result was that in the republic, the configuration of the urban area was still 
dominated by the old city and the adjacent area, as well as by the functions 
undertaken by administrative centers, commercial hubs, and services. The 
transition toward republican sovereignty and the formation of a hegemonic 
social and political bloc under the effective tutelage of the occupation gov-
ernment was clearly correlated to the construction of the new capital and the 
way in which it was conceived.
The Liberating Army—the Cuban independence forces—never entered 
Havana; even more symbolically, the House of Representatives of its 
government- in- waiting had to meet in Cerro, a Havana suburb used by 
the now modest middle classes, instead of choosing a central location that 
offered the kind of dignity that the occasion demanded. In symbolic terms, 
the previous Autonomist government of 1898 (convened by Spain as a last- 
ditch effort to undercut the independence rebellion) had been equally unfor-
tunate: the Casino Español was chosen as the headquarters of its parliamen-
tary chamber, and the headquarters of the executive branch were situated 
in the Palacio de los Capitanes Generales (Palace of the Captain General) 
and in the Palacio del Segundo Cabo (Palace of the Second Lieutenant), the 
very locus of Spanish colonial power in Cuba. The latter was also the scene 
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of the transfer of powers between the North American commission and the 
Spanish authorities, which included Autonomist leader Rafael Montoro “as a 
member of the Cuban Government,” a fact that is generally omitted.54 Special 
witnesses to the effective transfer of sovereignty, this time in the Palacio del 
Gobierno (Palace of Government), included the General Staff of the Liberat-
ing Army: Generals José Miguel Gómez, Mario García Menocal, and Mayía 
Rodríguez y Lacret, the future usufructuaries of the republic.
With regard to the new public buildings that were representative of the 
republic, the austerity of the first Occupation Government and, above all, 
of Estrada Palma’s presidency delayed the creation of buildings that sym-
bolized the new state. The initial decision to house the House of Represen-
tatives in the old marine headquarters (a modest building in terms of size 
and appearance even after it was extended and renovated), the Senate in the 
Palacio del Segundo Cabo, and the presidency of the republic in the Palacio 
de los Captianes Generales (where it shared the building with Havana’s city 
council) was a means of reasserting the traditional areas of power, which 
were now occupied by the institutions of the new nation- state. Not until 
1910 did the legislature plan the new Palacio de Gobierno Provincial, and not 
until the plan was reviewed in 1915 was the building used as the headquarters 
of the executive branch, fueled by the first multimillion-dollar revenue from 
the sugar industry and also by large loans taken out by García Menocal (up 
to $52 million during his term of office, $1 million more than the loans taken 
out by his two predecessors put together, though $2 million less than the debt 
run up by Zayas in half the time during his presidency of 1921–25).55 Only 
then did the republic finally begin to rid itself of its initial austerity and assert 
its physical presence through buildings that symbolized power.
The creation of scenographic frameworks that represent the functions of 
the state (referred to by Segre with regard to the Master Plan that Machado 
commissioned from Forestier) is as old as the transformation of the palatial 
court of the Renaissance into a truly complex, bureaucratic state.56 The same 
was true of the multiplication of the number of public servants in twentieth- 
century states: in Cuba the number increased to 25,600 in 1907 and to 51,400 
in 1930; over the next twenty years the figure grew to 130,000.57 The cre-
ation of the city of Washington, D.C., was the first republican example of a 
scenographic framework of power and the first example of the modern era. 
Emulating the U.S. Capitol, irrespective of the political nature of the regime 
that promoted it, clearly demonstrated the desire to make the authority and 
dignity of the institutions visible through their monumentalization. Without 
doubt this also helped to formalize them, to grant them the appearance of 
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institutions that were above the government of the time and to distract atten-
tion from that government’s actions.
At that time and afterward, the city was in private hands, partly inherited 
and partly fostered by private interests. From the very beginning (and with 
no significant resistance) these prevailed over the general will. The fact that 
such a public renovation project was never carried out became the basis 
of successive laments for “the republic which could have been,” a powerful 
myth under permanent construction during the twentieth century. Around 
the time that Fernando Ortiz wrote about the Afro- Cuban criminal under-
world as an enemy within the city (1916), in other Latin American metropo-
lises which were experiencing strong growth, the lumpen, together with 
workers (to a large extent immigrant workers) and those excluded from 
society through poverty, tended to be defined as “dangerous classes” and 
were the target of measures of control, in addition to being pushed out of 
the city center, confined to working- class suburbs, and subjected to disci-
plinary rules. This happened during the expansion of São Paulo over the 
first two decades of the twentieth century, when it became clear that efforts 
were being made to establish clearly demarcated neighborhoods according 
to social classes. The aim, in line with the orders of the city’s mayor, Washing-
ton Luís (1914–16), was “to purify [the city] morally and physically” and to 
eradicate the “vicious mixture of scum of all nationalities, all ages, all of them 
dangerous.”58 At the same time that the mansions of the city center were 
being demolished to make way for offices and commercial areas, laborers 
were being moved out to working- class colonies. Washington Luís, a lawyer 
and historian with little sensitivity to urban history, was able to extend the 
scope of his ideas when he was elected state governor in 1920 and president 
of the republic in 1926.
The process of confrontation with workers organized in trade union or 
socio- ethnic groups in the urban environment of Havana progressed at the 
same time as the businesses and organizational capacity of the subaltern 
classes also progressed. The economic opportunities ushered in by the First 
World War, with increases in the price of sugar and the subsequent multi-
plication of the island’s other activities linked to the sugar industry, also led 
Cuba to stigmatize and marginalize any social sectors that were not inte-
grated and any labor sector that adopted a more aggressive position during 
Mario García Menocal’s first term in office (1913–17). It was this period that 
witnessed the deportation of unwanted anarchist trade union leaders, claim-
ing that it was due to their status as foreigners.59 The increase in exports be-
tween 1915 and 1917, when the volume doubled that of 1914, was followed by 
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the “boom years” between 1916 and 1919, which attracted North American 
capital to the sugar industry and made wealthy Cuban businessmen richer 
than they could have ever imagined. Menocal noticed the rapid urban de-
velopment of Havana toward the west, beyond Vedado and the barrier that 
the River Almendares represented, and commissioned the construction of a 
second bridge (there was a recently constructed but obsolete bridge at Calle 
23). The bridge reached the 5a Avenida in Miramar and was opened in 1921.
The real estate business was at its height. Powerful real estate and urban 
development companies had just been set up offering exclusive plots at the 
Playa de Marianao and between Miramar and the Country Club. A news-
paper advertisement from 1920 stated that “Traders, landowners, and indus-
trialists who have made their fortune . . . can improve their good luck even 
more and multiply their capital by investing in land at the Alturas del Coun-
try Club, where mansions are being built that are worth over $1,200,000.” 
The ad went on to use the slogan “It’s the modern Havana! An elegant, aris-
tocratic Havana!” Once again, as always, there was the claim of a renovated, 
modern Havana compared with the old one, just as there had been in 1835 and 
1853, just as there had been in 1875 and 1900. The developers stated that they 
were looking to create “a meeting place for elegance” which would welcome 
those who due to their position and education formed part of an elite, offering 
them mansions in accordance with their status and with the “insurmountable 
barriers between different social classes.” Social and residential segregation 
was finally expressed in very clear terms, with suburbs that were inaccessible 
to groups with less spending power, with special urban designs and styles 
that partially distanced themselves from the Hispanicizing trends that could 
nevertheless still be seen in the “tropical- style” mansions. One year after his 
presidency, García Menocal became a shareholder in the company that devel-
oped the Miramar area and together with his family he went on to take control 
of the Board of Governors.60 Havana (this time a private, exclusive Havana 
hidden from public view) began to be reinvented with its sights set, once 
again, on a modernity that could always be sensed but that remained elusive.
Notes
This paper was prepared as part of the research project har2012–36481 funded by 
the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad and p1-1b2012-57, Universitat 
Jaume I, and also Programa Prometeo 2013/023, Generalitat Valenciana para Grupos 
de Excelencia. The current version has drawn on comments made during its presenta-
tion in the symposium “After the Intervention: Civics, Sociability, and Applied Science 
in the New Cuba, 1895–1933,” Windsor, May 26 and 27, 2010.
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¡Tierra! and the Expansion of Anarchism  
in Cuba after Independence
Amparo Sánchez Cobos
In 1917 the Cuban socialist and writer Carlos Loveira published From 
26 to 35: Lessons from My Time in the Workers’ Struggle. Among his 
early experiences in Cuba’s “workers’ struggle,” he recounts the harsh 
impact of the failure of the 1911 railway workers’ strike in Sagua la 
Grande in which he had figured as one of the leaders. Dejected by the 
way events had developed, he decided to abandon the area and seek 
better luck in Havana. “I directed my feet to a house at 115 Aguila 
Street, headquarters of the anarchist weekly ¡Tierra! a publication 
widely renowned in the revolutionary workers’ movement span-
ning all languages, races, and countries. . . . I wasn’t an anarchist but, 
not knowing the address of any other workers’ centers, and without 
money, friends, or colleagues who could lend a hand, where better 
to go than the editorial offices of ¡Tierra! to get orientation and soli-
darity in such sad circumstances?”1
Loveira’s anecdote begs the question, how did ¡Tierra! come to 
transform itself into the point of reference for radical labor on the 
island and transcend its anarchist framework? Loveira knew the 
anarchists, including the members and distributors of the Havana 
paper, because he had collaborated with them on a number of occa-
sions, not least during the 1911 strike when he was president of the 
Sagua la Grande section of the Cuban League of Railway Workers. 
Nevertheless, the centrality of ¡Tierra! for radical Cuban intellectuals 
like Loveira had to do with the paper’s capacity to articulate particu-
lar international as well as national communities. These were com-
munities that transcended the borders of anarchist ideology. The fol-
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lowing pages reconstruct these communities from the pages of ¡Tierra! in an 
effort to counter the tendency to conceive narrowly of Cuban labor radical-
ism in the postindependence period only in terms of a struggle between a 
national working class and U.S. capital in its new imperial sphere of influ-
ence in the Caribbean basin.
Cuba’s traditional historiography proposed that anarchism during the 
first years of the republic was associated with a group of Spaniards who only 
concerned themselves with the defense of their compatriots and, under the 
influence of a “pernicious” ideology, left island workers ideologically disori-
ented and backward in their consciousness and organization. According to 
this vision, the distortion was corrected by the communists starting with the 
foundation of the Cuban Communist Party in 1925. Together with this inter-
pretation came the idea that Spanish anarchists did not understand Cuba’s 
political and social realities and that by transplanting Spanish practices and 
ideology to Cuba—the “Spanification” (“españolización”) of the Cuban 
labor movement—they fomented division and confrontation in the island’s 
working- class community.2 The role of the Spanish press on the island, and 
that of ¡Tierra! in particular, has received scarce attention, although many 
studies have used the newspaper to glean information on the Cuban labor 
movement even as authors have disparaged the paper for its ideological per-
spective.3
Some recent studies have acknowledged the relevance of anarchist activity 
in reorganizing workers following independence and the important legacy 
of theory and practice they bequeathed to the Cuban labor movement.4 Kir-
win Shaffer’s work regarding ¡Tierra! locates the periodical in the array of 
radical papers and analyzes its function as the principal nucleus of the trans-
national anarchist network established in the Caribbean, connecting Havana 
with Panama, Puerto Rico, and Florida (principally Tampa, St. Augustine, 
and Key West), and responding, among other things, to North American 
policies in the region. Shaffer’s fine work is representative of current U.S. 
historiography in that relations established among worker communities in 
the Caribbean, and particularly in Cuba, are framed and contextualized in 
terms of the United States and U.S. foreign policy.5 This context was clearly 
important, above all in terms of financing. The weekly publication was dis-
tributed and had subscriptions throughout the Atlantic world, however, and 
the relations established by the members of its editorial team transcended 
the Caribbean region and cannot be fully understood outside of a broader 
Atlantic context that includes Spain.
The exchanges and connections made through ¡Tierra! refer us to the exis-
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tence of an organic internationalism in the Atlantic world—that is, to orga-
nizations and individuals that transcended national frontiers and that re-
lated to one another through a print medium that represented their common 
interests. ¡Tierra! was in direct and constant contact with what was happen-
ing outside of Cuba’s borders, while at the same time serving as a forum for 
discussing ideas and translating from the local to the international domain 
issues that were common to the broader community of workers. In some 
cases the paper became the voice of those “libertarian” communities located 
in places where the local anarchist press did not have any forceful presence.6 
In the process they participated in the creation of an “imagined commu-
nity” of adherents in the ideological sense—an international community of 
workers who perceived themselves to be in analogous situations, with simi-
lar problems and desires.7
This immersion in the libertarian circuits of the Atlantic world had its 
reflection in the expansion of common experiences inside Cuba. The direct 
relation with Spain established during the colonial period and continuing 
after independence in a context that favored immigrants from the Spanish 
peninsula—anarchists among them—was visible in the type of enterprises 
implemented. The nearly 900,000 Spaniards who arrived in the island in the 
three decades following independence explain in part the continuities with 
the previous century, especially in terms of organizing workers and in the 
cultural practices spread after independence that had a European orienta-
tion. The new conjuncture demanded putting into practice different strate-
gies to ensure the expansion of anarchism throughout the island and, just as 
in the late nineteenth century, the press would play a key role in this pro-
cess. In sum, the success and centrality of ¡Tierra! in the first two decades 
of the Cuban republic forces us to take note of a dynamic network in the 
island’s working- class culture that has been written out of dominant narra-
tives, one that was cosmopolitan, transnational, and nonsectarian, and re-
volved around a largely Atlantic axis running from Cuba to Spain, and taking 
in places like Florida, Wales, and France (not to mention California) along 
the way.
Part- Time “Journalists”
¡Tierra! Periódico Semanal (Land! A weekly paper) was born in early July 
1902, only two months after the birth of the Cuban republic itself. Aside from 
a few suspensions in publication caused by the Cuban authorities and the 
content of some of its issues, and aside from financing problems that slowed 
its publication at certain points, the most important anarchist publication 
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in Havana and the island of Cuba in the first years of independence came 
out with a good deal of regularity until the beginning of 1915, when it was 
closed by the authorities for having published articles attacking the govern-
ment. Also contributing to its definitive disappearance were the deficit suf-
fered starting in the final months of 1914, combined with repression directed 
against anarchists that led to the deportation of some of its most important 
collaborators.
Two clear periods are distinguishable in the life of the paper, in each case 
linked directly to the composition of the editorial team: the first runs from 
its creation to the middle of 1908, and the second from that point until its 
disappearance in early 1915. The first editorial team was made up princi-
pally of native- born Cubans. The founding director was Feliciano Prieto, a 
tobacco worker. Among the first on the writing staff were the Cubans Juan 
Aller, Arturo Juvanet, Bernabé Ugarte, Oscar Martínez, Andrés Castillo, and 
Manuel Martínez Abello and the Spaniards Pedro Soteras and Rafael Cu-
sidó i Baró.8 The majority of this first team were also tobacco workers, and 
some were from the Society of Cigarmakers (Sociedad de Torcedores). From 
its inception the paper enjoyed the collaboration of other Spaniards, among 
them Domingo Mir Durich and José Guardiola, who were two of its most 
important distributors in Havana, as well as Adrián del Valle and Luís Bar-
cia, both of whom were well known among the anarchist community in the 
United States. Barcia had participated along with Feliciano Prieto as a writer 
on the anarchist paper El Despertar (The Awakening), published in New York 
starting at the end of the nineteenth century. Del Valle, commonly known by 
his pseudonym, Palmiro de Lidia, had emigrated to the United States from 
Barcelona in the late nineteenth century and quickly distinguished himself 
by his contribution to the anarchist press. Arriving in Cuba immediately fol-
lowing the war of independence during the years of U.S. occupation of the 
island, he published Nuevo Ideal, the first anarchist paper of the new era that 
lasted until the beginning of 1902.9
This first team carried on with little variation until 1908 when the paper 
was taken over by the “24th of November” group, whose name referred 
to the “Apprentices’ Strike” of 1902, essentially a general strike that seized 
the island. According to the editors, personal problems among the origi-
nal members motivated the change.10 From that point on more Spaniards 
could be found among the dedicated staff. A confidential file put together 
by the Cuban Secret Police around 1912 claimed the director was Sebastián 
Aguiar, a carpenter originally from the Canary Islands, and the administra-
tor was Domingo Mir Durich, from Lerida city in Catalonia, who worked 
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for the Department of Public Works. The same police report listed among 
the writers the Majorcan day laborer Juan Tur i Tur; a tobacco worker, Juan 
Tenorio Fernández; a chemist from La Coruña, Paulino Ferreiro del Monte; 
and shoemaker Juan Búa Palacios and shopkeeper Gregorio Hernández, 
both from Spain. The police also found, however, that the paper still had 
significant contributions from natives of Cuba like Miguel Lozano Ariza, a 
Havana tobacco worker; the builder Joaquín Lucena; and Marcelo Salinas, a 
tobacco worker from Batabanó. They also made special note of the Colom-
bian schoolteacher Juan Francisco Moncaleano.11
Anarchism had been introduced to Cuba in the 1870s in good measure 
through the arrival in Cuba of publications, mostly from Spain and particu-
larly from Catalonia. The ideas and principles cohering in Europe following 
the breakup of the First International found a good seedbed among workers 
in Havana and surrounds who had formed radical republican groups and 
guild and reform organizations.12 According to the Cuban historian José Ri-
vero Muñiz, the links grew after the celebration in 1882 of the Second Con-
gress of the Federation of Workers of the Spanish Region (Segundo Con-
greso de la Federación de los Trabajadores de la Región Española) where a 
motion was passed to foment the spread of anarchism in Cuba.13 The Cuban 
Enrique Roig San Martín founded the Center for Artisan Instruction and 
Recreation in Santiago de las Vegas, outside Havana, in the same year, and 
it soon became the principal propaganda nucleus for anarchist ideology be-
cause in conjunction with the Spanish anarchist weekly La Tramontana it co-
ordinated the distribution of anarchist publications in Cuba. The first Cuban 
anarchist periodicals appeared soon after, the most important being Roig 
San Martín’s El Productor, which was published between 1887 and 1890. As 
Joan Casanovas has shown, the ideology and tactics of urban workers were 
coordinated in these papers over the final decades of the colonial period, led 
principally by workers linked to the tobacco industry, notable among them 
the Cubans Roig San Martín, Enrique Ceci, Pedro Rodríguez, and Enrique 
Mesonier and the Spaniards Gervasio García Purón, Maximino Fernández, 
and Eduardo González Bobés.14
Cuba’s final war of independence dismantled worker organizations and 
led to the exile, repression, or death of many of its most important leaders 
(Ceci, for example, died in the conflict). At the close of the war, it was com-
mon to see former anarchists from the colonial era, especially native- born 
Cubans, become reformists interested in creating nationalist organizations 
that might represent workers in the legislature—the most important of these 
being the League of Cuban Workers (Liga General de Trabajadores Cuba-
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nos), created by Messonier in September 1899.15 These organizations would 
henceforth rival the efforts of a new anarchist movement, born of postinde-
pendence politics and economic conditions, in its efforts to attract workers 
and others from the popular sectors. Parallel with the gradual growth and 
expansion of the sugar industry, and likewise stretching eastward across the 
island, came the growth of the working class. It was a working class with a 
strong Spanish character due to the collaboration of the U.S. authorities and 
the first republican governments in promoting policies that favored immi-
gration from Spain as a way of combining two key desires of racist elites: sat-
isfying the insatiable need for labor following the abolition of slavery in the 
late 1880s, and “whitening” what would now be the “national” population.16 
According to the Spanish Geographical and Statistical Institute, 822,291 im-
migrants from Spain arrived in Cuba between 1900 and 1929—making up 
61 percent of the total immigration of the period and roughly 10 percent of 
the island’s population.17
As a result, the end of Spanish colonialism did not mark a clear point of 
rupture with the workers movement of the late nineteenth century, especially 
given that this immigration current included many anarchists. Practical ex-
perience of anarchism, and the importance given to the press in particular, 
reinforced links and continuities with both the earlier Cuban movement and 
the anarchist community in Spain. A novel impulse was added: transcending 
the frontiers of Havana and environs to reach the new working class. Unless 
they became naturalized Cubans (the only way they could vote), immigrants 
were on the margins of the political possibilities being explored by the new 
reformist organizations. This helps to explain the adherence of many to the 
anarchist project, as do other factors such as the long- term goals of the native 
reformists and the extended period of time it might take to gain a foothold 
in the republican political sphere (of little interest to workers who did not 
necessarily intend to remain in Cuba forever), and the scant experience of 
many of the new arrivals from Spain with participation in a democratic po-
litical sphere. The pro- Cuban (and thus anti- Spain) discourse of the Cuban 
reformists also made that option unpalatable to new immigrants.
The anarchists who survived the war and the change in the political char-
acter of the island, together with those who arrived as immigrants to par-
ticipate in the new stage ushered in by independence, focused on the two 
measures they considered most urgent: the reorganization of their groups 
and the expansion of anarchist principles. At the same time they spread 
an “openness and integrationist” discourse that called for the unity of the 
worker community of the island in defense of its class interests over and 
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above divisions based on nationality, race, skin color, or any other differenti-
ating characteristic. During the first years of the republic, the anarchist press 
and especially ¡Tierra! would become the voice of that workers community, 
continuing the integrationist spirit that characterized its late colonial ances-
tor. It railed against the use of immigration to lower production costs by re-
ducing salaries through an abundant labor supply. At the same time it spread 
the image of a working class that was expanding throughout the island—one 
that, if united, had great potential to exert pressure in a context of economic 
growth. The syndicalist tactics promoted by the Havana weekly—among 
them the general strike—were an attempt to connect that potential to the 
main desires of the worker community, which could be summed up in most 
cases as a reduction in the work day, an increase in the daily wage, and pay-
ment in U.S. money.
But as with other prior and contemporary anarchist publications, ¡Tierra! 
was produced by workers, not just for them. A constant characteristic over 
the more than twelve years ¡Tierra! was in publication was that its editorial 
team, just as its correspondents and collaborators, were workers of differ-
ent occupations—tobacco workers, carpenters, agricultural laborers, shoe-
makers, or shop clerks—who turned themselves into journalists in their 
“free time.” All of them, far from seeking profit or recompense from the 
sale of the paper, participated altruistically, dedicating the greater part of 
their off- hours to its production. As its editors noted, they worked from 7 to 
11 p.m. six days a week, and from 9 to 11 a.m. on Sundays.18
The fact that its promoters and writers were workers of distinct nationali-
ties helps to explain why the paper devoted itself to covering the problems of 
the island’s workers, regardless of their social or political nature. The stance 
was articulated in the paper’s very first editorial, along with its stated inten-
tion of becoming the intermediary and unifier of the working- class commu-
nity. ¡Tierra! would be a “truly workers’ paper that without exclusivism or 
limitations will devote itself to the defense of the working class in general . . . 
and holding aloft the banner of socialism . . . to foment revolution and the 
class spirit and rebellious sentiment necessary to achieve the union of all the 
workers of the island of Cuba.”19 But it also helps to explain why those who 
produced the paper involved themselves directly in attempts to resolve those 
problems, participating in strikes and protest movements that had conse-
quences for them as well as for the paper itself.
For example, anarchists—especially members and collaborators of 
¡Tierra! like Prieto, Del Valle, Manuel Martínez Abello, Francisco Ros Planas 
y Arturo Juvanet—played a leading role in the Apprentices’ Strike of 1902, 
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organized by Havana tobacco workers, and soon joined by workers from 
other sectors and organizations of diverse political tendencies in the capital 
and neighboring provinces. Prieto, the director of the paper, was the main 
strike leader, and along with Martínez Abello and Ros Planas he was sen-
tenced to six months in jail for the articles they published in favor of the 
strike.20 Throughout the wave of labor actions and the main strikes that took 
place over the first republican decade, a similar pattern is visible: collabora-
tion of workers linked to different political tendencies; involvement and in 
many cases leadership exercised by anarchists; repression, again principally 
against anarchists; and the newspaper ¡Tierra! subjected to prosecution and 
temporary suspension of publication due to its support for the strike and 
protest movements.
At the same time, as with other anarchist newspapers, the relation be-
tween ¡Tierra! and its readers was mutual and reciprocal: in many cases the 
subscribers and consumers of this type of press were not only readers but 
also involved in the writing and signed as authors of some of the accounts 
or news published in its pages. And, though not numerous, some of these 
occasional correspondents were women. Slowly women began to join the 
anarchist cause thanks in good measure to the discourse launched by the 
newspaper, a tendency also visible in the development of anarchist pedagogy 
and schools in the island.21 In a majority of cases, there was a direct relation-
ship between the sending of money from different places within and beyond 
the borders of Cuba, for sales as well as subscriptions, and the sending of 
chronicles and news from the same places.22
Indeed the anarchist press is an excellent resource for illustrating the rela-
tions among communities of workers at the national and international levels. 
As the Spanish jurist Juan Díaz del Moral noted in 1929, beyond their prin-
cipal function of transmitting messages, anarchist periodicals and publica-
tions “served as organs of communication among all the committed and 
even among all Spanish- language workers. To subscribe to a paper and pay, 
to announce the creation or orientation of groups, to ascertain the location 
of a friend or a debtor, to send notice of a change of address—the worker 
used his newspaper, thanks to its spread through all countries where Span-
ish was spoken.”23 The editorial team itself addressed the issue of the nature 
of those who wrote for the paper: “Here every worker who wishes to improve 
his own condition and that of others by showing the way is the writer of this 
newspaper, just as every man of generous feelings and who loves real liberty 
and equality for that part of humanity that is enslaved and overworked can 
also find a place in our paper as a writer. . . . Some of our writers are in Lon-
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don, others in France, still others in Mexico and sundry countries of this un-
fortunate planet.”24
Shaffer emphasizes the Caribbean-U.S. orientation and significance of 
¡Tierra! by pointing to the collaborators and correspondents who sent re-
ports to the Havana paper, as well as the network of distribution and sub-
scriptions established in that area between 1903 and 1911 and which made up 
one of the main sources of external financing.25 But the newspaper’s network 
exceeded this emerging regional political community. There were essentially 
two types of foreign writers and collaborators: those who sent news or shared 
information with the community of readers on an occasional and sporadic 
basis, and those who sent stories to Havana on a regular basis. Among this 
latter type of “assiduous correspondent,” the Spaniard Vicente García stands 
out. An anarchist who wrote for the Havana paper first from England and 
later from France, he was responsible for a time for the sections “Desde 
Inglaterra” (From England) and “Cosas de España” (Spanish Happenings). 
Following the first few installments these were joined together and renamed 
“Things of the World” (the title was in English, apparently a reflection of its 
point of origin), with the correspondent tackling a variety of themes. After 
1909 this became a regular section that was open to other correspondents. 
With a focus centered on the proletarian community, García fairly regu-
larly sent to Havana the series titled “Workers’ Struggle,” and between 1908 
and 1912 he also sent “Letters from London” and “Letters from Europe”; in 
1914 this anarchist, originally from Burgos, was also the one in charge of 
keeping the Cuban working community up to date on the world war. All his 
chronicles tended to appear on page 2 of ¡Tierra! García became well known 
among the worker community of the Atlantic world for these collaborations 
sent from Dowlais, in the south of Wales. In fact he is a perfect example of 
the collaborator profile in the anarchist press.26 But García was much more 
than a correspondent for ¡Tierra! Through him the weekly paper received 
money originating with the sale of the paper throughout the European anar-
chist community, principally that of Britain, as well as the donations that he 
himself coordinated from this Welsh locale.
While García is an excellent example of the correspondent- subscriber- 
distributor, he is not the only one. Indeed, this type of figure was common 
in the provinces of Cuba as well as in foreign lands. The editors, writers, and 
collaborators of ¡Tierra! were, then, “intellectual workers” converted into 
transmitters of a particular ideology and practices. Among other roles as-
sumed by these “part- time reporters” was that of selecting what to send, and 
in this sense they functioned as catalysts of a collective way of thinking: an-
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archist thought. The selections they made, like the news they disseminated 
or wrote, were subjected to their value judgments, their prejudices, and their 
particular ideological representations. They were conscious, as well, of their 
power of persuasion and of the necessity to reach as many readers as pos-
sible in order to attain their principal objective, which was the diffusion of 
anarchist thought. These were transmitters of an ideology of action, of a way 
of thinking whose main thrust was about practical acts. And stimulating the 
impulse toward practical activities was precisely another of the missions of 
¡Tierra! If the fact that its promoters were workers explains the orientation 
of the newspaper and its involvement in workers’ issues, the significant pres-
ence of Spaniards among those collaborators helps to explain the type of 
projects they sought to implement.
Subscriptions and Distribution inside and outside Cuba
The expansion in the circulation of ¡Tierra! beyond Havana to the rest of 
Cuba, related to the intense activities undertaken by its prime movers, is re-
vealed in its sales and subscription data. In its first months it was sold only 
in the Havana bookshops La Pluma de Oro, La Única, and La Bohemia and 
could also be purchased directly from Domingo Mir Durich and José Guar-
diola. Only two years later it was sent to distant points in the island and dis-
tributed in all the provinces.27 A single issue was sold for three cents, while 
a fifty- issue package cost fifty cents, making subscription the largest method 
of sale. Subscriptions partially explain the projection outside the capital, as 
well as outside the island itself. In 1904 subscriptions had also been taken out 
in Barcelona, Jerez de la Frontera, and La Línea (Spain); in Dowlais (Wales); 
Veracruz and Mérida (Mexico); as well as some locales in the United States, 
from Tampa, Key West, and St. Augustine in Florida to Brooklyn, New York; 
Paterson, New Jersey; and San Francisco. In 1908 ¡Tierra! started to be sold 
in New York, at the Italian Bookshop of B. Spano on Oath Street; the follow-
ing year it could be bought at the Librería Española on Vallejo Street in San 
Francisco and from the “Agencia de Publicaciones de Valdespí” in Ibor City, 
Tampa.
An overview of subscriptions and distribution inside and outside the 
island (see figure 6.1) gives us an idea of the rather dynamic network estab-
lished by anarchists around three corners of the Atlantic world, one made 
possible no doubt by the mobility characteristic of anarchists and especially 
those with links to Spain. It is no coincidence that those involved were politi-
cal émigrés immersed in the general migratory currents established between 
Europe and the Americas starting in the late nineteenth century. State re-
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pression against the most radical sectors of labor—among them, obviously, 
anarchists—or the search for work were two of the most common reasons 
behind this mobility, though in the specific case of the anarchists we should 
not forget those who emigrated to plant the “libertarian” seed in other places. 
Indeed, the independence of Cuba—the new era that began for the island’s 
workers at that point—would compel many anarchists to establish them-
selves in the island.28 The advance in communications starting in the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century offered them the technical support they 
needed.
There are multiple examples of this dynamic and of anarchist movements 
among the foreign subscribers and distributors of ¡Tierra!—for example, the 
Spaniard Francisco Ros Planas, mentioned above as having participated in 
the Apprentices’ Strike of 1902 and having spent time in jail. After getting out 
of jail in June 1903 he emigrated to Mexico, where he set up in Mérida. Also 
following jail time for political activities, the Cuban tobacco worker Marcelo 














Figure 6.1 Financing and distribution of ¡Tierra! Source: Author’s collation  
of data from available issues of ¡Tierra! Others include the United Kingdom,  
Canada, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina.
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Spanish tobacco workers had settled in the late nineteenth century. Part of the 
money collected in Ibor City for subscriptions to ¡Tierra! arrived in Havana 
via Salinas. For their part, migrants who worked on the Panama Canal ex-
plain the connections and subscriptions to ¡Tierra! in Panama. Shaffer ex-
plores nicely how the Havana paper filled the void in anarchist publications 
in the Canal zone, something that also happened in Puerto Rico, where we 
find an immigrant community of tobacco workers.29 The figures on sales of 
¡Tierra! in the United States can be largely explained by the same reasons.
In some cases the subscribers were passionate readers and collectors of 
the anarchist press, like the German Max Nettlau, who wrote to the paper’s 
offices in Havana to ask for the issues he was missing, or the Spaniard José 
Sánchez Rosa, who registered among the most faithful subscribers of ¡Tierra! 
in the southern Spanish city of Seville. A self- taught teacher, Sánchez Rosa 
was a perfect incarnation of the anarchist of humble origins converted by his 
relationship with the anarchist press and its content into an “organic intel-
lectual” of anarchism in the Gramscian sense of the term.30 Family connec-
tions explain the money that arrived occasionally from Brazil, where Nicolás 
Villamisar lived, brother of the Spanish anarchist Francisco Villamisar, who 
had resided in Havana since the 1890s.
In many instances the newspaper’s relations were woven through sup-
port for the great workers’ causes. Most notable were the connections with 
exiled members of the Mexican Liberal Party in the context of the Mexican 
Revolution. Collections arrived from California sent by Pilar A. Robledo, 
the pseudonym of the Mexican anarchist and book dealer Rómulo S. Car-
mona. In 1912 and 1913 Carmona participated in distinct activities with the 
Colombian Juan Francisco Moncaleano, mentioned above as one of the writ-
ing team of the Havana weekly, who had gone from Cuba to Mexico in 1912, 
though soon after found himself deported to Spain due to his anarchist links. 
Following a brief stay in the Spanish peninsula, Moncaleano emigrated to 
Los Angeles, where he played a leading role in the Mexican and anarchist 
struggle. Carmona and Moncaleano were members of the junta formed to 
demand the release of the Flores Magón brothers, Ricardo and Enrique, and 
of Librado Rivera and Anselmo L. Figueroa, imprisoned in the United States 
on McNeil’s Island. María Broussé, the partner of Ricardo Flores Magón, also 
collaborated by sending money to the Havana offices of the paper. Notable 
in this regard was the collection taken in the Los Angeles Federal Court 
during the trial of members of the pLm in June 1912. In many cases, ¡Tierra! 
subscribers were members of anarchist groups, and the groups were used 
as a platform for distributing the paper.31 The role played by the groups in 
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solidarity with the paper is especially visible in the Panamanian case and ex-
plains the 3 percent share of money gathered there registered in figure 6.1.32
The reception of ¡Tierra! in international anarchist circles can also be ob-
served in the relations established with other like publications, links that 
in many cases explain the subscriptions and the money sent to the offices 
in Havana. The money from Spain generally arrived through the anarchist 
paper, Tierra y Libertad; also La Protesta of Buenos Aires was responsible for 
some of the money received from Argentina, just as the money from Costa 
Rica came via the periodical Renovación and from its administrator, Ricardo 
Falcó Mayor. Likewise, as we have seen, members of the editorial team of 
the Mexican anarchist paper Regeneración account for some of the remit-
tances coming from California between 1912 and 1914.33 On more than a few 
occasions these exchanges included a back- and- forth dimension: through 
¡Tierra! remittances to other countries were sent and other foreign publi-
cations were sold in Cuba. Already in 1903 the Havana paper announced 
that it was selling Tierra y Libertad, at the time edited in Madrid; La Revista 
Blanca, also published in the Spanish capital; and the Barcelona periodical 
Natura. The following year the repertoire of foreign publications offered for 
sale had expanded to include Madrid’s El Rebelde, Barcelona’s El Produc-
tor and El Boletín de la Escuela Moderna, and La Protesta and Vida Nueva 
from Buenos Aires. These relations continued to grow, and by 1912 a net-
work had been consolidated connecting the newspaper administration in 
Havana with those papers with which ¡Tierra! maintained an open account. 
This involved, as well, acting as an intermediary for the foreign publications 
in terms of receiving and sending money collected for subscriptions and for 
different causes. Among the anarchist papers with which ¡Tierra! maintained 
open accounts were Tierra y Libertad from Barcelona, Cultura Obrera from 
New York, Regeneración from Mexico (though published in California), and 
Costa Rica’s Renovación, and after 1913 La Protesta from Buenos Aires, Ac-
ción Libertaria from Madrid, and El Obrero Industrial from Tampa.34
Finally, to continue underlining the reasons that explain the success of 
the Havana weekly in reaching workers inside and outside the island, and 
still related to the monetary question, were the solidarity campaigns. Beyond 
receiving money to keep itself going, ¡Tierra! relentlessly collected funds to 
support innumerable struggles that the international anarchist community 
waged in distinct moments, both inside and outside Cuba. The solidarity 
funds collected in 1902 “on behalf of those dead, wounded, or imprisoned 
during the general strike”—the Apprentices’ Strike—was one such major 
cause. The fund- raising campaigns most commonly found in the pages of the 
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newspaper were those in support of people “imprisoned for social questions” 
and on occasion included the fees of the lawyers contracted for those de-
tained, without whom the workers would not have been able to defend them-
selves. For example, thanks to appeals in the pages of the newspaper, funds 
were collected in 1908 to send to a lawyer in Camagüey who had taken on 
the defense of the four workers imprisoned after the Jagüeyal strike—jailed 
for demanding the seven months’ pay the sugar mill supposedly owed the 
workers. Other appeals for donations were made to help comrades or their 
families in difficult situations, as in the case of the Spaniards Abelardo Saave-
dra and Francisco González Sola, who had been expelled from the island in 
1912, or in the same year the family of Moncaleano after he emigrated. Fund- 
raising was also done to maintain anarchist schools or propaganda excur-
sions around the island, two issues I return to below.
With respect to the campaigns to support international causes, again the 
most notable were those to help anarchists detained for social struggles—
among the most popular were in support of those imprisoned in Alcalá del 
Valle, Spain, in 1904. Also worth mentioning was the intense support work 
carried out by ¡Tierra! in favor of “the Mexican revolutionaries” thanks to 
a fund- raising campaign that ran from 1912 to 1914, which finished up with 
another one specifically on behalf of the pLm members who were in prison. 
In support of the Mexican anarchists, the Havana team published a protest 
coupon that was also printed by other anarchist publications of the Atlantic 
world in 1912 (see figure 6.2).
The reflection of this extensive and consolidated network of distribution 
and subscription can be seen in the slow growth of the weekly’s print run. In 
1904 it had already reached 2,000 copies, by the end of 1906 it was 2,500, and 
in 1912 it surpassed 4,000. In 1913 the run topped 6,000 copies at one point, 
though the normal print run was about 5,500. Due to funding problems, the 
final months in the life of ¡Tierra! saw the print run drop to three thousand 
copies. The deficit dragging it down combined with the drop in subscriptions 
meant that by the week of December 10, 1914, the paper ceased to come out 
due to lack of funds. Overall, these print runs were surprisingly large, espe-
cially if compared to anarchist periodicals in other countries with a much 
larger working- class population than that of Cuba. For example, accord-
ing to Spanish author Ramiro de Maeztu, at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury and beginning of the twentieth, the anarchist papers in Spain reached 
print runs of twelve thousand copies and sold at the very least four thou-
sand copies an issue.35 In Argentina, another country that had a considerably 
greater population than Cuba, the anarchist paper of greatest distribution at 
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the beginning of the twentieth century, La Protesta, had a print run of be-
tween eight thousand and twelve thousand copies, and the rest of like pub-
lications oscillated between two thousand and three thousand copies sold.36 
But the ¡Tierra! numbers are even more surprising if we take into account 
that, as the historian Lily Litvak has noted, the sales of this type of periodical 
press were significantly lowered by the fact that the same issue of the paper 
passed through various hands and might also be read in the workers centers 
or in the social studies centers (Centros de Estudios Sociales).37
Organization—Diffusion—Inspiration: Following the Spanish Model
The first U.S. intervention saw the reorganization of groups and periodicals 
that had been dismantled during the independence war. No organ was able 
to consolidate itself to the point that it was powerful enough to promote 
the growth of anarchism throughout the island, despite the efforts made in 
this regard by Adrián del Valle through his paper, Nuevo Ideal. Starting in 
1902 ¡Tierra! did play this role. In order to do so, its members followed a 
strategy defined in three steps: organization, spread, and practical education 
of workers and their families. The organizational model pushed by ¡Tierra! 
was intended to overcome the existing divisions at the heart of the island’s 
working- class community and to direct their energies according to common 
objectives and tending to resolve problems in the short or medium term.
Figure 6.2 Letter of protest to the president of the United States from a  
1912 issue of ¡Tierra!
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Unlike the guilds and associations defined by trade, typical of the nine-
teenth century, whose actions in the public sphere only represented affiliated 
workers, the writing team of the Havana weekly advocated the organization 
of small groups that were intended to overcome the guild framework and 
congregate workers independently of their trade; they also sought to include 
their families, which provided a way into the project for women and chil-
dren. The model involved small action- oriented cells, not to exceed fifteen 
members, that were without rules governing their functions. They gener-
ally met in different places to prepare tactics for direct action or to choose 
projects that would serve to direct the propaganda or revolutionary orienta-
tion of the workers. These groups had an anarcho- communist base in terms 
of organizational and economic orientation, though they totally disassoci-
ated themselves from the use of violent methods. The ultimate objective was 
to form a Federation of Anarchist Groups in which each group would main-
tain its independence—including its capacity to abandon the federation—
and would be in charge of coordinating the actions of all its members. This 
organizational structure echoed what were known in Spain in the last three 
decades of the nineteenth century as anarchist groups of affinity, tertulias, or 
cells, with which the ideology’s pioneers coordinated organization and pro-
paganda in the early days of this current of thought in the peninsula.38 Their 
transfer to Cuba can be explained by the presence of Spanish anarchists and 
also because in the recently emancipated island “the group” showed itself to 
be the best option to overcome the disarticulation of anarchism during the 
war of independence.
To ensure support, the editorial team spread an “open” discourse in keep-
ing with the spirit of the paper itself, making clear that among its groups, 
and so in its centers, every worker and his or her family was welcome inde-
pendently of skin color, gender, nationality, or political status. ¡Tierra! put it 
this way: “In our houses the stupid hatred for color or nationality disappears, 
substituted by love and fraternity, the bases of a new and close form of so-
cial organization resulting from our complete emancipation.”39 The group, 
and with it the anarchist center, were born in Cuba with an integrating and 
globalizing intent: they welcomed all workers and extended to all spheres of 
daily life. “The groups could advantageously supplant mutual aid societies, 
information agencies or those for placing workers, and even the meeting 
places, availing themselves of locales where they might pleasantly read, dis-
cuss, and even entertain themselves.”40
During the years when the paper was in print, anarchists organized more 
than eighty groups dispersed across the island of Cuba, though with greater 
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density in Havana and in Oriente, areas where workers was most numer-
ous.41 All of their memberships included at least Spanish anarchists together 
with Cuban- born workers, and in some there were also workers of other 
nationalities. The so- called Direct Action group, for example, organized in 
1912 in Manzanillo, Oriente, was made up of French, Portuguese, and Ital-
ian anarchists—notable in that European immigration to Cuba at this time 
was not numerous except for those from Spain. The growth in the number of 
groups, according to information published in ¡Tierra!, was especially visible 
after 1907, coinciding with the end of the first propaganda excursion carried 
out in almost the entire island (discussed below). So, while between 1902 and 
1907 a total of thirteen groups formed around the island, between 1908 and 
1914 a further fifty- five were organized—a growth that was also no doubt the 
result of the expansion of the paper’s presence outside Havana.
The 1908 change in the ¡Tierra! editorial team led, on the one hand, to an 
intensification in the back- and- forth relations with Spain (because the new 
team was made up in its majority by peninsulars), and on the other hand to 
a clearer intent on exercising the role of mediator of Cuba’s anarchist com-
munity. The paper itself announced the change: “In its new epoch, ¡Tierra! 
will be the organ of Cuba’s anarchist groups (grupos libertarios) and will be 
in constant communication with them on issues relating to our ideal, as well 
as on initiatives that come of either the ‘24th of November’ editorial team or 
any other group; they will not be implemented without consulting the other 
groups. . . . This will be a principle of the anarchist federation in Cuba ac-
cording to the basic points approved in the 1907 Amsterdam Congress.”42
From this point on, ¡Tierra! would maintain a more direct relationship 
with the international anarchist community, one that entailed among other 
things following the doctrinal mandates established in international con-
gresses and meetings. Indeed, starting in 1912 the proposition on organiz-
ing promoted in its pages veered toward anarcho- syndicalism, the model 
prevalent in the Atlantic world and also in Spain. During the first years of 
the twentieth century, syndicalism—an outgrowth of the French Labor Ex-
change (Bourse de Travail) created at the end of the nineteenth century—
became influential among European and American anarchists due to the 
influence exercised by the French General Workers Confederation (Con-
fédération Général du Travail—Cgt). This integration of anarchists into the 
labor movement, which connected with the Proudhonist roots of anarchism, 
became visible in Europe and the United States following the adoption of 
these principles in the 1906 Charter of Amiens (Carta de Amiens) (1906) and 
the Amsterdam congress (1907). The U.S.- based Industrial Workers of the 
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World, organized in Chicago in 1905, and the Argentine Regional Workers 
Federation (Federación Obrera Regional Argentina), born in 1915, are ex-
amples of this influence in the Americas. Anarcho- syndicalism also became 
dominant among Spanish anarchists following the creation of the National 
Workers Confederation (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo) in 1910 that 
adopted the organizing principles of the French Cgt and of Workers Soli-
darity (Solidaridad Obrera), founded in Barcelona four years earlier.
These principles were widely spread in Cuba through the pages of ¡Tierra! 
due above all to the articles by the Spaniard Pedro Irazoqui, who from 1912 on 
figured as one of its principal campaigners. For the first time in Cuba words 
like revolutionary syndicalism and sabotage became widespread through the 
efforts of the ¡Tierra! anarchists. Also starting in 1912, other groups were or-
ganized to promote anarcho-syndicalism: La Alarma was founded in Havana 
in 1913 with the main objective “to propagate syndicalism through all means 
at our disposal.”43 In the same way, the use of peaceful methods of struggle 
became widespread—the boycott, the general strike, among others—which 
held sway at the time among workers throughout the Atlantic world, while 
the organization of industrial unions was being recommended. This reorien-
tation in organizational typology was also related to the growth in the Cuban 
community of workers which was especially visible during the second decade 
of the republic. Many unions were born during this period, and between 
1917 and 1920 above all. The final stage in this movement was the organi-
zation in 1921 of the Havana Workers Federation (Federación Obrera de La 
Habana) and, four years later, the National Workers Central of Cuba (Cen-
tral Nacional Obrera de Cuba). ¡Tierra! then laid the bases for the organiza-
tion of the island’s workers in the years following the paper’s disappearance.
One of the most important practices in the formation of new groups, or 
cells, was the “propaganda excursion.” The first one, organized at the end 
of 1906 by the members of ¡Tierra!’s writing team, was carried out between 
April and August of the following year. It took in almost the entire island, 
with the exception of Pinar del Río, and had as its main goal extending anar-
chist ideology and organizing groups of ácratas throughout the country.44 To 
direct the initiative and the excursion, three leaders were chosen, two of them 
Cubans—Manuel Martínez Abello and Juan Aller—who were also members 
of the ¡Tierra! editorial team. The third organizer chosen, Abelardo Saavedra, 
came after an appeal to Spain for collaboration. Saavedra was from Cádiz, in 
the south of Spain, who since 1904 was part of Madrid’s “4 de mayo” group, 
at the time in charge of publishing the anarchist paper Tierra y Libertad. 
Saavedra was a very well known anarchist in the Spanish community, in part 
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due to his participation in this type of excursion activity in the peninsula. 
He was also a friend with other important peninsular leaders, among them 
Fermín Salvochea, Pedro Vallina, Francisco González Sola, and José Sánchez 
Rosa, all Andalucians like Saavedra and recognized anarchist speakers and 
propagandists with experience in all types of locations. Saavedra arrived in 
Havana in April 1907, only days before the beginning of the excursion.
On top of the participation of Saavedra, the link between Spain and the 
excursion is also demonstrated by the type of activity proposed. The so- 
called sociological excursions or propaganda excursions were long- distance 
sojourns with an itinerary fixed beforehand. Anarchists in the Spanish 
peninsula had organized such excursions ever since the ideology began to 
be known there in the 1870s. They were precisely designed as one of the 
most important methods of ideological expansion. From that point on, the 
“Apostles of the Ideal” were a common sight, traversing the peninsula with 
books, pamphlets, and papers as their only baggage. These apostles were 
most famous in Andalucía. Indeed an excursion of this type was organized 
in Spain in 1904 as an initiative of Tierra y Libertad, and it toured the entire 
country.45
In the Cuban case, the fact that in the final years of the nineteenth cen-
tury anarchism was only present in and around Havana explains the ab-
sence of this type of practice prior to independence. The first that has left 
any evidence is the one that brought Saavedra to Cuba, but from that point 
on these outings became common as an indispensable complement to the 
rest of the proselytizing and propaganda activities and counted on the eco-
nomic and propagandistic support of ¡Tierra! Their impact should be mea-
sured in relation to the number of new anarchist groups and with expan-
sion in the distribution of the paper itself around the entire island.46 Again, 
Carlos Loveira, recalling the 1911 railway workers strike in Sagua la Grande 
where he had been a leader, provides insight on these activities and con-
cretely on the role played by the ¡Tierra! collaborators: “The train that came 
from Cienfuegos to Sagua la Grande every afternoon, and that joined up in 
Santo Domingo with the one coming from Havana, brought us a group of 
high- level worker tribunes, among whom the anarchists stood out for their 
well- deserved fame. They were manual workers who were expert in the art 
of perfect public speaking and the envy of many political big shots and not a 
few grand pooh- bahs [parlaembaldes] from the lodges and casinos: Abelardo 
Saavedra and Francisco Sola.”
From that point on, Saavedra became one of the best known anarchists 
among Cuban workers, precisely due to his involvement in practical experi-
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ences and strike actions—activities that would eventually lead to his expul-
sion from the island. His fame was already manifest in Loveira’s 1917 work: 
“The meeting heard the most experienced public speakers. The high note 
was the speech of Saavedra, about whom I can say, in addition to the praise 
already penned, that he is the prototype of the worker- orator in terms of his 
use of a workers’ language with simple phrases and concepts and just the 
right note of sincerity to move and convince the people. An Andalucian of 
the kind who doesn’t need to belabor a joke, Saavedra’s oratorical produc-
tions contain jokes [retruécanos], and anecdotes full of fun and originality 
come out spontaneously.”47
Saavedra, then, was the prototypical incarnation of the activist anarchist 
involved in all types of practical experiments implemented to spread “the 
Ideal” in Cuba. One of the most important of these experiments took place 
in the realm of education. The third step in the strategy promoted by those 
who made up the Havana newspaper circle had to do with activities related 
to the education of workers and their families, something that anarchists 
around the Atlantic world considered essential. Spreading the ideology and 
educating the masses for the future social revolution were two complemen-
tary necessities.48 In principle, in the middle of the organizational vortex ini-
tiated after independence, anarchists used the pages of ¡Tierra! to spread a 
discourse that was specifically directed in two ways: first against the educa-
tion provided by the government, since it did not translate, in their eyes, into 
an increase in the schooling of working- class children, and second toward 
awakening the consciousness of those workers who did not take care to edu-
cate their families or themselves. The other face of this discourse centered 
on promoting an educational model that was their own and appropriate to 
the anarchist sensibility. The pedagogical renovation that took place among 
anarchists also had its inspiration in the so- called rationalist schools or mod-
ern schools organized by anarchists in Spain. In Barcelona, the Catalan peda-
gogue Francisco Ferrer i Guardia had organized the first modern school in 
1901, and it spread in short order beyond the borders of Catalonia to other 
Spanish provinces. In 1908 the International League for the Rational Educa-
tion of Children (Liga Internacional para la Educación Racional de la Infan-
cia, or Lieri) was founded in Paris by Ferrer i Guardia and would become a 
fundamental player in the expansion of these centers beyond the borders of 
Spain. With a clear internationalist orientation, the school model intended 
to “introduce into the teaching of children in all countries a practical idea of 
science, freedom, and solidarity.”49
Again ¡Tierra! played a decisive role in the spread of this model in Cuba, 
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as did the larger context of Spanish immigration to the island. Starting in 
1906, the anarchist paper became one of the principal backers of rational-
ist ideas, as well as a center for the promotion and financing of “modern 
schools.” In the same year other Spanish anarchists arrived in Cuba and took 
charge of the effort to give life to the rationalist movement. One of the first 
was Francisco González Sola, the Granadan comrade of Saavedra who had 
achieved fame in Spain for his antimilitarist speeches for which he had to 
go underground and leave the country. A fund- raising drive started the year 
before by workers in the Cuban community of Regla, just outside Havana, 
and publicized in ¡Tierra! helped to pay the costs of his travel.50 Saavedra 
himself played an essential role in the rationalist propaganda effort in Cuba, 
carrying on a job he had already begun in Spain, having participated in the 
founding of secular schools in Andalucía and, in 1905–6, collaborating with 
Ferrer in Barcelona.
In this first stage of spreading propaganda and rationalism in Cuba, the 
Center for Social Studies (Centro de Estudios Sociales), organized in Regla, 
was key. Saavedra belonged to it, as did the Canary Islander Roberto Car-
ballo, helping the center play a decisive role in the development of these 
modern schools. The Cuban Section of Lieri was founded in Regla in 1908, 
and the Valencian Miguel Martínez was elected to represent Cuba in the 
international body. From that point on, the Committee of Directors of the 
Cuban section of the Lieri was made up of Cuban and Spanish anarchists.51 
Martínez had just arrived in the island in 1908, charged by Ferrer i Guardia 
himself with setting up the first rationalist school in Cuba, which was built 
precisely in the Regla Center at the end of that year. The Valencian had also 
been a close collaborator of the Catalan pedagogue in Spain and a teacher 
in a Barcelona modern school, as well as in others that were organized in 
Valencia.52
According to information published in ¡Tierra! the years between 1909 
and 1913 were those of greatest expansion of rationalism in Cuba, especially 
once Ferrer’s trial and execution in late 1909 became known.53 Anarchists or-
ganized some propaganda excursions, led mainly by Saavedra and González 
Sola and promoted by ¡Tierra! At the same time some groups were created 
that had this as their specific objective: the Educación del Porvenir (Educat-
ing the Future) group, for example, founded in Regla in 1908, Cienfuego’s 13 
de Octubre, founded in 1909, Sagua la Grande’s Sociedad Racionalista (1910), 
and Havana’s Agrupación racionalista Ferrer (beginning of 1912). New mod-
ern schools were set up throughout the island. Beyond Havana, where there 
were numerous such schools, others could be found in Manzanillo, Cruces, 
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Matanzas, Sagua la Grande, Pinar del Río, and Cienfuegos. Cuban and 
Spanish anarchists were among the teachers, and in the one founded in the 
Havana barrio of Jesús María, the Colombian couple Juan Francisco and 
Blanca Moncaleano were especially well known.54 ¡Tierra! kept fund- raising 
efforts open to guarantee the maintenance of these centers and insisted that 
everyone participate to keep them going. The paper also supported the travel 
costs of Moncaleano when he embarked in 1912 to revolutionary Mexico on 
a mission to found modern schools there. Despite the efforts to sustain these 
schools, not one of them survived past 1913. Financial difficulties explain the 
majority of closures, although they are also partly explained by the expulsion 
from the island of their main backers, among them Saavedra and Sola,55 and 
the departure of Moncaleano. One final external factor, just as significant, 
was the renewed effort by the Cuban government to bring to life a public and 
secular schools system, whose relative success must have drained followers 
of the anarchist project among the popular sectors.56
The sales figures of ¡Tierra! are surprising, as is the duration of its publication, 
given that one of the very characteristics of the worker press—and the an-
archist press in particular—was its difficulty in sustaining itself. Indeed, the 
rest of Cuba’s anarchist periodicals created in the same era had an ephemeral 
life. The closest in longevity was La Voz del Dependiente and its successor, El 
Dependiente, which lasted from 1907 to 1917. Though these papers, too, had 
an anarcho- syndicalist orientation, it was closer to the model of the worker 
press based on a particular trade and focused on narrowly worker issues 
(both were mouthpieces of the Society of Cooks, Clerks, and Workers of the 
Cafes, Eateries, Restaurants, and Hotels of the Island—the Sociedad de Co-
cineros, Dependientes de Cafés, Fondas, Restaurantes, Hoteles y Obreros 
de la isla) and included announcements and advertisements as its principal 
form of financing.
By contrast, ¡Tierra! devoted itself to giving voice and representation to 
that larger Cuban working- class community, one that came to be made up 
of immigrants. It takes us to questions of identity and political community of 
wider horizons—that is, of the Cuban workers movement in general during 
the first years of the republic and of the relations of the workers of the island 
beyond their immediate environment to an expansive and plastic trans-
national network. We might see that dynamic network, itself in large mea-
sure brought to life as part of a strong Spanish anarchist presence around 
the Atlantic world, as overlapping with another one predominantly linking 
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many areas around the island of Cuba to Spain. The dynamism is no doubt 
related also to the mobility characteristic of the anarchist of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries—a type of political immigration that connected the 
two sides of the Atlantic world. It is also one with a particularly Spanish caste, 
and it forces us to consider how, far from any lineal “Cubanization” of the 
workers movement following independence, or discrete emergence of a U.S.- 
Caribbean anarchist network that reflected the rise of a primordial sphere of 
U.S. imperial hegemony, Cuban working- class politics experienced an im-
portant period of pronounced “Spanification” following independence from 
Spain, one that intensified after 1908.
¡Tierra! not only transcended Cuba’s borders in a way made especially 
visible in the paper’s transnational relations. It also transcended the bor-
ders of anarchism. On more than a few occasions and despite deep ideologi-
cal divisions, the paper fomented collaboration with other leftist tendencies, 
especially socialist ones, in favor of the working- class community and be-
yond to the popular sectors of the island. By spreading an integrationist and 
open spirit, the paper tried to attract the popular sectors independently of 
their social or political condition, offering them a project that transcended 
the frontiers of labor questions and broached all manifestations of everyday 
life. It is also worth stressing the fact that, in this case, anarchists emphasized 
the forging of groups of affinity and of educational centers over other types 
of organizing traditions and focused on families, including women and chil-
dren, in contrast to the typical organizations based on occupation or guild 
traditions that were still known in Cuba and that were oriented more nar-
rowly toward the defense of a guild membership who were generally male.
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Steeds, Cocks, and Guayaberas
The Social Impact of Agrarian Reorganization in the Republic
Imilcy Balboa Navarro
The image of the Cuban campesino that was spread and consolidated 
in the island in the first half of the twentieth century—as much in 
literature as in painting—promoted the stereotype of mounted men 
in white guayaberas who frequented the cockfight.1 But the fact that 
this was the most common image does not make it accurate, for it 
confused the peasant farmer (or campesino) with the colono—the 
latter, as we will see, an extremely elastic social category—and the 
colono with the colonia (the agricultural estate). Because it blurred 
the distinction between large and small colonos, and between land-
owners and renters, the image obfuscated the real social relations 
of the countryside.2 The republic born in 1902 needed new icons, 
and this conflated image was part of the new symbolic repertoire 
constructed by the elites in cahoots with the U.S. intervention au-
thorities. It was convenient to represent the rural sectors in terms 
of a male campesino who was racially white, and who stood midway 
between the rural worker and the industrial sugar mill owners, with 
vestigial elements of the old hacendado. This fantastical hybrid ended 
up being identified with the colono. So the classic image of the Cuban 
campesino was forged, an all- encompassing figure in whom the new 
nation aspired to recognize its rural roots.
Take, for example, Carlos Loveira’s 1922 novel Los ciegos (The 
blind). Introducing the character of Ricardo Calderería, owner of 
the Dos Ríos sugar mill in La Cidra, the author provided a double 
description of the external attributes that defined mill owners and 
colonos and contrasted their appearance. When he appeared in his 
city guise, Calderería was described as
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a Cuban from head to toe insofar as he was always dressed to the nines, 
with a silky- smooth one- hundred- duro Panama hat and very tight- fitting, 
fine yellow ankle boots made to measure (factory- made boots did not 
have a high enough instep to accommodate such aristocratic Creole feet). 
He had a great love of good saddle horses, which during the afternoon 
carnivals allowed him to compete with the “banker” Magriñat himself in 
terms of how beautiful and well groomed his mount was, how luxurious 
his silver tack, and how elegant his stylish Creole riding.3
When he returned to the countryside and assumed the role of colono, that 
same well- dressed rider who rivaled the city’s bankers changed his “white 
civilian clothes for a peasant guayabera shirt, high leather gaiters, and a 
coarse panama hat of Mexican proportions.” His stay in the countryside 
meant “a folding cot, workers’ food, a convict’s chastity, and sylvan intellec-
tual isolation.”4 He was faced with rural workers prepared to demand their 
rights. Ricardo’s “heroic” life on the colonia, marked by “horrendously early 
starts to go to the cane fields,” was punctuated by daily clashes which forced 
him to “battle with laborers who were more demanding and more aware of 
their worth since the revolution had awakened the conscience of the Creole 
population and goaded their dignity.”5
Loveira’s descriptions in 1922, made in the context of a fall in sugar prices 
on the world market the previous year and the bank crash that followed, 
shrouded the agricultural bourgeoisie (the large and medium- sized colonos) 
with the old ways of the hacendados (mill owners) which they yearned for 
and were loath to relinquish. His novel dresses the colonos in the attributes 
of the hacendados of the nineteenth century: their clothing, footwear, visits 
to the property, and so on. These are external attributes that the owners of the 
colonias themselves resisted abandoning precisely because they gave them 
a certain social recognition. It was this agrarian bourgeoisie—colonos dis-
guised as vulnerable farmers—that saw itself as a threatened group during 
the second decade of the republic. The crisis of the “lean years” of the 1920s 
brought underlying class contradictions to the surface and with them a dis-
course in defense of the small- scale farming bourgeoisie whose greatest ex-
ponent was Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, a twentieth- century intellectual who 
laid the foundations for modern Cuban historiography.6
Between May and August 1927, Guerra published a series of articles on the 
large landed estate system in a leading newspaper, Diario de la Marina, and 
these were eventually compiled in a book, Azúcar y población en las Antillas 
(Sugar and population in the Antilles). Guerra contrasted sugar cultivation 
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by the large estate system—the latifundia—with the farming methods of the 
peasant producer, but not just any peasant farmer. He reduced the sector 
to the so- called colonos, the sugarcane farmers, thus confusing what he ar-
gued was the truly national sector of agricultural production with an agrarian 
bourgeoisie associated with growing sugarcane and investing it with the folk-
loric virtues of the campesino. He also added a racial element, insofar as the 
image of the peasant that Guerra defended was that of the white colono. The 
workers and day laborers in the background of his agricultural panorama 
were at best represented as exploited victims in order to attack the latifundia 
system, at worst used to sustain a race- based classification of rural labor that 
excluded Afro- Cubans from the category of colono.
In attempting to explain the changes in agrarian structure as the conse-
quence of the rise of the great estate, Guerra was taking up a debate that had 
begun in previous decades. The agrarian question, especially seen in terms 
of property relations, had acquired a certain protagonism at the beginning 
of the twentieth century with the advent of the republic, when the clari-
fication of types of domination over and ownership of the land had been 
essential in the new economic conjuncture, given the island’s dependent re-
lationship with the United States.7 For the most part agrarian reorganiza-
tion in the republic had been explained by way of study of the latifundia 
and its political and economic consequence, not only on agrarian structure 
but also as an agent of domination.8 Its social effects, according to Guerra, 
were felt primarily by one sector, the colono—or at least the type of colono 
he represented. What is missing in his work is any discussion of the work-
ing and living conditions of peasant farmers and agricultural workers that 
might clarify the social dimensions of the expansion of the latifundia system.
The following pages attempt to provide just such a contextualized exami-
nation by taking a deeper look at the elements that determined the structure 
of agriculture during the initial years of the republic and particularly the ex-
pansion of large estates. We also look at the social consequences of this pro-
cess—the groups that acquired cohesion and those that were finally left out 
and the means of social and labor control. The objective is to understand 
how the colonos came to seek redress for their socioeconomic plight in the 
1920s by joining the ranks of the nationalists—a process in which Guerra’s 
text and discourse played a key role. Doing so will allow us to go beyond a 
body of historical work on the Cuban republic that reduces the problem of 
agrarian social structure—and by extension, of nationality—to the prob-
lem of the colono and to consider the significant role of other social actors, 
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whether owners or not, campesinos or colonos, day laborers or other kinds 
of agricultural workers.9
The Foundations of Agricultural Reorganization:  
Expansion and Control
Colonos emerge on the agrarian stage in the period after the first war of in-
dependence (1868–78) with the beginning of the process leading to the abo-
lition of slavery and the creation of the central (a more industrial sugar mill-
ing process getting product from a much greater extension of land, often 
including many different properties, as opposed to the ingenio, the old sugar 
mill). The rise of the central cemented the separation of the agricultural from 
the industrial phase of production and generated a new social division of 
labor that would play a shaping role in the island’s destiny.10 The colono 
cultivated sugarcane and the mill processed it in return for a share of the 
colono’s harvest. At the outset the colonos might be white campesinos or 
former slaves, though as time wore on they would be understood only as the 
former. The colonato—the colono regime—took on two guises. The first was 
an administrative version, whereby the colono managed the cultivation by 
wage laborers of lands belonging to the sugar mill. The second—the “clas-
sic” form— involved the transfer of land to the colono- grower through a 
rental agreement or through sharecropping.11 What distinguished the colono 
regime above all was the double game between independence and depen-
dence. Colonos were independent, it is true, but at the same time the ma-
jority of them depended on the central. An even more complex situation was 
faced by those who subleased from other landowners and so faced conditions 
of double subordination (both to the mill and to the principal leaseholder).
Independence reinforced these mechanisms. From 1899 onward, the agri-
cultural policies introduced by the U.S. occupation governments endeav-
ored first and foremost to further the agricultural transformation which had 
begun during the previous century.12 The measures adopted benefited not 
only investors from the United States but also the island’s large landowners 
who cooperated with the intervention authorities and acted as their partners 
in government. This last point, which is often ignored, set the interests of 
certain groups against those of others. However, it must not be forgotten that 
prominent figures from national political life also participated in the U.S. 
occupation governments overseen by John R. Brooke (1899) and Leonard 
Wood (1899–1902), and this line of action was continued by the Department 
of Agriculture, controlled by Cubans.13
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The proposals of the authorities and those of the sugar mill owners con-
curred on one issue: continuity.14 Large landowners, grouped together in the 
Círculo de Hacendados, took up the main demands that had already been 
raised during the colonial period with regard to marketing and production, 
ensuring a sufficient supply of labor and making changes to the uses and 
control of the land. To that end, they requested a reduction in restrictions on 
access to the U.S. sugar market, the introduction of an immigration law that 
would guarantee the supply of a labor force, and the removal of obstacles 
that hindered access to landownership.15 The government did not try to alle-
viate existing social inequalities in the countryside by forcing the redistribu-
tion of property, and neither did it introduce efficient regulations in order 
to promote the reconstruction of ruined farms or resolve the problem of the 
lack of credit. However, more efficient mechanisms were put in place to lib-
eralize the land market. Here it is worth highlighting Military Order no. 139 
of May 27, 1901, and Military Order no. 62 of March 5, 1902.16 The first abol-
ished the moratorium on mortgage repayments, thus making it easier to sell 
or transfer estates, while the second (of greater importance) established rules 
for the demarcation, division, and sale of haciendas comuneras, vast areas 
of shared cattle range, mostly in central and eastern Cuba, whose common 
status had, prior to the new edicts, excluded them from the land market.
As a result, large- scale agricultural estates became firmly established. The 
spread of these large estates occurred through the same basic mechanisms 
that had promoted the tendency toward bigger plantations in the latter third 
of the nineteenth century. Property was increasingly concentrated, and less 
efficient producers were eliminated. The supply of sugarcane to the large 
sugar mill was decentralized, with the colono system established as an alter-
native to small sugar properties with their own mills. The means of control-
ling small growers and laborers (immigration, railways, contracts, and wage 
labor) was perfected. From a spatial point of view, two major tendencies 
were clear. The sugar industry resumed its expansion toward the east, and 
political power became concentrated in the region of Las Villas where the 
phenomenon of patronage was strongly felt. The newest element in the sys-
tem was the large injection of capital by U.S. investors that gave it control 
over the sector.17
The majority of the new estates (sevent-five in total), which also had the 
highest total area of island plantations (between 30,000 and 85,000 hect-
ares),18 were set up in the provinces of Oriente and Camagüey, regions where 
elements at the core of the old agricultural structure had survived to the 
greatest extent (haciendas comuneras, crown lands, and state land). These 
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elements were opened to the land market as a result of Military Order no. 62. 
Likewise, investors were favored by the low price of land due to the destruc-
tion caused by the war or, as a result of this, the ruin of many landowners 
who were forced to sell all or part of their estates. All the above reasons were 
conducive to the establishment of large U.S. companies such as United Fruit, 
which owned the Preston and Boston sugar mills; the American Sugar Re-
fining Company, which owned the Cunagua and Jaronú plants; the Cuban 
American Sugar Company, with the Mercedita and Tinguaro sugar mills; 
and the Rionda group, which acquired the Francisco sugar mill.19
The expansion of large estates involved not only controlling the surround-
ing land but also strengthening control over growers and laborers. The sugar 
mill played a major role in the whole production and commercialization 
process. It acted not only as the owner but also as moneylender, purchaser, 
and carrier. For those who worked on land provided by the sugar mill and 
for those who worked their own land, the central imposed contracts that 
determined the surface to be used for growing cane, the amount of land that 
could be used for other crops, the type of seeds to be used, and the method 
for eradicating pests. It also specified the day on which the cane had to be cut 
and reserved the “unlimited” right to inspect the colonias and to construct 
railways or any necessary infrastructure, in addition to having the right to 
take wood, water, and so on. The sugar mill also set the terms of payment, the 
interest to be paid, and any sanctions in case of breach of contract.20
For colonos and tenant farmers it was difficult to avoid these conditions, 
since the railway and the land all around them belonged to the sugar mill. 
In addition, the sugar mill owners ensured their “loyalty” by other means, 
namely, through refacción (usually a short- term loan guaranteed by a portion 
of future harvest) and by threatening to cancel contracts.21 The sugar mill 
advanced the funds required for sowing and prohibited the colonos from re-
questing or accepting loans from third parties without their authorization. 
Any failure to comply with these conditions entitled the company to termi-
nate the contract, and the sugar mills reserved the legal authority to cancel 
or transfer contracts without prior warning. Growing sugarcane in colonias 
involved a relationship of subjugation that left little margin for farmers to 
undertake their own initiatives. The fact that they depended on one source 
of employment (compared with other less lucrative options) placed them in 
a vulnerable position with regard to the demands of the owner.
Wages and immigration were used to ensure that sugar mills had con-
trol over the labor market. With regard to wages, workers were once again 
paid in vouchers or tokens, amid claims that it was “for the good of the 
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day laborer.” This was despite the penalties for such practices introduced by 
Military Order no. 213 of 1900 (a fine of up to five hundred pesos and up to 
six months’ imprisonment) and the fact that La Ley Arteaga (Arteaga Law) of 
June 23, 1909, outlawed the practice.22 Immigration policy was implemented 
in three stages: measures introduced by the U.S. intervention governments; 
changes made to the immigration laws according to the needs of the sugar 
industry, predominantly regarding projects for the introduction of European 
workers; and regulation of the entry of workers from the Antilles. Initially, 
the intervention governments attempted to introduce similar restrictions in 
Cuba to those that had existed in the United States since the 1880s, which 
limited the entry of convicts, lunatics, destitute people, prostitutes, and other 
so- called undesirables. Furthermore, section 3 of Military Order no. 155 pro-
hibited drawing up contracts and making advanced payment for the jour-
ney to Cuba (which had been the usual method used by plantation owners 
to obtain labor during the sugar harvest). The order issued on May 15, 1902, 
shortly before the transfer of power to the republican government of Cuba, 
was a clear attempt by U.S. producers to safeguard their position, concerned 
as they were about competition from Cuban sugar, which could be produced 
using cheap labor, thus reducing costs.23
However, immigration policy was soon adapted to the pressing needs of 
the industry. Just as in the past, the large plantations blamed the situation in 
agricultural areas on the “shortage or lack of men to do farming work” and 
on the fact that workers demanded “exorbitant wages.”24 To solve the prob-
lem, they requested an increase in the number of workers in order to flood 
the market and thus reduce wages. Just one month after the immigration of 
whole families brought in to do agricultural work was authorized by Tomás 
Estrada Palma on July 11, 1906, La Ley de Inmigración, Colonización y Tra-
bajo (Law on Immigration, Colonization, and Labor) was passed. The state 
subsequently provided 1 million pesos (80 percent for families and 20 per-
cent for laborers) to meet the costs of traveling from mainland Spain and the 
Canary Islands, in addition to other European countries (“preferably” Swe-
den, Norway, Denmark, and northern Italy). Immigrants’ applications could 
be endorsed by individuals or companies. Immigrants were authorized to 
disembark in Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, and Santiago de Cuba as well as Havana 
and even in other ports where a large number of applications had been made. 
The plantation owners, aware of the problems faced by their class, adapted 
the laws to fulfill two recurring demands, namely, that the state should meet 
the costs of immigration and that laborers should be allowed to disembark 
closer to the production areas. And although it shared rhetoric with the dis-
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course used to promote family immigration, just as in the past the conditions 
contained in contracts left this type of immigration in the hands of the “plan-
tation owners, landowners, and colonos,” and no program was introduced 
specifically to settle families.25
The Law on Immigration, Colonization, and Labor was followed by a 
series of decrees that extended or specified the conditions under which that 
immigration would occur. In general, however, it can be said that during 
the first decade of the century immigration policy was left in the hands of 
the plantation owners. The justifications put forward, the projects presented 
and above all the fact that plantation owners, bankers, and traders joined 
together in the Asociación para el Fomento de la Inmigración (Association 
for the Promotion of Immigration), created in 1912, clearly showed that their 
aim was to get laborers for agricultural work and mainly for the sugar indus-
try. In 1913, a further step was taken in this direction. In an attempt to solve 
the problem of the “lack of workers,” on January 10 the government of José 
Miguel Gómez signed Decree no. 23, which authorized the importation of 
laborers from the Antilles. Specific instructions were given to comply with 
Military Order no. 155 of 1902, which prohibited immigration under contract 
or the advance payment of travel expenses, in addition to the Law on Immi-
gration, Colonization, and Labor of 1906, which promoted the entrance of 
Spanish and European workers. The plantation owners were granted free-
dom to bring the laborers they so desperately needed for the sugar harvest 
in exchange for defraying the costs of immigration and freeing the state from 
having to meet this expense.26 In 1913, sugar production already exceeded 2.5 
million tons. The volume of the island’s sugarcane harvest had grown con-
stantly since the beginning of the century, above all after el Tratado de Reci-
procidad Comercial (Treaty of Commercial Reciprocity) was signed in 1902. 
The island provided over half the raw material needed by U.S. sugar mills, 
which made Cuba their main supplier.27
Together with immigration, the bateyes (company towns that grew up 
around the sugar mills) and repression played a role in perfecting the con-
trol mechanisms. The sugar mills turned the bateyes into veritable satellite 
towns that combined privileges (accommodation, wages, electricity, and 
water) with coercion (the threat of expulsion, security guards, and Rural 
Guard posts). The highest- ranking administrators were provided with free 
accommodation or very low rent. The brick or stone houses with tiled roofs, 
which generally had bathrooms and toilets, were occupied by the supervisors 
and elite employees. Mid- level workers lived with their families in wooden 
houses which were nevertheless spacious and had tiled roofs. Day laborers 
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continued to live in bunkhouses divided into small rooms with a door but 
no windows.28
Even when the shops and services set up in the bateyes were nominally 
independent (typically including grocery stores, drugstores, tailors, barbers, 
and laundries), payment in vouchers or tokens limited workers’ ability to 
pay for the services. At the same time, a system of private repression was 
introduced that used security guards (operating under license from the sec-
retary of the interior) who could make arrests and turn over detainees to the 
courts. There was also the Rural Guard, which was created in 1899 and whose 
aim, just like other institutions of this type, was to defend property.29 Neither 
must we forget the political clientele and hierarchies cemented, which origi-
nated during the war due to the chain of command or for affective reasons 
and were transferred to economic areas after the end of the war.30
Expansion and Crisis: Triple Control over  
Land, Cultivators, and Day Laborers
The model presented here became even more firmly established as a result of 
international events. The First World War and the destruction of beet sugar 
fields in Europe increased the demand for cane sugar. As a result, prices shot 
up and the cane sugar industry increased production. The earnings gener-
ated marked the beginning of the period known as La Danza de los Millones 
(dance of the millions), in other words, the boom years. As had been the case 
with the sugar boom in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
the sugar industry was prepared to take the next step. It had land and a well- 
controlled labor market. Industry leaders also had access to legislative and 
executive influence beyond what they had during the previous century when 
Cuba was a colony. The new government understood the problems of the 
agrarian bourgeoisie and acted accordingly. Just as the revolution in Haiti 
had provided the island of Cuba with the opportunity to become the world’s 
largest sugar producer, now the war in Europe provided a boost in the same 
direction, and the island became once again the world’s leading producer.
The urgent need to fulfill the needs of a market that offered huge, quick 
profits gave rise to a new phase of expansion. Once again, it was carried out 
via the same dynamic: greater concentration of land, the making available 
of more land through juridical reform and sale of public land, and the ex-
pansion of the rail network. North American investment increased in order 
to fund the whole project: not only to finance the sugar mills, but also to 
purchase land and build private railways.31 During these years, over forty 
sugar mills were built and fields of sugarcane spread across the island until 
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they took over the landscape. Loveira referred to the time as the “period of 
national diabetes,” with a rapid increase in the number of sugar mills and 
colonias that “invaded and swept away everything in their wake— woodland, 
groves of fruit trees, fields of livestock and crops, even the outskirts and 
streets of rural villages—all for the maddening illusion of 23 cents per pound 
of sugar.”32
The provinces of Camagüey and Oriente continued to lead the expansion. 
This was no accident, given that both provinces still had a high proportion of 
unused land. There was no longer any crown land, that is true, but there were 
still forests, which were considered public land during the colony and were 
later inherited by the state and local administrations. At the beginning of the 
First World War, the two provinces accounted for 35 percent of the island’s 
total sugar production, yet by 1929 the figure had increased to 60 percent.33 
To meet the market demand, gigantic estates were built with enormous new 
sugar mills that incorporated the latest technology in order to increase pro-
duction capacity. In addition, private railways were built to guarantee the 
supply of sugarcane. This private rail network had over nine thousand kilo-
meters of track, double the amount available for public use.34
Modern innovations bound the colono even tighter to the sugar mill. 
Stiffening the control mechanisms did not lead to a drop in the number of 
colonos. In fact, it would appear that their total number doubled during the 
first decades of the twentieth century. In 1899, there were some 15,000 colo-
nos whereas by 1914 the figure had risen to over 37,000.35 The sugar mills did 
not aim to eliminate the colonos, but rather to incorporate them into the 
latifundia system, thus reducing the colonos’ negotiating power and limiting 
their freedom of choice. Control of the land was consonant with extensive 
agriculture and allowed the sugar mill to impose its conditions and offer low 
prices for the cane. Contracts became “legal fiction,” which explains why they 
were preferred to sugarcane grown by the sugar mills themselves. The fact 
that it became commonplace to offer to pay a surcharge to obtain a tenancy 
agreement indicated that it was increasingly difficult to gain access to land. 
Ramiro Guerra reported that the tenants of small and medium- sized rural 
farms were unable to cover costs due to high rents and high rates of inter-
est on refacción loans. He concluded that “the latifundia system is gradually 
strangling independent farmers, ruining and impoverishing them, lowering 
their standard of living, and creating conditions in which it is impossible for 
them to survive.”36
Meanwhile, the working and living conditions of agricultural laborers be-
came increasingly hard. These sectors “had to make the same effort as before 
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the checks with strings of zeros and the sacks of sugar pawned for hundreds 
of thousands began swirling around them.” Laborers still worked between 
ten and twelve hours per day and many sugar mills still paid wages in vouch-
ers and tokens.37 Neither did the profits have any effect on immigrants from 
the Antilles, except for the fact that their numbers increased. On August 3, 
1917, a new law was enacted that extended the inflow of foreign “laborers and 
workers” for two more years.38 It was no coincidence that the president of 
the republic at this time, Mario García Menocal, was among the founders of 
the Chaparra sugar mill and that during his years in the government he was 
one of the directors of the Cuban American Sugar Company. García Meno-
cal combined political power with an understanding of the needs of his class, 
and during his eight years in power more than 81,000 Jamaicans and 190,000 
Haitians entered the island.39 This benefited the island’s producers, who had 
a larger number of workers at their disposal whose condition as people of 
color, speaking a language other than Spanish, and with limited knowledge 
of the country and its laws made them more vulnerable and easier to oppress. 
It also benefited those U.S. officials who were with the occupation authority 
in Haiti from 1915 to 1934 and who acted as agents for the recruitment of 
workers.40
Sugar production doubled between 1914 and 1919 and sugar prices 
reached almost five cents per pound.41 The island’s wealth and prosperity 
were directly proportional to the sugar harvest. The model was functioning 
successfully, so why question the latifundia system, the aspiration and source 
of such prosperity? But the crisis was not long in coming. During the 1920s, 
the sugar industry had to contend with a period of prolonged instability. The 
recovery and increase in production exceeded the market possibilities, and 
prices began to fall. The situation was heightened by the world economic 
crisis beginning in 1929, and it did not improve (and then only temporarily 
and in line with the interests of the major producers) until 1934, when a new 
commercial agreement was signed with the United States that established a 
system of quotas and the reduction of tariffs.42 In the farming sector the crisis 
brought about changes in the latifundia model that led to a higher degree of 
perfection (if such a term may be used) by further streamlining the intrinsic 
elements—again, the trio of land concentration, increase of available land, 
and worker controls—that had originated at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury and become firmly established during the early twentieth.
Just as the war of 1895 had acted as a catalyst for the elimination of less 
efficient units, the financial crisis of 1921 eliminated the weaker units and 
acted as a natural selection mechanism. This had a double effect insofar as 
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each year it led to a decrease in the number of sugar mills while strength-
ening the overall latifundia system. The large estates tended to increase the 
number of hectares they had under production. Having large areas of land 
allowed the companies not only to control several colonos but also to with-
hold a considerable amount of land. This constituted a “reserve” in case 
other land was overused or expansion was required. As in the past, control 
of the factors of production played a key role, and as a result, in addition to 
increasing the amount of land under their aegis, they continued their policy 
of controlling the workforce.
There was a decrease in the number of independent colonos, those who 
owned their own land. At the beginning of the century, the land owned by 
independents made up 36 percent of the total land under sugarcane cultiva-
tion, whereas by 1930 this figure had dropped to 16 percent, and in 1933 such 
land barely represented 10 percent. Meanwhile, the number of colonias con-
trolled by sugar mills increased from 33 to 63 percent in the earlier period 
and reached 64 percent in 1933.43 It is precisely at this point that the voice 
of Guerra and the other defenders of the “colono” made themselves heard.
With regard to immigration, it is worth highlighting that during this 
period the laws that were enacted not only provided sugar mills with labor 
reinforcements but also enabled them to control any unruly workers. When 
the labor market was saturated as a result of the crisis, noneconomic reasons 
were used to justify the limitations placed on immigration. Thus in 1921, De-
cree no. 1,404 attempted to force the repatriation of Haitians and Jamaicans. 
The decree, signed on July 20 during a lull in sectoral activity, acknowledged 
that immigrant workers from Haiti and Santo Domingo had been “positive 
for the development of our sugar industry during the period of exceptional 
growth.” However, the drop in production meant that so many cutters were 
no longer required. So, although nominally the suppression was due to the 
“current adverse conditions,” it disguised the prohibition of immigration fol-
lowing the so- called threat to the nation’s health.44 However, the interests of 
one group of landowners (above all, the big estates of Camagüey and Ori-
ente) blocked the implementation of the decree. In fact, the entry of workers 
from the Antilles continued during the 1920s, although Decree no. 1,158 of 
June 17, 1921, which regulated the arrival of workers at ports in Santiago de 
Cuba, Manzanillo, Antilla, Nuevitas, and Puerto Padre, did come into effect. 
The repatriation of workers once milling had finished did not affect the large 
mills, and they actually benefited from the fact that workers were made to 
leave when work was scarce.45
The immigration laws must also be seen as a response to the increase 
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in worker protests that periodically shook the country between 1917 and 
1924. Above all, during the governments of García Menocal and Gerardo 
Machado, attempts were made to associate immigration with the increase 
in social unrest. García Menocal ordered the expulsion of “evil foreigners,” 
who were none other than labor leaders who were mainly Spanish anarchists. 
Machado’s policies were aimed at workers who carried out attacks using ex-
plosives; spread subversive propaganda; advocated the destruction of prop-
erty, anarchy, and the overthrow of the state; and urged workers to carry out 
similar attacks.46 To close the circle even more, one year later on August 21, 
Decree no. 1,331 was issued, obliging the sugar mills’ security guards to pro-
vide the secretary of the interior with all the information they could gather 
on propaganda distributed by anarchists, communists, and any other “labor 
agitators.” In addition, the sugar mills used detachments of the Rural Guard 
to keep the peace.47 The custom of paying workers in vouchers or tokens, 
which had been banned since 1909 but which was still common practice, was 
legally sanctioned on December 6, 1929. The report issued by the Foreign 
Policy Association in 1934 acknowledged that the grocery stores had become 
a means of exploiting workers on two fronts, since the majority of workers 
were paid in vouchers that could only be exchanged in these stores, and they 
charged high prices for the products.48
A Nation Tailor- Made for Colonos
The most direct attack on the latifundia system at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century was led by Manuel Sanguily, who focused his denunciation 
on the foreign- owned portion. Sanguily, who felt that those who owned the 
land also owned the country, was alarmed by the growing number of for-
eigners who “are spreading around the island with the intention of taking 
ownership over the land.” He tabled a law in the Senate in March 1903 that 
would prohibit sale of land to foreigners, but it failed to win approval. One 
month earlier Emilio Arteaga, the representative for Camagüey (one of the 
provinces most affected by the phenomenon), proposed a similar law and 
also saw it defeated.49 In his 1929 book, Latifundia and the Cuban Economy, 
Raúl Maestri emphasized the debate over large property holdings and its 
effects on the island. The work analyzed the latifundia system in its dual 
aspect, both economic and sociopolitical. He defended the benefits of large- 
scale sugar production, noting that medium- sized and small properties were 
“anti- economic” because they brought with them “a paralyzing social caste.” 
For Maestri the small and medium- sized owners impeded the introduction 
of technical advances and production gains because their principal con-
Steeds, Cocks, and Guayaberas | 221
cern was simply to maintain their slice of land and “settle into a routine and 
humble existence that, due to deep- rooted inclination, resist any alteration 
or change even when they are inspired by the fairest concepts of equity.”50 
He nevertheless criticized the latifundio as a factor in the island’s depen-
dence on the United States and blamed it for the structural deformation of 
the Cuban economy.
For the creole elite that assumed power in 1902 the republican ideal re-
produced certain postulates that they had favored in the previous century, 
ones directed at creating a country with a majority white population that was 
synonymous with order, civilization, and progress. These intentions were re-
inforced by concepts that were held, in similar ways, by the U.S. interven-
tion government. The U.S. authorities brought with them a series of rigorous 
racial distinctions and negative stereotypes that transcribed the island ac-
cording to their obsession for whiteness and a clear separation of races.51 In 
this way, during the first years of the republic, nationalist ideologues found a 
favorable context in which to elaborate their archetypical colono.
The consequences of the sugar crisis and the reorganization of farming 
properties following the financial crash reopened the debate regarding large- 
scale properties and their effects on the island. Guerra and other such ideo-
logues, in defending the colonos, attacked not the Cuban and Spanish ha-
cendados but rather the Afro- Antillean laborers (in this sense their thinking 
was not so far from nineteenth- century reformers like José Antonio Saco 
or Ramón de la Sagra, who despite their differences agreed that the island 
needed to be whitened). They labeled Antillean immigration “undesirable,” 
pointed to Military Decree no. 155, signed by Wood in 1902, as a “sage piece 
of preventive legislation,” and ended up demonizing the latifundio because it 
relied on the “importing of low- priced labor.”52 Nowhere is this clearer than 
in Guerra’s identification, in Azúcar y población en las Antillas, of an “iniq-
uity that affronts heavenly and human justice”: the fact that “while in the 
countryside millions and millions of tons of sugarcane planted by natives are 
left in the ground, unable to be milled due to limits on the harvest, Antillean 
workers are imported to perform labor required to cut a large portion of the 
cane that is milled in certain sugar mills.”53
In short, the author supported a nationalistic policy. The sugar problem, 
he felt, was viewed from above and with no regard for the colonos. As a re-
sult of the 1926 policy that restricted the sugarcane harvest, the colonos’ 
“freedom” to grind their sugarcane in the mill of their choice was practically 
eliminated. Even so, ever since the nineteenth century this had been relative, 
since it depended on how close the sugar mill was and the means of commu-
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nication. On this occasion it was not entirely due to the latifundia system. 
The state itself sealed the demise of this option with the decree of February 
28, 1931, which obliged colonos to grind their cane in the same sugar mill as 
they had the previous year. At the same time, sugar mills ensured that recog-
nition was given to the “normal sugarcane zone,” which assigned the nearby 
growers to them in advance. Perhaps this measure, even without intending 
to, worked in favor of the survival (albeit with limitations) of the figure of the 
colono in opposition to the option of company- grown cane.
It is important to mention another factor here that is generally ignored, 
namely, Ramiro Guerra’s participation in Machado’s government as presi-
dential secretary (1932) and general school supervisor. Perhaps for that rea-
son he trod gently and refused to criticize the state interventionism that char-
acterized the period, while defending the policy of reducing the sugarcane 
harvest. In the epilogue to his book, he made a point of defending Machado’s 
economic policy and stated that subsequent governments did not bring about 
significant changes. Inaccuracy or oversight? During Grau San Martín’s 
period in office, sugar mills were required to purchase at least 20 percent 
of their cane from colonos. And for the 1935 sugarcane harvest, the Caffery- 
Batista- Mendieta government raised the figure to 30 percent. Furthermore, 
Grau’s government introduced one of the main measures of the period af-
fecting colonos. Decree no. 16 of January 2, 1934, led to the creation of the 
Asociación de Colonos de Cuba, which included everyone involved in the 
sugar industry: owners, colonos, tenant farmers, subtenants, and sharecrop-
pers. It also included those working under “any other temporary agreement,” 
and even so, its membership barely exceeded forty thousand.
Guerra’s analysis omitted three important factors determining the social 
dynamic in the sugar sector. First, there was the connection between the 
growing social instability and the workers’ response, in addition to the in-
corporation of workers from Haiti and Jamaica to the sector’s struggles dur-
ing the period. Second, there was the response of the middle classes, who in-
vested their political energies in educational and sanitary programs. Finally, 
there were the measures adopted by the state, which resumed the expul-
sion of “evil foreigners” and the repatriation of immigrants from the An-
tilles once the sugar harvest had ended. It must also be pointed out that the 
wage strategy applied by the owners constituted an instrument used to con-
trol the labor market that made no distinction between nationalities. In any 
case, immigrant workers from the Antilles who spoke a different language 
and who were unprotected by the law were more likely to be cheated when 
it came to negotiating or receiving payment for their work.54 Neither should 
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it be forgotten that in 1929, payment in vouchers or tokens was against the 
law and a punishable offense. On the other hand, the wealthier colonos who 
used workers from Haiti and Jamaica to cut their sugarcane were exonerated, 
since (according to Guerra) they were forced into this situation by the con-
tracts imposed by the latifundia system. It is therefore worth asking if the 
theory of low salaries did not apply to them.
Precisely which colonos was Guerra defending? There were perhaps not 
so many of them, but they were not without influence at different levels of 
national political life. For example, on historian Jorge Ibarra’s list of forty 
plantation owners or large- scale colonos who became politicians during the 
first two decades of the century, twenty- one were colonos, six were sugar mill 
owners or co- owners, and ten were administrators, shareholders, and law-
yers (the others were a plantation owner, a cattle farmer, and another in the 
business of importing and exporting sugar). Moreover, those classed as colo-
nos produced between 500,000 and 35 million arrobas of sugar (between 5.75 
million and 402 million kilos), which situated them among the major pro-
ducers. Within this group there were twelve congressmen and two senators, 
while the others held the office of mayor in various towns. A further reveal-
ing element was that many of them had a past associated with the indepen-
dence movement and not exactly as foot soldiers. Ibarra registered ninety-
six officers in the Ejército Libertador (Liberating Army) linked to the sugar 
industry: large- scale colonos (seventy-seven), owners, sugar mill co- owners 
or shareholders (ten), managers (seven), and chairmen of sugar companies 
(two). Among these there were five generals, four brigadier generals, four 
major generals, one lieutenant general, twenty colonels, twenty lieutenant 
colonels, eleven commanders, twelve captains, six lieutenants, four second 
lieutenants, and one sergeant.55
The interests of the sugar industry also reached as far as the president. 
General José Miguel Gómez was the owner of the La Vega and Algodones 
sugar mills. Major General Mario García Menocal was the administrator and 
an important colono of the Chaparra sugar mill, owner of the Palma sugar 
mill, and co- owner of the Pilar sugar mill. (All the family were involved in the 
business, and family members had shares in Menocal’s sugar mills, appeared 
as colonos connected with other sugar mills, and held positions as senators 
and congressmen.) Brigadier General Gerardo Machado was the owner of 
the Carmita sugar mill together with his brother Carlos. And Colonel Carlos 
Mendieta, who served as president of the republic in 1934, was a colono of 
the Cunagua sugar mill. The group of officers from the Ejército Libertador 
who became colonos were not in the majority, but they were representative, 
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and they did have influence. These “colonos- libertadores” had close links 
with power and the possibility of passing legislation in the interest of this 
sector. Why, then, did they not do so?
According to figures from 1940, between 500,000 and 1 million arrobas 
of sugar (approximately 5.75 million and 11.5 million kilos, respectively) 
were produced by only 21 percent of the colonos. This percentage dropped 
to minimal levels (barely 1.5 percent) for production over and above this 
figure.56 These large- scale colonos considered themselves to be plantation 
owners, given their past and their proximity to power. Throughout the twen-
tieth century, it can be seen how landowners and colonos joined forces in 
farming associations, which is paradoxical given the apparent differences in 
interests. The colonos with the greatest resources took over the leadership of 
the associations (acting paternalistically in some cases but resorting to tyran-
nical methods in most cases) and eventually represented the entire sector. 
However, they did so only in the interest of large- scale producers.
This group used the same methods of labor exploitation and control as 
those used by the large estates. Cuco, the main character in Loveira’s novel 
Los ciegos, is surprised to discover the cane cutters working in the neighbor-
ing colonia living in “a large shack of the type referred to as sticks in the earth, 
with six, eight, and up to ten filthy, discolored hammocks hanging from the 
supports.” Outside the shack, near one of its corners, “two large, blackened 
iron caldrons boiled on large cooking stoves made using three stones.” He 
concludes by intoning, “Poor people! How they live! Imagine having to en-
dure six months of this life on a sugar plantation in one of these shacks, in 
such isolation, eating what they eat!”57
To return to our point of departure, the widespread images used to por-
tray the campesino during those years—a white guayabera shirt, horses, 
cockerels—did not match the reality of the peasant farmer at all. The 1934 re-
port of the Foreign Policy Association made a distinction between the living 
conditions of the colonos who lived on their land and the conditions of those 
who held other administrative positions such as foremen and field inspec-
tors, who enjoyed better conditions. It later acknowledged that “those well- 
dressed horsemen who ride along the roads on Sundays and holidays on 
their way to cockfights and other forms of entertainment come from these 
classes; they are also the source of social trends which take the sons and 
daughters of these families to the batey or to the village in search of jobs 
which provide greater social prestige.”58
The peasant in an immaculate guayabera shirt was an invention of the 
rural middle classes, who reinvented themselves by establishing a link be-
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tween the land and the style of the plantation owners. It was an invention of 
great significance. Despite his poverty, Liborio, the caricatured figure who 
represented the Cuban peasant par excellence, continued to wear his white 
guayabera shirt, even if it was threadbare.59 Guerra and the nation’s ideolo-
gists used the concept of the colono in a self- serving and confusing way. They 
associated the colono with farming colonias without making any distinction 
between large and small producers or between landowners and tenants. They 
did not make any distinction because it was not in their interests to speak of 
a farming bourgeoisie, and they ended up hiding away a whole social class. 
It was not so much a nation of whites as a nation of white middle classes, of 
white landowners who had existed during the two decades of the republic de-
spite the spread of North American capital. However, during the lean years 
they saw that their survival in agriculture was in danger more than ever be-
fore, hence their reaction and defense of the agricultural colonia and the 
colono system that proved effective while they managed to join forces with 
the large Cuban growers who dominated political office. It was a discourse 
that also benefited them politically. In the so- called republic of generals and 
doctors, the agricultural leaders were the large landowners and the voters 
were the owners of small farms.60
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Rotary Clubs and Regional Civic Power in Cuba, 1916–1940
Maikel Fariñas Borrego
Most studies of sociability in Cuba have focused on migratory pro-
cesses and the transformation into lo cubano of various modes of 
associating, primarily those rooted in Spanish, Chinese, and African 
traditions. Generally, they converge along an axis of common themes 
that tackle various specific models of association, including mutual-
ism, religious brotherhoods, unions, and trade organizations, and 
with a thematic emphasis on the popular sectors, charity, musical 
groups, and the development of the sciences.1 Strategies and forms 
of sociability inherited from contact with U.S. and British cultures 
have received very little attention, though they had notable influence 
in the country’s political and economic spheres, especially those that 
sprang up in Cuba after the founding of the republic in 1902.2 In an 
effort to address this imbalance, the following chapter provides an 
overview of the appearance and operations of Rotary clubs in Cuba 
in order to discern the multiplicity of positions taken by the “regional 
bourgeoisie.” I try to get away from a historiographical trend that 
understands the bourgeoisie as a unified and homogeneous group 
and, in the most extreme cases, identifies their interests with that of 
powerful groups in Havana.
Studying Rotary clubs makes it possible to demonstrate how vari-
ous associations, acting at a local level, held a particular sway that 
was of major importance for regional life in Cuba. The work of these 
associations went far beyond the mere social and organizational into 
the very political, economic, and symbolic universes of the locales in 
which they were established. Intriguingly, analysis of organizations 
like Rotary provide evidence of occasions when regional groups fo-
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cused their power within civil society in order to modify laws or policies 
imposed by the central state or to launch, from their remote position, alter-
native destinies for the nation as a whole. Rotary clubs, in short, offer a nice 
way to de- center Cuban history and study regional power and civil society, 
but their character as part of a national and international network helps to 
avoid falling into the insularism that often limits the scope of local history.
Social groups that act upon and influence public opinion are usually iden-
tified as interest groups. Whether they are ephemeral forms of social coali-
tion or well- structured organizations, a study of their actions allows for the 
identification of an important dimension of the social history of politics. 
Our study sets out to analyze forms of civic power in a republic that was ex-
tremely centralized in an effort to arrive at a far more pluralized vision of 
the acting interests and struggles within the country. At the same time, these 
regional civic actions also transcended national boundaries. In the very same 
way that power and counter- power, action and resistance, contestation and 
negotiation intersect within national politics, these dynamics are also in play 
at the international level—in this case in the relations between Cuba and 
the United States. In studying Rotary, we will also be able to appreciate the 
process by which certain strategies of domination employed by the United 
States were subverted with the same tools conceived for the purpose of this 
subjugation.
The Arrival and Diffusion of Rotarismo in Cuba
Even if abundant manifestations of sociability already existed in Cuba, the 
law of associations (instituted by royal decree on June 13, 1888) considerably 
expanded the creation and growth of new societies. A great majority of these 
associations were inherited from a Spanish cultural tradition that fostered 
cultural centers like secondary schools and intellectual societies (ateneos), 
social clubs (casinos), regional centers, and mutualist and charitable orga-
nizations. However, the increasing cultural proximity of the United States 
began to provoke the creation of other types of associations within Cuba. 
Very little is known about the gradual predominance of certain organiza-
tional forms such as the club, a phenomenon that began to appear at the end 
of the nineteenth century and accelerated at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, most notably in the activities and level of social interaction of elites 
in the capital organized by such entities as the Unión Club de La Habana 
(1880), the Habana Yacht Club (1886), the American Club (1901), the Vedado 
Tennis Club (1902), the Young Men’s Christian Association (1905), the Club 
Atlético de Cuba (1909), the Círculo Militar y Naval (1911), the Country Club 
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de la Habana (1912), the Lawn Tennis Club (1913), the Club Rotario de La 
Habana (1916), the Club Atenas (1917), the Miramar Yacht Club (1926), the 
Club de Leones de La Habana (1927), the Havana Biltmore Yacht & Country 
Club (1927), and the Lyceum (1928). To this we can certainly add forms of 
informal sociability also adopted from the United States, such as the bridge 
party or baby shower, which were all the rage among the elite of this period.3 
Over the years, the modes and manners of the elite in Cuba increasingly 
seduced important sectors of the middle class; they were even appropriated 
and reinterpreted by popular culture and transformed in a variety of ways.4 
Research on these forms of associations is scarce, with the exception of free-
masonry, the only form of sociability originating from Britain or the United 
States that has captured the interest of a significant number of researchers.5
The rapid spread of Rotary clubs throughout the world after the founda-
tion of the first club in February 1905 under the guiding principles of Paul 
Harris has been practically ignored by historians. By 1910 fourteen clubs had 
been founded in the United States, and the celebration of the first Rotary 
convention took place in Chicago in August of that same year, resulting in 
the creation of the National Association of Rotary Clubs, headed by Harris. 
The following year, at the Portland convention, the characteristic slogan, “He 
profits most who serves best,” was adopted and preparations were made for 
the publication of the monthly Rotarian.6 By this time, the first club outside 
the United States had already been founded in the Canadian city of Winni-
peg. In subsequent years, the movement toward establishing associations 
expanded and increasingly claimed considerable international force; within 
ten years, organizations had been established throughout Europe, Latin 
America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania.7
Rotary clubs assumed different characteristics in each country, and al-
though they established specific organizational objectives meant to cater to 
the club’s development in each nation, they nonetheless outlined their pro-
posals as an international entity. With the appearance of the first clubs out-
side the United States, it became necessary by 1912 to restructure the Na-
tional Association of Rotary Clubs, and in 1912 the International Association 
of Rotary Clubs was created.8 In 1922, at a convention in Los Angeles, the 
statute was revised and the denomination Rotary International (ri) was 
adopted, a name that still identifies the organization today.9
Generally, Rotary clubs were established in the capital or principal city of 
a province or region and spread. In Rotarians’ incursions into other cities, 
whether it was within the same country or in other new territories, the same 
commercial networks already developed by businessmen were used. These 
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businessmen became commissioners for the organization. Needless to say, 
the different organizational dynamics and the idiosyncrasies of each country 
resulted in considerable differences among associations established interna-
tionally, even if they were governed by the same institutional norms. In fact, 
the Rotarian Juan Marinello, speaking on the issue of transferring cultural 
expression from one nation to another, remarked:
Every institution, fellow Rotarians, although having by their very nature 
a universal character, adapt themselves to the demands of each coun-
try, and each one comes to adopt its own features. This is certainly not a 
new argument. It is simply a fact that a Catholic priest from the U.S. has 
much more in common with a Protestant priest from the same country 
than with a Catholic priest from Spain. This being a universal law, Rotary 
clubs have been no exception to it and, furthermore, no one can deny that 
Rotary clubs in the Republic [of Cuba] work with a certain originality. If 
compared to other countries, our clubs have dedicated themselves with a 
special focus to political action with a heightened nationalist conscious-
ness. This state—sad as it is to say, though a great deal sadder to keep it 
quiet through cowardice—has provoked our disorderly public adminis-
tration. Our wine—as Martí would say—may be sour, but it is our wine. 
It is necessary that our Clubs persist with this sublime attitude, which is 
the most beneficial and necessary thing for us.10
The statement reveals the process of adaptation to new cultural elements, as 
well as an awareness of the protagonists of this process. At the same time, 
it unveils without hesitation a preferred arena of work for Rotary clubs in 
Cuba: intervention in national politics.
Rotarians first arrived in Cuba from the Rotary Club of Tampa, Florida, 
which sought to establish the first association of its kind in a non- English- 
speaking country. The initial efforts to organize the Rotary Club in Havana 
began in 1914 under Ernest Berger, a member of the Florida club. Following 
his first visit to the country, the businessman returned in 1916 with his asso-
ciates Ángel Cuesta and John Turner. On April 26, 1916, Berger, Cuesta, and 
Turner succeeded in establishing a Rotary chapter in Cuba, making it the 
fifth country worldwide to have hosted Rotary.11 Although concrete informa-
tion is lacking, we can assume that commissioners were sent to Santiago de 
Cuba and Matanzas and, as a consequence, in the summer of 1918 clubs were 
founded in both these cities. From these three founding points, clubs spread 
the length and breadth of Cuba.
This proliferation across the nation permitted the structuring of a solid 
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network that allowed for the development of each club’s proposals with 
greater facility. By 1939–40, for example, there were bases in each of the 
country’s six provinces: twelve clubs in Oriente, seven in Camagüey, seven 
in Las Villas, four in Matanzas, seven in Havana, and two in Pinar del Río. 
To date, it has been impossible to identify a pattern for the establishment 
of clubs throughout the country beyond a logical administrative- political 
hierarchy. What remains clear is that clubs spread from the capital to the re-
spective hub of each province and, from there, to each of the municipalities.
Characterizing the Members
It is well known that Rotary developed a system of classification for its mem-
bers that became increasingly detailed. As a rule, members had to be estab-
lished in business or in an independent profession. Departing from this 
latter condition, an influential individual could be nominated as a member 
Table 8.1
Founding of Rotary Clubs in Cuban Cities, by Year
year City
1916 Havana
1918 Santiago de Cuba, Matanzas
1919 Guantánamo, Sagua la Grande, Cienfuegos
1921 Sancti Spíritus, Trinidad, Camagüey, Caibarién
1923 Santa Clara
1924 Cárdenas
1925 Morón, Ciego de Ávila, Colón, Güines, Manzanillo, and Pinar del Río
1927 Holguín
1928 Santa Cruz del Sur
1931 Bayamo
1934 San Antonio de los Baños, Antilla, and Florida
1935 Placetas, Nuevitas, Victoria de las Tunas, Artemisa, Palma Soriano, 
Puerto Padre, Jovellanos, Banes, and Yaguajay
1936 Mayarí, Pina, Gibara, Marianao, and Santiago de las Vegas
1937 Jiguaní
1938 Regla y Guanabacoa
Source: René Acevedo Laborde, Manual Rotario, Rotary International, Conferencia 
del Distrito 25 . . . , Rotary International. District 25: Memoria del año oficial . . . , 39.
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if supported by two already existing members. It was necessary to determine 
the business that best represented the community in order to attempt to en-
list the owner or representative of the company into the local club.12 Among 
aspiring Rotarians in a city, the most prominent individuals were always pre-
ferred, though the lists of members include a great many individuals who 
had very low social profiles.13 Nevertheless, membership included some very 
well-known actors in Cuban history: Eduardo Justo Chibás Guerra (civil 
engineer, father of Eddie Chibás, one of the presidents of the Partido del 
Pueblo Cubano, Orthodox); Juan Marinello Vidaurreta (a leading writer who 
became president of the Partido Socialista Popular and would occupy im-
portant political posts after 1959); Gerardo Machado y Morales (leader of 
the Partido Liberal, elected as president of the republic in 1925), Carlos de 
la Torre y de la Huerta (distinguished researcher and university professor 
in natural sciences and zoology), Conrado W. Massaguer (recognized cari-
cature artist and director of the journal Social), Aquilino Entrialgo Bolado 
(owner of the most important department store in the country), Andrés A. 
Terry Gutiérrez, Julio Blanco Herrera Clavería, and Juan Sabatés Pérez (three 
important capitalists and industrialists), and Enrique Godoy Sayán and Juan 
Gelats Botet (two prominent personalities in the world of finance).14
To examine the social character of Rotary clubs in various Cuban cities, I 
will examine three—those of Pinar del Río, Camagüey, and Havana. At the 
founding meeting of the Rotary Club of Pinar del Río in 1925, a classifica-
tion system that determined its initial composition of twenty- one members 
was immediately established.15 The following professional categories were 
approved for the members of this new club: lighting merchant, hotel owner, 
farmer, agronomist, financier, proprietor, professor, civil engineer, banker, 
tobacco harvester, bacteriologist, farmer, accountant, surgeon, theater pro-
ducer, journalist, lawyer, general practitioner, dental surgeon, attorney, and 
private school teacher.16 Nine professionals appear on this list, including four 
physicians. To these were added three financiers and three agriculturalists, 
only one of them explicitly identified with tobacco, the province’s most im-
portant crop. There are three individuals that appear on the list dedicated to 
the provision of services: a hotel manager, a theater producer, and a lighting 
merchant. We also only see one proprietor, without further clarification on 
his position. Finally, the list includes an attorney and a representative for pri-
vate schools who is revealed to be a clergyman.
The Rotary Club of Camagüey numbered fifty- one members in 1939 and 
only had three men representing the ranching and agricultural sector (a 
rancher, a sugar farmer, and a coffee roaster). Financiers were a little better 
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represented (there were four), two of them specializing in insurance. A dozen 
professionals were included in the ranks of this club, and half of them were 
either physicians or involved in the medical sciences. The largest subgroup, 
numbering fifteen people, was composed of medium- sized and small manu-
facturers, most of them focused on food production. Businessmen formed 
the third largest subgroup with eight representatives; five of these members 
provided the community with services including light and power, railways, 
streetcars, and activities associated with hotels and bars.17
The Rotary Club of Havana was the largest in the country, with 156 mem-
bers in 1940.18 The importance of sugar production, and its extensive culti-
vation in the country, is such that scholars have distinguished it from the rest 
of Cuba’s agricultural production when speaking of the nation’s economy. 
Nonetheless, the number of capitalists associated with this sector in Havana’s 
Rotarian circle was small—only three members declared themselves in-
volved with sugar (one grower, the owner of a mill, and a wholesaler). What 
is more surprising is that, in a country for the most part dedicated to stock- 
raising and agricultural production, the lists do not include other agricultural 
producers of coffee, tobacco, or food destined for the internal market. Not 
even ranchers received representation in the capital city’s club. Nevertheless, 
we can identify certain individuals involved in industries that are ultimately 
linked to agriculture or ranching: coffee roasting factories, tobacco factories, 
rice mills, tobacco plant warehouses, and commercial refrigeration.
On the other hand, twelve Havana Rotarians were from the world of 
finance (banking and insurance). Importers represented another signifi-
cant group, as eleven members were classified as such. Professionals from a 
variety of disciplines had a large representation, numbering thirty- one—with 
ten doctors and nine lawyers. Small and medium- sized industrialists num-
bered thirty, and a significant number of these men were involved in manu-
facturing foods like vegetable oils, condensed milk, ice, beer, yeast, mineral 
water, soup, ice cream, rum, and soda. Those to follow in importance were 
members who were involved in the paper industry and whose areas of con-
centration were mostly in packaging—paper plates, carton containers, en-
velopes, and paper cups—and textiles such as fabric, stockings, shirts, and 
towels. Next was a group of individuals engaged in chemical, pharmaceuti-
cal, and cosmetic production—cement, perfume, and painkillers—as well 
as the remaining manufacturers who were involved in various lines of pro-
duction including tobacco, cigars, furniture, mattresses, and wooden boxes. 
Finally, we must include in this subgroup those who were involved in public 
works, roads, and shipyards. Twenty- eight individuals worked in the service 
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sector: eleven worked in transportation and seven worked in communica-
tions. Individuals working in the commercial sector also represented a sig-
nificant portion of the membership, numbering twenty- six.19 In general, the 
members were “white” Cuban men; aside from the fact that Afro- Cubans 
and mestizos had their own organizations, they were usually not permitted 
to join organizations formed by white Cubans. The presence of English and 
German surnames on the membership lists of these clubs is also noteworthy.
Interest Groups: Regional, National, and International
The influence that a Rotary club could exercise in a small town was at times 
disproportionate to its size. The power of these associations, constantly 
transformed into local interest groups, grew largely as a result of their ad-
vantageous recourse to strong national and international networks. In fact, 
this provided them with a distinct technical superiority that allowed them to 
trump other social and political actors in the region. There were other factors 
that facilitated this process. The sociopolitical standing of club members was 
of great importance; positions of power and leadership within the local com-
munity were qualities that the organization most desired to find in its mem-
bers. Also crucial was the ability of members to publish directly in journals 
and magazines or maintain connections with local or national publications 
that would permit a degree of influence over the community. Public opinion 
could be shaped through these interventions, aimed at prioritizing solutions 
to the most predominant conflicts within these small communities. More-
over, Rotary clubs increasingly developed a degree of organization that facili-
tated their function as an interest group. Although Rotary clubs never saw 
themselves as interest groups per se, the evidence indicates they functioned 
in this mode. From a series of simple public interventions we can observe 
mechanisms and dynamics that reveal the intrinsic characteristics of their 
procedural methods at all levels: from the local to the municipal, provincial, 
national, and finally international.
The number of motions initiated by each club in their monthly sessions 
could be considerable, and some of these activities included lobbying or co-
operative projects with public entities that suited their interests. However, 
a significant amount of time was also devoted to notifications, warnings, 
follow- ups on issues developed in previous weeks, fund- raising, rulings, mo-
tions in support of other associations, and multiple solicitations to govern-
mental authorities. For instance, the projects developed by both the Rotary 
Club of Sagua la Grande in May 1923 and that of Pinar del Río in August 1928 
serve as examples of some of these preoccupations. The former organized 
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a theatrical function to collect funds in order to buy a vehicle for the local 
health department, acquire street lamps, and initiate a project for a children’s 
park.20 The latter made several appeals that are worth listing in order to dis-
tinguish the managerial character of its proceedings: reiterating to the mayor 
an appeal for the betterment of parks and streets; requesting that the reserve 
of funds be administered to pay the costs for the construction of a fire station 
and the acquisition of equipment; soliciting the secretary of public works to 
send a chemical fire extinguisher and to repair a major road; requesting that 
the Ministry of Health clean the parks and avenues; expressing interest in the 
establishment of a central bank; and supporting the Rotary Club of Cama-
güey in favor of preserving and advancing cattle ranching in Cuba.21
Significantly, Rotarians participated in the decision- making process for 
mapping out the route of Cuba’s great central highway, one of the most 
important projects of the Machado era. The proposal for the design was 
launched during one of the meetings held by District 25, which, in accor-
dance with the international regulations created by ri for Cuba at the time, 
corresponded to the whole of Cuba.22 These clubs made great efforts to con-
tribute, in a coordinated fashion, to the creation of what would be the prin-
cipal roads in the country. For example, during the third meeting of the 
district, “[Mario] Macbeath suggested that each municipality and each pro-
vincial council should study the stretch of road that corresponded to their 
respective locale in order to coordinate their own findings with the govern-
ment’s overall plans for the principal highway.”23 Moreover, they understood 
the necessity of defining the best way in which to accomplish their goals and 
of identifying which doors needed to be knocked on in order to achieve 
them. The suggestion to continue in this direction was taken up immedi-
ately: “García Vida proposes that . . . these studies, once completed, should 
be submitted [for discussion] to their respective clubs and subject [thereafter 
to further discussion] among the Senators and Representatives of each prov-
ince in similar club sessions so that the project becomes of interest to the 
nation.”24 The plan was essentially to have legislators who represented the 
community in congress participating in club meetings; this was to guarantee 
the success of club tenders, producing roads that would be as amenable as 
possible to the vision and particular interests of Rotarians. For example, the 
Rotary Club of Matanzas executed their studies with this objective in mind 
and invited the engineer from the province’s Department of Public Works 
and other members of the provincial government to sessions, in order to 
understand what was needed to finish incomplete stretches of highway from 
Unión to Bolondrón, Cidra to Sabanilla, and Güira to Navajas.25
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On several occasions, Rotarians from the interior provinces assumed ex-
tremely critical stances against public authorities or called in certain con-
nections within their powerful networks to force changes in whatever they 
believed needed to be modified. For instance, agreements and treaties con-
ducted with foreign powers that would affect the interests of Cuban ranchers 
greatly alarmed Rotarians from Jiguaní. There were most certainly members 
in this club whose investments were tied to businesses that were adversely 
affected by these agreements. In a meeting that took place in 1937, Rotari-
ans declared, “Taking into consideration the importance of the ranching 
industry in our country, the Rotary Club of Juguaní unanimously opposes 
the trade agreement with Uruguay by reason that this stated agreement is 
greatly detrimental to what we consider to be our second largest national 
industry.”26 Members of this club undertook immediate and multilevel ac-
tions to reverse the situation. First, they made the negative implications of 
this agreement for the country known to the highest national authorities 
by drafting telegrams that they agreed to send to the presidents of the re-
public, the chamber of representatives, the senate, and secretaries of agri-
culture and state.27 Second, the club notified Rotarians around the province 
and throughout the nation so as to coordinate collective action, particularly 
a “campaign that opposes the aforementioned trade agreement” involving 
the filing of complaints with public support to increase pressure on state 
administration by “sending a copy of the same telegram, in order to obtain 
from provincial and national clubs the aid and cooperation necessary to fight 
against the government.”28
In contrast to Rotarians from the eastern provinces, who were actively in-
volved in preventing unfavorable international agreements, their counter-
parts in the west of the country were fighting for a commercial agreement with 
Spain that would benefit the export of tobacco. To accomplish this, members 
of the Rotary Club of Pinar del Río produced a memorandum in collaboration 
with the local house of commerce that explained the necessity and validity of 
this project. Shortly afterward, the presidential secretary received a letter that 
outlined the interests of the project and was accompanied by the aforemen-
tioned document. The old colonial metropolis was depicted in this study as an 
excellent market for the exporting of both manufactured and raw tobacco.29
Since the rate of consumption within the nation is very small compared 
to the [agricultural] production and the production of the tobacco and 
cigar- making industry within the nation, [factories within the country] do 
not have the capacity to process all the tobacco [generated in the country-
District 25 | 241
side of Pinar del Río], it is necessary and indispensable to find [foreign] 
markets for the surplus produced in tobacco leaves and raw material. At 
the same time, in order that the tobacco and cigar- making industries are 
able to augment their productive capacities, it is equally necessary that 
markets be found [to encourage] this meager production.30
The idea of coordinating a trade agreement with Spain had been in pro-
cess since the 1910s. Rotarians in this region, who were experts in the mat-
ter, promoted the achievement of the blocked agreement. It is worth noting 
that their particular interest in exporting the tobacco plant was itself a direct 
outcome of the club’s commitment to defending the fundamental interests of 
the agricultural producers in the region. “The Rotary Club of Pinar del Río, 
always attentive to the nation’s problems, [are] even more interested in local 
matters and especially in those that are related to the province’s principal 
source of wealth . . . tobacco.”31 However, the most important factor in this 
case is the persistent and systematic character of the efforts this club made to 
obtain approval for the agreement. In fact, members never ceased inquiring 
into the state of affairs concerning the agreement. It must be noted that their 
fundamental interest in this project was the development of the province and 
not necessarily the country.32 Under the banner of acting in the best interest 
of the patria chica—the area defined by deeply felt regional loyalties—the 
club exerted constant pressure on the national government.
A brief chronology of the events that led to the success of their venture 
allows us to appreciate the level of work deployed to achieve their objectives. 
The first steps were taken in December 1925 with a call for support in the 
city’s chamber of commerce to negotiate the realization of this project.33 In 
May 1926, they agreed to “review the petitions that must be made to Spain 
as part of the trade agreement . . . in relation to the interests of Pinar del 
Río.” In July the club met with the minister responsible for the agreement 
after reviewing the matter with the Comisión Revisora de Aranceles (a cus-
toms and excise commission) and after having contacted a number of in-
dustry groups like the Asociación de Almacenistas y Cosecheros (tobacco 
harvest and storage), the Unión de Fabricantes de Tabacos y Cigarros (cigar 
and cigarette makers), the trade journal El Tabaco, and the Federación de 
Sociedades Económicas (a federation of pro- industry associations). Signifi-
cant headway was made during this meeting, and “the secretary of state ac-
cepted a proposal that was included in the agreement, which obligated Spain 
to buy a fixed amount of raw tobacco annually.” The suggestion to “request 
the support of local associations and the provincial governor in campaign-
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ing for the trade agreement” followed immediately afterward.34 The club an-
nounced that they were looking for the support of all civic entities as well as 
that of the central authorities in charge of regional administration. In March 
1927, the club asked the secretary of state “for information as to the state of 
negotiations concerning the trade agreement with Spain.”35 Later, knowing 
that there would be a visit from the president of the republic to the capital of 
the province, club members decided to deliver “a report on the status of to-
bacco in the region and [the necessity] of the agreement.” Nothing deterred 
members from achieving this objective, and at every opportunity Rotarians 
were quick to turn to government officials at all levels to reaffirm these inter-
ests. The last memo related to this issue is from May 1927, when members 
decided to “organize a meeting for mayors of the province who support the 
negotiations aimed at coordinating a trade agreement.”36 Thus the club not 
only sought to expand the interest group’s support base within civil society 
but it also sought the backing of all local government officials.
Another case demonstrates far more covert mechanisms employed to 
exercise political pressure. In late 1925 Julio Antonio Mella, a student leader 
who had recently become the first secretary general of the Cuban Commu-
nist Party, was arrested for allegedly having placed a bomb in the Payret 
Theater. In prison he staged a hunger strike, a strategic act of protest against 
the Machado regime’s authoritarian tactics to eliminate political threats that 
triggered a massive national solidarity movement. Though it is often remem-
bered as a movement led by a union of progressive actors on the left, in fact 
Rotarians were centrally involved. Believing the government to be acting 
in error, Rotarians pulled strings in an effort to effect a reversal. Nine days 
after the initiation of the hunger strike, the Rotary Club of Camagüey sent 
a telegram addressed to the acting interior minister: “The Rotary Club of 
Camagüey respectfully requests of you, Sir, as a fellow Rotarian and Cama-
güayano, to exert your valuable influence in obtaining the release of Julio 
Mella.”37 It is interesting to note that the organization, at this moment trans-
formed into an interest group, appealed first to the minister’s status as a 
Rotarian and only secondarily to his local origins when demanding that 
he carry out the petition of his fellow club members. Given the importance 
that Mella’s liberation had in calming public opinion within the country, the 
intervention is notable.
If the actions of Rotary clubs in the different provinces could take on such 
forms, what about those of the Rotary Club of Havana (rCh)? The protec-
tionist leanings of Cuban Rotarians were well known in economic circles. 
In debates on protectionism and free trade, Rotarians identified themselves 
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with the former and asked for the implementation of tariffs that would serve 
these interests.38 The socioeconomic standing of the club’s membership nec-
essarily conditioned the political and economic posture of the organization. 
Since small and medium- sized industrialists constituted an abundant group 
within the rCh membership, this resulted in the rest of the members declar-
ing their support of protectionism. The club had manifested its strong sup-
port of this economic policy since 1922 and did so more ardently when the 
matter became a subject of debate in the House of Representatives in August 
1922. According to one contemporary media chronicler of Cuban politics, 
“The matter was discussed in the House [of Representatives] . . . Ferrara 
advocated free trade, and Santiago Rey and Germán López defended pro-
tectionism. The Rotary Club [of Havana] continues to be the stronghold of 
protectionist ideals and in a session, attended by [Orestes] Ferrara, notions 
of free trade were vehemently fought by Crusellas, Blanco Herrera, Alzuga-
ray, and Dufau.”39
The rCh was well acquainted with the economic and political stance of 
members of the House of Representatives. It was also eager to make its own 
criteria public and shape public opinion in accordance with the club’s own 
interests. The rCh invited Ferrara to a session on September 7, 1922. Fe-
rrara was then obligated to stand before those who were not only the prin-
cipal champions of protectionism but also the owners and representatives 
of the most prominent small and medium- sized industries in the country. 
This seemed to be a debate that addressed the development of a more di-
versified economy, which defended sectors not involved in sugar produc-
tion within the national economy. However, it is worth mentioning that this 
economic positioning of Rotarians resulted in their public recognition as the 
fundamental center of protectionist ideals to the extent that their voice was 
represented in public opinion as conflicting with the House of Representa-
tives. More specifically, their public voice was seen as equaling the latter and 
capable of maintaining a direct and critical debate with these emblematic 
institutions of the state.
In the early 1920s, the Rotary Club of Havana maintained a critical stance 
toward the national government. In fact, the rCh was one of the organiza-
tions that, beginning in 1923, supported the Veterans and Patriots Movement 
(Movimiento de Veteranos y Patriotas) in their effort to reform a corrupt po-
litical system and raise the moral tone in public affairs.40 The rCh affirmed 
that “only an honest public life and perfect honesty in administration will 
make us prosperous and, considering that the program of legislative reform 
presented to the Public Powers by the National Association of Veterans and 
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Patriots embodies in all its parts the aspiration of this Rotary Club, we wish 
to publicly manifest our sympathies with the moralizing principles of good 
government that this association sustains in its program.” The club also par-
ticipated in the Cuban Council for National Renovation (Junta Cubana de 
Renovación Nacional), which exposed in detail all the wrongs that afflicted 
the country. This is a clear demonstration of the kind of critical thinking that 
animated Rotarians from Havana, at least during those years.41 However, in 
later years, there was considerable convergence between the interests of the 
Rotary Club of Havana and the presidential campaign of Gerardo Machado. 
The well- known slogan “Water, roads, and schools” anchored the presiden-
tial campaign of the Liberal Party candidate.42 His political program was 
in tune with some principal debates initiated by Rotarians over the previ-
ous months during the electoral race. It is noteworthy that Rotarians went 
from criticizing the government of Alfredo Zayas to helping establish the 
manifesto for a fellow Rotarian in his journey to becoming president of the 
 country.
All incursions into public life by the rCh marked out positions in civil 
society by the urban middle class of the capital. Members could openly act 
as an interest group, initiate subtle changes in the tendencies and criteria of 
public opinion, or continually reaffirm their public position on matters of 
national importance. When Machado moved away from his early reformism 
and assumed dictatorial powers, the rCh moved with the urban middle- 
class tide as it shifted against the strongman. In 1934, a year after the fall 
of Machado, in a plenary session for the rCh that took place at the Hotel 
Nacional, members received notice of the abolition of the Platt Amendment. 
They expressed their collective delight at the news and sent a message to the 
president of the republic, congratulating him for putting an end to the ap-
pendix that used the nation’s sovereignty as collateral. The letter to the presi-
dent stated: “The president [of the rCh] reminds his fellow colleagues of the 
pleasant and joyous news of the abolition of the Platt Amendment, which 
signifies our complete independence without any form of limitation. It was 
agreed on this occasion to send a congratulatory message to the Honorable 
president of the republic.”43
In general, Rotarians focused on making the public aware of the impor-
tance of the club’s active participation in the socioeconomic processes under 
way in the country. They affirmed that “each populace has the government 
it deserves. Contribute in creating one that is worthy of your community.”44 
This meant joining their political party’s neighborhood committees and vot-
ing on election days.45 However, in time, they succeeded in delivering their 
District 25 | 245
social and political positions with greater boldness and even designed gov-
ernment programs for political figures who aspired to occupy the highest 
offices in the country. The contradictions within the organization were evi-
dent as Cuban Rotarians were, if only momentarily, more openly political 
than was expected of Rotarians in any country. One of the ex- governors of 
District 25, Carlos Gárate Brú, declared that “Rotary clubs do not discuss or 
challenge ideologies or forms of government.”46 This contradicted the ways 
in which the Cuban organization proceeded, since Rotarians even came to 
explicitly formulate a plan of government that would have national reach. In 
preparation for the 1944 elections, the rCh wrote a memorandum to Ramón 
Grau San Martín and Raúl de Cárdenas Echarte, both candidates for the Par-
tido Cubano Revolucionario (Auténtico), running respectively for president 
and vice president of the republic. This document contained a plan for gov-
ernment that was developed by the association.47
On countless occasions Cuban Rotary clubs demonstrated their capacity 
to exercise pressure well beyond the nation’s territorial boundaries. Gener-
ally, members would further their projects by means of complex negotiations 
with their counterparts in other countries and would subsequently receive 
the support they required. The majority of these negotiations were under-
taken with the United States, with the clear intention of obtaining benefits for 
Cuba. These kinds of negotiations were accomplished either through the col-
lective participation of all the clubs within the country, by a distinct group of 
clubs seeking help with a specific regional issue, or by one single club alone, 
which was usually the club in Havana. However, according to the latter, the 
club was “always supported by other clubs in the District.”48
Cuban Rotarians sought to defend Cuba’s image when confronted with 
nonsense published as yellow journalism in the United States. Soon after 
the rCh was founded, they were involved in a battle to deny accusations 
that Cuba was affected by yellow fever and that, furthermore, the country 
was inhospitable in its treatment of tourists. Members of the club in Havana 
launched a written campaign, asking various clubs in the United States to 
rectify the situation in their locale. The campaign received positive results, 
and clubs in the United States eventually sent their Cuban counterparts clip-
pings from U.S. newspapers where the false information had been retracted. 
“However, the club of Colorado makes it clear [in their letter] that only the 
information that concerns the existence of yellow fever in Cuba was rectified. 
Stories having to do with various abuses committed by the tourist industry 
were not retracted, since victims of these had been several Rotarians from 
this area.” Members responded to this with shows of pride in the interest of 
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enhancing the country’s reputation to ensure that the economy would not be 
affected, especially tourism. “At the suggestion of Mr. Julio Blanco Herrera, it 
was agreed upon that we would respond to your club in order to indicate that 
isolated instances of abuse should not give motivation for generalizations . . . 
and to inform you that the Rotary Club of Havana has already established an 
information bureau with the objective of avoiding further isolated cases.”49
In other instances, acts of international pressure even extended into U.S. 
congressional sessions. In April 1924, for example, Cuban Rotarians looked 
for ways to persuade this legislative body to issue an official recognition of 
Cuba’s sovereignty over the Isla de Pinos through the proposed Hay- Quesada 
treaty.50 During debates surrounding the signing of the treaty, the presi-
dent of the rCh proposed that “since [this] issue of great importance comes 
nearer to a court ruling, I propose to my fellow Rotarians that, through the 
mediation of the governor of our district, we ask Rotary International to use 
their good and diligent means to encourage the United States Congress— 
adopting the just rulings issued by the corresponding committees—to pro-
ceed to a prompt resolution.”51 Cuban Rotarians sought to involve, with 
much tact, their counterparts in other parts of the world. The path of politi-
cal action traveled from the Rotary Club of Havana to the governor of the 
Cuban district; from there, it followed to the governing body of the organi-
zation and then to the U.S. Congress. Negotiations in this case were planned 
at a national level to solicit the participation of the highest- ranking repre-
sentative of the Rotary Club in Cuba. Although the function of the governor 
of District 25 was to represent Rotary International within Cuba, it remains 
very clear that his duties were not to convert himself into the faithful ser-
vant of foreign interests (even if, eventually, this too could have occurred). It 
is important to stress how these structures of domination, generated within 
the context of U.S. imperial power, could also be subverted to obtain benefits 
for the country. Instruments of subjection were now employed to obtain the 
recognition of Cuba’s sovereignty over a fragment of the nation’s territory, a 
territory that had been left pending only to later be seized.
More intriguing still, everything seems to indicate that the initiative of 
the Rotary Club of Havana was an alliance between Cuban Rotarians and 
the Cuban government to obtain the ratification of the treaty. In a note of 
April 3, 1924, apparently written by Cosme de la Torriente, Cuban ambassa-
dor to Washington, to the Cuban secretary of state for foreign affairs, and 
marked “confidential,” Rotary clubs were encouraged to intervene in the 
matter. “It would be advisable, without it seeming that I have suggested it, 
that the Rotary clubs of Cuba obtain assistance within the country so that 
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all come forth and voice their support of the ratification of the treaty con-
cerning Isla de Pinos before the American Senate.”52 This maneuver was 
an attempt to counter campaigns that were launched from Isla de Pinos by 
U.S. citizens residing on the island who portrayed themselves as victims of 
supposed abuses committed by the Cuban government, a strategy aimed at 
preventing ratification of the agreement. These campaigns led Rotarians to 
close ranks around government authorities. Finally, Isla de Pinos, the sec-
ond most important island in the Cuban archipelago, was recognized as an 
integral part of the nation on March 13, 1925.53 What is truly important about 
this case is that the Cuban government decided to rely on these associations 
to achieve the successful resolution of a matter of state. Cuban government 
officials understood that Rotarians had access to mechanisms that permitted 
them to sway U.S. public opinion as well as to influence government authori-
ties in the United States.
Rotary clubs in Cuba were essentially made up of the urban middle class, 
composed of three subgroups: small industrialists, businessmen, and uni-
versity professionals. Essentially, clubs formed a small universe with ample 
space for social sectors spanning the small and medium urban bourgeoisie 
to distinguished members of the country’s elite. The cases presented in this 
study demonstrate that Rotary clubs became a force capable of influencing 
the socioeconomic development of the country in general and, more specifi-
cally, of the region where they were established. The zealous defense of local 
production and the local and national image, the impulse to create infrastruc-
ture to achieve socioeconomic development and the systematic intervention 
in all matters of interest to the public constitute irrefutable proof of this.
Although regional civic power in Cuba involved many more actors than 
can be addressed in a chapter of this scope, Rotarians played a very impor-
tant role in this sphere. They had an exceptional organizational structure that 
simultaneously connected them with the most remote villages and the high-
est echelons of an international hierarchy. Their focus on the public sphere as 
a central territory for Rotarian intervention made them a pressure group and 
a powerful network. They intervened regularly at the local, municipal, pro-
vincial, national, and even international levels to guarantee the implemen-
tation of their projects. That this organization included members with very 
powerful connections adds an important element to the study of the capacity 
of their actions. These connections were sometimes invoked in a publicly 
transparent manner, at other times behind closed doors; a strategic telegram, 
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letter, or private visit might be enough to catalyze a movement, pass a piece 
of legislation, secure the signing of a treaty, or reshape a policy plan. Cuba’s 
Rotary clubs were social networks that could reach every possible sphere.
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CHAPTER 9

El naciente público oyente
Toward a Genealogy of the Audience in Early Republican Cuba
Alejandra Bronfman
Histories of the Cuban media dub the 1940s and 1950s the golden 
age of broadcasting. Rather than echoing broad historiographic cur-
rents emphasizing profound corruption or failure to build demo-
cratic institutions, they note instead a pervasive soundscape replete 
with telenovelas, star announcers, music, news, and political com-
mentary. Cubans organized their days so as to catch programs featur-
ing the Chinese detective Chan- Li Po, the charismatic and loquacious 
spiritist Clavelito, and the beloved, fiery critic of political corrup-
tion, Eddy Chíbas.1 Local programs also regulated leisure hours in 
smaller cities and towns, as attested to by Sunday afternoons char-
acterized by empty streets and synchronized receivers.2 Broadcast 
listening shaped many of the rhythms and practices of sociability in 
Cuban everyday life.
The success of Cuban broadcasting extended beyond national 
borders. As Yeidy Rivero observes, Havana came to be the “media 
capital of Latin America” during this period. Not only were some 
of the genres such as telenovelas generated in Cuba widely popular 
all across the region but, as Rivero convincingly argues, the degree 
of “technical, advertising, and creative” expertise in Cuba’s sophisti-
cated broadcasting industry, which by the 1950s included television 
as well as radio, had been exported and circulated throughout the 
region.3 Havana’s prominent position in the region as the source of 
expertise and programming had, argues Rivero, a lasting impact on 
Latin American mediascapes.
Cuba’s informative and entertaining radio histories proceed 
quickly from the introduction of broadcasting to the ubiquity of 
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soaps, jingles, and stars, pausing only briefly on an array of experiments, 
practices, and debates that shaped that transformation. By assuming a pub-
lic, they take for granted what, as Bruno Latour might argue, needs to be 
explained.4 This essay poses a central question: how did a public for broad-
casting come into being in republican Havana, and what are the conditions 
by which it emerged? How did an audience grow? As actors in the dramatic 
political processes of the Republican period, the media and its public merit 
further consideration. When broadcasting was introduced in Cuba in the 
1920s, as we shall see, the audience was mostly elsewhere. That the medium 
and a local public would become two parts of what we identify as “radio” was 
not a foregone conclusion.
Thinking about media when they were new counters the appearance of in-
evitability and naturalness that media take on once they have become ubiq-
uitous. Lingering on initial moments of uncertainty and instability allows 
for a deeper understanding of, as noted by Lisa Gitelman and Geoffrey Pin-
gree, “how interpretive communities are built or destroyed, how normative 
epistemologies emerge.”5 I argue here that a public attuned to the particu-
larities of early radio in Cuba did not exist prior to broadcasting but rather 
materialized in the context of economic and political circumstances in the 
republican era. As proposed by Carolyn Marvin, histories of media must 
include an array of users. Along with consumers, it is crucial to take into 
account entrepreneurs and technicians who policed the boundaries of use, 
meanings, and purpose as systems of communication began to take shape. 
Marvin argued eloquently for a decentering of technological histories, away 
from the progression of different machines and toward the discursive con-
texts in which they were created.6 Here I draw from Gitelman and Pingree, 
Marvin, and Latour to get at the question of the composition of a public. I 
propose that the machines assembled a public at the same time that people 
assembled machines. The public and the machines can be understood as arti-
facts of mutual invention. But this was an incomplete, uneven process. The 
transposition of broadcasting to early Republican Cuba did not call forth a 
homogeneous “mass” audience. Rather, from its inception, it assembled a 
fractured, critical, and skeptical public. The excesses and leftovers remained 
as counterpublics and a variety of noisy machines that disrupted the sound 
of mainstream broadcasting.7
What difference does sound make? The medium in question reproduced 
and transmitted sound over long distances, extending the range of the voice 
and of the ear. Contemporary observers expressed wonder at the capacity of 
wireless to shrink distances and meditated on the possibilities for new com-
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munities and the destabilization of seemingly incontrovertible categories like 
space and time.8 But if commentators marveled at utopian possibilities, they 
remained paradoxically silent about the actual sounds emanating from the 
machines, evincing a problematic distance between the promise of instant 
and clear communication and the reality of beeps, whistles, rasps, crackles, 
and blips, along with the occasional tones of human voices or musical in-
struments. I would suggest, however, that the appeal of clarity and seemingly 
unmediated sound as eventually proposed by manufacturers of radio sets 
obscures a much more ecumenical approach by early listeners. The people 
listening to their machines did not demand smooth, clear reception at the 
onset of broadcasting. It was only later that the demand for clarity of sound 
came to shape a public with specific parameters of social status as well as 
with particular expectations and practices. In so doing it marginalized other 
kinds of listening practices and relationships with machines. My intention 
here is to remain attuned to the exigencies and limits of the aural, but the 
methodological challenge of doing a history of sound with written texts re-
mains. For the moment these and visual representations of the machines 
themselves are my sources.
New Machines
What apparatus serves as a point of entry for a history of radio in Cuba? Per-
haps it was the telephone, introduced in 1859 as a machine that could receive 
and transmit sound, especially voices. Since the telephone was intended to 
provide crucial information to commercial enterprises, it fits neatly into 
broader narratives centered on empire and technology. A second version 
might begin with the stations assembled and owned by amateur radio opera-
tors, who in the early twentieth century used those stations to send or receive 
shortwave signals. Such a beginning would privilege individuals rather than 
state or corporate actors and place more emphasis on informal transnational 
connections rather than national boundaries in the making of radio.
There is a third beginning: October 10, 1922. At 4 p.m. President Zayas 
spoke into a microphone first in English and then in Spanish. A series of 
musical performances followed his speech. The program was aimed at the 
United States, but also at those in Cuba with the technology to receive broad-
casts.9 This beginning might be understood not as a beginning at all but 
rather as the moment in which the stories of the telephone and the amateurs 
come together and, in so doing, confound simpler interpretations of com-
munications technologies as either wholly controlled by imperial, capitalist 
interests or predominantly in the hands of scattered individuals. The radio 
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station from which Zayas spoke, pwx, was built by the Cuban Telephone 
Company, an offshoot of International Telephone and Telegraph, and it 
transmitted via telephone line to its sister station, weaf in New York, which 
in turn broadcast within its range. Relative to the expense and labor involved 
in the construction of this station, listeners were few. One hundred manufac-
tured receivers were dispersed throughout Cuba. In the days before the pwx 
broadcast, General Electric and Westinghouse had distributed another forty 
receivers to government employees. On October 10, they opened the doors 
of their store so that passersby could listen.10 Any remaining listeners would 
have been those “amateurs” who had acquired or built their own equipment 
and for the first time would have been able to tune in to a broadcast from the 
island itself rather than from across the ocean.
It is worth remembering that Cuba was at that moment emerging from a 
recent economic catastrophe, in which the price of sugar, buoyed by several 
years of high demand as a result of war in Europe, plummeted dramatically 
in 1921. During the war, foreign investment, particularly from the United 
States, had grown substantially. Twenty- five new sugar mills had been built 
between 1914 and 1920, raising the volume of sugar produced and bolster-
ing wages for workers. After sugar prices crashed, the prosperity in evidence 
since 1915 was suddenly at risk, as banks failed, businesses closed, and un-
employment grew.11
As many historians have observed, the economic crisis spurred a politi-
cal crisis for the Zayas administration, as urban and rural workers mobilized 
when confronted with sudden deprivation relative to the past decade. At the 
same time, students, intellectuals, and veterans framed their protests with a 
critique of the corrupt relationship with the United States and a lack of sov-
ereignty. Revisiting Zayas’s opening speech with this in mind suggests that 
he was at once lauding technological modernity in an effort to bolster fading 
legitimacy and making explicit the connection to the United States, perhaps 
against growing criticisms of his administration.
Thus sonic technologies made their appearance in Havana amid uncer-
tain economic conditions and increasingly vocal expressions of discontent 
with a political system that many saw as corrupt and demeaning. One of the 
results of this dual crisis was a shift in political practices that entailed, as 
Gillian McGillivray and Robert Whitney have argued, efforts to incorporate 
popular mobilizations into electoral politics and in reformulated nationalist 
discourses. As in other parts of Latin America, the “people” was constituted 
as a political actor with varying degrees of force and influence.12
With the advantages of hindsight, it seems relatively straightforward to 
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make the connection between interlocutors looking for a medium and a 
medium looking for an audience. As facilitator to a regime looking for ways 
to harness and control a politicized “people” as well as for an opposition 
looking to disseminate its messages of dissent, the place of a medium like 
radio seems clear, especially given what we know of radio’s eventual role. But 
none of it was obvious to people at the time.
El Naciente Público Oyente
Cubans were not strangers to listening. Across socioeconomic status, modes 
of sociability included gatherings centered around aural communications. 
As Marial Iglesias has argued, public festivals were integral to the construc-
tion of a nationalist sentiment in the aftermath of colonialism. These in-
cluded civic and religious processions, mítins, commemorations, and fu-
nerals. In the streets and plazas of urban centers, the collective listening 
to music, songs, and speeches that took place during these rituals helped 
Cubans negotiate the complex transitions from Spanish rule to North Ameri-
can tutelage with a modicum of autonomy. Particularly in a context in which 
illiteracy predominated, collective aural experiences proved significant to 
any attempts to elaborate nationalist hegemonies. These were produced and 
consumed by diverse groups, including Afro- Cubans whose drumming ses-
sions came to be a site of contestation over the meaning of civilization and 
modernity.13
Listening publics had also formed in enclosed spaces. Araceli Tinajero 
has traced the tradition of reading aloud that came to characterize many 
cigar factories in Cuba, the United States, and other parts of the Caribbean. 
Stretching back to the nineteenth century, readers became a fixture on fac-
tory floors, offering entertainment and information to thousands of workers. 
They were paid by the workers themselves and most commonly read news-
papers and novels for up to four hours a day. The workforce, which Tinajero 
argues was ethnically diverse and tended to the lower end of the socioeco-
nomic spectrum, became an expectant and informed listening public whose 
interests ranged, apparently, from news of politics and sports events to ca-
nonical authors like Cervantes, Victor Hugo, and Dickens.14 The elite also 
had listening spaces, such as the opera house and concert hall. As attested to 
by the theaters and concert halls built in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, these were popular pastimes among the bourgeoisie seek-
ing the trappings of distinction in a fluid social context. More recently, the 
phonograph had made an appearance, rendering living room and parlors 
listening spaces in a few exclusive homes.
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But this rich, diverse, and sophisticated culture of listening did not immedi-
ately take up the radio as its next object of interest. In the early years, listening 
to a box played on different desires and expectations than going to a concert, 
attending a rally, or taking in a novel over the course of a workweek at a cigar 
factory. Initially, the medium’s appeal was more associated with the machines 
themselves than with its potential to convey sound to large numbers of people. 
The most prominent machines that transmitted sound were telephones. By 
1888, the Spanish colonial regime had created a telephone network with thirty- 
four kilometers of lines and one thousand five hundred subscribers. In the 
wake of the U.S. occupations (1898–1902 and 1906–9), U.S. capital, which had 
provided the initial financing, took greater control and created the Cuban Tele-
phone Company. The brothers Hernand and Sosthenes Behn subsequently 
bought this and added it to their growing telecommunications empire, Inter-
national Telephone and Telegraph. By 1916, Havana had 5 telephones per 100 
inhabitants, which was half that of New York, but three times that of Madrid. 
In 1921, Havana and Key West were connected with the first overseas (or under-
sea) telephone cables, allowing for speedier communications among the grow-
ing capitalist enterprises in Cuba and the United States. Because of the finan-
cial relationships, Havana and New York were linked via telephone sooner than 
New York and other parts of the United States.15 If one were to map access to 
sonic media, boundaries of wealth, infrastructure, investment patterns, and 
urban space would matter more than national boundaries.
Wireless radio sets appeared soon after World War I and seem to have 
taken their place alongside telephones as the most recent development in 
long- distance communications. The medium worked for two- way or point- 
to- point communication. It was suited to bits of information at best and, if 
not entirely reliable, was exciting for the possibilities of communicating elec-
tronically over great distances. A series of men—all men as far as I can tell—
became fascinated with the equipment and its possibilities and began to 
build or buy stations to operate privately. This world of amateurs or hobby-
ists existed as a more diffuse network already engaged with the emergent 
technologies prior to the Cuban Telephone Company’s efforts to expand to 
broadcasting. In the United States, many amateurs were boys or middle- class 
men, relegated to their basements, tinkering late at night or on the week-
ends, forming associations with other amateurs and exchanging messages 
mostly about the fact that they could exchange messages.16 But in Cuba and 
throughout the Caribbean, those who could afford the equipment tended to 
be wealthy and established. Often they were planters or sponsored by plant-
ers who used the ability to communicate to serve their business interests.17
El naciente público oyente | 257
These amateurs and their stories have made a scant impression in pub-
lished texts. Rather, their presence emerges on the Internet, as part of what 
is becoming an extensive alternative history of radio. Luis Casas Romero 
is remembered as both a military man who had fought in Cuba’s Wars of 
Independence and as a musician who founded and directed the Banda In-
fantil de Camaguey. He built station 2LC in Havana in 1920 and transmit-
ted Cuba’s first radio signals in August 1922. Casas began his broadcast with 
the cannon shot fired from La Cabana every night at 9 p.m., followed by a 
weather report. According to Lázaro David Najarro Pujol, the programming, 
initially directed at “aficionades radioemisores”—in other words, other ama-
teur broadcasters—was eventually directed at the “naciente público oyente” 
invoking a recently incarnated entity, the “hearing public.”18
Other amateurs included Manuel Alvarez, who built a station in Cai-
baren, Las Villas, and Frank Jones, an electrical engineer employed by the 
sugar industry who built a station that opened in early 1922, broadcasting 
from Central Tuinucú.19 The contemporary press reports that F. W. Mor-
ton and Humberto Giquel also operated stations at the opening of pwx.20 
Yet another to lay claim to originating wireless communications was Frank 
Butler, chief assistant to Lee De Forest, who, at the behest of the U.S. Navy, 
established a wireless station in Guantánamo as early as 1905. By his own tell-
ing, this was a dangerous and unpredictable adventure, complete with pan-
thers, convicted killers hired as assistants, explosions, and an earthquake. 
But it was also a successful venture that culminated in the completion of 
one of five stations planned by the navy during this period.21 It is possible 
that in this moment there were as many producers of sound as consumers. 
The traditional narrative that begins with the Cuban Telephone Company’s 
pwx broadcast in 1922 obscures this existing sonic culture fed by machines, 
people, and knowledge.
Cuba’s nascent listening public in all likelihood included those with links 
to this economy, as interested parties seem to have been more likely to build, 
rather than purchase, their own receivers. A newspaper column entitled 
“Radiotelefonía” inaugurated shortly following the October pwx broadcast, 
and written by J. M. Baquero, announced early on that since General Elec-
tric and Westinghouse sold sets at such prohibitive prices, it would dedicate 
much of its column space to dispensing advice about building receivers.22 
According to Baquero, anyone with access to a cigar box, some tin foil, a 
telephone, and a few other household items (as well as his informative in-
structions) could construct a set that would receive broadcasts.23 The many 
letters and responses posted in subsequent columns, full of questions about 
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antennae or the merits of different kinds of wire, suggest that many readers 
became builders, rather than purchasers, of radios.
By December 1922, commentators witnessed listening throughout the 
city: a walk on a concert night revealed inhabitants attuned to radios in 
elite and modest residences, grouped in clusters in a bicycle shop or sharing 
one set of headphones among six people.24 But what were they listening to? 
Programs were intermittent and either without clear direction or extremely 
specific. On Wednesdays and Saturdays, from 8:30 until 10:30 p.m., pwx 
broadcast “programas musicales, discursos en español.” Humberto Giquel’s 
station also began with the 9 p.m. cannon shot and offered Havanans the 
weather forecast for the following twenty- four hours.25 If listeners were lucky 
and particularly adept at tuning their receivers, they might receive program-
ming from the United States, Canada, or even further afield. In November, 
pwx broadcast the proceedings of the American Medical Congress, which 
was deemed a success and prompted a reflection about the nature of pro-
gramming. Why, asked Baquero, were there no broadcasts of the opera, or 
of religious services, or meetings of other social organizations?26 The evi-
dence suggests that the nature of broadcasting took shape much more slowly 
than the dissemination of technical knowledge about these machines. From 
this perspective, programming seems an afterthought rather than the main 
attraction. At the onset, radio as a medium lacked a clear purpose regard-
ing the services it might provide, the parameters of time and taste, and the 
demographics and interests of anticipated audiences. Thus broadcasting did 
not insert itself into existing listening practices but rather hovered on the 
margins, seeking ways to make itself relevant despite considerable techni-
cal constraints.
Indeed, absent from discussions of early radio is an overwhelming de-
mand to settle on a fixed format. Radio in this early incarnation appealed 
precisely because it held out the possibility of receiving noise from other 
parts of the world. Listeners were pleasantly surprised, perhaps, but cer-
tainly did not require that what they heard make sense or provide sustained 
information or entertainment, or that it dispense up- to- date news regarding 
sports matches, political events, or natural catastrophes. All of that would 
come later. In the beginning, radio appealed precisely because it could access 
and sonically represent the fragmented and dispersed nature of the world—
this medium, much more than others that preceded it, gave the impression 
of transparency.27 The ether, replete with all sorts of noise, could be captured. 
As commentator Julian Power of Carteles put it, radio sounded like this: 
“Celeste Aida . . . oiga, quitese de la linea . . . ik, ik, ik . . . Celeste Ai . . . brrrr. 
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. . . Station kkk? . . . . Toc- toc- toc . . . señores y señoras, va a cantar Sylvia. 
. . . ik, ik, ik . . . you, my baby flapper. . . . tratachín, tratachín . . . jabon de 
reuter! . . . toc, toc . . . ese melyto, a la reja . . . solo de violín por.”28 If Power 
evinced exasperation with this as a listening experience, he positioned him-
self as an outsider and critic of the mainstream. I suggest that the growing 
appeal of radio drew from its capacity to offer access to far- flung domains 
of sound. Perhaps, for some, what was exciting and really new was not that 
they might receive cohesive and easily audible concerts from across town 
but rather that they might, on some clear evening, find themselves listening 
to bits of a boxing match or a weather report from hundreds of miles away.
The machines remained the center of attention and drew dispersed groups 
into association with one another. Cubans spent a great deal of energy trying 
to figure out which machine to use, which one to build, and how many ways 
to use it. In newspapers and publications, diagrams mapped out the way bits 
of wire, coils, cardboard, and metal could be put together in the most effi-
cient fashion. Marked with neat numbers and labels for each of the parts, 
the bird’s- eye and three-quarter views rendered the machines both impres-
sive and accessible, bound to succeed, because of their complexity, and pos-
sible to assemble with a modicum of determination. The listener this ma-
chine called forth was self- sufficient, competent, and attentive to precision 
and detail. Having a radio was not so much about entertainment as about 
being part of a mechanically minded, electrically literate community. The 
diagrams, the worrying about antennae, and the anxiety about translated 
manuals suggest that the machines held out an allure perhaps even distinct 
from their function. Part of the fascination derived from the tactile, palpable 
connection to this invention.29
So an audience was beginning to take shape, interested in making its own 
equipment and trolling both for regular broadcasts and for random and dis-
tant noises captured by their antennae. At the same time, the presence of 
these machines gave rise to an assortment of other occupations and pre-
occupations. The vendors, the “radio- doctors,” writers, commentators, and 
instructors formed part of a cluster of people and activities centered on the 
equipment. Jorge González, of the signal marine corps, found a new market 
for his skills when he became an instructor at the new Academia de Radio-
telefonía. Cuba’s Department of Communications opened its own academy, 
requiring both instructors and students. And translators were busy produc-
ing Spanish- language versions of books on radio.30 The machines spawned 
a collection of people concerned with how to explain their function, how to 
keep them working, how to use them in different ways, and how to sell them. 
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The rise of broadcasters and performers may in fact have been preceded by 
and depended on the community of mechanics, engineers, publishers, and 
pedagogues this medium supported.31
Receivers, as machines that emitted entertaining or informative program-
ming, were among many apparatuses introduced during this period. Along-
side stories about the growing broadcasting industry, magazines like Carteles 
and Social featured articles that predicted an array of uses for the trans-
mission and recording of sound. From abroad came the story of linguis-
tic work in progress by John Harrington of the Smithsonian Institute and 
William Gates, director of the National Museum in Guatemala. Their use 
of the “palofotófono” to record the speech of a Guatemalan Indian named 
Cipriano Alvarado, who had been “found in the mountains and completely 
ignorant of civilization,” promised to be the key to unlocking the secrets 
of Mayan Quiché. This device, recently invented by Charles Hoxie at Gen-
eral Electric, apparently reproduced images of words on film, thus, accord-
ing to the authors, allowing for a detailed analysis of tone, inflection, and 
nonverbal sounds. Where previous efforts to record guttural and laryngeal 
sounds had failed, the palofotófono promised to further the ambitions of 
linguists in search of pure samples of a disappeared language. The scientists 
had recorded Alvarado telling the Maya creation story and broadcast it over 
the radio, giving audiences “an opportunity to listen to a disappearing lan-
guage.”32 As Jonathan Sterne has pointed out, an initial impetus for the de-
velopment of recording technology was a developing interest in preservation 
of bodies. In the wake of the U.S. Civil War, medical and scientific knowledge 
devoted some attention to preserving dead bodies for scientific research. The 
possibility of preserving voices, especially of the soon to be dead, spurred ex-
perimentation in recording technologies.33 Anthropologists working in the 
1920s made the leap from recording vanishing voices to the desire to record 
vanishing languages. Linguistic dictionaries enjoyed long- standing status 
as an indispensable tool for anthropologists. The use of recording devices 
seemed a logical next step. These machines would assist them in their en-
deavors to capture dying sounds and allow (skeptical?) listeners to witness 
their work.34
From London came the account of another technological breakthrough. 
Engineers were working on the “vidoscopo,” a device that would allow for 
the broadcasting of visual as well as sonic material. So, imagined the au-
thor, people sitting in the comfort of their homes would be able to view a 
film simultaneously to its showing in New York or London or anywhere else 
in the world. When this happened, the “emoción estética de los fanáticos 
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del radio,” already giddy with the radio broadcasts of opening nights at the 
Apollo Theater, would surely expand and send audiences into new ecstatic 
heights.35 This and another potential invention, the phonofilm, pursued the 
possibility of marrying visual and sound recordings. Lee De Forest, respon-
sible for this latest of several attempts, claimed that the best use for this 
would be for dance numbers, but the journalist reporting on these inventions 
projected other uses, such as the recording and broadcasting of educational 
lectures. He also imagined this as a link to the dead, citing De Forest’s lament 
that the technology hadn’t been invented in time to record the great speeches 
of Abraham Lincoln or Theodore Roosevelt.36 These machines promised the 
creation of memory and an archive. In their presence, the future was imag-
ined as one that could hold on more precisely to the past. But they remained 
fantasies from abroad as Cubans continued to fiddle with their homemade 
equipment and rely on radio in public spaces as their principal source of 
electronically transmitted sound.
Buy Buy Buy
Such an anti- consumerist engagement with radio proved frustrating to Gen-
eral Electric and Westinghouse executives, whose own projections had in-
cluded profits from purchases of receivers. Advertising was not yet a major 
generator of income, and Cuba did not require the licensing of receivers, as 
in Great Britain.37 The companies, whose expansion into Latin America had 
been premised on growing profits in the face of continuing economic diffi-
culties, embarked on a concerted effort to persuade Cubans to buy new re-
ceiving sets.38
Given the high cost and the unproven nature of the machines themselves, 
the General Electric and Westinghouse campaigns involved appealing to ex-
pectations of gender and class. Marketing strategies included persuading 
potential buyers that receivers were easy to use, attractive, and would foster 
sophisticated renewed social relations. Steve Wurtzler’s work on marketing 
of receivers in the United States has demonstrated the ways that manufactur-
ers worked to transform equipment from apparatuses worthy of garages or 
basements to pieces of furniture appropriate for living rooms and parlors.39 
A similar logic seems to have been at work in Cuba, as demonstrated by the 
advertisements populating the pages of Carteles and Social, publications that 
served as one of Havana’s principal arbiters of bourgeois taste. One General 
Electric ad promises that listeners will “dance with radio,” offering the ap-
peal of dancing in one’s own home to the best music coming “from Chicago 
or New York.”40 A drawing of well- dressed couples waltzing on a veranda of 
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what seems to be a large house suggests that the receiver’s proper place is in 
the homes and entertainments of the wealthy. The radio could turn a home 
or a veranda into a privatized version of a concert hall or a dance floor.
Other ads promoted the receivers’ simplicity. Itself simple, the ad in-
cluded a line drawing of a receiver, accompanied by the claim that it would 
receive all the concerts broadcast from the United States.41 Continuing with 
this theme, some ads included images of tuned-in children, simultaneously 
touting the possibilities of strengthening family ties, fostering cosmopoli-
tan attitudes, and operating accessible technologies: “Pepito y Bebita, antes 
de dormir, oyen un cuento que desde Chicago o New York, les transmite su 
abuelito.”42 rCa promoted its receivers in a similar manner. Assurances to 
potential buyers included clarity of sound and reception from great distances 
(always the United States, in these ads) without static. They also claimed 
simplicity and affordability, the latter somewhat undermined by the draw-
ings of elegantly dressed young women gathered around a receiver in a well- 
appointed parlor. It seemed to matter little that they neglected to explain the 
array of machines with specialized names: the “Radiola Super- Heterodyne” 
and “Radiola Regenoflex” were promoted as equally easy to use and effec-
tive.43 The appeal was to be part of a transnational audience. They were sell-
ing a relationship with the United States as much as an apparatus.
Figure 9.1 General Electric ad: “Before going to sleep, Pepito and Bebita listen to a story 
transmitted by their grandfather from New York or Chicago.” Carteles, January 1923.
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Against the emerging and existing practices of listening in the street or 
in public places, or of constructing equipment and searching for an eso-
teric variety of emanations from multiple locations, rCa and General Elec-
tric waged a campaign to promote listening that took place inside homes 
(particularly those that could afford to buy their apparatuses), by young 
women, couples, or families, to concerts or other programs broadcast from 
the United States. The acquisition of manufactured radio sets moved spaces 
of electronically mediated listening from the street to the home, from a male- 
occupied nook or closet to a female- dominated shared living space. The pub-
lic that ge, Westinghouse, and rCa hoped to foster was enclosed in private 
space and reliant on a commercial company for their entertainment. It was a 
public that sought cosmopolitan connections in the comfort of their home, 
enjoyed regular diversions at regular intervals that might move easily from 
consuming the machines to consuming that which the machines told them 
to buy, and that would integrate new technologies into traditional rituals of 
courtship, childrearing, or conviviality.
But street listening persisted, taking on new dimensions. In March 1923, 
Figure 9.2 Victrola ad: 
“To listen to the best music, 
you need Victrola.” Social, 
November 1924.
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Humberto Giquel mounted a radio and loudspeaker on a car and presented it 
at carnaval, during which the car, draped in flags and paper flowers, paraded 
the streets. Photographs denote the curiosity of onlookers, falling perhaps 
short of bedazzlement, but certainly indicating the novelty of the “radio- 
auto.”44 Just as Havana expanded from its older urban core and more cars 
began to appear in the streets, Giquel linked sound with mobility as a new 
mode of inhabiting urban space.45 The loudspeakers themselves were worthy 
of putting on display, as in the exhibit of a giant loudspeaker with a woman 
perched on top (see figure 9.3). Underscoring the new commodification of 
sound, the ad jokingly denied the commodification of women—asserting 
that though the loudspeaker was for sale, its model was not.46 As the “magi-
cian of the twentieth century,” electronically broadcast sound inspired in-
ventors and entrepreneurs to generate an array of uses. It might expand and 
fuel the entertainment industry, generate and fulfill consumer demands, or 
fill urban spaces with (more) noise.47 This pleased some observers and irri-
tated others.
Figure 9.3 A fifteen- 
foot loudspeaker. 
Carteles, October 1924.
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El Octopus Acústico
According to some critics, rather than integrating smoothly into practices 
of social reproduction or contributing to the pleasures of public space, the 
radio wrought destruction and disrupted the rhythms of family life. As ener-
getically as it was declared the magician of the twentieth century, radio was 
condemned on a number of fronts. Critics bemoaned the dangers to both na-
tion and psyches. Julio Power understood radio as science gone awry, taking 
on a life of its own and producing overwhelming, unbearable quantities of 
noise: “el monstruo ubicuo . . . perturba la paz del universo.” The noise posed 
multiple dangers, among them that of imperialism—not only were Cubans 
now condemned to hear more English than they ever wanted, once emissions 
from Europe or China increased, the cacophony would send Cubans straight 
to the insane asylum. The apocalypse would come to fruition eventually, with 
increasing rates of deafness and states battling for airwaves. Only then would 
a new, sensible silence reign.48 In the context of rising critiques of imperi-
alism and perceived threats to national autonomy, the radio served as a re-
minder of the fragility of sonic boundaries. There was no defense against the 
aural violation of national borders.
Another danger, according to Power, was a radical transformation of 
daily life, including the enjoyment of other entertainments. No one used 
cameras or phonographs anymore, and attendance had declined at live per-
formances. The radio had driven everyone inside, he argued, vacating once 
lively streets and plazas in favor of the ironically described “cajita mágica 
y radiosa.” And public space would be newly filled with the “jinete sata-
nico”: advertising. He composed a scenario in which loudspeakers mounted 
in plazas and street corners would peddle Gillette soap, Bayer aspirin, and El 
Gaitero cider. Urban centers had already become tremendously noisy, he ob-
served apocalyptically, so much so that those seeking a quiet existence would 
have to spend their lives in airplanes.49
Alberto Guigou also announced the death of traditional social rituals. 
Drawing a sharper distinction between public and private space, he an-
nounced a reign of silence in public accompanying the turn inward to do-
mestic broadcasting. Suffering from the “morbo auditivo,” people put on 
their headphones and neglected cards, chess, conversation, or books in favor 
of the radio broadcast. This had thrown families into disarray, as children 
turned away from their grandmothers’ bedtime stories or refused to go to 
bed. But courtship suffered most of all. No more furtive kisses on the sofa, no 
more lingering conversations, no more kisses blown from windows. More-
over, the radio had introduced conflict, as couples bickered over musical 
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tastes, or young women worked in vain to wrest their lovers from the ten-
tacles of the “octopus acústico.”50
If these observers agreed that the radio disrupted and corroded social 
practices, they disagreed as to how it had affected communal space: while 
one insisted on an increasingly noisy soundscape in the street, the other em-
phasized an eerily silent and deserted city. At risk were traditional family 
structures. And in contention was the use of public space. Newly mobilized 
political communities had not yet harnessed broadcasting to their purposes. 
But worries and uncertainties about the capacities of radio to transform 
space, and the practice of politics along with it, seem to be driving much of 
this commentary. As R. Murray Schafer observed, there is no ear lid, and the 
capacity of these new machines to produce sound that could not be shut off 
or ignored fed these writers’ anxieties.51 Not only were families, couples, and 
pocketbooks at risk; the radio called into question, and therefore put in dan-
ger, the very boundaries of communities and of selves.
An Assembled Audience
Despite their positions on opposite sides of the moral divide with regard to 
radio, both the critics and the advocates point to a process of what Latour 
would call a reassembly.52 Radio reorganized groups of people, bringing 
them into contact with one another and reconfiguring forms of sociability. 
Electrical engineers, corporate executives, young women, journalists, adver-
tising agencies, and aspiring broadcasters all came to have a stake in sonic 
technologies and the process by which they would become part of daily Ha-
vanan life. Responding to an initial context of ambulatory listening and con-
Figure 9.4 “Radio and Love,” by Alberto Guigou. Carteles, May 1923.
El naciente público oyente | 267
sumers that preferred tinkering over buying, private capital worked to create 
a listening audience in private, domestic, moneyed spaces. Listeners grew 
accustomed to designing aural schedules, demanding clarity of sound, and 
regarding emanations from long distances as normal occurrences. Amateurs 
remained outside and on the margins of the tightening bonds between capi-
tal and broadcasting, but they did not disappear. Changing configurations of 
wires, machines, microphones, transmitters, and receivers conjured people 
to make, fix, listen to, and buy them. An audience had come into being.
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New Knowledge for New Times
The Sociedad del Folklore Cubano during  
the “Critical Decade” (1923–1930)
Ricardo Quiza Moreno
Historians have dubbed Cuba in the 1920s the “critical decade” or the 
era of a “burgeoning national consciousness.” From profound eco-
nomic crises to the rise of the Machado dictatorship, developments 
in this period set the tone and shape for the country’s subsequent 
growth. These developments took place within an atmosphere char-
acterized by a dynamic civil society and the emergence of new social 
actors, including artists and intellectuals with an unprecedented level 
of awareness of their civic role in subverting the republic of “generals 
and doctors” and engendering alternative discourses in historiogra-
phy, music, literature, and the fine arts.1 The political and economic 
upheavals of the 1920s pervaded cultural production. This revolution 
within the aesthetic and academic sphere was enacted through the 
initiative of artists and intellectuals and supported by the emergence 
of institutions that facilitated the process of reinvigoration and me-
diated the implementation of novel political cultures. The Sociedad 
de Estudios del Folklore Cubano (Society for the Study of Cuban 
Folklore) was among those institutions that dedicated themselves to 
researching and promoting nontraditional culture and to develop-
ing new scientific standards. This organization aimed at recovering 
cultural material far removed from the elitist objects of analysis pro-
moted by official academia.
The Sociedad del Folklore emerged within a national and global 
context that favored the rise of novel focuses and methods in artistic 
and academic spheres. The end of the First World War brought on 
a plethora of popular movements—some related to the disruptions 
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provoked by the war itself and others related to the drive of laissez- faire capi-
talism. Oswald Spengler hastened to proclaim the “decline of the West” due 
to the incompatibility of a dogma dedicated to individual liberties, the spon-
taneity of the market, and a mechanical model of progress defined by urban 
and demographic growth and the expansion of capitalist relations to mar-
ginalized sectors. The complex social dynamics following the Belle Époque 
escaped the normative frameworks of interpretation dictated by Newtonian 
principles and Darwinism. At their height, psychoanalysis, sociology, and 
anthropology evinced a “will to know” that grounded its object of study in 
the Other. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that these innovative 
disciplines were frequently used to legitimize regimes cut from a totalitar-
ian cloth; with the growing importance of the masses within the political 
sphere, such regimes incorporated the popular sectors rather than simply 
ruling over them coercively. We need only remember the use of Lombrosian 
anthropology in Mussolini’s fascism.
As a dependent country with rigid political stratification, Cuba quickly 
became acquainted with the paradoxes of the post–World War I era. In fact, 
the second decade of the republic would witness economic and governmen-
tal crises that would discredit the republic endorsed in 1902. In the same 
period that the Sociedad del Folklore Cubano emerged, a number of groups 
of intellectuals, women, students, war veterans, workers, and a portion of the 
petit bourgeoisie manifested their nonconformity to the political project that 
had been spearheaded by the protagonists of the anticolonial movement at 
the turn of the century. Notably, the committee that created the Sociedad del 
Folklore was formed in 1923, the same year that other bellwether organiza-
tions appeared: the Federation of University Students, the Communist Com-
mittee of Havana, the National Movement of Veterans and Patriots, and the 
“José Martí” Popular University.2 During this period, the country celebrated 
the first congresses for women and students, and two years later the first 
communist party and first trade union confederation appeared. This decade 
also saw the manifesto known as the “Protesta de los Trece” (the “Protest of 
the Thirteen”), a response by intellectuals furious with the reigning state of 
corruption.3
In the academic terrain, especially among historians, confrontation mani-
fested itself as a clash between different modes of reconstructing the nation’s 
past: crisis called for a critical revision of official history. Subjects and theo-
ries until then virtually unknown began to compete with more traditional 
scholarship, and the use of unconventional sources justified these novel in-
terpretations. At the same time, new ideas about the origins and future of the 
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patria, or nation, began to flourish and be widely distributed. The historian 
Ramiro Guerra’s well- known text Azúcar y población en las Antillas (Sugar 
and population in the Antilles), for example, a text that questioned the coun-
try’s sugar production and latifundista model was published in the influen-
tial, though controversial, newspaper Diario de la Marina.
Nevertheless, the public statements of intellectuals and the ideas about 
Cuba’s condition expressed in their works do not tell the full story of the cul-
tural radicalism of this decade. The intellectual rivalries staged in the island’s 
republic of letters displayed particular characteristics derived from specifici-
ties in the process of cultural production. An understanding of the dialectic 
between academic attitudes and their external determinants must recognize 
not only the quality of a culture to reflect a particular era but also its autono-
mous character in structuring it. As Pierre Bourdieu puts it, the “specificity 
of the system of production . . . leads to the specificity of the relations which 
are established within it: the relations between each of the agents of the sys-
tem and the agents or institutions which are entirely or partly external to the 
system are always mediated by the relations established within the system 
itself, that is inside the intellectual field.”4
It is in this sense that I propose to show how the cultural practices and 
policies that developed within the Society of Cuban Folklore, an intriguing if 
short- lived manifestation of the new cultural production of the 1920s, estab-
lished strategies that contributed to the subversion of the cultural order of 
the republic while simultaneously creating alternative sensibilities. Beyond 
an investigation of the decade’s cultural products—as the result of a certain 
mode of expression and aesthetic standard as well as exponents of social 
conflict—I am interested in specifying the connection between the structure 
of society and the modes of operation and organization of the institutions 
that made the creation of symbolic goods possible. I emphasize the prac-
tices, rituals, and institutional norms that led to the foundations of a new 
social imaginary.
Tradition within Rupture: The Sociedad del  
Folklore Cubano and Its Cultural Debts
The creation of alternative spaces for the social sciences was a distinctive sign 
of a new phase in Cuba: the debut and subsequent development of the Socie-
dad del Folklore was a confirmation of this turn of events. Nevertheless, the 
cultural group was constrained by certain debts—bound as it was to traces 
of a cultural tradition that mediated its reformist nature. This new cultural 
project relied on the support of several members of the Academia de la His-
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toria de Cuba (Cuban Academy of History), an organization renowned for 
its relations with the government and its explicit desire to legitimize an epic 
discourse saturated with heroes.5 The inauguration of the Sociedad del Folk-
lore was attended by academic historians and others who endorsed this new 
organization.6 Three of six members of the Sociedad’s board of directors also 
served in the Academia de la Historia.7 In fact, many members of the Aca-
demia or similar organizations, such as the Academia Nacional de Artes y 
Letras (National Academy of Arts and Letters) and the Sociedad Económica 
Amigos del País (the Economic Society of Friends of the Country, in whose 
head office the folkloric group was founded), served as committee members 
of the Sociedad or collaborators of its journal, Archivos del Folklore Cubano.8
Moreover, the four honorary presidents elected during the organization’s 
first session were prominent individuals in the Academia de la Historia.9 
Although the organization failed to receive the governmental support it re-
quired,10 the Secretaría de Instrucción Pública y Bellas Artes (secretary of 
public education and fine arts) nonetheless entrusted this new organiza-
tion with the task of creating and distributing propaganda and documenting 
popular culture in various cities across the country, cities that would become 
home to this organization’s first folkloric groups.11
The Sociedad del Folklore’s ties to powerful academic figures and insti-
tutions can be explained: beyond the political and conceptual differences 
visible in the principal cultural projects of the era, there were also affinities 
that were inherent to the intellectual milieu of Cuba at this time. This conver-
gence stemmed from specific characteristics within the practice of the social 
sciences, especially historiography, in addition to the historical context. A 
preoccupation with “the past” permeated the social sciences and remained 
a strong focus for cultural organizations that emerged in the first years of 
the republic. There was a certain need to explain the origins of the political 
regime in Cuba, a necessity that only escalated with the approaching cele-
brations of a quarter century of independence at the very time that Cuba was 
experiencing the breakdown of governance and civil consensus. By 1922, the 
economic model maintained by sugar production was in crisis, which led to 
General Gerardo Machado’s rise to power and the consolidation of the re-
public’s first dictatorship.
The recovery and study of the past pervaded academic production to such 
an extent that the Sociedad del Folklore understood folklore as “the popular” 
in historical terms. An editorial in the organization’s journal proclaimed: “in 
Cuba, the moment one cuts through the mental surface of the Pueblo [the 
People], one discovers the rich veins of ancestral tradition since, in the sub-
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soil of Cuban popular culture, there lies unknown deposits of very different 
civilizations.”12 This kind of “human geology” proposed by the Sociedad was 
accompanied by a strong dose of nationalism—a characteristic that made it 
akin to other intellectual strains in Cuba during the 1920s. Hence the journal 
Archivos del Folklore Cubano was conceived as a “refuge for the Cuban soul 
under whose shelter we could protect ourselves from the hurricanes raging 
outside.”13
The study and recovery of the past and an inclination to focus on national 
history as well as a similarity in research procedures—examining sources, 
writing practices, and the defense of the principle of scientific objectivity—
made possible a degree of communion between cultural agencies and agents. 
The model questionnaire for compiling popular Cuban literature, designed 
by the Society of Folklore and published in its journal, proposed as its prem-
ise that “the documenter should not alter what is heard from the narrator: 
respect his grammar, his logic, and his spirit.” In like manner, the institution 
offered a variety of instructions for researchers: in the event of oral evidence, 
the researcher was urged to investigate the interviewee and refer to his or her 
nationality, origin, name, and age as well as the form, moment, and place 
in which the data was transmitted. In the case of written evidence, the re-
searcher was to record information about the document.14
The Sociedad del Folklore established an interesting dialectic between 
tradition, change, nationalism, and science as a result of its advocacy for 
“national reconstruction.”15 On the other hand, orthodox institutions were 
continually affirmed for their significant work and research in culture, dem-
onstrated by the conferring of intellectual distinctions and honors as well as 
the publication and promotion of individual works. Referring to his election 
as corresponding member of the Spanish Academy of History (Academia de 
la Historia de España), Fernando Ortiz accepted that “these Spanish acade-
mies retain prestige.”16 Nevertheless, despite its imperfections, the republic’s 
political system possessed a margin of tolerance that allowed for the func-
tioning of civil society and admitted dissident features within its structure 
even if these were periodically repressed by the emergence of authoritarian 
governments.
From Heterogeneous to Heterodox:  
The Composition of the Sociedad del Folklore Cubano
The variety of individuals directly and indirectly associated with the Socie-
dad del Folklore was a testament to its innovative and pluralistic charac-
ter—a quality that affected not only the themes selected for research but the 
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methods of investigation as well. The institution’s foundational gathering—
a meeting of both female and male intellectuals, some of them affiliated with 
the artistic and political vanguard of the period—was a sign of what would 
follow in the seven years of the organization’s existence. In contrast to the 
masculine profile of other cultural centers, the Sociedad del Folklore ad-
mitted many women who came to occupy decisive positions in the organi-
zation and wrote with regularity in its journal. Carolina Poncet y de Cárde-
nas, in particular, was a pioneer of folkloric studies; her thesis on ballads in 
Cuba won the Premio Nacional de Artes y Letras in 1913.17 Perhaps the most 
notable contribution made by female members—who were mostly teachers 
and specialists in pedagogy—was the introduction of childhood as a privi-
leged subject of study. Both “The Folklore of Cuban Children,” by Sofía Cór-
dova, and “Superstitions and Cuban Children,” by Consuelo Miranda, were 
doctoral projects from the Escuela de Pedagogia (School of Education) of the 
Universidad de La Habana that were published in installments in the insti-
tution’s journal. To these was added “Superstitions and Cuban Schoolchil-
dren,” by Manuela Fonseca García.18
The folkloric society brought together three generations of scholars: those 
who had participated in the political and cultural processes during Indepen-
dence; those who were born in the late nineteenth century; and those born 
during the republic who, like the preceding generation, achieved recognition 
in the first three decades of the twentieth century. The latter two generations, 
recognized as the island’s “thirteenth and fourteenth literary generation,” 
forced an air of reform into the organization. They arrived on a scene of 
cultural production that had long been defined by dogma, a fact that drove 
them to find other modes of cultural and academic expression and an alter-
native to institutional legitimization.19 The majority of those who had not 
participated in the anticolonial project set forth political ideals that oscil-
lated between a new kind of nationalism and the resolute militancy of the 
Left. To a certain extent a parallel can be drawn between the organization’s 
academic agenda and the political and generational plurality of its members. 
In this way, it is significant that the majority of the organization’s contribu-
tors were scholars who belonged to this aforementioned “thirteenth genera-
tion.” Among the most prominent were Fernando Ortiz, Carolina Poncet, 
Juan Marinello, and José María Chacón y Calvo.
Fernando Ortiz was affiliated with the Movimiento Minorista and was a 
critic of the Machado dictatorship.20 Ortiz presided over the Sociedad del 
Folklore, acting as the proprietor of its journal in a moment of crisis and de-
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veloping the organization’s international connections. His works appeared 
in nearly every issue of Archivos del Folklore Cubano and were characterized 
by their interdisciplinary nature, sheer quantity of data, and extensive use of 
a comparative approach.21 Together, Carolina Poncet and Chacón y Calvo 
applied a philological- historical approach to the study of folklore largely 
rooted in Spanish traditions, a framework they had acquired through con-
tact with the respected linguist Ramón Menéndez Pidal. Without straying 
from a descriptive method as prescribed by the Positivists, Poncet and Cha-
cón studied in great depth the etymology of ancestral grammar, mostly origi-
nating from Spain, to arrive at the foundations of a national culture. Finally, 
both approaches can be found in the work of Juan Marinello, an intellectual 
who would eventually come to embrace Marxism.22
In spite of his extended residency in Spain for diplomatic reasons, José M. 
Chacón never ceased to collaborate with the Sociedad—assisting in its jour-
nal as much as in the development of folkloric groups throughout Cuba. It 
is certainly not by chance that the organization’s two most important mem-
bers, Chacón and Fernando Ortiz, tried to change the logic of tradition and 
exclusion in the Academia de la Historia. It is perhaps for this reason that 
both men decided to create a far more open and democratic association with 
respect to its composition and object of study.
While presiding over the Academia de la Historia, Ortiz advocated for the 
admittance of new generations of historians while simultaneously denounc-
ing the monopolistic character of the Academia. In 1929 a conflict arose sur-
rounding Chacón’s book Cedulario Cubano. Chacón had been commissioned 
by the Academia to procure from Spain a colossal folder of documents on 
Cuba, which essentially acted as the supporting material to his own volume. 
Many academics questioned whether Chacón had acted correctly in publish-
ing his text based on the materials he had been entrusted to submit to the 
Academia or whether he had violated his contract with the Academia. This 
discussion ultimately highlighted the aristocratic nature of the Academia, a 
fact that would lead to the resignation of both Ortiz and Chacón years later.23
Nevertheless, attitudes toward the generational issue as well as the Socie-
dad del Folklore’s political creed and breadth of academic production were 
far from univocal. As a result, figures like Emeterio Santovenia and Ramiro 
Guerra, contemporaries of Ortiz and members of the same folkloric group, 
held differing positions. Santovenia conducted extensive research that, from 
a descriptive angle, contributed greatly to local and national history, yet later 
maintained close political ties to the series of governments that culminated 
276 | Ricardo Quiza Moreno
in the authoritarian rule of Fulgencio Batista.24 Guerra, on the other hand, 
author of one of the most iconoclastic historical texts of the period, nonethe-
less embraced the nationalist project of Machado to such an extent that he 
became his private secretary. The fall of Machado, the “donkey with claws,” 
led to Guerra’s self- imposed exile in the United States; when he returned to 
Cuba, he entirely removed himself from politics with the exception of occa-
sionally participating as an expert in some international events.25
In order to carry out its objective of “documenting, classifying, and com-
paring traditional elements of our popular life,” the Sociedad del Folklore 
relied on specialists from a variety of disciplines.26 The coexistence of mul-
tiple disciplines within the same cultural space signified a breakdown in the 
predominance held by the disciplines of history, pedagogy, and law within 
the country. This plurality brought the folkloric organization nearer to the 
standards for greater disciplinary variety embraced by the Sociedad Econó-
mica Amigos del País, although the latter did not count among its collabo-
rators a sufficient number of the new disciplines in Cuba such as sociology, 
anthropology, archaeology, and ethnography.27
Rupture within Tradition: The Structures, Themes,  
and Objects of Study of the Sociedad de Folklore
In contrast to other cultural institutions, which were quite rigid, the Socie-
dad del Folklore established a flexible system of organization. One of its most 
notable features was a spirit of equality among its members, privileging both 
individual contributions and collective works. Although the organization’s 
membership categories resembled those of other institutions, its require-
ments for admittance varied substantially. For instance, there was no limit 
to the number of collaborators allowed and there were no special conditions 
for admittance; members of this category could be residents of Havana or 
any other city with folkloric groups. Corresponding members, on the other 
hand, could be residents of areas abroad or areas with no folklore groups 
present whatsoever.28
The Sociedad’s organizational system functioned according to a radial 
structure unlike the pyramidal structure of the Academia de la Historia and 
the Academia Nacional de Artes y Letras. The institution had a central or-
ganization in Havana with delegations in various parts of the country. Be-
ginning in 1923, branches began to appear in Santiago de Cuba, Pinar del 
Río, Güines, Camagüey, Cienfuegos, Bayamo, Trinidad, Sancti Spíritus, and 
Matanzas.29 The original platform granted its branches “absolute autonomy” 
in internal management, programs of study, and social activities; further-
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more, the right of delegates to participate in the organization’s central gov-
erning committee was defended.30
If traditional organizations grounded their authority in a system of inter-
nal hierarchies, other groups like the Academia Cubana de la Lengua (the 
Cuban Academy of Languages) and the Sociedad del Folklore aspired to 
make an impact on the academic sphere by using a different intellectual style 
that held the power to convene. Of course, capturing a following that would 
enlist itself as equal members in a new cultural project was a recurring and 
characteristic strategy of this cultural era in Cuba. In this way, there is some-
thing revealing about the work developed by Chacón and Ortiz in the Aca-
demia Cubana de la Lengua in 1926, motivated by the intention of achieving 
independence from official and traditional cultural standards. With respect 
to this, scholars Patricia Motola and Marialys Perdomo, argue:
One of the most polemical questions concerned the designation of the 
first members. In his letters to Chacón y Calvo, Fernando Ortiz insisted 
that this Spanish organization should not immediately appoint long- 
standing academics. His intention was that the Academia should accu-
rately reflect the intellectual profile of the period. For this reason, among 
the founders of the Academia there appeared personalities from a range 
of generations and political postures, all recognized for the merit of their 
work in the cultural sphere. In every case the designation was motivated 
by the fulfillment of requirements such as having demonstrated a devo-
tion and competency in philological studies; this was demonstrated not 
only through prolificacy but also by indicating, in one’s publications, an 
excellent grasp of Castillano. In other words, only Cubans of “high moral 
standing and good manners” who resided in Havana and were over the 
age of thirty could aspire to this lifelong post.31
In a 1927 statute, the Sociedad changed its parameters of operation and 
limited the number of full members to thirty. From this point on, in order to 
be a full member, the individual had to reside in the capital or its surround-
ing municipalities, be of legal age, and be a published or emerging scholar or 
author of a completed work relevant to the study of folklore. The same re-
quirements except those related to residency applied to corresponding mem-
bers.32 These changes were intended to address logistical issues rather than 
implement a politics of discrimination, since the most valuable financial and 
intellectual contributors to the organization were located in Havana. More-
over, the study of folklore was a new discipline, and many of those advocates 
isolated from the culture of the metropolis were insufficiently prepared to 
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undertake folkloric studies with the professionalism required. These indi-
viduals were typically amateurs whose work was limited to collecting infor-
mation about popular traditions.
However, the editorial politics of the Sociedad del Folklore were particu-
larly democratic, as they accepted contributions to Archivos del Folklore Cu-
bano from all over the country; these contributions were granted more or 
less prominence according to the quality of the work. Even submissions of 
lesser significance were accepted and published in a collection designated 
for “various data . . . that due to its brevity or character does not warrant 
being published separately or in another section.” Regular contributors like 
Fernando Ortiz provided some of the information in this section, but ordi-
nary readers were responsible for the rest. Occasionally, Archivos del Folklore 
Cubano accepted brief notes, commentaries, and observations from readers 
residing in Pinar del Río, Havana (Marianao and el Cotorro), and Las Villas 
(Trinidad). At one point the journal even published the notes of a young 
Cuban boy, Andrés Fernández Estévez.33
This academic ingenuity reflects the tensions within an institution that, 
while avoiding obstructing contributors with valuable information, aspired 
to innovate within a terrain that was insufficiently explored by the sciences. 
In fact, nearly 50 percent of the 149 articles initially published in Archivos del 
Folklore Cubano were highly descriptive in tone. The degree of unfamiliarity 
with folkloric material and sources led Francisco de Paula Coronado, in the 
organization’s second session, to volunteer his services by writing a letter to 
the major public libraries around the world in order to find groups and pub-
lications in other nations that specialized in folkloric studies.34
The operational metamorphosis endured by the Sociedad del Folklore 
was a sign of the existing cultural disparity between the capital—a solid cul-
tural infrastructure maintained by institutions, widely distributed journals, 
printing presses, publishing houses, schools, and libraries—and the rest of 
the country. Nonetheless, the modifications did not affect the secular spirit of 
the organization. On the contrary, the solemnities and exclusivities of other 
institutions were not implemented in the folkloric organization. The primary 
sources consulted on the Sociedad reveal neither the existence of any special 
liturgies upon admittance to the institution nor the conferring of any insig-
nias on its members. There were neither medals nor shields, nor armchairs, 
nor portraits—at most perhaps a black cat, a symbol of the popular beliefs 
and traditions that dominated the pages of the organization’s journal as a 
vulgar allegory announcing the displacement of more traditional objects of 
study (see figure 10.1).35
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Ethnographic questions especially concerning the treatment of black 
Cubans is a crucial theme when addressing matters that most concerned the 
Sociedad del Folklore Cubano, given that the country had only abolished 
slavery thirty- six years earlier, and in 1912 the state had ferociously repressed 
Afro- Cubans in putting down a rebellion by the Partido Independiente de 
Color.36 The Sociedad del Folklore Cubano did not content itself with cele-
brating pre- Columbian and Spanish traditions. It also recovered a cultural 
patrimony of African origin. The organization entered the public debate in 
favor of the importance of Afro- Cubans to the Cuban melting pot and estab-
lished the contributions of its descendants as a formative part of the nation 
and Cuban nationality.37
Perhaps the most exemplary illustration of their efforts is the constant ap-
pearance of articles dedicated to this theme in Archivos del Folklore Cubano. 
Among these articles, appearing under the generic titles of “The Afrocuban 
Feast Day of the Kings” and “Los negros curros” (roughly translatable as 
“the Black Dandies”) were the works of Ortiz who in this period emphasized 
connections between Africa and certain Cuban attitudes and celebrations.38 
Ortiz’s academic and institutional efforts in the 1920s served as the basis for 
a cultural movement—expressed primarily through poetry but also through 
Figure 10.1  
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literature, journalism, music, and the visual arts—that acknowledged those 
of African descent as an essential component to the essence of what is Cuban. 
Above all, the movement embraced African roots in Cuban music, religion, 
and language.39 In contrast to other discourses on race, the Afro- Cuban 
movement, contemporaneous with the Sociedad del Folklore, emphasized 
the necessity to integrate blancos and negros within the same national com-
posite. At the same time, working- class Afro- Cubans championed a similar 
discourse that spread throughout popular culture.40
The catalog of cultural manifestations that were of interest to the Socie-
dad del Folklore was as vast as the organization’s makeup. Work conducted 
by the institution included documentation of stories, fables, and legends; 
analyses of ballads, décimas, songs, boleros, popular music, and poetry; as 
well as studies of locutions, idioms, tongue twisters, cubanismos, and other 
popular philological forms. The institution also devoted itself to the recovery 
of proverbs, refrains, riddles, and diverse modes of expression as well as the 
compiling of popular knowledge about folk medicine, botany, geography, 
or agriculture. Finally, the Sociedad del Folklore also dedicated itself to de-
scriptions of superstitions and supernatural beliefs as well as local customs, 
fiestas, dances, ceremonies, and children’s games.
A Change of Scenery: Research Strategies and Institutional Tactics
In order to collect the wealth of folkloric material within the country, the 
Sociedad turned to techniques that were used infrequently during this 
period. They used surveys and interviews that led to working relationships 
with informants and demonstrated the importance accorded oral sources. 
On January 22, 1923, the Sociedad del Folklore appointed Carolina Poncet 
and Manuel Pérez Beato to write a questionnaire on Cuban folklore. On Feb-
ruary 9 of the same year the Sociedad approved another questionnaire, de-
veloped by Chacón y Calvo, relating to popular literature and accepted a 
proposal by Gaspar Agüero to develop a survey on music. Two months later, 
both scholars submitted their projects to the Sociedad for further discus-
sion.41 The questionnaire developed by Chacón y Calvo, who was assisted 
in the end by Poncet and Pérez Beato, established a series of instructions 
and regulations for the study of folklore. The authors advised researchers to 
pay special attention to oral traditions without distorting the information 
heard.42 The goals and the nature of the information collected by the Socie-
dad del Folklore justify the originality of the scientific proposal. Its scientific 
objective and the use of empirical data and procedures granted this organi-
zation—aimed as it was at rebuilding and legitimizing a plebeian history—
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a distinctive mark that distinguished it from the heroic and grandiloquent 
narratives of traditional historiography.
In addition to implementing novel research procedures, the Sociedad del 
Folklore Cubano engaged in editorial and organizational maneuvers in order 
to strengthen its cultural project and survive within an adverse environment. 
The editors of Archivos del Folklore Cubano acknowledged antecedents of 
folkloric research in Cuba to lend to this discipline a certain pedigree. How-
ever, this kind of cultural patina that consecrated and certified certain pro-
cesses of “invention of tradition” was in keeping with academic trends of the 
period. Reproducing work of this kind served to give scientific value to the 
institution and supplement its journal, which depended on valuable contri-
butions that were not always readily available.
In order to strengthen the institution’s academic excellence, the journal 
included works written by notable intellectuals of the nineteenth century 
such as José Martí, the naturalist Felipe Poey, rare book specialist Antonio 
Bachiller y Morales, and various writers like Gertudis Gómez de Avellaneda, 
Luis Victoriano Betancourt, and the Puerto Rican costumbrista Manuel A. 
Alonso.43 Editors also published contributions from distinguished special-
ists like the North American historian Irene A. Wright’s foundational works 
on early colonialism in Cuba and the works of philologist and lexicographer 
Antenor Nascentes, an authority on the Portuguese language in Brazil.44 To 
these scholars were added Aurelio Espinosa, a renowned Stanford University 
scholar, Ramón A. Laval, the most prominent Chilean folklorist of his time, 
and the American anthropologist and sociologist Elsie Clews Parsons. All 
were united by the influence of Franz Boas, whose works largely shaped the 
discipline of anthropology in the first half of the twentieth century.45
Boas’s theory of cultural relativism emphasized the necessity to research 
without prejudice or discrimination the heritage of so- called peripheral 
peoples, an approach that fit well in the Cuban setting. Contrary to Spen-
cerian evolution, which dominated universities and research centers in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, Boas maintained that there were no 
superior or inferior forms of culture. He rejected Western ethnocentrism 
and its assumption of supremacy in relation to other cultures. This concept 
opened up the potential for close and equitable collaborations between ex-
perts of the “First World” and their colleagues in other parts of the world.
Furthermore, sections like “Noticias y comentarios” and “De la Sociedad 
del Folklore” in Archivos del Foklore Cubano served as publicity for the folk-
loric association and its foreign counterparts. In these sections one could 
gain a sense of the broad impact of the Sociedad on specialized publications 
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like the British Journal of African Society, the German Volktam und Kultur 
der Romanan, and the Journal of American Folklore, as well as local papers 
like El Mundo and Diario de la Marina.46 The latter was traditionally a re-
actionary paper in wide circulation that, thanks to Ramiro Guerra, a mem-
ber of the Sociedad and one of the paper’s principal editors, popularized the 
institution’s work in a permanent section entitled “Cuban Folklore Notes.”47 
The voice of the cultural and political vanguard—in addition to members 
from marginalized sectors like Guerra, Emilio Roig, Nicólas Guillén, and 
Gustavo Urrutia along with a generation of youth that integrated the Movi-
miento Minorista—balanced the tone of the Diario de la Marina.48 No less 
important in communicating the importance of folkloric research was the 
bibliography section in Archivos del Folklore Cubano, which reviewed works 
about folklore by both Cuban and foreign authors. It became an important 
tool for transmitting the organization’s cultural project in the sense that it 
suggested to the reader, in a compelling manner, the importance of acquir-
ing new forms of knowledge.
Nevertheless, despite efforts to occupy a relevant place within the aca-
demic field, the existence of the Sociedad del Folklore was relatively short- 
lived, and the organization was plagued by financial worries and the ab-
sence of official support. Even at the moment of drafting the first regulations, 
many members already had a sense of the difficulties the institution would 
encounter in its trajectory. Article 9 of the bylaws stated that in the event 
the organization should dissolve, its archives and library would pass to the 
public library of the Sociedad Económica Amigos del País. This was indeed 
a brilliant and democratic anticipatory solution of last resorts that ensured 
that materials conserved by the organization would remain accessible to all.49 
Concerns about the survival of the organization must certainly have peaked 
when, in its fourth session, the Secretaría de Instrucción Pública y Bellas 
Artes denied the possibility of financial assistance.50
On the other hand, following the logic of enlightenment, the organiza-
tion’s determination to overcome obstacles made it a kind of missionary 
institution on the verge of new cultural horizons. In fact, the Sociedad del 
Folklore recognized the advantages of the new scholarship it was producing 
and insisted on its role as eradicator of “the darkness of our intellectual en-
vironment.”51 Yet, unlike other established organizations, it lacked a desire 
for acclaim.
The organization’s financial balance from 1924 to July 15, 1927, showed 
a deficit of 492 pesos, a sum ultimately defrayed by Fernando Ortiz, who 
nonetheless conveyed the impossibility of repeating such a “heroic deed.”52 
New Knowledge for New Times | 283
Monetary problems also placed the institution on unfavorable ground with 
respect to the publishing houses charged with producing its journal. The 
terms imposed by the latter, in order to continue publishing Archivos del 
Folklore Cubano without cost, were that Ortiz had to become its owner.53
The institution’s inability to control the production of its cultural ma-
terial is indicated by the poor publication quality of its journal—with ir-
regular periodicity and numerous misprints. This was the price to pay for an 
institution that had attempted to incorporate itself, with new and alternative 
projects, in the cultural field of the period.54 A low number of subscribers—
at barely thirty- two—and the absence of a large consumer base demonstrate 
how difficult it was to coin a new cultural project in the midst of a cultural 
orthodoxy supported by a political model that although decaying still held 
spiritual force.55 The difficulty in finding an audience had much to do with 
the disjoint between tradition and change within the economic, social, and 
cultural orders.
Archivos del Folklore Cubano attempted to supplement the weak reception 
of Ortiz’s and Chacón’s projects with commercial advertisements that ulti-
mately undermined the academic puritanism cultivated by institutions like 
the Academia de la Historia de Cuba and gave the Sociedad del Folklore the 
appearance of a pragmatic culture industry.56 It is noteworthy that advertise-
ments displayed in the folkloric journal came from small and medium- sized 
businesses with relative preponderance in the Cuban economy. The reason 
for this is perhaps that this publication was of no interest to large local or 
foreign sugar- producing industries or perhaps its publishers had either no 
interest in or simply no access to advertisers with higher purchasing power. 
What is clear, however, is the confluence between this new cultural project 
and the aspirations of a sector of the bourgeoisie directed toward an inter-
nal market.
At the beginning or end of every issue, nearly always appearing as an 
entire page, were advertisements from the insurance company El Iris, which 
had Ortiz as one of its principal shareholders. This was also the place where 
other businesses would advertise, such as the bookstores Minerva, La Mo-
derna Poesía, and Cervantes, the latter two associated with the publisher 
Cultural S.A. Other advertisers included Fábrica Nacional de Toallas, the 
well- known store El Encanto, and the beer La Tropical, which was advertised 
as the “drink of Liborio . . . folkloric personification of the Cuban people” 
(see figure 10.2).57 All these “minor” industries, as they were known in this 
period, contributed to the precarious sustainability of Archivos del Folklore 
Cubano.58
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Structured or Structuring? The Legacy of an Academic Institution
The Sociedad del Folklore Cubano was founded on January 6, 1923, a date 
that coincided with the Afro- Cuban Feast Day of the Kings. On the same 
date, the Archivos del Folklore Cubano published an editorial supporting the 
institution’s mission. The inaugural pages of the publication conveyed pre-
monitions of the uncertain future of the organization, though it nonethe-
less drew attention to the impoverished state of studies of popular culture 
and the need to strengthen these kinds of analyses within the nation. The 
text largely summarized the purpose and character of the folkloric organiza-
tion detailing the interrelations between its academic and public objectives: 
“An entire treasure lies hidden beneath layers of modern culture, waiting for 
Cuban scholars to discover, interpret, classify, and establish it for national 
civilization.”59
In this sense, and in accordance with Bourdieu’s theory of the confor-
mation of a cultural field with its specificities, it can be affirmed that the 
actions of the Sociedad del Folkore, even in its routine practices, reveal the 
Figure 10.2 Ad for La Tropical 
beer featuring the Liborio 
character. From author’s 
collection.
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characteristics of an entire political and sociocultural sphere undergoing im-
portant transformations. The Sociedad del Folklore Cubano constituted an 
alternative academic forum that, out of the originality of its scientific pro-
posal attempted to carve a space in the nation’s cultural sphere. Its dissi-
dence with regard to traditional cultural projects is demonstrated not only 
by its unorthodox structure and organizational composition but also by its 
institutional strategies and practices and the novel content of its discourse. 
Structured and structuring, the Sociedad del Folklore resulted from the de-
mands of an age and, at the same time, conceived of itself as forging national 
representations far from the dominant ideological standards. Although its 
domain of activity and capacity to spread its new canon was limited, the 
Sociedad del Folklore nonetheless constituted a link in the gradual paradigm 
shift that occurred in Cuba beginning in the 1920s.
The Sociedad del Folklore expressed and enabled transformations in na-
tional sensibilities behind other, better known milestones in the offing. In 
1937, the Havana- based Teatro Campoamor performed an unusual piece on 
the sacred music of the Yoruba Africans. For the first time in Cuba, esoteric 
song, sounds, and dances became a secular spectacle. Fernando Ortiz and 
the Institución Hispanocubana de Cultura, which succeeded the Sociedad 
del Folklore, were largely responsible for this project.60 This artistic represen-
tation demonstrated a shift that had occurred in the country’s social imagi-
nary—black Cubans had agreed to present their social and sacred values to a 
public that, although small, opened itself to receive the rich popular culture. 
Years later, the so- called Constitution of 1940 established, in article 20, that 
“the republic does not recognize exemptions or privileges and declares all 
discrimination by motivation of sex, race, color, or class and any other harm 
to human dignity as illegal and punishable.”61
Notes
1. The name given to the first republic (1902–33) from the 1920 novel of the same 
name by Carlos Loveira. The novel describes the atmosphere of corruption and pa-
tronage that reigned in an era in which a teacher, three generals, and a lawyer won the 
presidency.
2. The original Spanish names are the Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios, the 
Agrupación Comunista de la Habana, the Movimiento Nacional de Veteranos y Patrio-
tas, and the Universidad Popular José Martí.
3. On this event see Pichardo, Documentos para la Historia de Cuba (Tomo iii), 
119–20.
4. Bourdieu, “Intellectual Field and Creative Project,” 92.
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5. For a detailed study of the role and place of the Academia de la Historia de Cuba 
in the country’s academic and political landscape, see Quiza Moreno, El cuento al revés, 
55–69.
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Sociedad del Folklore Cubano,” Archivos del Folklore Cubano (afC) 1, no. 1 (January 
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board of the Sociedad del Folklore as librarian and archivist; and Néstor Carbonell and 
Ramón Catalá, members at large of the folklore board and members also of the Aca-
demia Nacional de Artes y Letras. Catalá was also a member of the Academia Cubana 
de la Lengua after its foundation in 1927. “Actas de la Sociedad del Folklore Cubano,” 
afC 1, no. 1 (January 1924): 82; “Fundación de la Sociedad del Folklore Cubano,” afC 1, 
no. 1 (January 1924): 92.
9. The honorary members of the Academia de la Historia were Enrique J. Varona, 
Manuel Sanguily, and Raimundo Cabrera. “Fundación de la Sociedad del Folklore Cu-
bano,” afC 1, no. 1 (January 1924): 93.
10. The minister of public education and fine arts, Francisco Zayas y Alfonso, who 
was recognized as an honorary member of Cuba’s first association of folklorists, denied 
official support to the entity, and this is registered in its minutes. “Actas de la Sociedad 
del Folklore Cubano,” afC 1, no. 1 (January 1924): 86.
11. “Actas de la Sociedad del Folklore Cubano,” afC 1, no. 1 (January 1924): 77.
12. “Esta revista cubana,” afC 1, no. 1 (January 1924): 5–6.
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14. “Cuestionario de literatura popular cubana,” afC 1, no. 1 (January 1924): 9–10.
15. “Actas de la Sociedad del Folklore Cubano,” afC 1, no. 1 (January 1924): 77.
16. Gutiérrez Vega, José María Chacón y Calvo, 36.
17. Poncet became the chair in Gramática y Composición in Havana’s Escuela Nor-
mal de Maestros in 1915 and traveled to Spain in 1920, where she took a course with 
Menéndez Pidal. Ortiz García, “Cultura popular y construcción nacional,” 704.
18. Córdova, “El folklore del niño cubano,” afC 1, nos. 3–4 (May 1925) and “El folk-
lore del niño cubano,” afC 2, no. 1 (January 1926); Miranda, “Las supersticiones de los 
niños cubanos,” afC 4, no. 1 (January–March 1929); Fonseca, “Las supersticiones del 
escolar cubano,” afC 5, no. 3 (July–September 1930): 199–221.
19. Portuondo, “Anexo”; Cairo, La revolución del 30 en la narrativa y el testimonio 
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cet, Carlos Loveira, Mariano Brull, Agustín Acosta, José Manuel Poveda, Félix Lizaso, 
Manuel Navarro Luna, Luis Felipe Rodríguez, José Antonio Ramos, and José María 
Chacón y Calvo. This group is credited with a series of stylistic, thematic, and con-
ceptual innovations that would be taken up again later and with more radicalism by 
the subsequent generation. I refer, for example, to the postmodernist movement in 
poetry and to the social novel and plays. From the social sciences point of view, the 
work of Ramiro Guerra stands out, sharpened in order to call into question the plan-
tation model of prior history, as well as the work of Emilio Roig, with its frankly anti- 
imperialist content. Fernando Ortíz’s work in the area of ethnology and anthropology 
would be equally important.
Those born between 1898 and 1910 (Juan Marinello, Rubén Martínez Villena, Pablo 
de la Torriente Brau, Enrique Serpa, Enrique Labrador Ruiz, Regino Boti, Amelia Peláez, 
Víctor Manuel, Nicolás Guillén, José Z. Tallet, Dulce María Loynaz, Alejo Carpentier, 
Elías Entralgo, Jorge Mañach, Raúl Roa, Lino Novás Calvo), along with the preceding 
generation, led the profound cultural and political renewal of the 1920s, breaking with 
the academicist canon of traditional plastic arts and choosing Afro- Cuba as the primor-
dial subject of poetry, the novel, and the short story. From the political point of view 
many of those who belonged to this generation led the historic “Protesta de los Trece” 
and were part of the Minorista movement, while some swelled the ranks of the Com-
munist Party or fought against Machado.
20. The Minorista movement was made up of a nucleus of the aesthetic avant- garde, 
most of them against the republican status quo. According to one of their program-
matic texts, the Minoristas came together to transform “false values” and struggle for 
“national culture,” for “the economic independence of Cuba and against Yankee im-
perialism”; they also sought to introduce and propagate the latest artistic and scientific 
doctrines to the country, while demanding real citizen participation in government, 
promoting Latin American union and the improvement of the subaltern classes. See Pi-
chardo, “Qué era el Grupo Minorista,” 393–95; Roig de Leuchsenring, “El Grupo Mino-
rista de intelectuales y artistas habaneros,” 10–12.
21. For the number of texts published by Ortiz in Archivos del Folklore Cubano, see 
García Carranza, Bio- bibliografía de Don Fernando Ortiz, 80–91.
22. Marinello’s philological work, for example, “Un Guacalito de cubanismos,” 
stands out in his contributions to Archivos del Folklore Cubano; see afC 2, no. 2 (May 
1926): 108–19; 2, no. 3 (October 1926): 228–35; 2, no. 4 (June 1927): 363–68; 3, no. 1 
(January–March 1928): 21–26.
23. See Quiza Moreno, El cuento al revés, 55–69, and Anales de la Academia de la 
Historia de Cuba, 9: 61.
24. Emeterio Santovenia Echaide (Pinar del Río, Cuba, 1889–Miami, United States, 
1968) was a historian, journalist, and politician who was affiliated with the anti- Machado 
organization abC, and served as secretary to the presidency in the 1934 government of 
Mendieta, which was strongly backed by the military under Batista and the U.S. ambas-
sador. He was elected senator for Pinar del Río in 1940, and three years later he was in 
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the works of José Antonio Saco, it was not recognized as a discipline until the inaugu-
ration of the Chair in Sociology at the University of Havana, occupied by Enrique José 
Varona, for many years the only professor to teach the subject. See Mestre, “La antro-
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afrocubanos,” afC 2, no. 3 (October 1926): 193–208; Israel Castellanos, “Instrumentos 
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CHAPTER 11

Nation, State, and the Making of the  
Cuban Working Class, 1920–1940
Robert Whitney
The majority of persons participating in labor shall be Cubans by birth as 
much as regards to total amount of wages and salaries as in distinct cate-
gories of labor, in the form determined by law. Protection shall also be ex-
tended to naturalised Cubans with families born in the national territory, 
with preference over naturalized citizens who do not meet these conditions, 
and over aliens. The stipulations in the preceding paragraphs concerning 
aliens shall not be applied in the filling of indispensable technical positions, 
subject to the prior formalities of the law, and with provision that appren-
ticeship in the technical work in question be facilitated for native Cubans.
—CUBAN CONSTITUTION OF 1940, TITLE VI, SECTION 1, ARTICLE 73
The law shall regulate immigration in keeping with the national economic 
system and with social necessities. The importation of contract labor, as well 
as all immigration tending to debase the condition of labor, is prohibited.
—CUBAN CONSTITUTION OF 1940, TITLE VI, SECTION 1, ARTICLE 76
My parents did not return to Jamaica. My mother maintained contact with 
an aunt and my father with a brother [in the 1950s]. . . . Once, when I was 
working at the Base, an American lady told me something offensive. I told 
her, “Miss, I am Cuban because I was born here, I am Cuban by right.” I am 
a Jamaican because both my parents are from Jamaica. I am like a ball, you 
hit it and it jumps from here to there.
—VIOLDA CAREY, GUANTÁNAMO, OCTOBER 10, 2001
Who Are the Cuban People?
The title of this opening section might seem odd given that histori-
ans and social scientists agree that most Cubans trace their ancestry 
to either Spain or Africa. We know that the indigenous inhabitants 
of Cuba were largely exterminated soon after the Spanish conquest. 
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Thereafter successive waves of Spanish immigrants and African slaves popu-
lated the island. There are many Cubans of Chinese origin, but most of the 
descendants of the indentured laborers who went to Cuba in the nineteenth 
century either left the island once their contracts finished or assimilated into 
Cuban society. And, while immigrants from central and Eastern Europe and 
the Middle East went to Cuba in the early twentieth century, they did so in 
much smaller numbers as compared with other Latin American countries. 
So, in terms of ethnic background, the answer to the question “Who are the 
Cuban people?” is clear: the large majority of Cubans are of Hispanic or Afri-
can origin.
Ancestry, however, tells us little about cultural identity. “Culture,” in the 
broadest sense, refers to sets of popular representations, symbols, traditions, 
and values that people use to organize social life and help them make sense 
of their actions and the world around them. Throughout the long colonial 
period (1511–1898) the formation of Cuban identity was shaped largely by 
highly localized struggles over the limits and degrees of slavery and free-
dom. By the middle of the nineteenth century segments of the white upper 
classes increasingly expressed nationalist (if not always separatist) senti-
ments against Spanish rule. Cuba had become the world’s largest sugar pro-
ducer and Spain’s most important colony. Sugar production, in turn, was 
based on slavery, and by the 1850s blacks (both slave and free) almost out-
numbered whites, which provoked racist fears about the “Africanization of 
Cuba” and a Haitian- like slave revolution. Consequently, despite tensions 
between the Cuban elite and Spain, economic prosperity and fear of slave 
revolt kept Cuba under Spanish rule. A white and Hispano- centric vision of 
a Cuban imagined community was certainly emerging at this time, but mem-
bership in that community did not include slaves, free blacks, and mulattos 
and much of rural Cuba that was outside the control of the Hispano- Cuban 
economic and intellectual elite.
As for slaves, former slaves, mulattos, and poor rural residents through-
out Cuba, their exclusion from a white Hispanic Cuba did not mean they 
were not Cuban. Their subaltern nationalism, however, was more egalitarian 
and reflected their struggles for land, freedom, and equality. The day- to- day 
meaning of freedom for slaves and their descendants was shaped by local-
ized struggles against those who tried to limit freedom based on a person’s 
race, class, or gender. Local and regional conflicts, in turn, shaped people’s 
notions of race, class, and nation. And when local struggles merged with 
islandwide movements (as they increasingly did by the mid- nineteenth cen-
tury) they brought with them subaltern notions about rights and freedom 
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that often clashed with those of the usually self- appointed white leaders of 
these movements. By the last half of the nineteenth century, for most black 
and mulatto Cubans, freedom from slavery and the struggle for indepen-
dence were inseparable. Yet if many members of the Cuban elite resigned 
themselves to safe, if stifling, colonial rule, others could not. The antiracist 
and egalitarian nationalism of slaves, the freed colored, and their descen-
dants would not accept anything less than the immediate abolition of slavery, 
political and racial equality, and total independence from Spain.
These tensions within Cuban nationalism became particularly acute 
between 1868 and 1902. Within a period of thirty years Cuba experienced 
two wars for independence (1868–78 and 1895–98), the abolition of slavery 
in 1886, the development of technologically advanced sugar production, 
and, between 1898 and 1902, the transition from Spanish colony to a semi- 
independent republic under American hegemony. The cornerstone of Ameri-
can power over Cuba was the Platt Amendment, which the United States im-
posed on the Cuban Constitution of 1901. According to this amendment, the 
United States had the right to intervene in Cuban affairs in order to protect 
private property and ensure political order: it would be semi- independence, 
or no independence at all. Elite Cuban political opinion supported Ameri-
can intervention because many believed that only American power could en-
sure Cuban stability. The backbone of Cuba’s Liberation Army in both wars 
had been former slaves and poor peasants. By 1895 the need for political and 
military unity against Spain forged a viable, if tense, alliance that crossed the 
lines of race and class. Nationalist discourse, in turn, promised a future re-
public where all Cubans, regardless of race, would be equal. Yet the inclusive-
ness of nationalist discourse could not hide the fear of many white Cubans 
that blacks and mulattos were “culturally” ill- prepared for equal citizenship 
in an independent Cuba. War, the struggle against slavery and colonialism, 
and the fight for equal rights had forged a powerful—if divided and frus-
trated—popular nationalism. Despite these sharp political and cultural ten-
sions, by the time Cuba became a semi- independent republic in 1902, there 
was a widespread consensus that “Cubans” were people of either Spanish or 
African origin who had fought for, or at least not actively opposed, indepen-
dence.
So if we know that most Cubans are of Spanish or African heritage and 
that a strong, if highly contested, sense of national identity was firmly in 
place by the end of the nineteenth century, why ask the question “Who are 
the Cuban people?” at the beginning of a chapter about the formation of the 
Cuban working class in the twentieth century? I do so not to challenge ac-
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cepted wisdom but to suggest that if we are not careful, apparently simple 
answers to simple questions might cause us to gloss over or ignore com-
plex and historically unique moments of Cuban history. Cuba was the only 
Caribbean and Latin American nation in the twentieth century to receive 
large numbers of both white (mostly Spanish) and black (Haitian and West 
Indian) immigrants. By 1930, half of the island’s four million inhabitants had 
arrived after independence. One of the ironies of Cuban history is that more 
Spaniards migrated to Cuba just before or after Spain lost the island in 1898 
than during the entire colonial period. As of 1930, 800,000 Spaniards had 
entered Cuba.1 The majority of Spaniards settled in or near the towns and 
cities of western Cuba. Meanwhile, between 1900 and 1930, 325,000 Afro- 
Caribbean workers went to Cuba legally, of which roughly 185,000 were Hai-
tians and 140,000 were West Indians.2 Approximately 80 percent of the West 
Indians were Jamaican, with the remainder from Barbados and the smaller 
Leeward and Windward Islands. The vast majority of Caribbeans arrived 
after 1916, when the Cuban government relaxed immigration regulations to 
facilitate the labor needs of the rapidly expanding sugar industry in east-
ern Cuba. The stark reality was that Cuba did not have enough native- born 
workers to bring in the annual sugar harvests in the east. Consequently, most 
Haitians and West Indians lived on or near sugar plantations and company 
towns in the eastern provinces. By the mid- 1920s at least one in ten persons 
in the eastern provinces of Camagüey and Oriente were either Haitian or 
West Indian.3 In 1940 there were 40,000 legal British West Indians in Cuba, 
with perhaps another 55,000 to 60,000 illegal residents.4
Yet despite the dramatic change in the size and composition of the Cuban 
population in the twentieth century, we know very little about how and why 
immigrants became Cuban. Was it “easier” for Spaniards to become Cuban 
than it was for Haitians and West Indians, and if so, how and why? Was the 
experience of Haitians in Cuba different from that of West Indians, and if 
so, how and why? Most new immigrants could be categorized broadly as 
“workers” or “peasants” of one kind or another. So once they arrived and 
settled in Cuba, did they simply become part of a Cuban working class? The 
answer to this question was by no means obvious because many Spanish 
and Caribbean immigrants went to Cuba with no guarantee that they would 
find a job or land or be able to live there permanently. There were simply 
too many economic, political, and personal uncertainties to make becoming 
Cuban a foregone conclusion. It was for this reason that Spaniards, West 
Indians, and Haitians did their best to stay connected with diaspora net-
works that might, if necessary, provide the means for people to return home 
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or move elsewhere. In this sense, diaspora identities were inseparable from 
class identities. If social classes are identified by their relation to the means 
of production, few people in the Caribbean had secure access to any means 
of production for any length of time. Wage labor was one way to meet sub-
sistence needs, and it was by no means the most reliable way to do so. Most 
working people were neither peasants nor proletarians but a complex combi-
nation of the two social classes. Frequently, peasantlike means of production 
coexisted with proletarianlike relations of production.5 A person could be a 
wage laborer, cutting cane or working in a sugar mill for part of the year, and 
a peasant, domestic servant, shoemaker, carpenter, shopkeeper, street ven-
dor, or any combination of occupations for the rest of the year. And when 
people lost their job, land, or workshop, as many invariably did, knowing 
they had the option to return home or leave for another country provided 
some measure of security in an otherwise uncertain world.
This essay cannot possibly provide answers to all the questions raised 
above. Much more research about the immigrant experience is required be-
fore we can make too many accurate generalizations about Cuba’s popula-
tion in the first half of the twentieth century. What I will try to do, however, 
is show how the Cuban state, under the watchful eye of Fulgencio Batista, 
implemented labor legislation that “nationalized” the Cuban working class 
between 1933 and 1940. This period in Cuban history was decisive because, 
once Batista consolidated power after the revolution of 1933, he and his allies 
in the police, army, judiciary, and labor movement used the power of the 
state to compel immigrant workers to either leave the country or become 
Cuban citizens—or, failing that, to remain in the country illegally and with 
the constant threat of expulsion. While Spanish and Caribbean immigrants 
alike were subject to these authoritarian measures, the labor legislation was 
implemented in such a way so as to make it much harder for Haitians and 
West Indians to become Cuban than it was for Spaniards. Some people 
wanted to become Cuban citizens, but were not allowed to because of their 
race and class; others wanted to leave, but could not because they did not 
have the money or contacts to do so. Of course many immigrants or migrant 
workers who had lived in Cuba for years, if not decades, regarded themselves 
as Cuban, no matter what their legal status or whether or not they ever got 
their citizen papers.6 Whatever the case, what is clear is that in the 1920s, 
1930s, and 1940s, there was nothing simple about becoming Cuban. Nor was 
the answer to the question “Who are the Cuban people?” as obvious then (or 
now) as we might think.
Nation, State, and the Making of the Cuban Working Class | 297
The Unmaking of a Cuban Working Class: Eastern Cuba, 1916–1933
By the 1920s, then, it was by no means clear how “Cuban” the island’s work-
ing population was, especially in rural eastern Cuba. Nor was it clear what 
being “Cuban” meant to new immigrants. For Cuban nationalists whose 
sense of cubanidad (Cubanness) had been shaped by the country’s fight 
for independence, the “problem” of immigration and the ethnic and racial 
makeup of the island’s population became one of the defining issues of their 
time. There was widespread agreement among Cuba’s political and eco-
nomic elite that Cuba needed immigrants, preferably Spaniards; but Cuba 
also needed workers, especially in eastern Cuba. The practical problem was 
how could governments encourage Spaniards (and white immigrants gen-
erally) to become Cubans while discouraging black migrant workers from 
doing so. In theory, sugar companies were supposed to bring in the workers 
they needed for each harvest and then ship them back once it was over. In 
practice, of course, thousands of Haitians and West Indians remained in the 
country illegally, often with company connivance, and there was little Cuban 
authorities could do to prevent this. Immigration authorities, in fact, had at 
best only incomplete information about how many foreign workers were in 
the country at any given time or where they lived and worked.
The two articles from the Cuban Constitution of 1940 quoted above 
clearly indicate that that in the 1930s the “Cubanness”—or lack thereof—
of the island’s population was of great concern to state leaders. The articles 
also highlight how issues of national sovereignty, citizenship, immigration, 
and labor were entangled. The quotation from Violda Carey, however, shows 
that for some immigrants the meaning of being Cuban had less to do with 
what the state said it was and more to do with people’s day- to- day lives and 
personal history. Especially in the Caribbean, where identities are diaspora 
identities, the ability of national or imperial states to supervise and control 
diaspora populations has been partial at best. Caribbean peoples have always 
forged their identities within the shifting cracks and spaces of plantation, 
island, empire, and nation.7 National identities in the Caribbean are there-
fore decentered and fragmented.8
Nowhere is this observation more accurate than for eastern Cuba, where 
company- dominated enclave economies had far more control over people’s 
lives than did the “national” state in Havana. Despite the claims of state 
leaders, Cuban sovereignty was not only limited by the Platt Amendment, 
it was also limited by the fact that large parts of the countryside in the east 
were effectively outside its control. And for workers in the east it was easier, 
cheaper, and faster to travel to Jamaica, Haiti, Barbados, or Central America 
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than to Havana, where there was probably little reason to visit at all. Hun-
dreds of thousands of people were in Cuba for one reason and one reason 
only: to get a job and save enough money to send or take home. Depending 
on an ever changing set of personal and economic circumstances, the de-
cision to become Cuban (or not) was not the reason many people went to 
Cuba. On the contrary, given the cyclical and volatile nature of the Cuban 
and other regional economies, it made more sense for people to keep their 
options by not becoming a citizen in case they had to pick up and leave 
quickly to find a job elsewhere. Employers, too, and especially sugar compa-
nies, wanted access to a cheap and mobile labor force that could easily cross 
national borders with minimal interference from state bureaucracies. Be-
fore the 1930s companies (and Cuban governments) worried that too many 
immigration regulations would impede the “free” flow of labor, especially 
during the annual sugar harvests; they also were concerned that too many 
Cubans on the payroll would result in too many people claiming rights as 
both citizens and workers. Migrant workers, on the other hand, were easier 
to hire, fire, or deport and they were less likely (it was hoped) to demand 
rights and better wages and working conditions than would Cubans.
To one degree or another, this was the reality throughout the Caribbean 
(and in much of the world). Highly mobile multinational, multiethnic, and 
multiracial workforces were the norm, and in many ways Cuba was no ex-
ception to this general pattern, especially eastern Cuba. But given Cuba’s 
unique history of anticolonial and nationalist struggle, combined with the 
international importance of its sugar economy, Cuba’s lack of control over 
its own laboring population was a particularly sensitive point with nation-
alists. Of course, in the early twentieth century the idea that governments 
could or should interfere in how private capitalist recruited and deployed 
labor smacked of socialism and communism, so most politicians, no matter 
how nationalist they were, stayed away from such pronouncements. It would 
take a unique combination of political and economic conditions to create the 
conditions where Cuban state leaders could assert effective sovereignty over 
the entire working population of the island. Those conditions would arise, as 
we will see, between 1933 and 1940.
There were, then, understandable reasons why Cuban nationalists of all 
tendencies were “obsessed” with the problem of national identity.9 While 
the threat of American military intervention had diminished by the 1920s, 
nationalists worried that the very existence of the “Cuban people” was 
threatened by the overwhelming power of foreign capital and a sea of for-
eign labor.10 The popular saying, “Sin azúcar, no hay país” (Without sugar, 
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there is no country) certainly rang true to most Cubans, but the conundrum 
was that without foreign labor, there would be no sugar harvests. Cuba had 
always depended upon foreign labor, whether it was slave, indentured, or 
wage labor. And it was not just any foreign labor that would do: the associa-
tion of black labor with cutting and hauling cane was deeply engrained in the 
popular imagination, and it was unimaginable to many that sugar could be 
harvested any other way.11 This reliance on black foreign labor had provoked 
two “Africanization of Cuba” scares: the first was in the 1850s when blacks 
threatened to outnumber whites, and the second was in the early 1920s when 
the “uncontrolled” importation of Haitians and West Indians threatened to 
undermine “civilized” Cuban society by increasing crime, disease, and racial 
tensions.12 But as long as the logic of capital dictated the need to bring in 
cheap, foreign, and black labor, the logic of racism would take second place.
For the first thirty years of the twentieth century the racist anxieties of 
some nationalists were tempered somewhat by the fact that most Haitians 
and West Indians arrived and remained in the eastern provinces. Politicians 
based in Havana and the west certainly lamented their inability to assert 
complete sovereignty over significant portions of eastern Cuba, but in one 
sense this problem long predated the most recent sugar boom. Western and 
eastern Cuba had always been different societies. The western half of the 
island, and Havana in particular, was the historic center of economic and 
political power. More Spaniards settled in the west, and the east had a higher 
percentage of black and mulatto Cubans. In the nineteenth century, slave- 
based agricultural production was not as important in the east, and manu-
missions were relatively easier for slaves to obtain there. In the east, only 
about 6 percent of the population lived on sugar estates, whereas in the west 
the percentage was typically over 50 percent. Most rural people in the east 
had no title to their land. “Property” lines were usually ill- defined, and cus-
tomary land tenure persisted well into the twentieth century.13
Prior to 1916 the east was relatively unpopulated. This made it easier for 
sugar companies, with government support, to purchase, if not simply ex-
propriate, large tracts of land. In the process, peasants became proletarians 
or fled to more isolated and often mountainous regions where plantation 
owners or the Cuban state could not touch them. In order to survive, many 
of the dispossessed attached themselves to regional caudillos who might pro-
vide them with a job, a plot of land, or some other means to make a living.14 
What complicated matters was that people in the east had a long history 
of struggle against plantation labor of any kind and the fact that some of 
the new and largest plantations were American owned and run increased 
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resentment against both foreign capitalists and the politicians in Havana 
who supported them. The sugar companies built massive sugar mills, rail-
roads, private port facilities, workers’ barracks at the mill itself, and com-
pany towns. Many of these mill towns had segregated neighborhoods for 
company managers, skilled foreign employees, Cuban workers, and, after 
1916, foreign workers. As long as most of these foreign workers remained on 
isolated plantation enclaves in distant Camagüey and Oriente, political elites 
in Havana might complain, but were not too concerned, about how many 
foreigners were in the country.
The boom in sugar production, of course, would not last. By the late 
1920s international agreements had placed restrictions on the size of Cuba’s 
harvests, with the result that fewer workers were needed for the harvests. 
Even for those who found work, the harvests lasted three months instead 
of the usual ten.15 Once the world depression hit with full force after 1929, 
the economic and political situation became far worse. In the 1930s, out of 
a national population of 4 million perhaps 300,000 were chronically unem-
ployed.16 Even though the massive importations of foreign workers declined 
after the peak years of 1916–21 and had virtually ended by 1927, the continued 
presence of hundreds of thousands of foreign workers in the country fueled 
popular resentment against foreign labor. Hunger marches were common-
place. Mass migration of the unemployed and landless from the county to 
the cities and towns became endemic. Unprecedented numbers of orientales 
(easterners) traveled to western Cuba and Havana in search of work, and 
many foreigners (especially Jamaicans) joined them. For many westerners, 
the intrusion of so many (mostly black) easterners into their world was a 
shock, both economically and culturally. The struggle to get and to keep a 
job—any job—became desperate, and many habaneros resented the pres-
ence of so many “uncultured” orientales in their city. The Cuban economy 
had been through many cyclical crises over the past thirty years, but none 
compared to the prolonged crisis of the 1930s.
One dramatic example of the vulnerability of migrant workers was the 
“Sabanaso crisis” in eastern Cuba from July 8 to 13, 1931.17 Sabanaso, a small 
town in Oriente, was on the railway line between the large sugar mills at 
Delicias and Chaparra. The year 1931, of course, was a hard year in Cuba, 
and unemployment and poverty were endemic. Unemployed British West 
Indians and Haitians were trying to find work elsewhere on the island or, if 
possible, return to their home islands. On July 8 some five hundred British 
West Indians were “dumped” at the railway station at Sabanaso as they tried 
to get to Santiago to leave the island. The train to Santiago did not arrive, and 
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the train station manager asked for the assistance of a Mr. Neil Hone, a well- 
known manager of the sugar colonia El Canada in Sabanaso. Hone provided 
some rice and food for the men, and he asked the general manager of the 
Chaparra mill to provide a cow and water for the stranded workers. Cuban 
immigration officials soon arrived, but they did nothing. When a train did 
arrive, it took thirty Haitian workers back to Chaparra where they were to go 
to a company dock at Cayo Juan Claro and board a ship for Haiti.
The British West Indians at the station, however, were determined to leave 
for Santiago, and they remained in Sabanaso. At nights they slept in boxcars 
or on the train platform. Hone continued to provide food, milk, and cof-
fee for the women and children, and he eventually persuaded fifty workers 
to return to Chaparra. Meanwhile, the problem was compounded because 
more workers kept arriving at the station from other nearby mills. Matters 
neared the point of violence when Cuban authorities announced that only 
Haitians and Jamaicans would be repatriated to their islands if they returned 
to Chaparra and Delicias: most of the people trapped at the station, how-
ever, were from the Lesser Antilles, and they were told they were not eli-
gible for repatriation. A district military chief based at Delicias wanted to 
take the Jamaicans and Haitians back to Chaparra, and he asked Hone to 
help persuade the workers to go. Hone agreed to help on the condition he 
was left alone to persuade the men that returning to Chaparra and Delicias 
was the lesser of two evils. Some workers did return to the mills, but 150 men 
said they would rather walk to Santiago than return to unbearable working 
conditions. Hone explained to the British authorities that the problem was 
caused because neither the sugar company at Chaparra and Delicias nor the 
Cuban authorities had arranged for transportation of these workers, and as 
a result no one would take responsibility for them once they were abandoned 
in Sabanaso.
Five years later, near the town of Sabanaso itself, conditions for local 
workers remained desperate. Workers who had jobs in the mills, in construc-
tion, or on the railroads were in a fairly good position compared with field-
workers. Fieldworkers, however, were more vulnerable. There were thou-
sands of men and women scattered about in small towns and hamlets, many 
of them squatters with no title to the land they lived on. Wages were so low 
that people survived by cultivating a small plot to supplement their wages. 
According to one report, “not one of these men can support their families 
from the small pieces of land they cultivate and always depend on the work 
during the crop together with what they can produce in the way of foodstuffs 
from their land to see them through.”18
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A similar situation took place in May 1931 when unemployed British West 
Indians in Camagüey tried to get to Santiago so they could return home or at 
least find work elsewhere. The British consul in Santiago estimated that there 
were over ten thousand Jamaicans in Camagüey “that want to go home right 
now.” There were twenty- six sugar mills in the province, with an average of 
one thousand British West Indian workers on each estate. The largest estates 
included the Morón, Ciego de Avila, Nuevitas, and the Florida mills. The 
cost of train fare from Camagüey to Santiago was more than most workers 
could afford, with the average train ticket costing around $2.25 per person 
(which included their belongings, such as wash pans, bedding, and sewing 
machines). Bus fare from Camagüey City to Santiago was even more ex-
pensive, costing around $3.00 per person. Workers from the smaller centers 
found it difficult to get to a main town or city because there was no reliable 
transportation. Many West Indians complained to the consulate that they 
had no clothes for the trip and that numerous people were forced to beg for 
food and shelter. Meanwhile, in Santiago, the problem was that there were 
not enough facilities to take care of the large number of destitute people ar-
riving in the city. The British consul in Santiago complained that too many 
West Indians were arriving at his office and he had to pay the bus drivers 
who had brought them there because people could not pay the fares. Hostels 
and hotels were usually full and expensive. It cost around $1.00 a day for a 
person to stay in Santiago, and since there was no assurance when or even if 
there would be an affordable boat ride back to their islands of origin, many 
hundreds of West Indians were trapped in the city with no work or shelter.19
Other West Indian workers, however, managed to remain in Cuba, de-
spite their illegal status. Pantera, a Barbadian who arrived illegally in Cuba 
in 1916, said the key to survival was to stay single and keep on the move. 
His parents had wanted him to join the British army because that seemed 
the best way to find a better life away from a hopeless situation in Barba-
dos. Pantera, however, went to Cuba instead. The docks at Bridgetown were 
full of labor recruiters tempting young men like Pantera to hop on a boat to 
Cuba, and since no one seemed to care if he had permission to leave or not, 
he boarded the ship. Once in Cuba, Pantera worked as a cane cutter, tobacco 
picker, and professional boxer, and in 1927 he joined the Communist Party. 
He claimed he never worried much about being legal in Cuba: he said the 
only proof he needed that he was Cuban was his 1927 Party membership 
card, which he pulled out of his pocket and proudly displayed.20 Another 
Barbadian, Charles Yearwood, had no intention of going to Cuba at all. In 
1924 he went to the dock at Bridgetown to see a friend off who was going 
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to Cuba. He boarded the ship to chat with his friend before departure, but, 
Yearwood said, he and his friend “got into the rum a bit,” and when he went 
back on deck to disembark, the ship had departed. He asked the captain to 
take him back to port, but he was told the ship would not turn around for one 
person. Yearwood arrived at the port of Cayo Juan Claro near the Chaparra 
and Delicias mills with nothing but his clothes and not a penny on him. He 
quickly found work cutting cane and never returned home.21
The Making of a Cuban Working Class, 1933–1940
It was the profound economic and political crisis of the 1930s that fueled un-
precedented mass mobilization, nationalist sentiment, and, in 1933, social 
revolution. The story of the Cuban revolution has been told elsewhere.22 It 
was fueled by a mixture of nationalist, anti- imperialist, sometimes anticapi-
talist, and frequently racist and antiforeign sentiment. Between September 
1933 and January 1934, a loose coalition of students, middle- class intellectu-
als, and disgruntled lower- rank soldiers ruled Cuba. This coalition was di-
rected by a popular university professor, Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín. The 
Grau government promised a “new Cuba” with social justice for all classes 
and the abrogation of the Platt Amendment. In addition to social and politi-
cal reforms, the new government created a Ministry of Labor and passed 
“nationalization of labor laws.” Popularly known as the “Fifty- Percent Law,” 
this legislation stipulated that a 50 percent quota of employees in indus-
try, agriculture, and commerce be native- born Cuban citizens, that another 
30 percent be naturalized citizens, and that the remaining 20 percent could 
be foreign legal residents. Sometimes the same law was referred to as the 
Eighty- Percent Law when native- born and naturalized Cuban citizens were 
included in the same category.23 Grau’s government had promised “Cuba for 
Cubans,” and the nationalization of labor law was the concrete expression of 
that promise.
Grau’s government was overthrown in January 1934 by an equally loose 
but conservative coalition under Fulgencio Batista. Many people at the time 
wondered if Cuba would revert back to the old ways of doing politics, yet 
Batista understood that after 1933 governments could not afford to ignore 
nationalist sentiment and popular demands for jobs. While Grau’s more 
radical laws were shelved, between 1936 and 1940 Batista oversaw the suc-
cessful implementation of nationalization of labor laws. The most dramatic 
example of its implementation was the mass expulsion of thousands of Hai-
tian and West Indian workers between 1937 and 1940.24 By 1940 Cuba’s sugar 
economy no longer depended upon foreign labor to cut and harvest cane.
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There were two reasons why post- 1933 governments successfully imple-
mented the nationalization of labor laws. First, prior to 1933, state leaders 
had neither the political will nor the bureaucratic capacity to influence local 
labor markets. As long as companies brought in massive numbers of foreign 
workers, they had total control over whom they hired. But after 1927, and 
especially during the 1930s, the reduction in the size of Cuban sugar harvests 
meant that companies no longer needed to import foreign labor. There were 
enough workers within Cuba to bring in the harvests and maintain planta-
tion infrastructure. In fact, while there was not exactly a shortage of labor 
during the 1930s, depending on local circumstances employers increasingly 
found themselves competing among themselves for the same workers. At 
the same time, workers competed with other workers for the same jobs, and 
sometimes workers could play off one employer against another. Compa-
nies were uncertain if they could find enough qualified workers when they 
needed them. In other words, the downturn in sugar production, combined 
with an uncertain labor supply, weakened employers’ stranglehold over local 
labor markets, which in turn left those markets vulnerable to political inter-
ference from forces outside company control.
It was this conjuncture that explains why the nationalist labor laws were 
implemented successfully after 1933. Batista understood that Cuba had 
changed after 1933. Thereafter, to stay in power, governments had to respond 
(or at least appear to respond) to popular demands. No demand was more 
popular than “Cuba for Cubans.” The practical problem was that the state 
had no reliable information about how many foreign workers were in the 
country (legally or illegally), where they lived, and what jobs they had. And 
even if the state had such information, it did not have the administrative or 
coercive power to implement labor legislation, especially in the eastern prov-
inces. Once the flow of foreign labor had stopped, the effective “denational-
ization” of the workforce had come to end; the problem for Cuban national-
ists, however, was that the population that remained in the country was still 
too multinational and multiethnic for their liking. It was this population that 
needed to be “nationalized.” Under the watchful eye of Batista, after 1936 the 
state developed that power. Once Batista reorganized the army and police, 
he placed loyal followers in key administrative and supervisory positions, at 
both the national and local levels.25 By 1937 Batista had entered his “populist 
phase,” and his “redistributionist demagoguery” was accompanied by some 
real, if modest, reforms.26 His most popular measure was the implementa-
tion of nationalist labor legislation. Backed by the army and police, and in 
alliance with the Communist Party and trade unions, Batista had both the 
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political support and coercive power necessary to compel employers to hire 
Cubans before foreigners. Unemployed Cubans, of course, were delighted. 
Even if they did not get a job, the idea that a powerful man like Batista was on 
their side gave the unemployed some hope. Employers grumbled, but there 
was little else they could do.
According to the labor legislation, once employers reached the quotas 
for the percentage of Cuban workers, they were obliged by law to maintain 
the percentages or risk incremental fines for every violation discovered. The 
20 percent of foreigners employed must be legal residents of Cuba, though 
“the President of the Republic is authorised to make exception to this pro-
vision . . . in the case of non- resident foreigners whom it is necessary to em-
ploy each year in the cleaning and cutting of cane”—a clear recognition of 
the high numbers of illegal immigrants cutting and hauling cane in Cuba. 
Exceptions were made for technical workers who could not be replaced by 
native Cubans. Even more important, exemptions were made for anyone em-
ployed as a single worker, for fathers and children who worked in their own 
homes, and for domestic servants employed in private homes. As we will 
see, many British West Indians, and especially Jamaicans, fell into this latter 
category because many arrived in Cuba on their own initiatives as individual 
workers and not through the mediation of labor recruiters or contactors. 
Dismissals of foreign workers were to be prioritized in the following order: 
single foreigners were to be let go first, followed by married foreigners, then 
married foreigners with children, and foreigners married to Cuban women. 
Foreigners married to Cuban women and with children were the last dis-
missed.27
The problem was that in Cuba, in the short term, there were simply too 
few “Cuban” workers to fill all the available positions. If economic activity 
was not to be disrupted, foreign labor could not be replaced too quickly. 
This situation was especially true in eastern Cuba, where the expansion of 
the sugar industry had been especially notable since 1914.28 The seasonal na-
ture of work, combined with frequent competition for skilled labor among 
sugar companies, meant that the demand for labor could be stiff, and skilled 
contract workers could choose between employers. Employers and employ-
ees alike used the ambiguous status of “contract worker” to claim exemp-
tions from the law, thus retaining a higher percentage of foreign workers on 
the payroll bill than the law, as narrowly interpreted, permitted. Contract 
workers, whether skilled or unskilled, changed occupations frequently, and 
since their employment was seasonal, whether or not they were classified as 
“skilled” depended on the season, their occupation at the time, the decision 
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of an individual employer, or the political context. An “unskilled” Barbadian 
cane cutter during the harvest was a skilled gardener, railroad worker, me-
chanic, or carpenter during the dead season; a skilled Jamaican mill worker 
could lose his job to a less skilled Cuban because state officials (including 
Batista’s military men) at the local level might compel an employer to fire 
the Jamaican.
A further complication was that a “Jamaican” worker who might have 
lived in Cuba for many years was for all intents and purposes as Cuban as 
anyone else, at least as far as he or she was concerned. After years in Cuba, 
many West Indians spoke Spanish as well as “native” Cubans, and since few 
poor rural people, whether native- born or not, had birth certificates or legal 
documentation of any kind, there was no reliable way to determine who 
was or was not a “foreigner.” Needless to say, the sugar companies and the 
workers themselves could exploit this situation to their own advantage, and 
laws passed in a distant Havana could easily be ignored. Since the sugar 
companies themselves could not be trusted to implement labor legislation 
that might hurt their immediate interests, the Cuban state needed to create 
institutions (backed up by Batista’s police and soldiers) that would ensure 
that the labor laws were enforced. Prior to the 1930s it simply did not matter 
much to people in the west if people who worked in the far- off sugar planta-
tions of eastern Cuba were Cuban citizens or not. But once severe economic 
crisis and mass unemployment gripped the entire nation, the issue of the 
“Cubanness” of the working class went to the very top of the national politi-
cal agenda.
The Cuban nationalist labor laws were based on the simple conviction 
that in order for the nation to exist, there must be a national workforce. The 
problem, therefore, was how to create one. Information about how many 
foreigners were in the country and where they lived and worked was equally 
hard to come by. Government immigration data were useful up to a point, 
especially for the ports at Havana and Santiago de Cuba, but many sugar 
companies brought in thousands of foreign workers through private ports. 
Companies were under no obligation to provide the government with de-
tailed information on how many workers they employed or their occupa-
tions. Government immigration figures would always fall short of the actual 
number of foreigners in the country.
Clearly, before Cuban governments could implement the nationalization 
of labor legislation, they had to establish a bureaucracy and local and re-
gional offices to collect basic information about the Cuban labor force. The 
state needed information about how many “Cuban” and “foreign” workers 
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were in the country, what their skills were, where they lived, and what the 
specific labor market needs of the sugar industry were at any given time 
and place. It was for this reason that between 1935 and 1940 the Cuban state 
established civil registries and labor exchanges throughout the country, but 
especially in the east. The Mendieta- Batista government of 1935–36 passed 
Law no. 148, which established labor exchanges in all five provinces. The 
law stated that exchanges were created for the “government to control the 
supply and demand of labor in order to improve the possibilities of employ-
ment and afford laborers professional orientation on a firm basis.”29 The law 
stipulated that employers must advise the provincial labor exchange of all 
hiring and discharging of workers. When taking on new workers, employers 
were to hire unemployed laborers whose names were supplied by local ex-
changes. Employers were required to submit lists of all their employees, their 
technical qualifications, and their nationality. These lists would go to the di-
rector general of the Ministry of Labor, and the ministry would then deter-
mine whether or not there were enough Cubans to fill positions held by for-
eigners. Unions were required to inform the labor exchanges which of their 
members were fired, hired, and rehired. Employers could not hire workers 
who did not possess a labor exchange registration card, and violators of this 
provision were subject to fines ranging as high as $500. By December 1935 
the government claimed that a total of 94,346 unemployed workers had reg-
istered at the exchanges, with provincial breakdowns of 2,515 for Pinar del 
Rio, 6,990 for the Province of Havana, 11,370 for Matanzas, 17,849 for Santa 
Clara, 11,756 for Camagüey, and 43,866 for Oriente.30
With large numbers of foreign workers no longer entering the country, the 
sugar plantations had little choice but to use the labor exchanges to obtain 
the labor they needed. Mills constantly petitioned the labor exchanges for 
more labor, and managers often complained that they could not get enough 
workers. In Camagüey and Oriente, the Central Alto Cedro asked local ex-
changes for eight hundred workers, while the Central Boston requested five 
hundred laborers. The Tánamo mill asked for one hundred workers. On 
January 28, the Department of Labor declared that “a notice has been sent 
to all Labor Exchanges requesting them to speed measures to send any cane 
laborers they may have available to the mills. . . . The Labor Department is 
making every effort . . . to supply an adequate number of workers in its pro-
gram to handle the crop exclusively with native Cubans and thereby reduce 
unemployment.”31 The Labor Ministry ordered that foreign workers should 
not be registered at the exchanges, and the local authorities were told in no 
uncertain terms that there were to be no exceptions.32 Local politics, how-
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ever, were very personal. Many exchange officials were friends of local mill 
managers or were former employees of sugar companies (or might want a 
job with one in the future). These personal ties were often more compelling 
than directives from a distant Havana. Some mills bribed labor exchange 
officials, paying them to overlook the regulations and to place foreigners on 
the exchanges’ lists of available workers.33
Another purpose of the exchanges was to gather information about the 
number of foreigners in the country. Workers were required to register at the 
exchanges, and they had to show documents indicating their legal status as 
either Cuban citizens or as foreigners. If workers did not possess any docu-
ments proving their legal status (a very frequent occurrence), their employers 
were required to provide that information. In one case, the local inspector for 
the Registro de Extranjeros in Holguín wrote to the manager of the Chaparra 
and Delicias mills and warned him that the mill would be fined if it failed 
to inform the registry of all foreign workers on the company payroll.34 Of 
course, there were many delays in the establishment of the labor exchanges: 
officials needed to be appointed for each exchange, employers frequently did 
not comply by registering their workers at the exchanges, and it was not 
possible to force all workers to register if they did not want to. Though cor-
ruption and bribery would be a constant problem in the labor exchanges, 
Batista placed loyal army and police officers in the exchanges to work along-
side civilian officials and to ensure that fines against employers were issued.
By 1937 labor exchanges, along with the Cuban army and police, were 
present throughout the country, and in that year Haitian and British West 
Indian workers became the target of a campaign of mass repatriations to their 
islands of origin or to any British territory that would take them. On January 
19, 1937, the Cuban government under Fulgencio Batista announced plans to 
expel British West Indian and Haitian workers, and the armed forces were to 
enforce this order.35 By the end of February, three large resettlement camps in 
the eastern provinces of Camagüey and Oriente held several thousand Haitian 
and Jamaican workers.36 The British embassy complained about the treatment 
of their Jamaican and Barbadian subjects in these camps, though it was “a de-
batable point whether the British West Indians would be worse off roaming 
the countryside without food or shelter, or in a camp, fed and sheltered, but 
more or less a prisoner and probably subject to deplorable sanitary condi-
tions.” The Cuban Ministry of Labor informed the British embassy that these 
camps were for Haitians only, but the embassy dispatch concluded, “If the 
camps . . . are really intended for Haytians only, there must inevitably be great 
delay in disposing of the British West Indians, which in itself constitutes a 
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most thorny problem. . . . [G]iven the rough and ready army methods prevail-
ing in the provinces, it is almost certain that if large numbers of Haytians are 
rounded up many British subjects will find themselves swept into the mob.”37 
Batista ordered the Rural Guard to expel Haitian and Jamaican workers from 
the sugar estates, while “encouraging” mill managers to hire Cubans in their 
place. By March 1937, thirty thousand Haitians were repatriated from Cuba, 
with an expected fifty thousand to follow shortly.38 Thousands of Jamaicans, 
Barbadians, and other West Indians were subject to the same measures.
One of the central challenges of implementing the nationalization of labor 
legislation was the problem of documenting who was a foreigner and who 
was a “Cuban.” The cultural ambiguities, especially in the east, of determin-
ing who was “Cuban” were problem enough, but since very few poor people 
at all had any legal documentation whatsoever, it was nearly impossible for 
state authorities or employers to single out “Cubans” from “foreigners.” 
Since the early twentieth century, Cuban immigration officials had provided 
foreign residents of Cuba with carnets de extranjeros (foreign residency 
cards). As indicated earlier, for years the large sugar companies had brought 
in hundreds of thousands of workers through private ports, and companies 
were not obligated to provide workers with carnets de extranjero. After 1936, 
however, Cuban authorities strengthened the regulations about how carnets 
would be issued and how immigration laws would be enforced. One way the 
state did this was by placing Batista’s loyal followers in the army and police 
in the labor exchanges and municipal offices to oversee the distribution of 
the carnets. All foreigners were required to obtain a carnet at a cost of $1.45. 
These cards were valid for one year and could be renewed again for the same 
price. Thereafter a new carnet would be issued for a period of five years; this 
new document, however, had a photograph of the holder along with his or 
her fingerprints. Failure to register or to renew the carnet within thirty days 
of expiration resulted in a fine of $1.00. A similar fine was imposed for fail-
ure to notify authorities of a change of address. If a person did not pay these 
fines, they were to be deported. Destitute foreigners could obtain a free and 
temporary carnet if they could prove they were in fact destitute; if they man-
aged to do this, they could remain in the country for six months with the pos-
sibility of a six- month extension if their condition had not improved. If after 
the second six months a person was still destitute, they were to be deported.39
One of the functions of the labor exchanges was to issue carnets to workers 
once they registered at the exchanges. Workers had to fill out a legal declara-
tion stating their name, age, occupation, salary, employer, address, marital 
status, and nationality.40 In addition to registering at the labor exchanges, all 
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Cubans and foreigners were to register at civil registry offices in the provin-
cial capitals. The civil registries were the place where foreigners were to go 
to declare their intention of becoming Cuban citizens. A registration fee was 
charged to every person who registered at the civil registry offices. If migrant 
workers were caught without their carnet, they risked jail and deportation.
Of course, what people were supposed to do and what they did were fre-
quently at odds. Two factors complicated matters when it came to issuing 
the carnets de extranjero. The nationalization of labor law stipulated that 
temporary carnets could be provided to newly arrived migrants who could 
not afford to pay the initial registration fee: the understanding was that they 
would pay the fee when they received their first paycheck. If workers stayed 
within the boundaries of the foreign enclaves, they did not need to have a 
carnet. But, of course, people rarely stayed in one place, especially when the 
“dead season” arrived. Before the more aggressive implementation of the 
nationalization of labor law in 1937, it was safer for both workers and em-
ployers to avoid the law altogether: for workers it made no sense to draw the 
attention of the police and army by requesting legal papers; for employers, 
their labor needs were too uncertain to worry about whether their employ-
ees were Cuban or not.
Provincial civil registries in Las Tunas, Puerto Padre, Delicias, Chaparra, 
Guantánamo, and Santiago for the years 1936 through 1940 provide some 
fascinating profiles about individual West Indian workers and how they lived 
in Cuba before they became Cuban citizens. One of the striking aspects of 
these profiles was how often people openly declared that they had been in 
the country illegally for years and that they possessed no legal documents 
of any kind. Fear of deportation did not seem to be a factor.41 Many people 
brought witnesses with them to the registries who could corroborate that 
the claimants had regular employment and/or were respected members of 
their communities. It was not uncommon for claimants to highlight that 
they were married to “native” Cubans and that their children were Cuban. 
In terms of occupation, the majority of British West Indians who registered 
fell into the categories “contract laborer,” “domestic worker,” or small- scale 
traders of some kind.
As indicated above, the nationalization of labor legislation had identi-
fied certain kinds of contract labor that were not subject to the strict letter 
of the law. It appears that many British West Indian contract workers felt 
that their occupational status might permit them to remain in the country 
without becoming Cuban citizens. Another explanation for the willingness 
of undocumented British West Indians to come forward in late 1937 and 1938 
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was that the Cuban government’s repatriation plans were stalled. An edito-
rial in the influential sugar industry magazine Revista Semanal Azucarera 
wrote that “mass repatriations have struck a snag in the Cuban mill- owner’s 
and planter’s fear of a consequent scarcity of labor for the coming sugar 
crop. The plan, if carried out, will therefore be on a much smaller scale than 
originally conceived.”42 By 1938 the flow of migrant labor to Cuba had long 
stopped and sugar companies were uncertain if there were enough “Cubans” 
to supply their labor needs. Consequently, for a brief period both sugar com-
panies and workers found ways to evade the labor laws, sometimes with the 
unofficial approval of local government officials.
An example of the complex situation faced by sugar workers in the east 
is provided by Charles Ray, who was employed at the huge Chaparra sugar 
mill in the late 1930s.
I began to work in the mill . . . at age fourteen or fifteen. When they estab-
lished the eight- hour work day, I was a cart driver, and I remained driving 
carts on the sugar floor carrying sacks of sugar, which were big sacks, not 
like now where the sacks are small. . . . Being a cart driver wasn’t so lucky, 
and you earned $1.25. Then my father spoke with the American manager, 
and they took me from the sugar floor and sent me to work in the lab with 
the chemicals. . . . But when harvest time came, I don’t remember which 
harvest it was, an American chemist came who did not speak Spanish. 
He was the chemical manager; the owners brought him from the United 
States. The lab was outside the mill in a large, two- story building where 
the overseer was below and the laboratory was on top. He chose one of the 
chemists who was working in the mill, a half Chinese. His father was Chi-
nese, but he was Cuban because he was born in Cuba in the 1920s. Then he 
chose me to work with them there as an interpreter. . . . In 1937, when the 
English people went on their shift during crop time, as usual, a day went 
up to 6 p.m. The whistle would blow, and the English people would leave 
with their little bags over their shoulders. At each door there was a guard. 
“What are you, English? You cannot enter.” So in 1937, they took out all 
English people, and there were only fifty left. They left to look for jobs in 
other parts. I continued because I was not working in the mill. . . . In 1937 
and 1938 they were trying to identify who I was. Although they knew me 
since I was a boy, they were not sure if I was or wasn’t born in Cuba, be-
cause I had been playing baseball and dominoes and all those things with 
them. They had to be sure before they said anything, and so they said 
nothing to me. But at the end of 1937, an American chemist called me and 
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said to me: “Listen to me, Charles, they are after you because the guard 
has already gone to tell the general manager that there is still an English 
person working at the mill, and that English person is you.” The Cuban 
chemist told me: “To cover you, you are going with me to Puerto Padre. I 
have friends there. I am going to change your birth certificate from Eng-
lish to Cuban.” . . . They only left the Cuban boys and the “Gallegos” or 
Spanish immigrants on the sugar plantation, because the “Gallegos” were 
Cubans. . . . But then they wanted to dismiss me, too, and then the Ameri-
can kept me on the job until the harvest ended. He told me: “I am going 
to keep you here until the harvest ends. When it ends, you cannot work 
here anymore because the general manager gave me the order to take 
away your job.”43
Ray’s mention of the Chinese workers in the mill indicates another set of 
tensions at the Chaparra mill. On April 4, 1936, Francisco Chiong wrote a 
letter of complaint to the mill’s general manager. Chiong claimed to repre-
sent the Chinese workers at the mill, and he argued that many of them had 
been unjustly released from their jobs because they were not Cubans. Chiong 
pointed out that he had lived in Cuba for thirty years. He had worked for the 
company as a labor contractor, and he had traveled to China and to Jamaica 
to recruit workers for the Chaparra Sugar Company. He had been a loyal 
worker for years, and now he was out of a job. Chinese workers, Chiong 
argued, were being replaced “by other individuals just as foreign as we are.” 
Chiong made a point of saying that he was not opposed to the Fifty- Percent 
Law in principle, but he felt that it was not applied consistently or fairly.44
Clearly the nationalization of labor laws had a serious impact on the lives 
of Haitian and British West Indian migrants. Haitians were the most vulner-
able group of all: they had arrived in Cuba under the strict control of sugar 
companies, and they were employed almost exclusively as cane cutters and 
haulers. Workers’ housing (bateyes) within the sugar company enclaves was 
often segregated, with Haitians, British West Indians, Spaniards, Chinese, 
and Americans each living in their own areas. When Haitians were no longer 
needed at the end of each harvest, they could easily be located and deported. 
Between February and the summer of 1937, some 25,000 Haitians were de-
ported.45 By January 1939, another 5,700 Haitians had been repatriated.46
One of the striking features of these years was that there was virtually no 
serious opposition to the nationalist labor laws. Even the Communist Party 
and its trade union cadre, for whom working- class solidarity and class- based 
politics were ideological mantras, supported the nationalization of labor 
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laws and remained silent about the treatment of Haitians and West Indians 
in Cuba. The reasons for this silence are hard to identify with certainty. On 
the one hand, the party had a long history of antiracist struggle, and its mem-
bership included a high percentage of Afro- Cubans, so it is logical to assume 
that they could not support attacks on workers, Cuban or foreign. On the 
other hand, by 1938 the Communist Party was firmly allied with Batista, and 
as junior partners in his coalition it was not in their strategic interest to cre-
ate divisions in what they regarded as an anti- oligarchic democratic alliance. 
To date, there is no hard evidence to suggest that the Party condoned the 
treatment of Haitians and West Indians or participated in excluding them 
from getting jobs. Yet there is also no evidence that party members, even at 
the local level, stood up for foreign workers. This silence is striking given that 
so many communists in the east had a long history of grassroots working- 
class organizing, and they were not known as timid people. Until more re-
search is done, we can only surmise that the party’s relative weakness within 
Batista’s coalition, combined with its strict adherence to the principles of 
democratic centralism, kept its members silent.47
It is also important to note that by 1939 Batista felt secure enough to legal-
ize the mainly communist Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba. The CtC 
was a confederation of unions, many of which had functioned underground 
for years. Communist Party organizers had provided the experience and 
discipline required to get a union off the ground and running; as a conse-
quence, party union activists enjoyed widespread support among working- 
class people in general. Communist organizers, especially at the local level, 
were typically regarded as hardworking, selfless, and usually uncorrupt-
ible—the latter characteristic being no small feat in mid- twentieth- century 
Cuba. Now that the union movement was legal, however, its leaders had ac-
cess to the highest levels of state power (and resources), and being a union 
member no longer meant a person was automatically a revolutionary or sub-
versive. On the contrary, the two mass- based political parties to emerge after 
1939—the Auténticos and the communists—had strong trade union federa-
tions that not only served to gain working- class support for each party but 
also legitimized the link between class, state, and nation.48
What all these changes meant for foreign workers in Cuba—whether they 
regarded themselves as “foreign” or not—was clear. The pressure on people 
to assimilate into an intensely nationalistic society where there was a strong 
tendency for native- born Cubans to resent foreigners, especially if they com-
peted for the same jobs, was intense. Haitians in Cuba were by far the most 
vulnerable because their weak governments could provide no support for 
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its citizens abroad: they found some way to return to Haiti, were expelled 
from the country, or assimilated into society at large.49 West Indians, how-
ever, were British subjects, and if they had not taken out Cuban citizenship, 
they were still nominally under the authority of the British Empire.50 British 
imperial officials were keenly aware that the presence of so many of their 
colonial subjects in places like Cuba was both a problem for the empire and 
a source of tension with regional governments. In October 1943 the British 
ambassador to Cuba, Sir George Oglivie- Forbes, informed the Foreign Office 
that his embassy and consulates were inundated with West Indians seeking 
relief or financial help to return home.
The time is approaching when an important decision of policy should be 
made. Is it the desire of His Majesty’s Government that the British West 
Indians born in Cuba should remain British subjects, or are they to be 
told that as there is no prospect of settlement in the British Empire, it is 
in their best interests to allow their British nationality to lapse and to be-
come Cuban citizens? Such is the strength of nationalism here that there is 
already ample evidence of discrimination against naturalised Cubans and 
Cuban citizens born of alien parents, and I accordingly fear that to urge 
British West Indians against their wills to become Cuban citizens would 
not be an honourable course of action. . . . My own view is that while we 
should continue to give all possible protection and assistance to any who 
remain British subjects in Cuba or elsewhere, it is definitely undesirable 
that we should encourage children born in the British West Indian com-
munity in Cuba (or Santo Domingo) to maintain their British nationality 
if their intention is to continue to live in Cuba (or Santo Domingo).51
The ambassador did not want to encourage West Indians in Cuba to re-
nounce their nationality. But to encourage people to stay in Cuba only pro-
voked the Cuban government.
Another British dispatch written four years later was more blunt:
There is really no reason why a lot of these people should not merge with 
the people of the country [Cuba]. In Cuba there is little difference be-
tween the two standards of living [Jamaica and Cuba], nor need we be 
concerned very much about losing these people as British subjects—their 
loyalty to us is mainly sentimental, and personally I have found in prac-
tice they much prefer to serve Americans. They also cause a lot of un-
necessary trouble by proclaiming their British allegiance in a manner that 
is offensive to the people of the country whom they despise.52
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In 1950, according to Neil Hone, by this point British consul at Santiago, 
every West Indian on the relief list had been offered repatriation, “but very 
many prefer to remain in Cuba even without relief.” Able- bodied young men 
hoped to find work during the next sugar crop to save money for the trip 
home, but employers were even more reluctant to hire them and trade unions 
advocated for native- born workers to be employed first. Others simply did 
not have the money to leave the country, while many were too old to travel 
or had been away for so long they had no family to return to. Repatriation 
by sea was less feasible than before because the one line that took deck pas-
sengers—the Standard Fruit Company—had stopped its Santiago- Kingston 
run.53 There were still many Haitians and West Indians who were illegal resi-
dents of the country, but that status now meant that a person would be sub-
ject to systematic job discrimination and, depending on the community, 
racism. By 1940, for Caribbean immigrants and their descendants the best 
way to get a secure job or access to land was to become a citizen.
So who are the Cuban people? Again, we know the answer to this question, 
at least in terms of the ethnic background of most Cubans. Perhaps the more 
meaningful, interesting, and difficult questions to answer are how, when, 
why, and under what conditions people become Cuban. Grand national (and 
nationalist) narratives tend to lead to equally grand conclusions. However 
correct those conclusions might be, in our hurry to make sweeping obser-
vations about national identity and state formation, we can forget to tell 
the stories (especially local ones) of people who do not always fit easily into 
those grand narratives. Clearly, given the dramatic change in both the size 
and composition of Cuba’s population, any answer to the question “Who are 
the Cuban people?” could not possibly be the same in 1940 as it was in 1900. 
Ancestry and ethnic background might tell us where people came from, but 
they do not tell us who people are.
Nationalism of all kinds tends to reduce “the people” to a homogeneous 
body with the same ethnic roots. In the Cuban case (as with so many others), 
reducing the Cuban people to a single ethnic background was always com-
plicated by issues of race, class, region, and the struggles against slavery 
and colonialism. After independence, the story got even more complicated 
thanks to the political economy of sugar and labor migration. As much as 
Cuban nationalists wanted to ground Cuban identity in past struggles for 
nationhood and, more problematically, in a nonracial sense of cubanidad, 
the reality they faced was that the island’s population was too multiracial, 
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multiethnic, and multinational for their liking. As long as Cuba depended on 
sugar, and as long as harvesting sugar depended on foreign labor, there was 
little nationalists could do to alleviate their anxiety about the future of “the 
Cuban nation.” While there were a few radical labor organizers and intellec-
tuals who argued against racist and ethno- centric nationalism, their voices 
were drowned out by those who saw foreign capital—but especially foreign 
black labor—as the greatest threat to “the Cuban people.”
Thanks to the world depression and the downturn in sugar production in 
the late 1920s and 1930s, nationalist state leaders could realize their dream of 
“nationalizing” the Cuban working class. Once sugar companies, especially 
in the east, no longer needed foreign labor to cut and haul cane, post- 1933 
governments were no longer under the same intense pressure to make im-
migration policy conform to company needs. After the revolutionary mass 
mobilizations of the early 1930s, Cuban politics would never be the same. 
Thereafter, political leaders of almost every stripe—including many com-
munists and otherwise revolutionary figures—either supported or turned a 
blind eye to the state- sponsored attack on Haitians and West Indians. What 
had started as a series of “revolutionary” laws to nationalize the Cuban labor 
force became, by 1940, constitutional edicts. The state now had the power to 
grant or deny citizenship by enforcing who could get a job and who could 
not. Being—or at least claiming to be—a “native” Cuban now mattered a 
great deal. To what degree people were actually free to become Cuban or not 
very much depended on a combination of local circumstances, personal his-
tory, and ultimately state power.
The significance of the Constitution of 1940 was that Cuba became, judi-
cially speaking, a nation- state.54 Equally significant was that in the years 
leading up to the passing of the constitution, the coercive power of the state 
reached almost every corner of the country. Nominally national governments 
in Havana could pass, and enforce, legislation throughout the entire country. 
The abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1934 symbolized the formal end 
to American neocolonial power in Cuba. Informally, of course, a strong argu-
ment can be made that Cuba remained a neocolony up to the revolution of 
1959. But nation- states can still be neocolonies of one kind or another.55 And 
nationalism, no matter how radical in either discourse or practice, can still 
accommodate itself to powerful external forces, be they political, cultural, or 
economic. The real and symbolic importance of the constitutional consensus 
of 1940 was that for the first time in its history the Cuban nation was sovereign, 
at least over its own population. How state leaders used and abused that sov-
ereignty was the central political bone of contention for the next twenty years.
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What is indisputable, however, is that in the six years leading up to 1940 
and afterward, Cuban governments exercised the coercive power of the state 
to help make a Cuban working class. By making this argument, I in no way 
want to diminish or deny that Cuban and foreign workers themselves created 
their own class identities through struggle and sacrifice. I am not suggesting 
that some kind of Foucauldian repressive state discourse took hold in Cuba 
between 1933 and 1940 and molded a Cuban working class from on high. 
Cuba’s long history of subaltern rebellion and militant class struggle was too 
powerful to be smothered or co- opted by any single nationalist discourse. 
We also have some—but not enough—information about the role Haitian 
and West Indian workers played in the class and revolutionary struggles of 
the 1920s and 1930s. What I hope to have shown in this chapter, though, is 
that in order to better understand what it meant to be Cuban during the re-
publican period, we need to appreciate the complex interplay between popu-
lation history, class, and state formation.
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